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Document 832 5th May 1980
DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session
Paris, 2nd-Sth June 1980
MONDAY, 2nd JUNE
Beginning of the morning
Meetings of Political Groups.
1l a.m.
l. Opening of the twenty-sixth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session.
7. New weapons and defence strategy:
Votes on the draft recommendations in Document 827 postponed from the last session.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. Political developments in Europe 
- 
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General AfIair$ Committee.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty 
- 
reply to the twenty-f,rfth annual report of the Council :
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments.
4 p.m.
3. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council:
presentation by Dr. Christoph van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council.
Joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western Eufopean security:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs
Committee.
5. The international situation and European security:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Joint debate.
il
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TUESDAY, 3rd JUNE
Morning 9 a.m.
Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the General Affairs
Committee.
l0 a.m.
l. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security;.
The international situation and European security:
Resumed joint debate.
11.30 a.m.
2. Address by the Hon. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs.
Afternoon 2.30 p.m.
Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and of the Committee on
Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
3 p.m.
l. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security;
The international situation and European security:
Resumed joint debate.
Votes on the draft recommendations.
2. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Proce-
dure and Privileges.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
3. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
At the close of the Sitting
Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments.
WEDNESDAY,4th JUNE
Morning l0 a.m.
Nuclear, biological and chemical protection:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments.
t2
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Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
t. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Comrnittee on Defence
Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Defence-related information technology:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. State of European aerospace activities - reply to the twenty-hfth annual rep0rt of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Schefller on behalf of the Comniittee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
THURSDAY,5th JUNE
Morning 9 a.m.
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.
10 a.m.
l. State of European aerospace activities - reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council.
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. A European earth resources detection satellite programme:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Comnlittee on Scientihc,
Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. Relations with parliaments:
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee
for Relations with Parliaments.
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY.SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION
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II.
III.
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VI.
28th March
Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly
of lVestern European Union on the Coancil's activities for the period
lst January to 31st December 1979
Relations between the Council and the Assembly
Activities of the Council
Arr4aments Control Agency
Standing Armaments Committee
Public Administration Committee
Budgetary and adminisrative questions
1980
INTRODUCTION
l. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Fifth Annual
Report on their activities, covering the period lst January to 3lst December 1979.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters:
l5
l7
25
33
36
38
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CHAPTER I
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY
The Council again fully appreciated the
Assembly's contribution to study of the prob-
lems of European security and union. They
followed with particular interest the work done
on defence questions by the Assembly, which is
the European parliamentary body empowered
by treaty to deal with them.
The Council, being concerned to maintain
close and constructive relations with the
Assembly, continued their dialogue with it on
questions relating to the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt
with by the member governments of WEU in
other international fora.
A. Twenty-fourth annaal report of the Council
to the Assembly
The Council transmitted their twenty-
fourth annual report to the Assembly as early
as possible. They noted with satisfaction the
Assembly's appreciation of the content of this
document, which gave a detailed account of the
activities of the Council and its subsidiary
bodies during 1978.
As in previous years, some additional
information on arnaments control was provi-
ded in accordance with the procedure applied
since l97lr.
B. Assembly recommendations to the Council
and written questions put to the Council by
members of the Assembly
The Council took careful note of the
reports presented by Assembly Committees
during the two parts of the twenty-flrfth ordi-
nary session and of the views expressed during
the debates on those reports.
The Council gave careful consideration to
the fourteen recommendations 2 adopted by the
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
fourth ordinary session and the f,rrst part of the
twenty-fifth ordinary session and to the thirteen
written questions 3 put by members of the
Assembly in 1979.
They made every ellort to reply in as
detailed a manner as possible to all these
See Council reply to Written Question 123
Nos. 322 to 335.
Nos. 192 to 204.
recommendations and questions, taking into
account, where appropriate, activities in. which
the WEU member states participate elsewhere.
Thus, they gave the AssBmbly details of
consultations in which the representatives of
the WEU member states h{d taken part, in
particular in the frameworl( of political co-
operation of the Nine and in the North Atlantic
Council; on the subject of armaments co-
operation, they referred several times to the
work being done in the Confgrence of National
Armaments Directors and, lvhere possible, to
that of the Independent Eurbpean Programme
Group.
The Council noted with satisfaction that a
number of their replies were particularly
appreciated by the Assembly.
C. Meetings between tho Council and
Assembly bodles
Two informal meetings took place in
Rome on l6th May 1979 after the ministerial
session of the Council. At a working lunch
organised in accordance with the arrangements
agreed in 1968 and presided over by Mr. Sanza,
Under-Secretary of State at the Italian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, members of the Council
had talks with the Presidential Committee of
the Assembly. In accordancp with established
practice, the Minister also mqt the Chairman of
the General Affairs Committee.
In the afternoon, the Council and the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arm-
aments, also meeting under the chairmanship of
Mr. Sanza, discussed the subjects which had
been proposed by the Committee: SALT, mili-
tary balance and force redqctions in Europe
and the work in progress in tfre Standing Arm-
aments Committee of WEU and the IEPG.
On this occasion, reference was made to
progress in the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee's study of the armaments sector of indus-
try in the member countries of WEU, which
Ministers had considered durihg their meeting'.
Pointing out that only the legal part of the
study had so far reached the Council, Mr.
Sanza, recalling the Council's earlier reply to
the Assembly on the subject, told the Com-
mittee that, when the SAC's final report had
l5
l. Cf. Chapter II, B. 3 of this report.
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been submitted they would not fail to consi-
der how the Assembly might be informed of its
content and its main conclusions.
The Council continue to favour regular
contacts with representatives of the Assembly.
As the purpose of such contacts is to comple-
ment and expand the dialogue conducted
through the written procedure, they consider
that the flexible and open character of such
meetings should be maintained so that each
member of the Council can give his govern-
ment's views. Noting the concern expressed at
the Assembly's June session with regard to the
procedure at joint meetings, they pointed out in
their reply to Recommendation 330 that the
spontaneity of the discussions allowed by the
informal nature of these meetings did not
prevent the Council from giving their collegiate
views, provided they received prior notice of
the subjects which the Committees wished to
raise and could therefore concert their
opinions. It was in the light of these consider-
ations that they replied to the request for a joint
meeting made by the General Affairs Com-
mittee at the end of the year.
D. Speeches to the Assembly
by the Chairman-in-Olfice of the Council
and other Ministers
of member goveruments
The Council are aware of the Assembly's
interest in the participation of Ministers in its
discussions.
The Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council and
other Ministers of member governments spoke
during the twenty-fifth ordinary session.
In June 1979, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr.
Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, introduced the
twenty-fourth annual report of th'e Council. In
the second part of his speech, he mentioned the
elections to the Assembly of the European
Communities which had just been held for the
first time by direct universal suffrage and
expressed his views on the importance of this
event. He commented that the WEU Assem-bly was unaffected because the modihed
Brussels Treaty gave it clear and exclusive
responsibilities in defence matters. Mr. Schol-
ten, Netherlands Minister of Defence, outlined
his government's policy in this f,reld. Mr.
Aigrain, French Secretary of State responsible
to the Prime Minister for Research, dealt with
problems of scientific and technical policy.
In December, Mr. Thorn, recalling that the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the
Paris Agreements had been celebrated on 23rd
October, stressed that WEU, during its first
twenty-five years of existence had encouraged
efforts towards European union, which was the
ultimate objective set by the authors of the
modiflred Brussels Treaty; he remarked that to
this end it had acted in various fields in which
it is competent according to the circumstances
and needs of the moment, taking care at all
times to avoid overlapping of activities. The
Chairman-in-Offrce paid tribute to the Assem-
bly for its action throughout these years, noting
in particular the importance of the symposium
on a European arnaments poliey which it had
organised in Brussels in. October. As Foreign
Minister of Luxembourg, he gave his views on
the subject of East-West nuclear balance, the
peaceful use of nuclear energy and relations
with non-nuclear countries. Mrs. Hamm-
Briicher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of
the Federal Republic of Germany, gave her
government's position on problems of security
and d6tente in Europe. Mr. Bernard-
Reymond, French Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, in his speech, reviewed the principles
on which his government's defence policy was
based and also spoke of French disarmament
proposals, in particular the holding of a disarm-
ament conference in Europe.
Following their speeches, Ministers
answered numerous questions put to them by
members of the Assembly.
E. Symposium ofi a European armaments
policy
The Council were represented at this
symposium, which was arranged by the Assem-
bly in Brussels from l5th to lTth October 1979,
and followed the work with interest. Mr.
Martens, as head of the government of the host
country, made a major speech and Mr. Thom,
as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, also
made a speech during which he mentioned
some of the conclusions of the symposium.
l6
CHAPTER II
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL
The Council met at ministerial level in
Rome on l6th May 1979 under the chairman-
ship of Mr. Sanza, Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs of Italy.
The permanent representatives met ten
times at the headquarters of the organisation in
London and there were thirty-two meetings of
the working group.
***
Introducing the twenty-fourth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly on l8th
June, the Chairman-in-Oflice, Mr. Thorn,
reaffrrmed the validity of all the provisions of
the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols
and also the determination of the member states
of WEU to fulfil the obligations entered into for
a period of fifty years. He emphasised the
significance of Article V of the ireaty which
requires the signatory countries to afford each
other mutual assistance in the event of aggress-
ion and constitutes one of the keystones of
their security system.
At their meeting on 23rd October, the
Council celebrated the twenty-flrfth anniversary
of the Protocols modifying and completing thL
Brussels Treaty. In a message published after
that meeting it was stated that:
"On the occasion of the 25th anniversary
of the signature in Paris on 23rd October
1954 of the Protocols modifying and
completing the Brussels Treaty and setting
up Western European Union, the member
states of the organisation wish to recall the
outstanding contribution which Western
European Union has made, since its found-
ation, to the development of co-operation
between member states in accordance with
the aims of the treaty, which are designed
in particular 'to promote the unity and to
encourage the progressive integration of
Europe'.
They reaffirm their attachment to the
fulfilment of these aims and especially their
undertaking to provide for their collective
self-defence in accordance with the treaty.
In this regard they welcome the valuable
support given by the Assembly of Western
European Union, which is the European
parliamentary body in which the represen-
tatives of the peoples of the member states
discuss their common security problems. "
***
As they recalled in their twenty-fourth
annual report, the Council ensure that the
treaty and its protocols are applied and obser-
ved both as part of their own activities and in
connection with work in which member
governments participate elsewhere, in particu-
lar, political co-operation bptween the Nine,
the North Atlantic Council and the Indepen-dent European Programme Group. Their
action is based on the dual cqncerns ofensuring
proper implementation of the obligations of
responsibilities defined by the morljfied Brussels
Treaty and avoiding duplication of activity.
During the year under ponsideration, the
different aspects and stages of implementation
of the Paris Agreements appeared on the
Council's agenda twenty-nine times.
In Rome, on l6th May, the Ministen
discussed some aspects of the development of
East-West relations and the progress of the
study undertaken by the Standing Armaments
Committee on the situation of the armaments
sector of industry in the member countries.
In addition, the dialogue with the Assem-
bly, which constitutes an important part of the
Council's activity, was continued on questions
relating to the implementatioh of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
A. Political queslions
l. East-West reblions
In Rome on l6th May 1979, Ministers
discussed East-West relations in depth.
As is customary, statements were presented
on the development of bilateral relations
between the member countries of WEU and the
eastern countries since the previous ministerial
meeting.
Information was given on the many
contacts between governments with particular
reference to a number of high-level visits,
including visits, in 1978, by the President of
Romania to the United King{om, the Foreign
Minister of Hungary to the Netherlands, the
Foreign Ministers of Romania and the German
Democratic Republic to Italy, the First Party
Secretary of Hungary to France, the Foreign
Minister of Poland and the Ppime Minister of
Macedonia to the United Kingdom, the Foreign
Minister of Bulgaria to Italy and Belgium, the
t7
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Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary to
Belgium and Luxembourg; by the Prince of
Wales to Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom
Minister of State at the Foreign and Common-
wealth Offrce to Hungary and Bulgaria; visits
during the early months of 1979 by the Presi-
dent of the French Republic to Romania and
the Soviet Union, the Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany to Bulgaria, the Foreign
Minister of the Netherlands to Bulgaria, Roma-
nia and Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom
Minister of State at the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office to Yugoslavia; also visits by the
Foreign Minister of the USSR to Italy, the
Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary, the Prime
Minister of Serbia and the Deputy Foreign
Minister of Poland to the United Kingdom, the
Foreign Minister of Poland to the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Deputy Foreign
Minister of Poland to Belgium and Luxem-
bourg.
The German Delegation reported to the
Council on the development of the various
aspects of relations between the Federal Repub-
Iic of Germany and the member countries of
the Warsaw Pact.
In their speeches, Ministers referred to the
development of multilateral East-West rela-
tions, particularly in view of the CSCE follow-
up meeting scheduled to take place in Madridin November 1980. It was noted that the
member countries of WEU were concerned to
pursue and intensify the process initiated by the
conference on security and co-operation in
Europe, which was a central element of d6tente
and this remained a priority aim of their
action ; they stressed that it was important for
genuine and substantial progress to be made in
implementing the provisions of the final act of
the CSCE particularly with regard to respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
contacts between persons and the free flow of
information.
The member governments of WEU took an
active part in consultations held throughout the
year within the framework of political co-
operation between the Nine for the purpose of
co-ordinating closely the position of the
member countries of the European Commun-
ity. In a statement published on 29th October,
these countries expressed their deep concern at
the course taken by the trial of six members of
the Czechoslovak League for Human Rights(VONS) and the sentences handed down. It
was recalled that the Nine attached great
importance to full compliance with the Hel-
sinki final act and believed that if its principles
and provisions were respected, the 1980 confe-
rence in Madrid which would review its appli-
cation would have a greater chance of a
successful issue.
The member governments of WEU also
played an active part in the work of the North
Atlantic Council. In point 3 of the communi-
que issued after the ministerial session of that
Council held on l3th and l4th December 1979,
the allies reiterated their view that " d6tente
must be world-wide and indivisible in charac-
ter ". Under point 7 it was noted that " tangi-
ble progress in implementing the principles and
provisions of the final act of the CSCE and
adequate preparation are of great importance
for the success of the Madrid meeting ". In
point 8 of the communiqu6, the Alliance part-
ners confirmed their previously-expressed
intention of approaching and conducting the
Madrid meeting " in a constructive frame of
mind and in a manner which would permit a
thorough frank and measured review of the
implementation of all provisions of the final
aci". Under the same point, the allies' posi-
tion was set out in more detail, showing their
readiness to further concrete and balanced
progress in all fields covered by the final act of
the CSCE.
The Soviet military action in Afghanistan
at the end of the year constituted a grave threat
to the world-wide and indivisible character of
d6tente. Both individually and in a number of
fora member governments of WEU were
prompt to express lively concern at this action.
Immediate consultations were started between
the partners of the European Community and
between allied governments. The North
Atlantic Council held a special session on 29th
December 1979 and lst January 1980; it was
agreed that close consultations on the devel-
opment of the situation would continue. In a
declaration published in Brussels on l5th
January 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the
member countries of the Community stated that
while the Nine remain convinced that the
process of d6tente is in the interest of all
members of the international community they
are also convinced that detente is indivisible
and has a global dimension.
2. Enlargement of the European Communities
In their reply of March 1979 to Assembly
Recommendation 322, the Council stated that
they favoured the enlargement of the European
Community to include Greece, Portugal and
Spain as an important contribution towards
ensuring a lasting stabilisation of their
democracies and hence towards strengthening
and safeguarding the free part of Europe as a
whole.
The Council welcomed the satisfactory
outcome of negotiations with Greece. As the
Chairman-in-Oflice of the Council of the
Communities stated at the signing ceremony in
Athens on 28th May 1979, on the acts of
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accession of the Hellenic Republic, this enlarge-
ment of the Community was an accomplish-
ment; ii was a decisive stage in the construc-
tion of Europe.
In'addition, the talks on Portugal's entry
opened on lTth October 1978, and negotiations
on Spain's accession started on 5th February
1979.
In the field of political co-operation,
contacts between the nine European Commun-
ity countries and Greece, Portugal and Spain
have been intensified so as to familiarise these
countries with the joint positions adopted by
the Nine on foreign policy issues.
3. Situation in the Middle East
ln 1979, the member governments of WEU
continued consultations on this subject with
their partners in the European Community
within the framework of political co-operation
between the Nine and also with their allies
within the North Atlantic Council.
The Council have begun their study of
Recommendation 341, on the impact of the
evolving situation in the Near and Middle East
on Western European security, sent to them by
the Assembly in December.
They recall that the member countries of
the Community declared their position regard-
ing the Israeli-Arab conflict in two statements
issued in Paris on 26th March and lSth June
1979. From their point of view, which was
reaflirmed by the Chairman-in-Oflice of the
Council of the Communities in his speech to
the General Assembly of the United Nations on
25th September 1979, United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 taken to-
gether with the four principles set out by the
member countries of the Community in their
declaration of 29th June 1977, constitute the
basic framework for an overall, just and lasting
peace settlement; all the parties concerned,
including the Palestine Liberation Organisation,
must accept them as a basis for negotiations
within which they would all play their full part.
Further, the Council recall that the Nine
reaflirmed their support for the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanonin two declarations issued by the Foreign
Ministers at their meetings in Paris on l8th
June and Dublin on llth September 1979.
The serious situation created by the
occupation of the United States Embassy in
Tehran and the holding of its staff as hostages
in flagrant violation of international law was
considered by the Foreign Ministers of the
member countries of the Community on 20th
November and by the European Council at its
meeting in Dublin on 29th and 30th Novem-
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ber. The Council of WEU fully appreciated
the Assembly's concern in this regard and did
not fail to draw the attentlon of the govern-
ments of member states to the support given by
the Assembly to the declaration adopted by the
heads of state or of government of the Nine at
the close of their meeting. Replying to Assem-
bly Recommendation 342, they noted that all
the member states of WEU also gave their full
support to the resolution unanimously adopted
by the United Nations Security Council on 4th
December. They added that they would
continue their consultations ln any appropriate
frameworks. The Council recall that a declar-
ation supported by the fifteen members of the
Atlantic Alliance was published in Brussels on
l3th December 1979. Fuither, all member
countries of WEU supported the resolution
adopted by the United Nations Security
Council on 3lst December, reiterating the
request made to the Iranian authorities on 4th
December for the immediate release of the
United States nationals held as hostages in Iran.
The rhember governments of WEU were
greatly concerned at the events which took
place in Afghanistan at the dnd of 1979. The
consultations started between western countries
have already been mentioned under point
l. Within the United Nations, France and the
United Kingdom, which are permanent
members of the Security Council, voted for the
draft resolution demanding immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Afghanistan, which was considered by that
Council on 7th January 19801 All the member
countries of WEU voted for the resolution
making the same demand which was adopted
by the General Assembly meeting in extra-
ordinary session on l4th January. In their
declaration published in Erussels on l5th
January, the Foreign Ministers of the member
countries of the Community reaffirmed the
grave concern of the Nine rvith regard to the
crisis created by the military intervention of the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan and recalled that
this action represents a serious violation of the
principles of international relations enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations. They
urged the Soviet Union to act in conformity
with the resolution adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
4. Relations between fitropean
and African countlies
The governments of the member countries
of WEU have played an attive part in the
consultations which took place within the
framework of political co-operation between
the Nine.
In their twenty-fourth ahnual report, the
Council set out their views on various impor-
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tant questions on which the Assembly had
expressed concern. On the situation in Rhode-
sia, they stated that they fully supported the
efforts of the British Government, in co-
operation with the United States Government,
to reach a settlement acceptable to the people
of Rhodesia as a whole and that they associated
themselves with the position adopted by the
Council of the OAU in Khartoum in July
1978. In a statement published at the conclu-
sion of the meeting on political co-operation
held on I lth September 1979, the Foreign
Ministers of the member countries of the
Community urged all parties to seize the oppor-
tunity provided by the Constitutional Confe-
rence which opened in London on lOth
September to achieve a political solution on the
basis of majority rule. The Council warmly
welcomed the agreement achieved at this confe-
rence and signed in London on 2l st December
1979 expressing the hope that peace would
return to all the countries concerned and look-
ing forward to the day when the independent
Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a
full member of the international community.
The economic sanctions applied to Rhodesia
in implementation of resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council have been lifted by
the member governments of WEU in accord-
ance with the resolution adopted by the Secur-
ity Council on 2lst December.
Furthermore, the Council of WEU, who in
their last annual report to the Assembly refer-
red to the negotiations begun in July 1978 with
a view to renewing the Lom6 Convention,
noted with satisfaction the signature on 3lst
October 1979 of the new co-operation conven-
tion concluded between the European Econo-
mic Community and fifty-seven African,
Caribbean and Pacific States.
B. Defence questions
During 1979, defence questions have
remained a central part of the Council's activ-
ities in conformity with the obligations imposed
on them by the modihed Brussels Treaty.
On the occasion of the presentation of the
twenty-fourth annual report in June, Mr.
Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of
the Council, emphasised once again that the
treaty, whose Article V requires the member
states to afford each other mutual assistance in
the event of aggression, constitutes one of the
keystones of the security system of the signatory
countries.
Mr. Thorn also availed himself, in Octo-
ber, of the opportunity offered by the sympo-
sium on a European armaments policy, organ-
ised by the Assembly, to pay tribute to the
organisation's continuing r6le as regards Euro-
pean security.
l. Level olforces of member states
In application of the modified Brussels
Treaty and its attendant agreements and resolu-
tions, the Council have carried out, during
1979, all the prescribed procedures. As in for-
mer years, they have been assisted in this task
by the Agency for the Control of Armaments,
NATO and SHAPE.
(a) Forces under NATO command
The maximum levels of ground, air and
naval forces which member states of WEU
place under NATO command are fixed in Arti-
cles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modihed
Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol
provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to
enable these levels to be increased above the
limits specified in Articles I and II.
So that they may satisfy themselves that
the limits laid down in Articles I and II of
Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council
receive information every year concerning the
Ievels in question, in accordance with Article
IV of that Protocol. This information is
obtained in the course of inspections carried
out by the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a
high-ranking officer designated by him to that
end.
The information, as at the end of 1978,
which was conveyed by this oflicer at the
appropriate time, was considered by the
Council on 25th April. Information indicating
the status as at the end of 1979 was requested
in December.
Furthermore, the Council have taken the
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid
down in their Resolution of l5th September
1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO
command are examined in the light of the
annual review.
For the year 1978, at a meeting on l9th
January 1979, in Brussels, the permanent repre-
sentatives (or their substitutes) to the North
Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of
Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined
the levels of forces of WEU member states and
reported to the Council. At their meeting on
22nd February 1979, the latter noted that the
level of these forces, as set out in the NATO
force plan, fell within the limits specified in
Articles I and II of Protocol No. IL At the
same meeting, the Council took note of a
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declaration on French forces by the permanent
representative of France.
The same procedure is under way for 1979.
(b) Forces under national command
The strength and armaments of forces of
member states maintained on the mainland of
Europe and remaining under national com-
mand 
- 
internal defence and police forces,
forces for the defence of overseas territories, and
common defence forces 
- 
are hxed each year in
accordance with the procedure specified in the
Agreement signed in Paris on l4th December
1957, in implementation of Article V of Proto-
col No. II.
*
*:*
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been
able, in 1979, to carry out their obligations
under Protocol No. II to the modiflred Brussels
Treaty concerning levels of forces.
2. United Kingdomforces stationed on the continent
of Europe
In accordance with the Council's reply to
Assembly Recommendation 331, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed the
Council that the average number of British land
forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in
accordance with the commitment in Article VI
of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels
Treaty during 1979 was 55,650.
3. Study ofthe armaments industries
in member countries I
During 1979, the Council followed closely
the progress made by the Standing Armaments
Committee with its study of the armaments
industries in member countries, and in particu-
lar the economic chapter of this study.
On 25th April, in preparation for the meet-
ing of the Ministerial Council of l6th May, the
Head of the International Secretariat of the
SAC presented to the Council an interim report
by the Committee on the progress of its work.
At the end of their exchange of views in
Rome, Ministers confirmed the mandate given
to the SAC and agreed that the first part of the
economic study should be completed both
swiftly and to best effect with the co-operation
of the administrations concerned.
As stated in their reply to Assembly
Recommendation 335, the Cduncil have not yet
had occasion to express a vidw on the practical
follow-up action to be taken on this study but
they consider that it may enable governments
for the first time to have a detailed and
comparative analysis of the armaments indus-
tries in the member countries and assist them to
direct their choices and their programmes
towards increased co-operatiopr.
As to future projects, the Council declaredin reply to Recommendation 331 that they
would consider the possibility of entrusting the
SAC with work on other subjects which might
be suggested. Decisions would be made on a
case-by-case basis and bearing in mind the
SAC's other tasks and the resQurces at its dispo-
sal, whilst avoiding any dupliOation of work.
4. Assembly recommendatioas and written questions
(a) With regard to matters relating to the
application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the
Council replied to Written Questions 200 and
202 concerning the procedUre laid down in
Article II of Protocol No. III for amendments
to Annex III to Protocol No. IIL They also
answered Written Questions 203 and 204 deal-
ing with non-production controls and stocks of
weapons.
(b) On the complicated issup of a European
armaments policy, the Councll gave their views
in their replies to Recommendation 329 on the
industrial bases of European security, to
Recommendation 333 on defbnce procurement
and to Recommendation 335 on political
conditions for European armaments co-
operation.
They reaffrrmed the need for close co-
operation in this importa,nt field, whilst
acknowledging the difficulties of such an under-
taking because the armaments industries of
member states have widely differing structures
and levels of development. They confirmed
the importance they attach to the continuation
of the work at present being qarried out, with a
view to achieving greater harmonisation of
national policies leading to genuine co-
operation on specific programmes.
As the Council recalled, the Conference of
National Armaments Directors (CNAD),
amongst other responsibilitiqs, endeavours to
achieve interoperability in s$ecific equipment
areas within the Alliance as a whole and the
Independent European Programme Group(IEPG) concentrates on identifying opportun-
ities for collaboration in the design and produc-
tion of defence equipment between European
member countries. The Council noted that
wherever potential common i4terests are identi-
fied, detailed arrangements are made to exploitL See also Chapters I and IV.
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as far as possible the opportunities arising for
collaboration in development or production of
equipment.
Observing that the real problems of trying
to set up collaborative projects relate to issues
of requirements, costs and industrial arrange-
ments, the Council envisaged that permanent
industrial consortia may well be established as
an effective means of undertaking such projects
in the armaments held, but industrial and
management structures would need to be tailor-
ed to the circumstances of particular projects
where the interests and requirements of the
governments concemed appear to be in suffi-
cient conformity.
The Council also mentioned the dialogue
started with the United States with a view to
the production of certain types of armaments.
(c) The security of member countries of the
Alliance was a matter of paramount concern to
member governments during 1979. In the face
of the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces
and armaments, both conventional and nuclear,
member governments stated their resolve, in
answering Recommendation 324, to devote the
resources necessary to modernise and streng-
then allied capabilities to the extent required
for deterrence and defence.
In addition, in the communiqud issued at
the conclusion of the ministerial session of the
North Atlantic Council of l3th and l4th
December 1979, Ministers of member countries
belonging to the integrated military structure, in
outlining a comprehensive programme of action
comprising measures to reduce the military
imbalance through concrete improvement and
modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear and
conventional forces, undertook to improve their
military capabilities and thus maintain an
adequate level of deterrence and defence across
the whole spectrum.
(d) The Council confirmed, in answering
Recommendation 323, their full support for all
efforts to further progress towards general and
complete disarmament under close and effective
international control. They added that the
member states will make every effort to ensure
that the objectives laid down by the tenth
special session on disarmament of the United
Nations General Assembly are fulhlled as far as
possible before the next special session fixed for
1982.
Furthermore, the Council gave their
opinion on the SALT II Agreement, and its
implications for member countries, particularly
when replying to Recommendation 324 and
Written Question 192.
(e) The Council's views on the question of
limiting trade in arms, which involves both
importing and exporting countries, were given
in the replies to Recommendations 322, 323
and 335, as well as Written Question 194.
5' A s se m b t! 
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As mentioned in Chapter I, E of this
report, the Council's representatives who
attended this symposiur4, held from l5th-l7th
October 1979, tn Brussels, followed its debates
with keen interest. The Chairman-in-Oflice of
the Council, Mr. Thorn, noted that the Assem-
bly had intended, through the organisation of
the symposium, to make a positive and a most
important contribution to European co-
operation in their specif,rc field and that, in
doing so, they had shown how much impor-
tance the modified Brussels Treaty still has
today for the European union of tomorrow.
C. Scientific, technological and aerospace
questions
The Council followed closely the Assem-
bly's debates on the questions dealt with in
detail in the reports produced by the Commit-
tee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace
Questions in 1979.
Appreciating the interest expressed by the
Assembly in the continuation of the dialogue
between the two organs of WEU regarding the
policies of European countries on scientific,
technological and aerospace questions, the
Council again provided the Assembly with a
substantial amount of information on the
subject in their detailed replies to the recom-
mendations and written questions submitted to
them.
l. Energy problems
The Council, recognising the urgent need
for an intensified collective effort to meet
current and future energy problems, recalled in
their reply to Recommendation 332 the great
importance which they attach to continuous co-
ordination of the energy policy measures of the
member states of WEU and of all their research
and development efforts.
During 1979, member states increased their
co-operation in the field of energy policy both
within the European Communities and in the
OECD, particularly as regards energy saving
and the use of sources of energy other than oil.
At the meeting of the European Council
held in Strasbourg on 2lst and 22nd June, it
was decided:
- 
to increase the use of coal in power
stations and industry and to give special
attention to the development of new
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technologies for the extraction, transport
and processing ofcoal;
- 
to step up national and Community
research and development efforts in the
energy sector so that more tangible
prospects may shortly be found for the
economlc use of new resources, espec-
ially geothermal and solar energy ;
- 
to maintain Community imports between
1980 and 1985 at an annual level not
higher than that for 1978 ;
- 
to strengthen national and Community
programmes ln energy conservatlon ;
- 
to give a strong fresh impetus to nuclear
programmes, while ensuring that nuclear
energy is used under conditions guaran-
teeing the safety of the population.
Recalling these decisions in their reply to
Written Question 198, the Council of WEU
observed that the Community's efforts should
make a contribution towards ensuring Western
Europe's future energy supplies, but that
problems of energy supply and demand had to
be dealt with on a world-wide basis. They
therefore exlressed the hope that other indus-
trialised consumer countries would be prepared
to undertake similar eflorts of energy conserva-
tion and development and that it would prove
possible for the industrialised consumers to
establish contacts with producing countries and
with oil-importing developing countries in
order to analyse supply and demand prospects
and to work out ways and means of remedying
the difficulties identified. This view was
confirmed in the Council's replies to Recom-
mendation 332 (point 4) and 334 (point 5).
At its session on I I th September, the
Council of the Communities adopted a four-
year programme for the period 1979-1983 for
indirect-action research and development in the
energy sector.
At the meeting of the European Council
held in Dublin on 29th and 30th November,
the heads of state or government again dis-
cussed the world energy situation. Noting that
it remained very serious, they agreed on the
urgent need for the Community to develop a
more effective energy policy.
At their request, the Energy Ministers,
meeting on 4th December, hxed national oil
import objectives totalling 472 million tonnes
for the Community for 1980. They also deci-
ded to set up a quarterly monitoring procedure
to check on the implementation of these objec-
tives and on the application of the medium and
long-term measures needed in order to meet the
Community's targets for 1985.
In addition, the Europedn Council confir-
med its resolve to develop the indigenous
energy resources of the mernber states of the
Community, in particular cdal, nuclear power
and hydrocarbons, and to promote research and
development programmes in the energy field,
with particular regard to renewable energy
sources.
The European Council concluded, how-
ever, that as energy problems affect all
countries in the world, no lasting solution can
be achieved without closer understanding and
co-operation between the industrialised, the oil-
producing and the non-oil-producing, develop-
ing countries. They added that efforts should
be made to promote discussion with the oil-
producing countries with the object of adopting
policies, in both consumer and producer
countries, which would allow the transition to a
better-balanced market without serious damage
to the economy of the world as a whole. The
European Council considered it most desirable
that further significant and rapid progress
should be made in all international fora where
energy is discussed, i.e. the United Nations,
OECD/IEA and the Economic Commission for
Europe, with a view to establishing a consensus
and co-operation on the adjustments required
by the changing situation in the world.
2. European aircraft hdustry
In their twenty-fourth annual report, the
Council noted that the member states of WEU
were seeking to promote the best employment
of their respective industrial resources and
production capacities in order to achieve a
itrong and competitive aircraft industry in
Europe.
They were pleased to note that, in its reply
to this report, the Assembly welcomed the
progress already achieved toulards strengthening
European co-operation in the production of
civil aircraft and in particular the Airbus.
Regarding the development of European
co-operation on the productiion of fighter air-
craft and helicopters, the Council wish to recall
the details given to the Assentbly in the reply to
Recommendation 332.
The appropriate government departments
in France, the United Kingdom, and the Fede-
ral Republic of Germany are firmly resolved to
develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft
for the nineties. Such a complex venture
which will involve the most modern technolo-
gies, poses many difiicult problems which the
countries concerned have already begun to
study. For instance, they will endeavour to
harmonise their respective operational require-
ments and the time factors, in order to find a
conhguration which will satisfy all concerned.
In the course of these deliberations, the work
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will be apportioned between the countries
concerned, an industrial partnership established
and the most expedient form of management
agreed.
In addition, the governments of France, the
United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Italy have set up a joint steering
committee on the helicopter industry. This
committee has concluded its studies on expec-
ted military requirements into the nineties. It
is now working on a common technology pro-
gramme which will form the basis for joint
action with regard to military helicopters.
Only when that programme is ready will it be
possible to decide what orders can be provided
for the European helicopter industry.
3. Space queslions
In their reply to Recommendation 332, the
Council recalled that the European Space
Agency had declared themselves in favour of
the industrial production of the Ariane
launcher. They warmly welcomed the first
launching of Ariane at Kourou (French
Guiana) on24th December 1979.
The Council gave very careful consider-
ation to Assembly Recommendations 326 on
application satellites and 328 on weather
forecasting.
Answering the first of these recommenda-
tions, they observed that the medium-term
objectives of the European Space Agency were
clearly dehned by the agreements and under-
takings entered into by the member states in the
context of the numerous optional programmes
approved for both application satellites and
launchers. They further noted that the Agency
has funds available in its own general studies
budget to finance preparatory work on the
desirable aim of formulating a coherent
programme setting long-term goals.
On the subject of co-operation between the
European countries and the United States, the
Council stated that the European Space Agency
was examining the possibility of collaborating
with NASA in the contemplated construction
of a power module for space flight functions
which could also be used for subsequent Space-lab flights. They added that during its
discussions on future ESA programmes and
their financial implications, the Council of the
Agency would also decide whether the draft
Spacelab follow-on development programme, or
elements of it, should be carried out.
The following points from the very detailed
reply given by the Council to Recommendation
328 call for special mention.
The Council welcome and recommend the
active participation of member states in both
regional and world-wide efforts to maintain and
improve the meteorological observation and
data collection systems now available for the
North Atlantic and for North and Central
Africa. They also drew the attention of mem-
ber states to the need for close co-operation in
the evaluation of new observation techniques
and to the need for integration of those systems
which prove to be cost-effective in the longer
term.
The Council recognise the importance of
continued close co-ordination between military
and civil meteorological authorities in order to
ensure an optimal use of the available systems.
They also welcome all initiatives to incor-
porate meteorological forecasting between
affny, navy and air forces for combined oper-
ations both national and international.
Recognising the threat to mankind resul-
ting from human activities which may cause
alterations in world-wide climatic conditions,
the Council believe that joint research must be
undertaken and that joint action programmes
should be worked out. They therefore wel-
come the proposed second four-year climato-
logy research programme to be carried out in
the framework of the co-ordinated research and
development activities of the European Com-
munity and of the world climate programme
which the World Meteorological Organisation
has proposed to launch. They hope that the
member states of WEU will participate actively
in these programmes.
D. Secretariat-General
The Secretary-General and his principal
offrcers attended the symposium on a European
armaments policy organised by the Assembly in
Brussels in October 1979.
During the year, the Secretary-General and
his principal offrcers, representing Western
European Union, attended a number of meet-
ings of other international organisations, as
observers, when questions of concern to WEU
were under consideration. As in previous years
the most frequent of these contacts were with
authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the
Council of Europe.
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CHAPTER III
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY
A. Introduction
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol
No. IV, the Agency is required:
- 
firstly, to control the level of stocks of
armaments held by member countries on
the mainland of Europe, this control
extending to production and imports to
the extent required to make the control
ofstocks eflective;
- 
secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic of
Germany not to manufacture certain
types of armaments on its territory are
being observed.
In 1979, the Agency's activities continued
very much along the same lines and at the same
rate as in previous years.
Subject to the comments made under point
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the
Agency for 1979, the twenty-fourth year of
control, was carried out satisfactorily.
B. General remarks on control activities
l. Geneml operating methods
The methods used by the Agency are deter-
mined by the provisions of the modified
Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the
subject. During the year under review they
remained basically unchanged.
Within the Agency's terms of reference,
controls from documentary sources serye
mainly for checking levels of armaments as a
whole. They also contribute to the prepara-
tion of field measures for the control of levels
and of the non-production of certain categories
of armaments. This aspect covers all activities
concerned with processing, for the purposes
defined above, any useful documentary material
including, in particular, countries' replies to the
Agency questionnaire, and the results of field
control measures carried out earlier.
The execution of test checks, visits and
inspections, and all that is linked with these
functions, constitutes that part of control
carried out physically wherever there are activ-
ities and stocks subject to control and, more
generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure
that the information supplied is correct and
that undertakings are observed.
The control system is based primarily on
controls from documentary sources, the pur-
pose of field control measures being to verify,
physically, the accuracy of all the information
collected in implementation of Part III of Pro-
tocol No. IV.
Documentary and field control measures
are complementary, and equally essential for
the accomplishment of the Agency's task.
Traditionally, the annual report has always
presented documentary and field control mea-
sures separately, in the interest of both conven-
ience and clarity. However, it must not be
forgotten that these measures together make up
a single control function.
The Agency draws great benefit from the
continuity of its methods; by its steadily-
growing knowledge of the organisation of the
forces of each member state, of the progress of
armaments production or procurement pro-
grammes, the Agency develops its control
activity efliciently and logically, both in the
fixing of levels and quantities of armaments andin the choice and assessment of its control
measures.
However, in implementing the methods
outlined above, the Agency, as it is permitted,
continued in 1979 to look for possible improve-
ments, particularly to the questionnaire to
member states, to the inspection programmes
making due allowance for changes in force
structures and logistic organisations and to its
time-table of field control measures and techni-
cal information visits, in order to reduce
distances travelled and expenditure.
The Agency began consideration of minor
adjustments to the layout of the questionnaire
which now seem desirable after twenty-four
years of activity, in order to simplify and facili-
tate the submission of data by national author-
ities, their processing by the Agency and the
subsequent control operations.
2. Atomic, chemicol and biological weapons
The position described in earlier annual
reports remained basically unchanged.
The activities of the Agency do not extend
to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear compo-
nents of such weapons (namely the missiles
themselves and other specially designed equip-
ment) are subject to control except as regards
the weapons qualif,red as " strategic " by one
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member state. Furthermore, as this state has
declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is
directed to one and the same objective of
deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability
and tracked launchers are no longer subject to
control.
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to
biological weapons.
The control activities dealt with in this
chapter do not, therefore, concern these two
categories of armaments.
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place; no quantitative
controls are made since none of the member
states have declared possessing such arma-
ments.
C. Controls from documentary sources
In this field of control, the Agency studies
the relevant documents with the main purpose
of compariqg the quantities of armaments held
by the member states with the levels fixed by
the Council and thus establishing whether these
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of
the modified Brussels Treaty.
l. Information processed by the Ageacy
During 1979 documentary controls were
carried out in the normal way by studying,
processing and collating documents and infor-
mation obtained from various sources.
The main source consists of member
states' replies to the Agency's annual question-
naire and levels are determined by processing
the information supplied, taking into account
the material supplied by NATO regarding in
particular the forces placed under NATO
authority.
The second source of information is pro-
vided by national defence budgets which,
examined in conjunction with the data already
supplied by each member state in its reply to
the annual questionnaire, enables defence
expenditure to be evaluated and the financing
of programmes to be followed.
Finally, information from the media,
assembled and circulated by the Agency's
Central Documentation Oflice, is a third useful
source from which offrcial data can be cross-
checked, developments in the situation can be
followed and the knowledge of Agency experts
can be kept up to date.
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by
member states
Follow-up action on the replies to the
questionnaire sent to member states as in all
previous years was twofold. It is recalled that
some of the facts reported are checked physi-
cally by means of field control measures. In
addition, all the replies are studied by the
Agency experts, and compared with the other
sources of information available, including
member countries' earlier replies to Agency or
NATO questionnaires and budgetary docu-
ments.
(b) Request for annual information
Control of undertakings by one of the
member states regarding the non-production of
certain types of armaments takes the form of
field control measures.
These measures are partly prepared from a
study of documents based on the replies of the
country concerned to the annual questionnaire
and to the Agency's requests for annual
information.
As in previous years, the replies received
from the country concerned in 1979 were taken
into consideration for selecting and preparing
visits, inspections and agreed control measures
for inclusion in the Agency's programme of
control measures.
(c) Information provided by NATO
See point 2 (a) below.
(d) Information provided by the United States
of America and Canada
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. Il4
The Agency received, through the Council,
information supplied by the Governments of
the United States and Canada concerning their
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member states stationed
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these
countries have provided no aid to the forces
concerned.
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information
(Article vII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. Il)
The study of budgetary and financial docu-
ments is one aspect of the continuing control of
armaments. It is an important additional fea-
ture of the procedure applied for the determina-
tion of armament stock levels.
In 1979, as in all previous years, the
Agency studied the defence budgets of member
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states as well as the budget section of their
replies to its questionnaire. In addition, its
experts had consultations with the appropriate
departments in the defence ministries of
member countries.
The study of credit forecasts and real
expenditure confirmed the findings of the
Agency's studies on armaments levels forming
part of controls from documentary sources.
(f) Use of published material
By systematic study of the daily press, of
specialised magazines and periodicals and of
books and catalogues published in the WEU
member countries and in the United States. the
Agency's Central Documentation Office pro-
vided the Directorate and its experts with a
great deal of useful information.
In addition, special attention was again
paid to sources of information and bulletins
from other international organisations.
2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces
placed under NATO command
After receiving and processing the member
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and
studying the statistical reports furnished by the
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation (Article Yll, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV)
and, in particular, by the NATO international
staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the
annual consultations with the NATO military
authorities called for by Article XIV of Pro-
tocol No. IV.
As in previous years, these consultations
included a joint study session at Casteau, on
30th November 1979, attended by Agency
experts and the appropriate oflicers of SHAPE,
and concluded with a meeting in Paris on l4th
December 1979; at this meeting, which was
attended by the representatives of the Agency,
of SHAPE and of the International Military
Staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels
of armaments for the forces of member states
placed under NATO authority and stationed
on the mainland of Europe represented appro-
priate levels for the control year 1979 within
the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV,
for those armaments over which the Agency has
so far been placed in a position to exercise its
mandate of controlling levels.
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(b) Appropriate levels of arrnaments for forces
maintained under nalional command on the
mainland of Europe
The quantities of armaments declared to
the Agency by the member states as being
required on 3 I st December 1979 for their
forces maintained under national command on
the mainland of Europe have been accepted or
approved by the Council, who have taken note
of these flrgures of maximum levels of arma-
ments for these forces in 1979.
D. Field control moasares
l. Principles governing the application offreld control
measurus and general methods of execution
As recalled in the introduction to this
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:
- 
to satisfy itself that the undertakings not
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being observed;
- 
to control the level of stocks of certain
armaments.
Field control measures continued during
1979 on the same basis as during previous
years, as an essential part of the Agency's work,
in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No.
IV.
(a) Initial studies
When drawing up its programme of control
measures, the Agency again worked on the
basic assumption, which is suppofted by the
observations of previous years, that the under-
takings and declarations of member countries
are being honoured.
For non-production f-reld control measures,
the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the
information available to it, including that
obtained from the 1978 and earlier inspection
programmes, its progressive analysis of budget-
ary and other data and particularly the replies
of the country concerned to the Agency's
requests for information. At the conclusion of
this review, the Agency decided that a limited
programme of control measures similar to those
of recent years would allow acceptable verific-
ation of the undertaking not to manufacture
specihed armaments.
With regard to the control of levels of
stocks of armaments declared by member states,
sampling techniques were again deemed to be
adequate for verifying member countries'
declarations with the requisite level of
confidence. A programme on the scale of
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those of recent years was considered adequate
to ensure an acceptable level of confidence in
the corfectness of the various declarations of
stocks and production. No significant changesin thq distribution of inspections between
member states were envisaged but shifts in
emphasis towards naval and air armaments
were considered timely. As in 1978, a rela-
tively small number of control measures at
factories was considered to be adequate.
(b) Programme deJinition
Initial proposals for all quantitative field
control measures were assessed in the light of
announced re-equipment programmes, of orga-
nisation changes and, in particular, of the
development of computerised' stock accounting
centres. These considerations applied princip-
ally to the majority of control measures, i.e.
those taking place in depots and units. How-
ever, where it was considered necessary to
extend such controls to factories, their produc-
tion plans were reviewed to ensure that as far as
possible such inspections could be made at the
most informative phase of their production
programmes. Where possible, non-production,
production and factory repair depot inspections
were co-ordinated 
- 
so keeping to a minimum
consistent with its responsibilities, the fre-
quency of the Agency's measures at these
concerns.
As the Convention for the due process of
lawr has not yet entered into force, the control
measures carried out by the Agency at private
concerns had, in 1979, as in previous years, to
take the form of " agreed control measures ".
One consequence of this-situation is that,
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms
concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks'
notice. This agreement has never been with-
held. The 1979 programme .of control mea-
sures at privately-owned plants was therefore
drawn up with full confidence that it could be
implemented as in previous years.
To avoid duplication of activities, ArticleVIII of Protocol No. IV provides that
control measures relating to the forces under
NATO authority shall be carried out by the
appropriate NATO authorities. The forces
subject to the Agency's control measures there-
fore vary in percentage and type from country
to country, and this is an important factor in
l. Convention conceming measures to be taken by
member states of Western European Union in order to
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry
out its control effectively and making provision for due pro-
cess of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the
Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris
on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on l4th December
1957).
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the Agency's programme considerations. Arti-
cle VIII also affects depot inspections, but in a
different manner. Since the logistic support of
forces under NATO authority remains a wholly
national responsibility in peacetime, difficulties
can occur in dehning which mat6riel and muni-
tions in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces
under national command. Such problems
were again avoided in 1979 by the renewed
approval of the system of joint Agency/SHAPE
inspections introduced in 1957. A number of
the depots in question were therefore includedin the programme and inspected by the
Agency/SHAPE group.
On the basis of the foregoing considerations
and the information already available, the
Agency was able to deflrne its 1979 programme
with suflicient certainty for the Director to
outline it to the Council in March. After
subsequent discussions and arlalysis of member
countries' replies to the questionnaire i few
changes were made to the programme.
2. Type and exteat offield control measures
In 1979, no major changes were made in
the Agency's established procedure for the
conduct of its field control measures.
The total number of control measures was
seventy. It should be noted, in this connec-
tion, that this pattern of control activities
carried out by the Agency is satisfactory: it
enables some 80 0/o of existing armaments to be
checked in four years for the air force, five
years for the navy and six to seven years for
army munitions.
These measures fall broadly into the
following categories:
(a) quantitative control measures at depots;
(b) quantitative control measures at units
for forces under national command;
(c) control measures at production plants:
(i) quantitative control measures:
In 1979, these control measures
were carried out at plants manufac-
turing armoured matdriel, manufac-
turing ammunition and missiles,
and at one shipyard;
(ii) non-production control measures:
These control measures related to
chemicals and warships.
It should be stressed that the reports on
field control measures are protected by the
most stringent security measures at all stages of
their preparation, custody and analysis.
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3, Conclusions
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effect-
ively to carry out its tasks of applying control
measures. Such problems as arose in this very
complex field of inspections were dealt with
satisfactorily through the excellent relations
maintained with the national authorities.
(b) On the basis of all the field control measu-
res carried out in 1979, the Agency was able to
report to the Council:
- 
the measures taken for the control of the
stocks of armaments at depots, units
under national command and production
plants confirmed the data obtained from
documentary control measures ;
- 
the measures taken for the control of
non-production revealed no production
contrary to undertakings.
E. State and problems of control in certain
particular fields
l. Armameats for land forces
(a) Cunent production and purchases
All member countries are continuing to
modernise their land armaments as they
restructure their forces.
It may be noted that several countries are
adopting armaments produced by one of them(for example, the Leopard tank produced in
the Federal Republic of Germany and
adopted by Belgium and the Netherlands and,
in the case of Mark I, by Italy; the anti-aircraft
Gudpard tank produced in the Federal
Republic of Germany and adopted by Belgium
and the Netherlands), and the co-production by
several countries of certain weapons (such as
the 155 mm FH-70 towed howitzer co-
produced by Italy, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the United Kingdom).
The stage reached with the major pro-
grammes is as follows:
The Federal Republic of Germany has
ordered Leopard II tanks for its armoured
divisions and production of the armoured
transport vehicle is progressing. Belgium has
decided to replace its VTT M-75 and AMX-31
tracked armoured vehicles by M-l13 vehicles
over the next few years. France is continuing
to equip its units with AMX-10 armoured
vehicles to replace its AMX-I3 and EBR mat6-
riel; deliveries of the VAB have started. Italy is
continuing to produce Leopard I battle tanks
under licence. The Netherlands are replacing
their VTT AMX-I3 armoured vehicles by the
YPR-765 developed from the M-I13. The
United Kingdom had almost completed replace-
ment of the Centurion tank by the Chieftain.
The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy
and the United Kingdom ape working on the
trilateral 155 mm FH-70 towed howitzer pro-
duction programme and thq first of these new
weapons are in service iri the three coun-
tries. The Federal Republic of Germany, Bel-
gium and the Netherlands fiave already recei-
ved a number of 30 mm twin-gun anti-aircraft
Gu6pard tanks, which ar€ being produced
according to plan in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
The Lance acquisition programme has
been completed and this weapons system is
operational in all member countries where it
has been adopted.
(b) Control activily in 1979
Control measures werp carried out at
several depots, at a number of units under
national command and at plants manufacturing
armaments for land forces.
2. Gaided missiles and other s(f-lroplled missiles
(a) Current production
During 1979, the member states of WEU
continued to modernise their guided missiles
and to increase their stocks within the limits
allowed by the modified Brussels Treaty and
Council decisions. For example, Belgium is
now participating in the Helip programme and
has added the Exocet MM-38 to its naval
armoury. The Federal Republic of Germany
has started to take delivery of the Hot anti-tank
missile and the Netherlands have received their
first Lance missiles. In France production of
the improved Hawk has resumed and full-scale
production of Roland surface-to-air missiles has
begun.
The following modern guided missiles are
now being manufactured in the member coun-
tries: the anti-tank missilqs Milan and Hot
(produced jointly by the Federal Republic of
Germany and France) and Mamba (Federal
Republic of Germany); the $urface-to-air missi-
les Roland (produced jointly by the Federal
Republic of Germany and France), Hawk
(Helip) XMlM23B (produced jointly by France
and Italy), Matra R-440 Crotale (France); the
ship-to-ship missiles Exocet MM-38 (producedjointly by France and the United Kingdom) and
Otomat (Italy); the air-to-surface missiles
Exocet AM-39 (France) and Kormoran (Federal
Republic of Germany); the surface-to-air
29
DOCUMENT 833
missile Masurca (France); the surface-to-air and
air-to-air missile Aspide (Italy); the anti-
submarine missile Malafon (France); the air-to-
air missiles Matra Magic R-550 and Matra
R-530 (France).
In addition to the above guided missiles, a
number of unguided missiles were produced by
member states of WEU and, in particular, the
Zuni air-to-ground rocket in Belgium and a
number of ll0 mm rockets in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
(b) Control activity in 1979
Quantitative control measures were carried
out at a number of depots containing guided
and other self-propelled missiles or launchers at
several units under national command equip-
ed with these weapons and at plants manufac-
turing guided missiles.
3. Airforce armamenls
(a) Current produclion and purchases
1979 was marked by the beginning of full-
scale production of new aircraft and by their
delivery to most countries of WEU, as well as
by the emergence of promising prototypes.
Under the Tornado programme, the f-rrst
full production aircraft were delivered in the
Federal Republic of Germany and the United
Kingdom; in Italy, three of these aircraft are
continuing their test programme.
Work continued in France and the United
Kingdom on the Jaguar joint production pro-
gramme, as it did in France on production of
the Mirage F-1, and on the Mirage 2000 trials
programme; in addition, the Mirage 4000 was
shown at the Le Bourget Air Show.
Deliveries of Alpha-Jet aircraft in the
Federal Republic of Germany and in Belgium,
and of the F-16 in Belgium and the Netherlands
should also be noted.
(b) Control activity in 1979
Control measures were carried out at
several aircraft and aircraft engine depots and at
a number of air force units under national
command.
4. Naval amamenls
(a) Current production
Member countries pursued their respective
construction programmes with a view to main-
taining the size of their navies while phasing
out ships of an earlier generation. The build-
ing eflort was concentrated on frigates, conven-
tional submarines and fast-attack craft.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, con-
struction of the F-122 class of frigates 
- 
a modi-
fication of the Netherlands Kortenaer class
frigate 
- 
is continuing. Modernisation of the
Lutjens class missile destroyers has begun. Fast-
attack craft of the 143-A type are under
construction.
In France, work is continuing on the
Meuse, a second replenishment tanker of the
Durance class and on the Georges Leygues class
of corvettes, the first of which is already
operational. Attack submarines with nuclear
propulsion are under construction and one has
already been launched. Modernisation of the
aircraft carrier Foch began in 1979. Deve-
lopment of the Atlantic NG (new generation)
aircraft is continuing. Finally, deliveries of the
Super Etendard aircraft continued in 1979.
In Italy, a new 13,000-ton helicopter
carrier-Giuseppe Garibaldi was laid down in
1979. The Lupo class frigate programme was
almost completed and work was started on the
Maestrale class of frigates. The Sparviero
hydrofoil missile boat programme is progress-
ing; the f,rrst of the class was completed in 1974
and further units will come into service in
1980-81. Submarines of the Sauro class were
completed. Finally, the new replenishment
tanker Vesuvio joined the fleet.
In the Netherlands, the construction of
Kortenaer class frigates, to replace destroyers of
the Holland and Friesland classes, is continu-
ing. The Van Speyk class frigates are being
modernised and construction of a submarine of
the new generation is in progress.
As examples of co-operation between
member states, mention should be made, in
addition to the adoption by the Federal
Republic of Germany of a Dutch-designed
frigate referred to above, of the tripartite
minesweeper co-production programme (Bel-
gium, France, Netherlands).
(b) Control activity in 1979
I wo quantltatlve control measures were
carried out at naval shipyards, one being com-
bined with a non-production control measure.
5. Chembal weapons
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control
As in previous years, the Agency asked
member countries whether they wished to
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renew in 1979 the list of chemical weapons
subject to control.
The member countries agreed to this
renewal. This was reported to the Council,
who noted the fact.
The Agency therefore continued to use this
list for its control activities during 1979.
(b) Control activity in 1979
In application of Article III of Protocol No.
III which lays down conditions to enable the
Council to flrx the levels of chemical weapons
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by
those countries which have not given up the
right to produce them, the Agency asked the
countries concerned in its questionnaire,
whether production of chemical weapons on
their mainland territory had passed the experi-
mental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage.
ln 1979 as in the past, the member states
concerned replied in the negative.
As every year, the Agency requested all
member states in the corresponding sections of
its annual questionnaire to state whether they
held any stocks of chemical weapons, whatever
their origin. In the reply to this questionnaire,
no member state declared holding any chemical
weapons during the current control year.
As in previous years, the Agency addressed
to the appropriate authorities of the state
concerned a " request for annual information to
facilitate the non-production control of chemi-
cal weapons ". A precise and detailed reply
was received in answer to this request. In
addition, the temporary procedure applied with
these authorities since 1973 was again used
with success in 1979. All the information
supplied in this way was a major factor in
selecting chemical plants at which to carry out
agreed control measures in 1979.
For each control measure carried out, a
delegation from the national authorities was
present.
None of these measures revealed any indi-
cation of production of chemical weapons
within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No.
III.
6. Biological weapons
All member countries reported their
agreement to renew in 1979 the list of biolo-
gical weapons subject to control. The Council
noted the fact.
However, it will be recalled (see point B.2
of the present chapter) that the Agency exer-
cises no control in the ilield of biological
weapons.
7. Atomic weapons
Since the situation remained the same as in
previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated
in point 8.2 of this chaptdr, to exercise any
control in the atomic field.
F. Technical information visits and other
means of improving the fficiency of the
exPerts I
In 1979, as in previous years, technical
information visits were arranged to enable the
Agency's experts to keep their knowledge up to
date in the helds of armaments research,
development and production.
The land force experts visited the exhibi-
tion of land force mat6riel 4t Satory in France
and, in Italy, the Scuola Militare Alpina at
Aosta. They were also invited to a Harte
Faust hring exercise by the Eundeswehr.
The naval experts attended a symposium in
the Netherlands, organised by the Royal
Netherlands Navy. on West European navies
and the future; in the Unided Kingdom, they
visited the exhibition of naval equipment at
Portsmouth.
The experts in aeronautical and guided
missiles visited the Le Bourget Air Show and a
wind tunnel at Modane, in France, Erpro-
bungsstelle 6l in the Federal Republic of
Germany and the National Gas Turbine Estab-
lishment in the United Kingdom.
In the field of chemistry and biology, the
Agency experts obtained a wealth of valuable
information in the course of discussions with
military and civilian experts and when visiting
industrial and scientihc installations. In the
Federal Republic of Germarty, they visited the
Max Planck Institut fiir Immunbiologie at
Freiburg and in the United Kingdom, the
Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research
at Porton; they also had the opportunity to visit
two private plants in the United Kingdom.
An expert from the Agency attended a
session of the NATO Comtrnittee on nuclear,
biological and chemical (NBC) defence as an
observer.
G. Miscellaneous contacts
l. For the satisfactory conduct of its
mission, the Agency must carry out its duties in
an atmosphere of trust and close co-operation
3l
l. See also point C. I (/).
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with the national authorities. To this end, the
Director and the principal members of his staff,in 1979, as in previous years maintained
frequent contacts with these authorities.
On 2lst March 1979, the Director presen-
ted the Agency's report on its activities in 1978
to the Council.
2. As laid down in the modified Brussels
Treaty, the Agency has maintained close
contacts with the appropriate NATO author-
ities.
In this connection, mention should be
made in particular of the two meetings held to
f,rx the level of armaments of the forces under
NATO command, already referred to in point
C.2 (a) of this chapter and of the implement-
ation of the system of combined Agency/
SHAPE inspections mentioned in point
D.l(b).
The Director and the principal members of
his staff also had meetings in Brussels with,
among others, the Deputy Secretary-General of
NATO, the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief
of Staff, Logistics and Armaments Division,
SHAPE.
3. The Diiector and the principal members
of his staff attended the symposium on a Euro-
pean armaments policy, organised by the
Assembly in Brussels in October.
H. General conclusions
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol
No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the
Council that, as a result of the control exercisedin 19'79, the figures obtained in accordance
with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:
- 
for armaments of forces under NATO
command under the terms of Article
XIV of Protocol No. IV;and
- 
for armaments of forces maintained
under national command under the
terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of
l4th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. II,
represented for the control year 1979 and for
each of the member states, the appropriate
levels of armaments subject to control for those
categories of armaments over which the Agency
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.
As required by Article XX of Protocol No.
IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of
field control measures at production plants, it
did not detect for the categories of armaments
which it controls:
- 
either the manufacture in these establish-
ments on the territory of the Federal
Republic of Germany of a category of
armaments that the government of this
member state has undertaken not to
manufacture;
- 
or the existence, on the mainland of
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of
Protocol No. IV) or not justihed by
export requirements (Article XXII of
Protocol No. IV).
In 1979, the Agency again applied controls
effectively in those flrelds which are open to it.
As in the past, the atmosphere of co-
operation prevailing in relations between the
Agency and the authorities of the member
countries and of NATO, as well as those with
members of private firms, played an important
part.
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CHAPTER IV
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments
Committee
The Standing Armaments Committee met
four times in normal session, on 29th January,
l8th May, 2lst September and 23rd November
1979.It also met four times as an ad hoc group
to consider the study in progress on the situa-
tion of the armaments sector of industry in the
member countries of WEU.
Apart from this study, the main items on
the SAC's agenda were WEU Agreement
4.FT.6 and the activities of the Committee's
two working groups dealing respectively with
operational research and the evaluation of mili-
tary equipment.
In June, members of the Committee,
accompanied by memben of the International
Secretariat, visited the 33rd International Air
Show at Le Bourget and the exhibition of army
weapons and equipment at Satory. In October,
members of the Committee attended the sym-
posium on a European armaments policy
organised in Brussels by the Assembly.
l. Study ofthe armamen s sectot ofindustry
in the member coailties of WEU I
In 1979, as requested by the Standing
Armaments Committee at its last meeting in
1978, the International Secretariat continued to
prepare the economic chapter of the study
which, as stated in the twenty-fourth annual
report to the Assembly, will comprise a general
economic and financial presentation of the
armaments industries together with an analy-
tical description of those industries.
When starting to work on the first part of
this chapter, the SAC decided to divide it into
three sections, to be devoted successively to
general considerations on defence and arma-
ments expenditure, to the presentation of basic
industrial data separately for each country and
to the comparisons and syntheses laid down in
the detailed outline programme approved by
the Council in 1977. The Committee instruc-
ted the international secretariat to continue
collecting the necessary information from
national authorities. As this task proved more
diflicult than expected, the SAC was unable to
present a final document to the Council in time
l. See also Chapter I, C and Chapter II, B.
paragraph.
for the ministerial meeting of l6th May
1979. An interim progress report was submit-
ted in April.
The conclusions of the Minister's exchange
of views on this subject wete reported to the
Standing Armaments Commfttee by the Head
of the International Secretariat on l8th May.
The Committee noted that Ministers had
confirmed the SAC's mandate and that, while
agreeing to extend the time.table for comple-
tion of the study, they had expressed the wish
that the first part of the economic chapter
should be completed as quic(ly as possible and
to best effect, with the help bf the administra-
tions concerned.
In addition, the Head of the International
Secretariat, who attended the joint meeting bet-
ween the Council and the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments, informed
the SAC of the views there expressed concer-
ning the work of the Commlttee and, in parti-
cular, of the comments made on behalf of the
Council by Mr. Sanza, who had confirmed the
reply given to Assembly Recommendation 325.
During the second quarter of 1979, drafting
of the hrst section of the first part of the econo-
mic chapter reached the f,rn4l stage. The SAC
expected to complete the second section of this
part early in 1980. The preparation of the
third section depended on the progress of the
two others and the SAC had not reached the
point of discussing it. However, at the end of
the year it hoped to be able to submit a
complete report to the Coungil for the meeting
to be held at ministerial levQl in the spring of
1980.
2. llEU Agreement 4.FT,6
At its meeting on l8th May 1979, the SAC
was informed that a group o[ experts from the
United States army had recerftly visited Europe
to study the possible standardisation of equip-
ment trial methods in NATO. The head of
this group had-asked the pilot country co-
ordinator (United Kingdom) if they could have
a copy of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 for detailed
study, to enable the American authorities to
choose two trial methods for pheeled vehicles.
At its meeting on 2lst Sdptember, the SAC
approved the annual report on the updating of
WEU Agreement 4.FT.6.
The SAC also authorised the International
Secretariat to release two ttial methods con-3, second
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tained in that agreement to the American
authorities, who were asked to supply similar
information on a reciprocal basis.
B. Activities of the working groups
l. lYorking Group No. E on operuliontl research
Working Group No. 8 met twice, in Paris
in March and in Rome in October.
Information was exchanged in accordance
with the normal procedure: several new or up-
dated forms on operational research studies
were submitted by delegations.
Two reports dealing respectively with
" Mathematical models for calculating batches
of spare parts " and a " Detection model for
ground combat ", were received during the year
by the WEU library which now holds some
seventy studies on operational research. In
addition, bilateral exchanges of reports conti-
nued normally.
The group, which has been following work
on editing the five-language glossary of opera-
tional research terms, noted at its last meeting
that the work was almost finished. The French
Inter-service Centre for Operational Research(Centre frangais interarmies de recherche
opirationnelle) had agreed to prepare the rele-
vant magnetic tapes which would be handed
over to the government's Documentation
Centre for preparation of the final edition.
The glossary was expected to appear early in
l 980.
The meeting held by Working Group
No. 8 in March was combined with a sympo-
sium on methodology, when five studies were
introduced. Presentation by the delegations
responsible was followed by thorough dis-
cusslon.
The group's second meeting in October
was combined with a visit to Rome at the invi-
tation of the Italian Defence Staff. The military
and civilian experts attending visited the statis-
tical, data-handling and operational research
section of the IVth Bureau of the Defence
Staff. A series of operational research studies,
introduced by the head of the section, were pre-
sented and formed the subject of detailed
discussions. Participants also visited the Sele-
nia Company where they were greatly interes-
ted by the firm's developments on radar and
weapons systems and particularly by the
presentation of a study on " The use of life-
cycle cost-effectiveness programmes for third-
line maintenance design ".
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2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military
. 
,qaipment
The group of experts, which comes under
Working Group No. 8, completed its report on
the evaluation of a recovery vehicle, which was
submitted to the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee at its meeting on 2l st September
1979. This report is the product of the first
comparative approach to a method of selecting
military equipment: acting on a German initia-
tive in the specific case of a recovery vehicle,
national experts compared the various practical
and theoretical methods of assessing equipment
according to the specific criteria of each user.
The group's work showed that, while approa-
ches to the problem may differ according to
national requirements useful lessons can be
drawn by comparing the various available
mathematical methods. Even if the national
authorities do not succeed 'in deciding on ajoint evaluation method, they will be dble to
select the most reliable methods for each item
of equipment and to apply them uniformly.
This offers the possibilities of achieving an
important step towards pragmatic co-operation
on armaments between the member countries
of the organisation.
As the hrst stage of the work of the group
of experts has now been completed, transition
to the second phase depends on a proposal
from one or other member country for a study
of some unevaluated new equipment.
C. International Secretariat
l. Contacts with the Council
On 25th April, the Assistant Secretary-
General, Head of the International Secretariat
of the SAC, submitted to the Council the
Committee's interim progress report on the
study of the armaments sector of industry in the
member countries of WEU. On 7th June he
made a verbal report to the Council on the
other activities of the SAC.
2' wEa'*'^o!,:::::,r:;;i;tr on a European
The Head of the International Secretariat
reported to the Standing Armaments Commit-
tee on the debates on armaments questions
which took place during the second part of the
twenty-fourth ordinary session and the first
part of the twenty-hfth ordinary session of the
Assembly. Extracts from speeches, reports,
debates and recommendations on these ques-
tions were brought together in two documents
which were circulated to the members of the
Committee.
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Members of the International Secretariat
attended the symposium on a European arma-
ments policy organised by the Assembly in
Brussels in October. On a personal basis, the
Head of the International Secretariat presented
two reports, one written on " The juridical
conditions of defence procurement " and the
other verbal on " The armaments market ".
3. Relations with NATO
The International Secretariat of the SAC
was represented, as observer, at the meetings of
the Conference of National Armaments Direc-
tors, held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in
April and October.
A member of the Secretariat also attended
two meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments
Group.
4. Relations with FINABEL
In accordance with the arrangements which
have governed relations between the Internatio-
nal Secretariat of the SAC dnd the FINABEL
Secretariat since 1973, the Head of the
FINABEL Secretariat attended the SAC's
meeting on 29th January 1979 when details
were given of the results of the meeting of the
FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee, at which
a member of the Intgrnational Secretariat of the
SAC had been present. The Head of the
FINABEL Secretariat also attended the end-of-
year meeting of the SAC on 23rd November
when he informed the Committee of the pre-
sent status of the former WEU Agreements in
the series FT.l, 5 and 6 which, apart from
4.FT.6, had been taken over .by FINABEL
when the ad hoc group was disbanded.
As in former years, a representative of the
International Secretariat of the SAC attended
the meeting of the FINAflEL Co-ordinating
Committee held in Brussels at the end of
November 1979.
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CHAPTER V
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE
A. Meetings of the Committee
In 1979, the Public Administration
Committee's two annual meetings, which are
held in each of the member countries in turn,
took place at Villeneuve-lds-Avignon from 6th
to Sth June and at Luxembourg from 24th to
26th October.
These meetings are devoted mainly to ex-
changes of information about significant admin-
istrative developments in the member coun-
tries during the preceding six months and the
preparation of the next year's multilateral
course for government offrcials to be held under
the Committee's auspices.
During the year under consideration, the
Committee discussed a number of adminis-
trative problems common to the majority of the
member countries. As has been the case for
several years, many of these problems are direc-
tly related to the conditions which, for the
countries as a whole and consequently for their
administrations, result from a diflicult econo-
mic and financial situation: efforts to bring
down unemployment by means which varied
from country to country (shorter working week,
early retirement, part-time working, creation of
new jobs, etc.); the position of civil seryants
and their unions in relation to wage restraint
policies ; the policy of a number of the member
countries seeking to bring about considerable
reductions in public expenditure ; efforts to deal
with the increasing difficulty of financing social
security; the effects of the economic situation
on training and refresher courses for civil ser-
vants, etc.
Committee members are also kept infor-
med of the various modifications introduced
into the state and administrative machinery of
their countries as a result of government chan-
ges or reorganisations. The principal new laws
of significant importance on the administrative
front are reported and, where appropriate, their
texts circulated.
With regard to the course for government
officials to be organised in 1980, the Committee
agreed in principle to return, after an interval
of two years, to the instructional type of course
designed for young civil servants.
B. 1979 course for government officials
The twenty-eighth multilateral course for
government officials organised by the Public
Administration Committee was held in the
Netherlands, from l9th to 23rd November.
The aim of the course was to enable exper-
ienced civil servants to exchange information
and compare experiences in the member states
regarding the actual development of employ-
ment in the public sector over the last ten
years; to compare specific reasons for these
developments; to compare the relation between
the number of jobs in the public sector and the
development of the nature and scope of the r6le
of government; to identify future possible
growth sectors in connection with growth and
composition of unemployment.
Participants were asked to prepare before-
hand a note describing the situation in their
own country regarding:
- 
increase in employment over a ten-year
period, at the level of central govern-
ment, local government and other public
bodies;
- 
the relative importance of public sector
employment in connection with total
employment in the same period and the
effect of possible decentralisation of
tasks ;
- 
real growth in government spending per
sector in the last ten years, checking
whether it is possible to link budget prio-
rities with increases in employment in
the public sector ;
- 
development of size and composition of
national unemployment over the same
period.
The course brought together eighteen parti-
cipants, fairly high-level oflicials, from the
administrations of the member countries.
Their discussions throughout the five days'
work were directed to the following three major
themes, each of which was introduced by a
senior civil servant of the Netherlands adminis-
tration who was an expert in that particular
field: participants first studied the increase of
employment in the public sector in connection
with decentralisation. They then considered
the widening of scope of government activities
and its consequence for employment in the
public sector. Finally they studied changes in
size and composition of unemployment in
connection with the increase of employment in
the public sector.
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The last day of the course was devoted to a
summing up of the main results of the
discussionb and to drafting conclusions.
As the course was held fairly late in the
year, national delegations' comments have not
yet been received. However, from impressions
obtained at the end of the course, it may be
concluded that participants were well satisfied
with this multilateral course which enabled
them to study a subject of great importance to
the majority of the member countries.
C. Study visits
Study visits arranged under the auspices of
the Public Administration Committee enable an
offrcial to spend one or two weeks in the
administration of one of the other member
countries, studying his own speciality.
Consequently these visits cover a wide
variety of subjects as is shown by the following
few examples of visits carried out during the
year under consideration: industrial democracy ;
social assistance for the unqmployed (subjects
studied in the Federal Repu$lic of Germany);
employment of women in i4dustry (studied in
France); taxes on personal {apital (studied inItaly); health education; alfernatives to pro-
secution; prison security (studied in the
Netherlands); relations betfteen government
and local communities ; compatibility of decen-
tralisation and autonomy on the one hand and
government supervision on the other (studied in
Belgium).
It will be recalled that, on returning from a
visit to a foreign administration, each offrcial
prepares a report which is sent to the Commit-
tee and, of course, to the administration visited.
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lt. Budget
Summaries of the main budgets for 1979
and 1980 are shown in the Appendices to this
report. The proposed budgets for 1980 have
again remained within the boundaries of infla-
tion, compared with those of 1979.
During 1979, the outstanding problem rela-
ting to the pension scheme, of granting survi-
vors' pensions to widowers of female staff was
resolved. After appropriate amendments to the
pension scheme rules had been incorporated,
the option was reopened for female staff who
had remained in the provident fund. Only two
female staff members changed their original
option and chose to join the pension scheme as
a result.
The other outstanding problem of affrlia-
tion to the United Kingdom social security
legislation has not, however, been solved.
This last uncertainty means that figures
showing the results of the pensions' option
could not be finalised, but the preliminary
figures as at 3lst December 1979 are given in
the Appendix. The sums due to member
governments as a result of validation could not
be finally calculated, therefore, but an interim
indication is also given in the Appendix.
The contributions to the United Kingdom
social security scheme, by both staff members
and the organisation, are still being held in a
suspense account in the organisation's budget,
pending the final outcome of the current nego-
tiations.
B. WEU administrative meetings
Oflicials of the Secretariat-General, the
Armaments Control Agency, the Standing
Armaments Committee and the Offrce of the
Clerk, responsible for administrative matters,
continued as in previous years to meet periodi-
cally thus ensuring co-ordination while at the
same time reviewing administrative matters of
common concern to all departments of the
organisation.
Co-operation with the WEU Staff Associa-
tion has continued.
C. WEU provident fund
Of the monies that have become due to
governments as a result of the validation pro-
CHAPTER VI
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS
cess, and had been invested by the organisation
in the same way as the provident fund, 90 0/o
have now been reimbursed to governments.
The remaining l0 0/o will remain invested in
French francs but will not necessarily follow
the same investment pattern as the provident
fund.
Still under discussion in the framework of
the co-ordinated organisations remains the
question whether staff members who have fully
validated and staff members who have retired
from the organisation, may leave any balances
in the provident fund and, if so, under what
conditions.
The advisory panel on the provident fund
considered that the interests of staff and govern-
ments were best served by continuing the short-
term policy of investment in French francs, the
unit ofaccount.
D. Activities in the framework of the
co - o rdinat ed o rgani satio ns
l. Commitlee of Secretaies-General
The Secretaries/Director-General of the
five co-ordinated organisations met once during
the year to discuss administrative problems
mainly concerned with :
- 
the application of the implementing
instructions to the pension scheme
rules ;
- 
means of improving the machinery of co-
ordination;
- 
the 1979 triennial general review of
salaries ;
- 
relations with staff associations.
2. Standing Committee of Secretaries-Gerural,
Committee of Heads of Administration
These Committees met as a rule every
month in conjunction with the meetings of the
Co-ordinating Committee, whilst several special
sessions were held to deal with specific
problems.
On these occasions joint meetings with the
Standing Committee of Staff Associations are
also frequently held.
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3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts
The Co-ordinating Committee met eight
times in 1979 and issued ten reports,
Nos. 159-169 in the course of the year.
These reports dealt with the following
subjects:
l59th reporl: Revision of the remuneration
adjustment procedure (for A, L, and B and C
staff), effective from lst July 1978, approved by
the Council on 2lst March 1979.
160th report: 1978 general review of remu-
neration of category A and L staff (see also
l57th report), approved by the Council on 2lst
March 1979.
l6lst report: Reversion of rights to a survi-
vor's pension to widowers of female staff,
approved by the Council on 2lst March 1979.
162nd report: Periodical updating of the
daily subsistence allowances for staff travelling
on official missions, with effect from lst May
1979; approved by the Council on 2lst March
1979.
163rd reporf: Adjustmerlt of remuneration
to compensate for the increalse in cost of living
over the second half 1978 j approved by the
Council on 25th April 1979.
164th reporl: Arrangements for the affilia-
tion of NATO staff employed in Germany to
the pension scheme following ratification of the
agreement between NATO and the Federal
Republic of Germany ; approved by the Coun-
cil on 4th July 1979.
l65th report'. Exceptional adjustment of
remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; appro-
ved by the Council on l9th September 1979.
166th report'. Exceptional adjustment of
remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; appro-
ved by the Council on 2lst November 1979.
167th reporl: Daily subsistence allowance
of non-resident auxiliary/temporary staff appro-
ved by the Council on l4th December 1979.
168th report: 1979 tdennial review of
remuneration of staff, categofy B and C ; appro-
ved by the Council on l4th December 1979.
169th reporti Exceptional adjustment of
remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; appro-
ved by the Council on 23rd January 1980.
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APPENDIX
Summary of revised WEU budget for 1979
Salaries and allowances
Pensions
A* B* c* Total B + C
f.
889,285
66,420
34,715
t25,gg5
4,040
Frs
6,905,400
421,200
84,500
443,765
9,500
132,000
Frs
14,263,600
2,007,400
346,000
546,430
24900
241,700
Frs
2 1,169,000
2,429,600
430,500
990, I 95
33,400
373,700
Travel
Other operating costs . . .
Purchase of furniture, etc
Buildinss
Tornl ExpeNonunr
WEU tax
1,120,455 7,995,365 17,430,030 25,425,395
304,290
9,650
19,855
2,389,500
50,500
255,500
4,893,500
95,000
512,600
7,283,000
145,500
768, 1 00
Other receiots
Pension receiots
Tornl INcove 333,795 2,695,500 5,501,100 8,196,600
Ner Tornl 786,660 5,299,865 I l,g2g,g30 17,228,795
Naliorul contribations called for under the revised IIEIJ budget for 1979
Beleium
600ths f F. fn.
59
120
t20
120
2
59
t20
77,354.90
157,332.00
t57,332.00
157,332.00
2,622.20
77,354.90
157,332.00
1,694,164.94
3,445,7 59.00
3,445,7 59.00
3,445,7 59.00
57,429.32
1,694,164.84
3.445.7 59.00
France
Germanv
Italv
Luxembours
Netherlands
United Kinedom
Tour 600 786,660.00 17,228,795.00
* A Secretariat-General.
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.C Armaments Control Agency.
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Salaries and allowances
Pensions
A* B* c. Total B + C
f
1,001,217
81,500
36,885
155,575
10,465
Frs.
7,8 14,300
602,000
93,700
427,620
13,07 5
68,000
Frs.
16,223,000
1,905,000
380,900
613,520
29,935
123,000
Frs.
24,037,300
2,507,000
474,600
1,041,140
42,010
l9l ,000
Trqvel
Other operating costs . . .
Purchase of furniture, etc
Rrrildinos
Torel ExpeNorrune
WFI I tqv
1,285,642 9,018,695 19,27 4,355 28,293,050
350,322
15,590
24.130
2,',712,800
55,950
274,000
5,562,400
95,800
603,000
8,275,200
l5l,750
877,000
Other receints
Pension receints
Torar INcovp 390,042 3,042,7 50 6,261,200 9,303,950
Npr Torlr 895,600 5,97 5,945 13,013,155 18,989,100
Summary of WEU main budget for 1980
National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1980
Beloi
600ths f F. fn.
59
120
120
120
2
59
120
88,067.33
179,120.00
t79,120.00
179,120.00
2,985.34
88,067.33
179,120.00
1,867 ,261.50
3,797,820.00
3,797,820.00
3,797,820.00
63,297.00
1,867 ,261.50
3.797,820.00
F'
G
Italv
Lrrxemhorrrs
Netherlands
I Inited Kinsdom
T 600 895,600.00 18,989,100.00
* A Secretariat-General.
B Intemational Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C Armaments Control Agency.
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Numbers opting
as from
lst July 1974
Numbers opting
for full
valrdation
of service
Numbers opting
to retain
provident fund
Staff recruited
since
lst July 1974
Pensions
being paid
Hors
grades
Option No. I Option No.2 Option No. 3
Secretariat-General
Armaments Control
Agency
Standing Armaments
Committee
Office of the CIerk
oftheAssembly....
TornI-
2
2
I
l5
JJ
l6
l9
201
6
6
2
4
8
6
4
8
25
l0
4
2
I
I
2
5 83 34 22 47 6
Pension Scheme
l. Subject to amendment when the outstanding problem of United Kingdom social secunty is resolved.
Provisional statement of WEU pensions validations at 31st December 1979
Expressed in accounting units (l AU = I F. franc)
Notes. l. This statement does not include interest earned on,these monies whilst on deposit in the WEU provident fund a/c.
2. Of the total in column 6 an amount of 17,699,000 francs was paid over to governments in 1979.
l
Total sums
due lor
validatron
Amounts
withheld
for pensron
arrears
payable
(-)
Amounts credite(
to budgets
to offset
fu rther
pension
arrears
to be paid
(-)
Deducted
for 5.5512 o/o
write-down
(-)
Loan
balances
repayable
over
five years
and credited
to budgets(-)
Net sums
credited to
validation
accounts P.V.l
and P.V.2
(l) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6)
Secretariat-General
Standing Arma-
ments committee
Armaments Control
Agency
Assembly
Torem
4,499,956.00
4,513,382.36
10,228,601.16
5,750,034.77
31,060.29
472,547.52
I 
, 
I 84,603.4C
22t,872.39
1,095,836.16
43,960.25
116,463.36
87,744.35
t77,014.04
l3 1.194.8 I
24,965.34
227,564.03
688,638.00
264,034.54
4,327,367.01
3,s03,6s4.01
7 ,082,509.56
5,310,845.17
24,991,874.29 1,688,211.21 I,361,668.8C 512,416.56 1,205,201.91 L0,224,37 5.9
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l. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members o{ the Commillee. Mrs. von Bothmer (Chair-
man); MM. De Poi (Alternale'. Cavaliere\, Porthetne (Yice-
Chairmen); Sir Fredenc Bennett, MM. Berrier (Alternate:
Talon\, Brtgnon, Conti Persrni, Deschamps, Druon, Gess-
ner (Altemate'. von Hassel), Hanin, Hard.v', Lagneat, Lord
Political developments in Europe -
Reply to the twenty-fifth annual repofi 6f the Council
28th April 1980
L[cNarr, MM. Mangelschots, Mende. Mommersteeg (Alter-
nate Sbffeknl, llfiller. Peridier, Lord Reav. MM. Redde-
mann, Talamona, Thoss (Alternate: Glesener\, Llrutn,
Vahante. Vecchietti, Voogd.
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vole are
prmted m italrcs.
REPORTI
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2
by Mr. Page, RaPPorteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Draft Recommendation
on political detelopments in Europe 
-
reply to the twenty-fifth annaal report ofthe Council
The Assembly,
Remembering that the year 1980 marks the beginning of the
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty and welcoming the fact that
the WEU Council and the Assembly rests on a sound basis;
Noting with appreciation that the Council has again shown its intention to continue
the d_ialogue with the Assembly on the various questions relating to the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty and also the flexible and effective manner in which -it has generallyprovided information, particularly concerning the results of the study being carried- out by
the Standing Armaments Committee;
Considering that while Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty is opposed to duplica-tion of work, it also advocates affording the most effective assistance to "ihe work of other
economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented ";
Welcoming the fact that at its joint meetings with Assembly Committees the Council
proposes to incorporate an informal procedure " so that each member of the Council can
give his government's views " along with the expression of its collective views;
_ 
Anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to participate in a wider frame-
work of European co-operation and that the General Aftairs Committee should examine
any consequential changes in the organisation of WEU;
Aware that Europe, in order to be master of its destiny, would have to be politically
organised, based on genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies,
REcor.auENos rHAT rue CouNcrr_
L Continue its effort to keep the Assembly regularly informed, by all appropriate means, about:
(a) the progress of work in the lndependent European Programme Group, particularly in the
Assembly's specific fields of interest;
(b) those parts of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee which have
been completed and which are not covered by military secrecy;
(c) matters important to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when they are
dealt with by the member governments within other organisations;
2. Should not omit, in informing the Assembly of the results of political co-operation between
member states, to report also on subjects on which satisfactory results have not been'obtained or even
sought;
3. To this end, seek better liaison both between governments and between NATO and other rele-
vant organisations, so that questions not dealt with in these organisations may be the subject of
exchanges of views within the framework of the WEU Council;
4. Examine, with the President of the Assembly, the ways in which questions to be raised in joint
meetings by members of relevant Committees may receive ';collective " inswers;
5. Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may
be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation.
second half of the appli-
the relationship between
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Explanatory M emorandum
(submitted by Mr, Page, Rapporteur)
l. WEU at the half-way stage
L In its twenty-fifth annual report, the
WEU Council recalls the celebration of the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty on 23rd October 1979. The
Assembly for its part celebrated this anniver-
sary at its symposium in Brussels. In effect,
since the treaty was concluded for a period of
fifty years it now has exactly half its history
behind it. It is naturally impossible to foresee
now what our governments will wish to do in
2004 with an institution and a treaty which will
maybe not have lost all their justification, but
the twenty-fifth report should perhaps be
viewed in the context of developments in both
Europe and WEU in the last twenty-five years.It is in fact quite clear that the enlargement
of the European Communities and the growth
in their activities have led those of their mem-
bers who are also members of Western Euro-
pean Union to transfler to the Communities the
exercise of some of the responsibilities which
the modified Brussels Treaty had assigned to
WEU. But at the same time, as Mr. Thorn,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said in his
address at the Brussels symposium:
"... we all know that it will take an inde-
finite length of time to make the notions
of Community Europe coincide, in com-
position and in structure, with the less
clearly-defined notions of European
union. The substance of this notion is
proving far more difficult to define by
common agreement than had been fore-
seen by the Six, and then the Nine, at the
beginning of this decade. "
2. Following the accession of the United
Kingdom to the European Communities,
concomitant with the development of nine-
power political consultations, WEU took a
number of measures designed to adapt itself to
the new situation. Instead of meetings of the
Council of Ministers being held quarterly they
started to be held annually, the " economic
day " which followed the " political day "
disappeared and the agenda of meetings became
decidedly more meagre both at ambassadorial
and at ministerial level. Moreover, meetings
with representatives of the seven governments
to prepare for debates in the United Nations
General Assembly, FAO and ECOSOC were
abolished. It is not surprising that the Assem-
bly was concerned at this development and that
relations between the Council and the Assem-
bly were somewhat uneasy for several years.
3. For instance, joint meetings between
Assembly Committees and the Council became
less frequent, particularly where the General
Aflairs Committee was concerned. Recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly, like the
report of its debates, showed that parliament-
arians had some doubt about the will
of the governments to keep WEU alive. One
of the questions then put by parliamentarians
concerned the extent to which the undertakings
entered into by the signatories of the modified
Brussels Treaty, particularly the automatic
assistance provision in Article V, would conti-
nue to be applied in spite of the reduction in
the Council's activities. The deterioration of
relations between France and NATO therefore
made this a matter of particularly keen
concern.
4. Anxious to react against this uneasiness,
the Council endeavoured to meet the Assem-
bly's wishes as to both the substance and the
form.
5. Where the substance is concerned, the
Council has underlined that it will continue to
ensure the full application of the modified
Brussels Treaty and that it has lost none of its
responsibilities, even if some of them are being
exercised by other bodies. However, in accor-
dance with Article I of the treaty, it does not
intend to duplicate the work of other
organisations.
6. It should be noted however that the same
article also calls upon the Council to " assist
the work of those organisations ". It may be
wondered whether the activities of the Council
really meet this commitment. It might do so
however, whilst remaining strictly within its
field of activity, by taking the initiative of
exchanges of views between member countries
on questions that the EEC does not seem
prepared to tackle in the immediate future but
which are of interest to all its members, as
would be the case for co-operation in civil
defence matters or the co-ordination of defence
measures outside the area covered by the North
Atlantic Treaty. That would meet a need as
well as a matter of topical concern for most of
the governments.
7. The Council has also underlined on
many occasions that it considers the WEU
Assembly to be " the only assembly with
defence responsibilities " and that it would
continue to keep it informed of the application
of the treaty, even if such application were
carried out by other bodies.
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8. Where the form is concerned, the Coun-
cil has agreed to a resumption of joint meetings
with Asembly Committees on an annual basis.
It has ensured that a sufficient number of
members of governments of member countries
take part in Assembly sessions and has effec-
tively supplied the Assembly with information
about the activities of other organisations,
whether European or not.
9. There is no doubt that the Assembly has
warmly welcomed these initiatives by the
Council and that relations between the two
WEU organs have improved considerably.
10. Nevertheless, in recent years the Assem-
bly has noted a number of points on which it
felt the Council was not entirely fulfilling its
commitments, particularly with regard to the
application of Article XI of the treaty, the
possible participation of non-member countries
of WEU in the work of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee in accordance with paragraph
l0 of the Council's decision of 7th May 1955
setting up the SAC, keeping parliamentarians
informed about the work of the Independent
European Programme Group or even the Stan-
ding Armaments Committee. Finally, the
Assembly has noted that the presence of full-
ranking ministers at its sessions or even at
meetings of the Council of Ministers is becom-
lng rarer.
I l. Then there was the question whether the
European Communities would develop to the
detriment of Western European Union in areas
outside the responsibilities of the Communitiesbut more specifically within those of
WEU. On several occasions, the WEU Assem-
bly has expressed the idea that the future Euro-
pean union could not be simply a Community
extended to areas not covered by the Rome
Treaty but that it could but exist side by side
with Community bodies and inter-state bodies
such as WEU as long as there was no single
treaty covering all European activities and
establishing close co-operation between them.
12. By discussing without hesitation a ques-
tion put by Mr. Ferguson and Mr. von Hassel
on European industrial policy in the armaments
field, the newly-elected European Parliament
aroused certain reactions. This question in
fact appeared to imply that the European Par-
liament intended to link the question of arma-
ments with that of defence since it asked the
Commission to contact NATO to promote an
industrial policy in the field of armaments.
13. Speaking at the Brussels symposium, Vis-
count Davignon underlined that the Communi-
ties have wide responsibilities relating to mem-
ber countries' industrial activities which, in
view of the fact that many arms-producing
firms also manufacture other products, preclu-
ded teaving the armaments industry out of its
purview. But he did not refer to relations
between the Commission and NATO.
14. The WEU Assembly has constantly
shown an active interest in armaments matters
and has a good partner in the Council since,
through Mr. Thorn, it expressed its approval of
the course followed in the Assembly's work.
There is nothing to prevent it continuing
along this course. The question of responsibi-
lities remains a very delicate one but from the
standpoint of what has actually been studied
and achieved, avoiding any discussion about
principles and procedure, it seems that in pre-
sent circumstances the WEU Assembly has no
need to fear competition from the European
Parliament in matters relating to defence.
15. It should be added that the composition
of the Assembly, different in nature from that
of the European Parliament, makes it represen-
tative in a different way in the defence field, as
Mr. Thorn further indicated:
" The close links associating you with the
parliaments of your respective 
_countriesin any case give your work a dimension
which is not the same as that of the deli-
berations of a European parliament
elected by universal suffrage. If that
assembly seems destined to play a driving
r6le in the Europe of tomorrow, because
it is the product of a vote intended to
represent the common will of a European
people, the fact that you are an emana-
tion of the national parliaments gives
you, here and now, authority of another
kind and makes you, so to speak, a fede-
ral assembly of Europe required likewise
to express hic et nunc the opinions of the
European nations on matters which are
your responsibility. In many sectors,
these opinions are essential when any
common decisions are taken, pafticularly
those relating to defence questions and
armaments. "
16. If this twenty-fifth annual report is com-
pared closely with Mr. Thorn's address in Brus-
sels and the statements of several members of
the Council, it can thus be seen that WEU's
twenty-fifth anniversary helped to clarify a
situation which had for quite a long time been
out of focus. It shows relatively clearly the
admittedly modest but nevertheless essential
place occupied by WEU and its activities in a
Europe aiming at the enlargement of the
Communities and the progressive establishment
of a framework of wider European co-
operation.
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ll. Relations between the Council and the
Assembly
l. Basis of the dialogue
17 . In his reply to the twenty-fourth annual
report, Senator Minnocci, Rapporteur of the
General Affairs Committee, had already noted a
number of points on which the Council had
met the Assembly's wishes by specifying the
nature of its responsibilities.
18. There have been at least two further
ministerial statements in the same sense : one
by Mr. Thorn, Chairman-in-Offrce of the
Council, when presenting the twenty-fourth
annual report to the Assembly at the June 1979
session, who, in the words of the twenty-fifth
annual report, commented that:
" the WEU Assembly was unaflected
because the modified Brussels Treaty
gave it clear and exclusive responsibilities
in defence matters ",
and the other by Mr. Ruffini, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Italy, who, during the debate
in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 23rd
January 1980 on the activities of the European
Communities, said:
" The Council continued to ensure the
application of the Brussels Treaty and its
protocols, underlining the importance
which member states attach to the com-
mitments thus assumed. The Italian
Government considers that the Assembly,
the only Eufopean parliamentary body
authorised by virtue of its constitution to
discuss defence matters, retains its full
importance. "
19. The Council and member countries
therefore clearly recognise the Assembly's
exclusive responsibility for defence matters as
the Council repeats, in the phrase in Chapter I
of the twenty-fifth annual report, that the
Assembly " is the European parliamentary body
empowered by treaty to deal with " defence
matters.
20. Secondly, the Council pointedly recalls
its wish to continue its dialogue with the
Assembly " on questions relating to the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty, including
those dealt with by the member governments of
WEU in other international fora ". It specifies
moreover that in 1979 it gave the Assembly
" details of consultations in which the represen-
tatives of the WEU member states had taken
part, in particular in the framework of political
co-operation of the Nine and in the No(h
Atlantic Council " and also referred " to the
work being done in the Conference of National
Armaments Directors and, where possible, to
that of the Independent European Programme
Group ".
21. The Assembly for its part, by organising
the Brussels symposium on a European arma-
ments policy, showed that it still considered the
question of the joint producuion of armaments
to be in the forefront of its re$ponsibilities, even
if some of its members expr'pssed the wish to
have the European Parliam(nt deal with this
matter as well within the fra]mework of indus-
trial policy. As Mr. Thorn wisely remarked
when speaking on behalf of qhe Council at the
Brussels symposium:
" This work in no way challenges the
responsibilities, the powers or the autho-
rity of other European institutions but is
absolutely in line with your own task,
which the WEU Council has always ack-
nowledged in recognising that your
Assembly is the only European parlia-
mentary assembly with defence responsi-
bilities. "
22. Finally, the Assembly can only welcome
the fact that, in his address to the Assembly at
its December 1979 session, Mr. Thorn under-
lined, to use the words of the annual report of
the Council, " that WEU, during its first
twenty-five years of existence, had encouraged
efforts made towards Europ$an union. which
was the ultimate objective set by the authors of
the modified Brussels Treat!,... to this end it
had acted in various fields in] which it is com-
petent according to the circumstances and
needs of the moment. taking Care at all times to
avoid overlapping activitiBs ". Thus Mr.
Thorn followed a line very often stressed by the
Assembly that relations between WEU and the
European Communities are in no way competi-
tive but should converge in a future European
union whose exact nature cannot yet be speci-
fied.
23. The decision of the governments to take
appropriate steps within the framework of the
Nine (no doubt soon the Twelve or the Thir-
teen), even if WEU may have legitimate claims
to act itself, is common sensp and corresponds
to the essential facts of life which the Assembly
has always recognised.
2. Joint meerinls
24. The procedure for joinq meetings between
Assembly Committees and tht Council was des-
igned to allow a conhdential dialogue between
the two WEU organs. It was customary at
one time for the Chairmail-in-Oflice of the
Council alone to speak in teply to questions
put by parliamentarians. Speaking on behalf
of the Council as a whole, he had to ascertain
the positions of the various governments on
many questions which had not previously been
discussed by the Council. The procedure was
thus a cumbersome one and parliamentarians
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quite rightly complained about the resulting
absence ofdialogue.
25. In 1972, the Council proposed a new
procedure, drawing a distinction between a for-
mal stage during which questions put before-
hand by the Committees were the subject of
replies adopted unanimously by the Council
and a second stage, of which no minutes were
to be taken, during which all members of the
Council could be asked to reply, each in his
own name, to supplementary questions put by
parliamentarians. However, this procedure has
never been applied in spite of requests by the
Assembly.
26. At present, joint meetings are held in
accordance with an informal procedure, which
allows the Chairman-in-Office either to speak
on behalf of the Council as a whole, but
without the possibility of consulting it, or to ask
the representatives of the various governments
to speak. Without being opposed to this
method, the Assembly has often drawn atten-
tion to the fact that it was speaking less with
the Council than with the representatives of
individual governments and that it no longer
had any real means of knowing the position of
the Council as such on the questions it put.
27. In its twenty-fifth annual report, the
Council replies as follows to these remarks:
" As the purpose of such contacts is to
complement and expand the dialogue
conducted through the written procedure,
they consider that the flexible and open
character of such meetings should be
maintained so that each member of
the Council can give his government's
views. "
28. It is clear that if the Council were effect-
ively to apply the procedure as defined in the
above quotation, i.e. if the representative of
each member country was indeed asked to give
his government's opinion on questions put by
members of the Assembly, the Committee
could but welcome such procedure. It must
however note that so far a number of govern-
ments have been represented at joint meetings,
when they did not have the Chairmanship-in-
Office of the Council, only by their ambassa-
dors and that the latter have rarely spoken on
questions put by parliamentarians. More
widespread ministerial participation seems
essential if the " informal " procedure chosen
by the Council is to be applied properly.
29. It should also be noted that the Council
specifies that:
" ... the informal nature of these meetings
did not prevent the Council from giving
their collegiate views, provided they
received prior notice of the subjects
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which the Committees wished to raise
and could therefore concert their
opinions. "
30. Your Rapporteur wonders whether it
would not be in the interest of the Assembly to
take advantage of this statement by the Council
to put questions in writing so that the Council
would be in a position to give collective
answers at joint meetings. This very point has
been one of the Assembly's constant aims. But
the conditions in which this procedure can be
used should be specified beforehand by agree-
ment between the Council and the Assembly,
since there is every chance that it will amount
to almost the same procedure as that proposed
by the Council in 1972.
31.
3. Recommendations and written questions
In 1978, the Assembly noted an improve-
ment in the standard of the Council's replies to
Assembly recommendations. It realises that
the effort then made by the Council has been
continued in 1979. However, where written
questions are concerned, your Rapporteur notes
that there have been very few and that the
Assembly has not taken advantage of this
opportunity of obtaining a collective reply by
the seven countries on matters within its
purview. Nevertheless, it is disappointing to
note that the Council's replies rarely reach the
Assembly within the prescribed time limit and
are often rather sketchy and disappointing.
which no doubt explains why members of the
Assembly make only limited use of this means
of pursuing the dialogue with the Council.
4, Governmeat participalion in Assembly sessrons
32. It is certainly to be welcomed that the
Council has continued to ensure that there has
been a good attendance by ministers at Assem-
bly sessions and the Brussels symposium.
However, your Rapporteur wishes to point
out, as Mr. Minnocci did last year, the impor-
tance which the Assembly attaches to the pre-
sence of more full-ranking ministers, particu-
larly where foreign affairs and defence are
concerned.
lll. Activities of the Council
33. The Council clearly informed the Assem-
bly in its twenty-hfth annual report of the prin-
cipal external policy problems facing Europe,
whether or not they were dealt with in the
framework of the WEU Council. Your Rap-
porteur believes it did so in order to take
account of current events and to allow a dialo-
gue with the Assembly, particularly in connec-
tion with the subjects of reports recently
adopted by its Committees.
34. However, a simple list of visits by minis-
ters from Eastern Europe to the West and
ministers from our countries to Eastern Europe
does not provide a very interesting picture of
the .trend of bilateral relations between mem-
bers of WEU and the eastern countries. Since
this seems to be the field in which the WEU
Council has specialised, would it not be parti-
cularly appropriate to allow the Assembly to
participate more fully in such matters, which
take up the major part of its ministerial meet-
ings? Is the information exchanged at these
meetings really so secret that it cannot be sum-
marised in the Council's report rather than be
discussed in a confidential manner? The
Assembly hopes that the Council at ministerial
level will spend more time on WEU's own acti-
vities.
35. The reference to multilateral relations
with a view to the CSCE follow-up meeting
scheduled to be held in Madrid in November
1980, which takes into account the work of
both the Nine and the North Atlantic Council
and the possible effects of the invasion of
Afghanistan on East-West relations, is a piece
of information for which the Assembly can only
congratulate the Council. The Assembly has
very often underlined that " full compliance
with the Helsinki final act " was in its view a
fundamental aim and welcomes the fact that
the Council holds the same views. It would
however have appreciated more details about
the consequences which the Council considers
the invasion of Afghanistan will have for the
preparation of the Madrid meeting, particularly
in the defence field where WEU has special
responsibility.
36. Where the enlargement of the European
Communities is concerned, it would have been
more interesting if the Council had not con-
fined itself to mentioning matters relating to
Greece, Portugal and Spain, which have now
been settled, but had referred in the annual
report or by any other means it deemed appro-
priate to problems raised by developments in
the talks with Portugal and Spain.
37. There have in fact been press reports of
negative reactions by several of the nine
governments towards these candidatures, one of
them being afraid of Spain's accession because
of its agriculture, another Portugal's accession
because it wishes to protect its textile indus-
tries. Turkey's possible accession, because of
fears that the labour market may be saturated,
is also a cause of concern. Such concerns are
quite legitimate, even if when all is said and
done they should be secondary to the concern
to enlarge and deepen Community Europe.
When referring to such a matter your
Rapporteur believes that the Council should
not merely list the results achieved but also
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indicate the difficulties ntered and the
reasons why it has been im ible to overcome
some of them, provided, of course, that this
does not inhibit the govern
action.
nts' freedom of
38. Where the situation ln the Near and
Middle East is concerned. {here is real sub-
stance for a European policy f n the twenty-fifth
annual report of the Council find this conforms
to the proposals made by thp General Affairs
Committee last December When adopting a
report by Sir Frederic Bennett on the impact of
the evolving situation in the Near and Middle
East on Western European security. One is
happy to note a convergence between the views
of the Council and the Assembly where this
policy is concerned. However, the two points
which still pose major problems for Europe
- 
the recognition of the right of Palestinians to
self-determination and the joint attitude of
European countries towards Israeli settlements
on the West Bank, on the one hand, and the no
less significant extent of sanctions which might
be taken against the Soviet Uriion following the
invasion of Afghanistan, on t[re other- are not
mentioned in this chapter which therefore loses
much of its interest. Admitt{dly, the Nine do
not seem to have achieved vefy positive results
in these two fields: does the Council consider
that omission is the best inforpation it can give
the Assembly in such cases? ]
39. For the Assembly's fulure activity, it is
essential for it to know the Council's point of
view on these matters and the latter's answers
to Written Questions 205 to 214 put by Sir
Frederic Bennett offer little further inform-
ation. Should it be concluded that the Council
could not achieve unanimity in answering these
questions or drafting a more substantial account
of joint positions in its annual report? If so, the
Council would already be ren{ering the Assem-
bly a service by saying so instead of systema-
tically avoiding all relerence to matters on
which its members are not unanimous. A few
examples in the past have sh0wn that it could
take this liberty 
- 
for instance, when France did
not follow the same course a$ the members of
the NATO integrated militar! organisation. It
ghoyld find an appropriate waf in each event as
it did in that case.
40. However, your Rapporteur is bold
enough to reflect that all memlbers of the Coun-
cil were not apparently as pleased as the
twenty-fifth annual report irnplies with the
nine-power consultations following the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. For instance, Mr.
Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
told the Belgian Senate on 28th February 1980
that he was not satisfied with these consulta-
tions because it had taken the Nine two weeks
to adopt a joint position, because information
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from and consultations with the United States
in the framework of NATO were less than
satisfactory and also because it had not been
possible to hold the proposed meeting in Bonn
between the United States and certain Euro-
pean powers. There are still manifest diver-
gences between our countries on the steps to be
taken, in spite of the endorsement of Lord
Carrington's suggested policy for the neutralisa-
tion of Afghanistan. In short, it may be
wondered whether the Council, in painting the
picture of European co-operation over Afghan-
istan, has shown altogether too much sunlight
and has removed rather too many clouds and
shadows! Members of the Assembly should
make use of joint meetings and written ques-
tions to urge it to give a more accurate account
of the facts of the situation. And even so it
must not take the way out it took for Questions
205 to 214; it must give proper answers within
reasonable time limits when questions are put
to it.
41. One can only hope that African ques-
tions may now present fewer problems than in
the past for the cohesion of Europe and the
report on decisions taken within the framework
of nine-pbwer political co-operation with regard
to Rhodesia anci in the framework of the
Communities proper with regard to the Lomd
Convention call for no special comment.
lY. Conclusions
42. In its reply to the twenty-fourth annual
report of the Council, the General Affairs
Committee noted that there had been definite
progress in co-ordination between the various
European institutions, in relations between the
Council and the Assembly and also in the co-
ordination of the foreign policies of member
countries. Recent events in Iran and Afghanis-
tan, however, indicate that this co-operation is
far from perfect. The twenty-fifth annual
report confirms this impression and also shows
a close convergence between the views of the
Council and those of the Assembly on many
matters, inside or outside Western Europe.
This similarity of approach, if continued,
should allow further consolidation during 1980
of what now seem to be established practices.
Yo'rr Rapporteur believes that there is a
strong desire in the Assembly that the Council
and the Assembly should make further efforts
to have the work and the achievements of WEU
better known in member parliaments and with
the public as a whole.
43. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that
the Assembly adopt the twenty-fifth annual
report of the Council. However, at the close of
this study and as we embark upon the second
half of the period of history which began with
the signature of the Paris Agreements in 1954,
your Rapporteur wishes to underline a few
points which he feels should not only govern
relations between the Council and the Assem-
bly during the second half of this period of our
history but also allow WEU to make a greater
contribution to the building of a European
union.
44. First, if the Assembly is to be asked to
accept the de facto limitation of the Council's
activities, it should be on the express condition
that the latter continues to keep it fully inform-
ed of the way in which the modified Brussels
Treaty is applied. It is understandable that the
Council should have expressed some reserva-
tions about the way in which it would inform
the Assembly of the work of the Independent
European Programme Group, although it is un-
acceptable for it to doubt the principle of
communicating such information on the
grounds that it has no organic links with the
IEPG. It is also conceivable that as long as the
study undertaken by the Standing Armaments
Committee is not completed it does not wish to
divulge the text of each chapter. But these
reservations would be acceptable only if the
Council for its part, in accordance with its
earlier promises, really does its utmost to give
the Assembly the best possible information
about these matters, as it did, for example,
when it authorised Mr. Plantey to address the
Brussels symposium on the juridical aspects of
European armaments co-operation. In the case
of the IEPG, the Assembly should put specific
questions to the Council on the progress of the
group's work in order to put its good will to the
test to better effect than any declaration of good
intentions.
45. The second point is the assurance that
the Council really believes (as indicated by Mr.
Thorn, its Chairman-in-Oflice, in 1979) that
WEU, as a body, would not be foreign to a
newly-structured Europe but that it has a
special place to f,rll in the European union of
tomorrow. To this end it is probable that
there will have to be some relaxation of the
commitments imposed upon its members by the
protocols annexed to the treaty, and your
Rapporteur thinks there is no need to show a
radically hostile attitude towards any liberalisa-
tion of these commitments which corresponded
to the realities of 1954 but not of
1980. Conversely, but in the same context, by
applying Article XI and other measures, the
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Council must still be prepared to apply the
treaty in full and use it as a worthwhile instru-
ment for closer co-operation between all coun-
tries willing to take part in a future European
unlon.
46. A third point would be the way in which
the Council applies Article I, not just to relieve
itself of some of its activities as it has done
fairly consistently up to now, but to assist the
oOcur',reNr 834
work of other economic isat which
the member countries are re
47 . If the Council proves illing to show a
towards thesesufficiently positive attit
various points, it would
development of relations betry
and the Assembly in coming y
the second half of WEU's lifej
golden jubilee in 2004! i
ions in
,ted.
r well for the
'een the Council
ears, as we enter
leading up to its
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Information Report
(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur)
l. Relations with other European assemblies
l. Since its formation, the WEU Assembly
has always had contacts with the other two
European assemblies through members of par-
liament or officials of the Offrces of the Clerk.
For the Council of Europe, the seven countries
common to both assemblies are represented by
the same members. For the assembly of the
European Communities, about 5 0/o of its mem-
bers have always been members of the WEU
Assembly at the same time; the other 95 0/o
met members of WEU in their respect"ve par-
Iiaments.
2. The June 1979 elections radically chan-
ged this situation: the assembly of the Euro-
pean Communities now has more than twice as
many members, only half of whom are now
members of national parliamentsr, and these
figures may change yet again at the next elec-
tions. The final result will be an assembly of
410 members practically none of whom will be
members of national parliaments.
3. Up to July 1979, the WEU Assembly was
able to contact all members of the European
assemblies through written or oral questions putin the parliaments of member countries, by
statements in the permanent committees of
these parliaments and by speeches in plenary
sittings.
4. Since then, the situation has changed.
The Committee therefore decided that hence-
forth the orange booklet containing the texts
adopted and a brief account of the session
should be sent to the Offrce of the Clerk of the
assembly of the European Communities for dis-
tribution to members and senior officials. The
Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly trans-
mitted this proposal and has just received an
aflirmative answer.
5. On the problem of communicating or
exchanging documents and official reports of
debates, your Rapporteur was initially rather
surprised at the situation as it now stands.
6. From the assembly of the European
Communities, the Office of the Clerk o[ the
WEU Assembly receives all documents relating
to sessions, printed proceedings, questions put
to the Council of Ministen or to the Commis-
sion, publications on specific subjects and, on
l. To be absolutely clear, your Rapporteur has used the
official terminology: member of parliament = member of a
national parliament (consisting of one or two chambers);
representative 
= 
member of a European assembly who is
not a member of his national parliament.
microfiches, the ofijcial repdrts (series L and
C) and proceedings 
I
7. From the ParliamentarJ, Assembly of the
Council of Europe, the Office of the Clerk
receives documents relating ]to sessions, com-
mittee documents provided t$ey are not confi-
dential, volumes of document$ and proceedings,
texts adopted and minutes.
8. Conversely, the WEU Assembly sends its
proceedings, information bopklets and docu-
mentation to the libraries $f the other two
assemblies and also to ceftain officials. It
should be noted that commit(ee documents are
also exchanged between the two Committees for
Relations with Parliaments.
g. This widespread excharirge of documenta-
tion is obviously very useful: the secretariats of
the three assemblies may at any time refer to
what has been or is being done in the other
assemblies, but in practice tfirese archives are
only too rarely consulted by lofficials or secre-
taries of parliamentary com[nittees, and vir-
tually never by members of parliament them-
selves.
10. Year after year, all thege documents pile
up on shelves and the Officeslof the Clerk have
already had to start replaciirg documents on
paper by documents on miorofiches (about a
hundred pages fit on a fiche measuring
7 x l0 cm).
I l. Texts or documents m{y be communica-
ted in several ways:
(i) at the top offici4l level between
Presidents ;
(ii) by the Clerk to spedific committees;
(ilr) between officials in the Oflices of the
Clerk ;
(iv) officially to assembly libraries ;
(v) to the political groirps of the assem-
blies (since the sa{ne offrcials often
provide the secretariats for these
groups in all three assemblies, there
has been an automatic exchange for a
long time);
(vi) to national delegations (for the
Assembly of the Cpuncil of Europe,
the exchange is au[omatic since the
seven delegations 4re identical ; the
assembly of the Eurtopean Communi-
ties no longer has national delega-
tions but only political groups which,
in 1980, had a staffof 180);
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(vir) through other intermediaries such as
national political parties or similar
bodies.
ll. Activities of the Committee
for Relations with Parliaments
12. The Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments must shape its r6le and methods of
work in accordance with the aims of the
Assembly.
13. The modiflred Brussels Treaty made the
WEU Assembly the only European assembly
with responsibility for defence and security
matters.
14. It is therefore for the Assembly to air our
countries' problems in this respect, compare
their options and determine the areas in which
a common approach is desirable and possible in
order to promote closer European solidarity.
This is the goal of our debates and the purpose
of the recommendations which we address to
the Council.
15. However, the consultative nature of our
Assembly's deliberations and the fact that only
a small number of matters covered by its
recommendations are actually handled by the
Council should prompt the Assembly to pursueits work in other forums and by other
methods. This justifies the task of the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parliaments whose
present report recapitulates the methods of
work with a view to improving results.
16. The methods of the Committee for Rela-
tions with Parliaments may be divided into two
categories.
17. First, the Committee extends the dialogue
between the Assembly and the Council through
approaches to member governments of WEU in
accordance with appropriate procedure in each
parliament.
18. Second, the Committee concerns itself
with certain practical aspects of relations
between European assemblies and seeks to
bring the work of the Assembly to the attention
of those who shape public opinion.
19. Whereas methods in the first category
rely on specific parliamentary procedure under
the rules governing each parliament, the second
category calls for an all-round spirit of initiative
and imagination. In both cases, the results
obtained should be reviewed and an assessment
made of future prospects.
I
20. Composed of representatives of the par-
liaments of member countries. the WEU
Assembly can and must, through its national
delegations, pursue its direct action towards
each government using the appropriate proce-
dure in each parliament. It should therefore
be underlined how much the very composition
of the WEU Assembly can facilitate thepunuit of its aims. The security ques-
tions dealt with in its debates are essentially a
matter of national sovereignty and never the
subject of a Community approach. Whereas
the assembly of the European Communities,
elected by direct universal suffrage, can elicit
replies on matters within its purview, it is
powerless in fields relating directly to defence.
Conversely, the WEU Assembly can promote
concerted action by the governments which
have the last word in taking decisions on how
to ensure our security.
21. In the longer term, your Rapporteur
could perhaps envisage some kind of two
chamber system in the framework of a Euro-
pean union to take account of the difference in
membership of the economic and political orga-
nisation and of the organisation responsible for
security matters and also of the diversity of
methods used in handling these questions:
Community methods or consultations without
relinquishment of sovereignty, integration or
co-operation.
22. After underlining the importance of
action in parliaments, it is to be regretted that
there seems to have been a marked reduction in
such action, as may be seen from the table at
appendix. Committee members should above
all recall that their r6le is to be played mainly
in the national parliaments and that committee
meetings are useful only insofar as they prepare
for such concerted action.
23. Whether in the form of written or oral
questions or statements during a foreign policy
debate, the number of actions is not all that
counts. They must be effective and to that end
have a bearing on matters which are worthy of
debate or stimulate interest. Twice a year, the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
selects {rom among the Assembly's recommen-
dations those which are particularly suitable for
action in national parliaments. Assembly
recommendations can attract the attention of
parliaments and elicit meaningful answers from
govemments because of their political interest
and the depth of the thoughts they express.
Members of the Committee for Relations
with Parliaments have a modest but important
r6le to play and that is to explain the concerns
behind these texts and thus to facilitate a
convergence of European views on the crucial
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subjects which may norrnally be a subject of
division.
24. The Committee's task may be made
easier by 'the summary of reports which the
Presidential Committee has decided to have
prepared. by the Committees as from this year.
These summaries are to highlight the main
lines of the problem, possible options and the
Committee's suggestions so that members of
parliament snowed under by too many docu-
ments may immediately identify the texts which
interest them.
25. In this connection, it should be pointed
out that for the first time a parliamentary
committee has adopted a position after studying
a text adopted by the WEU Assembly: the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Cham-
ber of Deputies discussed Resolution 63 on par-
liaments and defence procurement and wound
up its discussions by adopting an opinion incor-
porating the ideas contained in the resolution.
A short summary of this meeting and the text
adopted are appended to this report (see
Appendix III).
26. The Committee's action in national par-
liaments is not only a matter of applying parlia-
mentary procedure or publicising certain docu-
ments, it is perhaps rather more a matter of
establishing human contacts. In the past year,
there has been no meeting between a WEU
Assembly Committee and a committee of a
national parliament, but the Defence Commit-
tee has established a welcome practice in invi-
ting the chairmen of parliamentary defence
committees to one of its meetings each year in
order to study jointly a topic of common
interest. Thus the participation of chairmen of
defence committees in the visit by the WEU
Assembly Defence Committee to the United
States was considered most rewarding.
II
27. The WEU Assembly is not concerned
only with the institutional dialogue between
parliaments and governments; it can and must
concern itself with the work of the other Euro-
pean assemblies and with the opinions of
influential persons working on one or other
aspect of the building of Europe.
28. Shortcomings have often been noted in
the co-ordination of the work of the European
assemblies because in the foreign policy field
the three assemblies have often tackled identical
subjects. There is a natural convergence in
this field: whatever may be the specialisation of
the three assemblies in their own specific areas,
some subjects will necessarily be tackled
successively in reports by their committees with
the difference that they will not be presented at
the same time and .u.h ur*fnbly will examine
its own particular angle deplnding on its mem-
bership and responsibilities.
29. This does not mean [h"t .ffo.tr to co-
ordinate should be abando{ed but above all
that an attempt must be flnade to improve
mutual information on wor( conducted in the
three bodies. Information lpay be exchanged
at several levels. 
i30. First, it should be posiible for the Presi-
dents of the assemblies to dxchange views on
matters of concern to theirl respective assem-
blies. The Conference of Presidents of Euro-
pean Parliamentary Assemplies provides an
excellent opportunity for organising such
meetings. Mr. de Koster, President of the
Assembly of the Council of' Europe, is to be
congratulated for having taken the initiative of
organising such a meeting during the Confe-
rence of Presidents held in The Hague in June
1978. A similar meeting wlll.perhaps be held
in Madrid during the Confefence of Presidents
to be held at the end of May.
3l. Conferences of PresidBnts and meetings
of the Interparliamentary Union also provide
an opportunity for the thrqe Clerks to meet.
These informal and unofficihl contacts should
allow a solution to be fqund to problems
stemming from possible overfapping in the type
of work undertaken by the a$semblies and their
committees and in the dates of certain
meetings. This area is not precisely within the
purview of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments, whose Chairman should simply
draw the attention of the Presidential Commit-
tee to the value the Committee attaches to
maintaining an effective exqhange of informa-
tion between the various o(gans of the Euro-
pean assemblies.
32. At the staff level, for more than two
years there has been a European centre for par-
liamentary research and documentation, a
network to facilitate the ex4hange of informa-
tion between the staffs of thirty-five national
parliaments and European assemblies. The
Secretary of the Committee for Relations with
Parliaments represents the 1VEU Assembly at
this centre and is thereforo able to acquaint
other parliaments and asqemblies with the
Assembly's work. The Coprference of Presi-
dents to be held in Madrid on 30th and 3lst
May 1980 will discuss the fpture of the centre
which it set up in 1977.
33. In the same spirit, the Presidential Com-
mittee might examine the contacts established
between committees of the Enrropean assemblies
conducting similar work, and particularly
between the Political Committee of the Council
of Europe, on the one hand, and the General
Affairs Committee and Scierttific Committee of
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the WEU Assembly on the other. It will prob-
ably wish to be informed of the type of work
carried out by the Political Committee of the
assembly of the European Communities.
34. The WEU Assembly has also endeavou-
red to draw the attention of public opinion to
certain fundamental conditions of European
security. This is partly why it has organised
symposia on problems of co-operation in the
aeronautical and arms production fields, the
last of which was held in Brussels on l5th, l6th
and lTth October 1979 and with which the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments was
associated. The Committee should ascertain
that the recommendations based on an analysis
of papers presented at this symposium are
examined with due attention by all concerned.
Committee members may promote a com-
mon approach to questions on which there has
proved to be suflicient convergence of the views
of those concerned. They must bring such
possibilities of co-operation to the attention of
their colleagues who do not have the benefit of
the same international experience.
35. Your Rapporteur apologises in advance
for repeating what has already been said on
many occasions by other Rapporteurs: all mem-
bers must play their part if the Assembly is to
exercise an influence. Including both repre-
sentatives and substitutes, almost 180 members
of parliament attend the WEU Assembly.
Your Rapporteur wonders how many of them
refer to its recommendations after leaving the
Palais d'I6na.
36. Yet members have so many opportunities
of referring to our work: debates on the defence
and foreign affairs budgets, procurement of
military equipment, policy debates on specific
questions or on the building of Europe in gene-
ral. Nor should we forget the possibility of
putting oral or written questions with or
without debate.
37. The Committee for Relations with Par-
liaments therefore urges all members of the
Assembly to consider that they have the task of
strengthening, in their national parliaments, the
idea of European solidarity when confronted
with problems affecting our security.
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APPENDIX I
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries
(Totak by country for eoch session)
Recommendations
adopted in
Member countries
Belgium France
Federal
Republic
of
Germany
Italy Luxembou4 Netherlands IUnitedKingdom Total
956
957
9s8
9s9
960
961
962
963
964
96s
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
0
4
2
0
3
0
2
0
4
0
2
t4
6
ll
3
0
0
0
0
l0
l6
4
t7
9
0
0
0
0
t2
2
4
0
t4
ll
t2
9
t4
l5
l5
4
6
4
I
28
40
l8
49
45
3
I
J
9
2
0
4
l3
9
t2
t2
22
20
t7
l5
l9
2
2
J
8
l3
4
t2
t2
0
0
0
0
8
J
6
22
ll
24
49
29
22
8
7
9
I
6
l3
l9
t4
l5
2t
l0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
I
I
0
I
2
I
0
2
0
0
I
2
J
2
I
4
l0
0
5
4
0
J
6
3
2
5
5
4
6
t6
4
J
6
I
0
0
ll
J
I
t0
I
0
2
3
0
I
0
l0
3
2
28
l8
t6
47
36
l0
l0
0
0
0
3
8
t4
t4
l0
J
t2
t2
9
29
ll
3l
4t
46
80
98
98
126
9l
55
48
l0
l3
l9
82
96
57
127
97
Total 107 303 217 297 33 99 235 t29t
Annual average 4.46 12.63 9.04 12.33 r.37 4.12 b.so 7.64
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Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since Jane 1978
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324
32s
326
327
328
x
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6
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4
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l
I
I
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4
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2
2
3
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1979
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APPENDIX III
Discussion on Resolution 63 of the LItEU
Assembly by the Foreign Affairs Committee of
the ltalian Chamber of Deputies,
17th October 1979
The Rapporteur, Mr. De Poi, noted that
examination of the resolution on the agenda
raised problems of substance and procedure, the
latter being mainly due to the fact that it was
the first time that the procedure under Article
125 had been applied. The first problem was
the right to examine such matters. He consi-
dered the Foreign Affairs Committee should
claim this right each time overall international
policy problems were examined in various
fields. This was partly the case for the present
resolution concerning which he did not propose
to become involved in a fight over responsi-
bilities insofar as the Defence Committee had
already started (and perhaps completed) its
discussion on this subject. He would keep to
general principles. Turning to the matter in
hand, he described the contents of the WEU
resolution, expressing his support for the
requests 
-and the proposed ways and means
which were not contrary to the principles of
Italy's Constitution. Just when Europe had to
face up to military requirements, even though
not militaristic, the parliamentary debate on
this matter would help to maintain peace and
not build up tension in international relations.
These were valid reasons for approving the
resolution, and he proposed that the Committee
express a favourable opinion on the points
which he read out. He recalled that such an
opinion would not be useless since the Com-
mittee concerned had not yet managed to
approve the resolution.
Mr. Cerquetti endorsed these views on the
question of responsibilities and specified, where
the substance was concerned, that the Commu-
nist Group had completed its discussion on this
decision and others taken in international par-
liamentary bodies with a view to asking the
national parliament to co-operate in decisions
on military policy. This debate was set in an
international context of almost generalised
rearmament and deteriorating d6tente between
the blocs, accompanied by a possibility of
conflicts over energy supplies ; if to this were
added the difficulties encountered in ratifying
the SALT treaty and the Vienna agreements,
the importance of the question of parliamentary
supervision of armaments policy could be
understood. As for the motion for an opinion
read out by the Rapporteur, he noted that it
should provide for approval of specific stan-
dards for the control of trade in armaments and
for military expenditure programmes, corrobo-
rated by appropriate sta0ements on inter-
national agreements on the subject which,
although not covered by the provisions of
Article 80 of the Constilution, should be
subject to parliamentary aqsessment. Finally,
he asked that the Foreign Affairs Committee
also propose a parliamenta[y discussion with
the government before thb NATO meeting
planned for December in order to examine the
subjects to be discussed there.
After further statements by the Rapporteur
and the Chairman, the Comririttee approved the
following opinion:
The Foreign Affairs Committee.
Having examined ResQlution 63 of the
WEU Assembly;
Considering that the ptinciples it sets out
comply fully with the Italian constitutional
system ;
Noting as worthy of corlsideration its asser-
tions on the expediency ofr promoting, in the
framework of the laws in forpe, and with a view
to updating them, a more Eontinuous flow of
information on internal and international
defence policy problems,
Expresses a favourable opinion on Resolu-
tion 63, emphasising the expediency of studying
possible changes in the rulEs of procedure of
the Chamber which may m4ke its studies more
punctilious and more effrcie4t;
Recognises the need to promote a political
debate with the government before NATO's
December meeting on the approach the execu-
tive intends to adopt at that meeting. and to be
kept informed subsequently ;
Notes finally the expediency of communi-
cating to parliament in due course all interna-
tional agreements which, although not covered
by Article 80 of the Constirtution, have major
repercussions on Italy's military policy.
59
Document 836 29th April 1980
Application of the Brassels Treaty
Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DnRrr RecouuexoRrroN
on the application of the Brussels Treaty following the invasion of Afghanistan
by the Soviet Union
ExpLRNnrony MruonnNoutvt
submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur
L lntroduction and relations with the Council
II. Activities of the Council and state o[ European security
(a) Defence questions dealt with in the Council
(i) Level of florces of member states
(li) United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe
(iii) Study of the armaments industries in member countries
(D) Srate of European security in the light of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan
III. Agency for the Control of Armaments
(a) Non-application of controls
(D) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments
IV. Standing Armaments Committee
V. Conclusions
L Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with I absten-
tion.
__2.. Members of the Committee: Mr. Bonnel (ActingChairman); MM. Ahrens, Banks, Baumel, Bechter (Alter-
nate: Schleiler), van den Bergh, Bernini, Boucheny (Alter-
rytei Jung), Cavaliere, Cox (Altemate.. Brown\, Delardin,Edwards, Fosson (Alternate'. Talamona), Grant, Handlos, de
Koster, Labriola, Lemmrich, Meintz, M6nard (Altemate:
Bozzi), Onslow (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), pawelczyk,
Pecchioli, Pdronnet, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Altemite:
van Hulst), Tanghe.
N.B. 7fie names ol those taking part tn the vote areprinted tn italics.
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Dralt Recommendation
on thc applicatioa olthe Brussels Treaty
following thc intasbn ol Alghanistan
by thc Sotiet Unioa
The Assembly,
(, Considering that at a time when the forces of the Soviet Union have judt invaded a non-
member country of the Warsaw Pact it is essential to reaflirm the mutual defence obligations of
Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
(rl) Recalling the recommendations in the report on strategic mobility prepared by the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments *;
(rrr) Considering that no provision of the modified Brussels Treaty should jeopardise the security of
the Alliance and noting that the Council applies only partially the controls provided for in Protocol
No. III;
(rv) Anxious to clarify the state of commitments entered into in the framework of the treaty,
RecouurNos rHAT rHp CouNctr-
l. Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, lVhere appropriate,
those provided for in Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus reafflrming the proper
responsibilities of each of the seven member countries and the respective provisiQns of the Brussels
and North Atlantic Treaties;
2. Call for the strengthening of the defence of all member states through the ulgent implementa-
tion by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme tb take account in
particular of the situation in the Middle East;
3. Approve, in the appropriate NATO bodies, the assignment of German naval forces to
SACLANT and to SACEUR with the sole aim of making the best use of all availablle allied forces for
the common defence;
4. Delete paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified BrusselsTreaty;
5. Make use of the procedure whereby NATO may provide material for replies to appropriate
Assembly recommendations;
6. Amplify, in future annual reports, the present reference to United Kingdom land forces
stationed on the mainland of Europe by a corresponding reference to the United Kingdom's Second
Tactical Air Force and any redeployment of such forces liable to affect the accufacy of the figures
given;
7. Clarify, in its twenty-sixth.annual report, the present situation as regards qtocks
weapons held by member countries and publish in it the list approved by the Cor|ncil,
force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency.
of chemical
currently in
I Document 758.
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E xplanat ory M emorandum
(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapportear)
l. Introduction and relations
with the Council
l.l. Meeting shortly after the invasion of
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly instructed
the General Affairs Committee to submit a
report to the Assembly analysing the political
aspects of the invasion, and at the same time
instructed the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments to examine, in the framework
of its report replying to the annual report of the
Council, the state of European security in the
light of the invasion. This examination is
undertaken in the context of defence matters
handled by the WEU Council in accordance
with the mutual defence provisions of the
modihed Brussels Treaty: Article IV calling for
close co-operation with NATO and its military
staffs; Article V on mutual military assistance
in the event of an armed attack in Europe on
one of the member states; and Article VIII.3
providing for the immediate convocation of the
Council at the request of a member state to
allow consultations " with regard to any situa-
tion which mav constitute a threat to peace, in
whatever area this threat should arise, or a dan-
ger to economic stability ".
1.2. In Chapter II (b) of this report the
Committee therefore reviews the state of Euro-
pean security in the light of the invasion of
Afghanistan and draws a few conclusions rele-
vant to the application of the modified Brussels
Treaty. Otherwise, the structure of this report
follows the broad lines of those of previous
years.
1.3. As in the past, the twenty-fifth annual
report of the Council to the Assembly recog-
nises that the latter " is the European parlia-
mentary assembly empowered by treaty " to
deal with defence questions. " The Council...
continued their dialogue with [the Assembly]
on questions relating to the application of the
modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt
with by the member governments of WEU in
other international fora. " But in its replies to
recommendations adopted by the Assembly in
1979 the Council does not seem to have had
recourse to the procedure whereby NATO may,in appropriate cases, provide material for
replies to Assembly recommendations.
1.4. This procedure was worked out by the
Council in liaison with the North Atlantic
Council precisely in order to meet the wishes
expressed by the Assembly to discuss defence
questions dealt with by member governments in
the framework of NATO in accordance with
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. In
Recommendation 320, the Assembly recalled
inter alia the existence of this procedure, and in
its reply the Council recognised that it followed
it " whenever they consider this to be necessary
and, in particular, when the questions raised
relate to matters within the competence of the
integrated command structures of NATO ".
Since the Council has not applied this proce-
dure since 1977, the Committee urges the
Council to do so again in case it should fall into
disuse.
1.5. The Committee takes this opportunity of
thanking the Council for the informal meeting
held with the Committee in Rome on l6th
May 1979. The Committee notes with satis-
faction that the Council's report refers to the
statement made by the Chairman-in-OfEce of
the Council, Mr. Sanza, at this meeting accord-
ing to which " when the SAC's final report' had
been submitted [the Council] would not fail to
consider how the Assembly might be informed
of its content and its main conclusions ".
1.6. In its report replying to the Council's
report for the previous year2, the Committee
had to complain about the fact that the chap-
ters of the Council's report concerning defence
questions did not reach the Office of the Clerk
until the end of March. This year again the
Committee has to record the same delay, these
chapters not having reached the Office of the
Clerk until 28th March 1980. The Committee
urges the Council to revert to the procedure
applied in 1975 and 1976 which allowed the
report to be communicated in February.
ll. Activities of the Council and state
of European security
(a) Defence questions dealt with in the Council
2.1. The Council's report first refers to its
statutory activities in accordance, inter alia,
with Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty.
(i) Level o.f forces o.f member states
2.2. Protocol No. II of the treaty makes it
incumbent upon the Council each year to
determine, or to note in certain cases, the level
l. Study on the armaments sector
member countries.
2. Document 808.
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of forces of member states under the headings
" Forces under NATO command " and " For-
ces under national command ". For land and
air forces of member countries, Protocol No. II
provides that for Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands the levels assigned to
SACEUR shall not exceed the maxima laid
down in the special agreement annexed to the
1952 lreaty on the establishment of a European
Defence Community. For naval forces assigned
to NATO command, levels shall be deter-
mined each year in the course of the NATO
annual review. the level of German naval forces
being limited to the level laid down in the
abovementioned special agreement. If, how-
ever, at any time during the annual review it is
proposed that forces assigned to NATO should
exceed the limits laid down in Protocol No. II,
acceptance by the country concerned of such
increases shall be subject to the unanimous
approval of WEU members expressed either in
the WEU Council or in NATO. The Commit-
tee refers to this question again in paragraph
2.14 of the present report.
2.3. The Council's report asserts that " they
have been able, in 1979, to carry out
their obligations under Protocol No. II to the
modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of
forces ".
(ii) United Kingdom 
.forces stationed on the
continent o.f Europe
2.4. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II.
the United Kingdom has to maintain a mini-
mum level of forces on the mainland of Europe;
this minimum has been fixed by the Council at
55,000 land forces plus one tactical air force.
This year, for the first time, the Council's
report declares that " the average number of
British land forces stationed on the mainland
of Europe in accordance with the commitment
in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified
Brussels Treaty during 1979 was
55,650 ". The Assembly is therefore able to
note that the commitment entered into by the
United Kingdom was respected in 1979. The
Council thus met the wishes often expressed by
the Assembly in its recommendations that this
figure be included in the Council's report. The
Committee thanks the Council for withdrawing
its previous refusal.
2.5. However, unlike Council reports for ear-
lier years, the present report makes no reference
to the presence of the United Kingdom's
Second Tactical Air Force and does not clarify
the situation concerning the redeployment of
units of the British Army of the Rhine from
Germany towards Northern Ireland. The
Committee insists that the Council's reports
should not omit to mention the tactical air
force, which is still included in the United
Kingdom's commitment, and that the reports
should clarify the situation cpncerning forces in
Northern lreland. The previous report speci-
fied that " at 3lst Decembei 1978 there were
3,243 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland ".
The Committee wishes the Assembly to be
informed whether a like figure is still to be
deducted from the figure of 55,650 men referred
to in the present report.
(iii) Stuh) of the armamanfi industries in
member countries
2.6. The Council's report informs the Assem-
bly that the economic chapter of this study,
which the Council instructed the WEU Stand-
ing Armaments Committee to start in 1977 , has
not yet been completed; this ls the only chapter
still to be done. However, tlpe Committee wel-
comes the fact that in its reply to Recommen-
dation 331 the Council agreef, to "consider the
possibility of entrusting the $AC with work on
subjects which may be suggested by the
Assembly "t.
Amendments to the lists of prbhibited weapons
2.7 Since the modified Brirssels Treaty was
signed in 1954, the Council has amended a
dozen times the list given in Annex III to Pro-
tocol No. III which defines the conventional
weapons which the Federal Republic of Ger-
many undertakes not to m[nufacture on its
territory. No amendment to this list was com-
municated by the Council in f he present annual
report. The Committee returns to this ques-
tion in paragraph 2.18.
(b) State of Earopean securlty in the light
of the Soviet invasion of .Nfghanistan
2.8. The Committee is not making a detailed
study of the Soviet invasidn of Afghanistan
since the General Affairs Committee has been
instructed to prepare a report on this
question. But the Defence Committee briefly
reviews here the repercussiorlts of the invasion
on European security.
2.9. The Soviet forces now in Afghanistan,
with the possible exception of certain command
elements, were not withdrawn from the forces
facing Europe on the northern, central or
southern fronts, except perhaps for certain units
which have to be taken into account in estab-
lishing the balance in East(rn Turkey. The
asymmetry in the forces fa4ing one another,
particularly on the centra[ front, remains
unchanged and the superiority of Warsaw Pact
forces, particularly in tanks and troops, is not
modified. Mr. Brezhnev's statement on 6th
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October 1979 that up to 20,000 Soviet troops
and 1,000 tanks would be withdrawn from East-
ern Gerniany in 1980 could have but a minor
effect on the balance; it would appear that the
return of troops to the Soviet Union shown on
television was solely for publicity purposes and
covered only a small proportion of the numbers
announced by Mr. Brezhnev.
2.10. The introduction of the SS-20 missile by
the Soviet Union in 1977 continues to place
NATO at a disadvantage. Soviet medium-range
missiles aimed at the European allied coun-
tries now include 500 SS-4 and 90 SS-5 mis-
siles, all with warheads of a yield of one mega-
ton, plus some 90 SS-20 missiles each with
three 50 kiloton warheads. The number of
SS-20s is increasing at the rate.of about five per
month.
2.11. In Afghanistan there are at present an
estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet forces with
modern equipment. Although the occupation
places the most advanced Soviet forces only
600 km from the Strait of Hormuz, the poor
lines of communication through Afghanistan
make a direct military action across Iran from
Afghanistan rather unlikely. The Soviet terri-
tory of Azerbaidjan is 800 km from
the Abadan oilfields and the lines of communi-
cation inside the Soviet Union leading to Azer-
baidjan are infinitely better than those across
Afghanistan.
2.12. The'most significant aspect of the occu-
pation of Afghanistan is the military precedentit sets. It is the first time since the second
world war that complete units of the
Red Army have invaded a non-member country
of the Warsaw Pact. This is the main reason
why it is essential for countries of the Alliance
to react strongly.
2.13. One consequence of the invasion is
already becoming evident in the Indian Ocean.
In 1978, as pointed out by the Committee at
the timer, the Soviet Union maintained
some eight to ten warships and the same num-
ber of support units in the Indian Ocean; the
United States had a permanent force of some
three surface combat vessels plus an aircraft-
carrier group which visited the area every three
months. In March 1980, the total number of
Soviet naval ships in the area reached twenty-
nine, including thirteen combat vessels, and the
United States had twenty-two combat units plus
seven support vessels. The French pre-
sence, with its principal base in Reunion in the
southern area, consisted of the command ship/
tanker La Charen e, accompanied by a des-
troyer, four frigates and a few smaller
vessels. Two German destroyers, accompanied
L Document 776, security
Rapporteur Mr. Grant.
by two support vessels, are on a routine cour-
tesy visit to ports in the Indian Ocean arranged
some time ago; they are not calling at ports in
the area of tension.
2.14. The Committee welcomes the fact that
the United States and some of its allies having
appropriate resources are reacting in this way,
thus proving their ability to resist by force any
possible use of force by the Soviet Union
against the vital interests of the western coun-
tries in this part of the world. The Committee
recalls the draft recommendation in its report
on strategic mobilityr which stressed " the needfor the armed forces of certain allied
countries to have ready access to areas of the
world where those countries exercise responsi-
bilities ".
2.15. The first conclusion to be drawn for
European security at the prese:rt juncture is the
need to underline the solidarity of the Alliance
by stressing the provisions of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty which concern mutual defence, i.e.
Articles IV, V and VIIL3 already referred to in
paragraph 1.10. As the annual report states
under " Activities of the Council " " the Coun-
cil ensure that the Treaty and its pro-
tocols are applied and observed both as part of
their own activities and in connection with
work in which member governments participate
elsewhere, in particular, political co-operation
between the Nine, the North Atlantic Council
and the Independent European Programme
Group. Their action is based on the dual
concerns of ensuring proper implementation of
the obligations or responsibilities defined
by the modified Brussels Treaty and avoiding
duplication of activity ". In application of the
three mutual defence articles, the Council
might very well specify in future annual
reports that decisions taken by WEU member
governments in the North Atlantic Council
bind their countries under the terms of the
more stringent Brussels Treaty as well as the
North Atlantic Treaty. Already in Article III
of Protocol No. II of the modihed Brussels
Treaty there is the formula cited in paragraph2.2 above whereby the seven countries
may approve, in the North Atlantic Council,
decisions modifying the scope of this Protocol
No. II. Paragraph 2 of Recommendation 342
of the Assembly proposes similarly that deci-
sioirs taken by the seven countries at meetings
of bodies of the European Community might
well constitute the consultations provided for in
the modified Brussels Treaty.
2.16. The second conclusion relating to Euro-
pean security is the absolute need to maintain a
military balance in Europe, inter alia by pur-
L Document 758, Rapporteur
on 4th November 1977.
in the Mediterranean,
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suing the long-term defence programme
approved in NATO, referred to in the next
paragraph, and the programme for the deploy-
ment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe
to counterbalance the SS-20 until such
time as the negotiations with the Soviet Union
lead to a dismantling of existing SS-20 missiles.
2.17. A third conclusion is that the countries
of the Alliance with appropriate means should
be prepared to back the United States in pro-
tecting Europe's interests outside the North
Atlantic Treaty area and to take over from
the United States in European waters when cer-
tain American ships leave for the Middle East.
In the context of the situation in the Middle
East in general, the North Atlantic Council was
warned on l4th April 1980 by Mr. Robert
Komer, the United States Under-Secretary of
Defence, that American reserve forces now ear-
marked for Europe and some ammunition and
equipment stockpiled there, might have to be
committed in the Middle East. The European
allies were asked to expedite implementation of
certain measures under the long-term defence
programme, in particular to increase stocks of
ammunition and war reserves, and to earmark
civil aircraft for military purposes in Europe
in case the United States'militiry airlift capa6i-
lity had to be committed to the Middle East.
2.18. Some provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty are involved in this last conclusion.
According to Article II of Protocol No. II, " the
naval forces of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many [assigned to NATO commands] shall
consist of the vessels and formations necessary
for the defensive missions assigned to it by
NATO within the limits laid down in the special
agreement... [annexed to the treaty of the Euro-
pean Defence Community], or equivalent fight-
ing capacity ". But Article III of the same
protocol provides that " if at any time during the
[NATO] annual review recommendations areput forward, the effect of which would
be to increase the level of florces above the
limits specified in Articles I and II, the accep-
tance by the country concerned of such recom-
mended increases shall be subject to the una-
nimous approval of the high contracting parties
to the present protocol expressed either in the
Council of Western European Union or in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ".
2.19. In another reportr, the Committee has
noted that to date German naval forces, with
the exception of a destroyer assigned to
STANAVFORLANT, had been assigned only
to SACEUR, which in fact limited them to the
Baltic Sea or the west coast of Denmark. The
Committee recommends that German naval
l. Document 837, the northern flank and the Atlantic
and Channel commands, Rapporteur Mr. Ahrens.
forces be henceforth assignbd to all NATO
commands, to make the bedt use of resources
according to the capabilities of German ships.
2.20. Later in Protocol No. III, in Annex III,
paragraph V " Warships, with the exception of
smaller ships for defence pu{poses ", the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty limits nayal shipbuilding in
Germany to eight 6,000-toq destroyers, other
surface combat vessels being limited to 3,000
tons and auxiliary vessels to 6,000 tons. Sub-
marines are at present limite( to 1,800 tons and
nuclear propulsion is forbidden. The Commit-
tee proposes that the Council, as it is entitled
to do under Article V of Protocol No. III, quite
simply arrange paragraph V of Annex III to Pro-
tocol No. III which imposes limits on naval
shipbuilding in Germany since such restrictions
have become detrimental to European security.
2.21. In Recommendation 320, adopted last
year on the Committee's repprt replying to the
annual report of the Council, the Assembly has
already recommended that the Council
" 3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary
vessels from the Iist of conventional armaments
which may not be produced on German terri-
tory ". Informed of the contents of paragraph3 of Recommendation 320, the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe, ln his letter to the
Chairman of the Committed dated 27th July
1978, declared: " I welcome the recommenda-
tion of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments to dellete the restriction
on the construction of permanent auxiliary ves-
sels imposed on the Federal t Republic of Ger-
many (FRG). The lifting of these restrictions
would not only better serve the needs of the
FRG navy but also would be of considerable
benefit to the Alliance. In view of the recom-
mendation by the Assembly of WEU, I am pre-
pared to support a request to the Council
by the Federal Republic of Germany to delete
the restrictions on the construction of naval
auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons dis-
placement ".
lll. Agency for the Control of Armaments
(al Non-application o! controls
3.1. The present annual report announces no
progress in the control of armaments in member
states in accordance with tho treaty; there has
on the contrary been a slight regression. As
the Committee pointed out in its reply to the
1978 report, the usefulness of these controls is
now disputed. The Comrqittee has always
underlined the major shottcomings in the
Council's application of the provisions of Pro-
tocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels
Treaty 
- 
the basic texts for the control of arma-
ments of member states on the mainland of
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Europe; these controls do not apply to the terri-
tory of the United Kingdom. Like earlier
reports, the Council's present report refers to
fields where the Agency does not exercise its
activities. Under the heading entitled in earlier
reports " Fields where the Agency is or is not
authorised to exercise its mandate ", the
following may be found in the present report:
" Atomic, chemical and biological wea-
pons
The position described in earlier annual
reports remained basically unchanged.
The activities of the Agency do not
extend to nuclear weapons. The non-
nuclear components of such weapons(namely the missiles themselves and
other specially designed equipment) are
subject to control except as regards the
weapons qualified as " strategic " by one
member state. Furthermore, as this stale
has declared that its nuclear capability as
a whole is directed to one and the same
objective of deterrence, its missiles with
nuclear capability and its tracked laun-
chers are no longer subject to control. "l
3.2. The Assembly was thus informed for the
first time that French Pluton tactical nuclear
missiles had just been withdrawn from Agency
control. Hitherto these missiles (but not their
nuclear warheads) were controlled by the
Agency as is still the case for Lance missiles and
other similar missiles equipping Belgian, Ger-
man, Italian, Netherlands and United Kingdom
forces on the mainland of Europe. (Nuclear
warheads for these missiles, which are Ameri-
can property held in American depots, are not
subiect to the controls provided for in the
treaty.)
3.3. If the provisions of Protocol No. III of
the modified Brussels Treaty were applied, it
would be the WEU Council, deciding by a
majority vote, that would fix the level of stocks
France would be allowed to hold on the main-
land of Europe (Article III of Protocol No. III)
and the Agency for the Control of Armaments
that would verify this level. Nuclear non-
production controls would also be applied in
Germany. In reality, because France has not
informed Jhe WEU Council that the " effective
production " of nuclear weapons has begun on
its territory, the Council has never sought to
apply the provisions of the treaty concerning
nuclear weapons. As the Committee pointed
out in earlier reports, the " strategic " forces not
covered by the Agency's activities include not
only the nuclear warheads of the French strate-gic forces but also their means of delivery
(nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, and
Mirage IV aircraft).
3.4. The Committee having examined in ano-
ther reportr the problems of protection against
biological and chemical weapons, it has consi-
dered in greater detail than usual the situation
relating to these weapons, control of which is
provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty in
very much the same conditions as for nuclear
weapons, The Council's present report, like its
predecessors, states:
" Nor does the Agency apply any
controls to biological weapons.
The control activities dealt with in this
chapter do not, therefore, concern these
two categories of armaments [biological
and nuclear].
In the case of chemical weapons, only
non-production controls take place; no
quantitative controls are made since none
of the member states have declared pos-
sessing such armaments. "
It subsequently states:
" As the Convention for the due process
of law2 has not yet entered into force, the
control measures carried out by the
Agency at private concerns had, in 1979,
as in previous years, to take the form of
'agreed control measures '.
One consequence of this situation is that,
in order to obtain the agreement of the
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a
few weeks' notice. This agreement has
never been withheld. "
3.5. Further on, the annual report specifies:
" In application of Article III of Proto-
col No. III which lays down conditions
to enable the Council to fix the levels
of chemical weapons that may be held
on the mainland of Europe by those
countries which have not given up the
right to produce them, the Agency
asked the countries concerned, in its
questionnaire, whether production of
chemical weapons on their mainland
territory had passed the experimental
l. Document 838, nuclear, biological and chemical protec-
tion, Rapporteur Mr. Banks.
2. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable
the Agency lor the Control of Armaments to carry out
its control effectively and making provision flor due pro-
cess of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the
Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in
Paris on 2lrd October 1954 (signed in Paris on
l4th December 195'l but ratified by only six states:
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom).l. Rapporteur's italics.
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stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage.
In 1979 as in the past, the member
states concerned replied in the negative.
As every year, the Agency requested all
member states in the corresponding sec-
tions of its annual questionnaire to state
whether they held any stocks of chemi-
cal weapons, whatever their origin. In
the reply to this questionnaire, no
member state declared holding any che-
mical weapons during the current
control year.
3.6. However, the Committee notes that
according to government statements or reliable
publications certain member countries hold, or
have held in the recent past, stocks of chemical
weapons. At its specialised plant in Nance-
kuke, the United Kingdom has produced sarin
nerve gas (GB) at the rate of 6 kg per hour and
small quantities of VX. The dismantling of
the plant was announced in 1976 and it was
opened to inspection to experts from some
twenty foreign countries in March 1979. In
France, no official statement has been made, but
there are reports that the pilot production of
nerve gases near Toulouse may have reached a
few hundred tonsr. The factory of the Service
des Poudres at Pont-de-Claix specialises in
chemical weapons2. In Germany, apart from
American stocks, a few second world war muni-
tions continue to be discovered and the Council
has recently had to reply to two written ques-
tions on this subject:
Reply of the Council to Written Question
203 (Mr. Boucheny):
" The modified Brussels Treaty permits
no derogation from the undertakings
entered into regarding the non-produc-
tion of chemical weapons. As to the
Stolzenberg factory, the Agency, follow-
ing press allegations, carried out, with the
support of the authorities concerned, an
agreed non-production control of chemi-
cal weapons at the plant in Hamburg on
7th December 1970.
This control measure revealed no indica-
tion of production of chemical weapons
within the terms of Annex II to Protocol
No. III, as was clear, moreover, from the
passages on the control activities of the
Agency in the Council's annual report to
the Assembly for l9JQ. "r
l. See e.g. The problem of chemical and biological war-
[are, Volume II: CB weapons today, page 217, SIPRI, 1973.
2. See Le service des poudres, Jacques Pergent, Forces
adriennes frangaises, No.24, 1970, page 96.
3. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November
1979.
Reply of the Council to Wriuen Question
204 (Mr. Banks):
" According to information given to the
Council, the chemical substances and
waste fbund, although partly poisonous
or otherwise dangerous, do not constitutg
stocks of chemical weapons. Article
XIII of Protocol No. nV to the modified
Brussels Treaty would not therefore
appear to apply. "r
3.7. These facts in themselves are not disturb-
ing; preparations being made by France and the
United Kingdom are part of the legitimate
defence effort. But it would be good for the
Council's report to make the situation clear.
3.8. Where non-production controls of che-
mical weapons in Germany are concerned, in
the absence of the guarantegs provided for in
the convention mentioned in paragraph 34,
the Agency is not authoris'ed1to take samples 
-
essential for any control worthy of the name.
The list of chemical products drawn up by the
Council for the application of controls was
brought to the notice of the Assembly in the
fifth annual report of the Cogncil, dated March
1960 (Document 159):
" List of chemical products (chemical
weapons) approved by the Council for
Agency control:
Section 1: Chemical, products which
cannot bd used for civilian
purposes:
(l) Alkyl alkylphosphono-
fluoridates.(2) Alkyl i N-dialkyl phos-
phoramidocyanidates.
(3) Mustqrd gas.(4) Nitrogen mustards.(5) Lewisites.
Section 11: Chemicalr products which
can be used for civilian pur-
poses:
( l) Hydrqcyanic acid.
(2) Cyanogen chloride.(3) Parachlorphenyldime-
thylurea.(4) Maleic hydrazide. "
In Section I, the first and second are nerve gases
of the G family; the third, fourth and fifth are
blister gases. In Section II, the first and
second are blood gases; the third and fourth are
defoliants. Missing from the list are the cate-
gory of V-agent nerve gases and the defoliants
used for military purposes by the United States
in Vietnam: 2,4-D and2,4,5-T.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November
1979.
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3.9. In subsequent reports of the Council, it
was stated in 197 | (Document 193) that
towards the end of 1960 " it was unanimously
proposed that the list be amended to include a
new group of highly toxic substances and this
proposal will be submitted to the Council ", but
it was only from a publication of the Stockholm
International Peace Reseach Institute that it
was learned that the group in question was the
V-agent nerve gases:
" ... the only substantial change came in
1960, when the family of O-alkyl S-2-
NN-alkylalkylaminoethyl alkylphospho-
nothiolates was added "l
but it is not clear at what point the Council
agreed to this amendment. ln 1962, the annual
report (Document 225) stated that " the list of
chemical equipment and products to be regar-
ded as chemical weapons during the year was
approved by the Council early in 196l ".
Only in 1963 did the annual report (Document
265) indicate that "at the end of 1961, the
Agency... carried out studies... The main
points considered were the revision and bring-
ing up to date of the list of chemical weapons
to be controlled in 1962 (subsequently appro-
ved by the Council)... ". A further change is
referred to in the annual report for 1965 (Docu-
ment 364):
" The list of chemical weapons for
control in 1965 was modified by the
Council by the addition of chemical for-
mulae to dehne the tabun, sarin and ami-
ton families. "
But again it was SIPRI that published the
details and omissions:
" Other amendments to the list comprise
the incorpdration of structural formulae
for chemicals listed in Section I. These
are as follows:
(l) R'O.RP(O)F, where R is a Cr: alkyl
group, and R' a linear or branched alkyl
or cycloalkyl group ofunspecified size.
(2) MeRN.P(O)CN.OR', where R is a
methyl or ethyl group and R' a linear or
branched alkyl or cycloalkyl group of
unspecified size.
(3) S(CHzCHzCl)2.
(4) N(CHzCHzCl)r.
(5) (CICH=CH)"AsCl., where n+m =3,
andn=0.
And, for the V-agents added in 1960:
RO.R'P(O)SCHzNR"R"', where R' is a
methyl or ethyl group, and R, R" andR"' are alkyl or cycloalkyl groups of
l. The problem of chemical and biological
Volume V: The prevention of CBW, SIPRI, 197 l.
unspecified size. R" and R"' may also
be linked into a single cyclic radical, and
the ethylene linkage between the nitrogen
and sulphur atoms can be methyl-substi-
tuted.
These structural formulae are notable for
the extent to which they exclude impor-
tant members of the sulphur and nitrogen
mustard gas families from the Agency's
control. "l
3.10. Since then the list of chemical products
to be controlled does not appear to have been
changed, successive annual reports statfug like
the present one:
" As in previous years, the Agency asked
member countries whether they wished to
renew in 1979 the list of chemical wea-
pons subject to control.
The member countries agreed to this
renewal. This was reported to the
Council, who noted the fact. "
3.1 l. The Committee asks the Council to
publish the full list now in force in its next
annual report and to keep the Assembly
informed of any subsequent change.
(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments
3.12. Although the usefulness of WEU controlsis no longer evident and the Agency's
true areas of activity remain limited solely to
conventional weapons, the number of inspec-
tions carried out by the Agency each year
shows that generally speaking there has been no
reduction in its activities, as may be seen from
the following table.
3.13. Once again, the Committee finds parti-
cularly useful the lists of armaments currently
being produced, set out in parts I to 4 of Sec-
tion E " State and problems of control in cer-
tain particular fields " which is a summary of
all current armaments production programmes
in member countries. It may be seen from the
very full list now given that production under
licence of Hawk surface-to-air missiles (Helip)
is being pursued with the participation of Bel-
gium, France and ltaly.
Conclusion on the control of armaments
3.14. In conclusion, the Committee believes it
can assert that the controls provided for in the
modified Brussels Treaty are being applied on
the mainland of Europe in respect of most
conventional weapons subject to control and
the non-production of chemical weapons in
Germany. As the annual report states:
warfare.
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Control
measures
at depots
Control
measures
at units under
national
command
Control
nEasures
at
production plants
(quantitative
control
measures)
Total
quantitative
control
measures
Control
measures
at
production plantr
(non-production
ontrol
measures)
(of which
rDn-
production
of cherhical
weapdns)
Total
control
measures
(all categories)
(l) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6) (7)
t96t
2
3
4
5
29
26
35
39
26
l5
20
l3
l9
l6
t2ll
l3
l3ll
66
57
6l
7l
53
7
7
l0
9
7
(2\
(2)
(4)
(4)
n.a.
63
65
74
80
60
6
7
8
9
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
:*
*
,1.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
(3)
78
70
79
77
1970
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
a
*
{.
b
*
:i
*
*
*
*
*
:l
l.
*
a
*
rl
b
*
*
*
l.
{.
*
*
*
{.
*
a
{.
*
b
*
tt
:1.
rl.
*
*
*
{.
*
*
ab{.*
*{.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
a
*
*
b
*
*
rt
*
{.
*
:t
*
*
*
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Il.8r
n.a"
n.a,
n.a,
n.a,
n.a,
n.a,
a
82
82
b
72
72
66
66
7t
72
7t
70
68
70
Numbers and types of inspections
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments
Note a, b: From l97l onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thence-
forth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent rcduction in num-
bers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both
sets offigures (old and new style 
- 
a and D) for the years 1970 and 1971.
z.a.: Information not available.
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports
of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns I to 6), figures for 196l-65 are also derived from
the published annual rcports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee.
Those for 1970 to 1979 have been communicated to the Assernbly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but
permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition ol
visit and are without significance.
* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted lrom the published report.
" When drawing up its programme of
control measures the Agency again
worked on the basic assumption, which is
supported by the observations of previous
years, that the undertakings and declara-
tions of member countries are being
honoured. "
The annual report for 1976 added:
" Clearly, if any doubt existed on this
point, control measures would have to be
increased. "
3.15. The Committee has already noted that
the usefulness of the few controls still applied is
not disputed, particularly in the case of restric-
tions on the production of conventional wea-
pons in Germany which the Committee now
proposes should be removed.
lY. Staniing Armamentr Committee
4.1. The Committee's report notes above that
the economic chapter of the study of the arma-
ments industries in member countries which the
Council instructed the WEU Standing Arma-
ments Committee to prepare in 1977 has not
yet been completed (paragraph 2.6 above). In
paragraph 1.5 above, the Conrmittee also wel-
comed the statement by the Chairman-in-Office
of the Council that " when the SAC's final
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report had been submitted [the Council] would
not fail to consider how the Assembly might be
informid of its content and its main conclu-
sions ". The Committee expects further infor-
mation from the Council at the joint meetings
arranged to follow the Ministerial Council
meeting in Luxembourg on l4th May 1980.
4.2. The Council also met the Assembly's
wishes in its reply to Recommendation 331,
adopted on the basis of the report by the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments
replying to the annual report of the Council in
1979. In its reply the Council agreed to consi-
der " the possibility of entrusting the SAC with
work on subjects which may be suggested by
the Assembly ". The Committee will not lail
to consider appropriate subjects to be proposed
to the Council when the study on the situation
of the armaments sector has been completed.
Y. Conclusions
5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions
are set forth in the draft recommendation.
Preambular paragraph (i) and operative para-
graphs I and 2 stress the relevance of the
mutualdefence obligations of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, described in paragraphs l.l and 2.15
of this explanatory memorandum, in the light of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and improve-
ments needed in allied defence effort dealt
with in paragraphs 2.8 to 2.1i. Preambular
paragraph (ii) recalls the Committee's previous
recommendation concerning strategic mobility
mentioned in paragraph 2.14. Preambular
paragraph (iii) and operative paragraphs 3 and
4 refer to certain limitations imposed by the
treaty which the Committee in paragraphs 2.7
and 2.17 to 2.21 proposes should be removed.
5.2. Preambular paragraph (iv) and operative
paragraphs 6 and 7 refer to shortcomings per-
ceived by the Committee in the Council's
report on the application of specific provisions
of the Brussels Treaty concerning troop levels
(see paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of this explhnatory
memorandum) and arms control (paragraphs
3.1 to 3.ll). Operative paragraph 5 calls for
the maintenance of the useful procedure refer-
red to in paragraph 1.3.
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Amendment I
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
-
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT I'
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett
l. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Arr4
" Delete ".
2nd June 1980
nge " and insert
Signed: Bennett
l. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).
7l
Document 836
Amendment 2
2nd June 1980
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
-
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT 2I
tabled by Mr. Ahrens
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " elsewhere ".
Signed: Ahrens
l. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).
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Amendments 3, 4 and 5
2nd June 1980
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
-
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENTS 3,4 and 5l
tabled by Mn Bozzi
3. In paragraph I of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "supplement" and'insert "be
preceded " and, at the beginning of line 2, insert " by ".
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, at the beginning insert " Invite the states
concerned, subject to the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany, to ".
5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Arrange " and insert " Exam-
ine the possibility of arranging ".
Signed: Bozzi
l. See 2nd Sitting,2nd June 1980 (Amendments 3 and 4 negatived; Amendment 5 not moved).
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Amendment 6
Application of the Brussels Treaty 
-
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council
AMENDMENT 6I
tabled by Mr. van den Bergh
6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " urgent ".
l. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment not moved).
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Signed: van den Bergh
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Introductory Note
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had an interview at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on
9th July 1979, with Vice-Admiral Sir James Jungius, KBE, SACLANT Representative in Europe.
In preparing this report the Committee as a whole met at combined Headquarters Allied
Command Channel, and Eastern Atlantic Area, on l2th September 1978, where it was briefed by
Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, RN; Commander Maritime Air
Channel, Air Marshal Sir Robert Freer, RAF; and their principal staff including Admiral Krijker,
Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of. Allied Staff; Commodore Harvey, Royal Navy, Deputy Chief of
Allied Staff (Plans); Commander Crosbie, United States Navy, of the Staff of Commander Submarines
Eastern Atlantic; Commander Donaldson, Royal Navy (Operations); Group Captain Donnovan,
Royal Air Force (Air Plans and Exercises) and Air Commodore Bush, Royal Air Force.
It met subsequently in Norway, calling at Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe,
KolsAs, on l3th February 1979, where it was briefed by General J. Brodersen, Danish Air Force,
Deputy Commander-in-Chief AFNORTH; Major General O. Mioen, Norwegian A.my; Rear Admi-
ral O. F. Berg, Norwegian Navy; Rear Admiral E.K.E. Noodt, Germany Navy, and Lt. Colonel Hunt,
Canadian Forces. The Committee inspected the AFNORTH war headquarters and was briefed by
Wing Commander Fauchon, Royal Air Force, on the air defence operations centre.
The same day the Committee met in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence where it was briefed
by Mr. C. Stephansen, Secretary General; General S. A. Hauge, Chief of Staff;,Mr. Omreng, Head of
Construction, Ministry of Defence, and Mr. Engby of the Ministry of Defence staff. Mr- Knutsen,
member of the Defence Committee of the Storting, took part in the discussion.
On l4th February 1979 the Committee met at Headquarters 45 Commando Group United
Kingdom Royal Marines, Elveg, near Elvergirdsmoen, where it was briefed by Admiral J. Meyer,
Royal Norwegian Navy, Commander Naval Forces North Norway; Major General Sir Steuart R.
Pringle, Bt., Major General Royal Marines Commando Forces, and Lt. Colonel R.H.B. Learoyd,
Commanding Offrcer 45 Commando Group.
On l5th February 1979 the Committee visited Headquarters*2" Company,45 Commando
Royal Marines, Malm, where it was briefed by Captain J. E. Haycock RM, Offrcer Commanding
"2" Company; Major Leo Don, Offrcer Commanding "W" Company (l3th Infantry Company,
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps), and Captain R. van Lierob, Second in Command, " W "
Company. The Committee witnessed demonstrations by " Z " Company RM and by " \[ir "
Company, Royal Netherlands Marines.
The Committee met subsequently at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9th July 1979, where it
was briefed by General H. F. Zeiner-Gundersen, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. On
l0th July 1979 the Committee boarded the Belgian frigate "Wielingen " moored in Zeebrugge, whereit was briefed by Captain Troispont, Commander Naval Operations, and Commander de
Maesschalck, Commanding Oflicer of the " Wielingen ".
The Committee met subsequently in the Bundeshaus, Bonn, on 25th September 1979, where it
was briefed by Mr. Andreas von Btilow, German Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence, and
Admiral Klaus J. Steindorlf, Chief of Organisation and Leadership Department of the German Naval
fta{. On 26th September 1979 the Committee visited Eggebek military airfield where it was briefedby Rear Admiral R. Deckert, Commander, German Navaf Air Arm. fhe Committee visited recon-
naissance and attack aircraft of the naval air arm. It then visited Naval Headquarters, Gliicksburg,
where it was briefed by Admiral Fromm, Commander-in-Chief German Fleet, and staff officers. It
then visited fast patrol boats of class 143 and 148 and minesweeper class 340 and 341 moored at
Flensburg Mtirwik.
From 25th February to 5th March 1980 the Committee met in the United States where it was
briefed in the State Department and Department of Defence, and met with members of both Houses
of Congrlss. Of particular relevance to this report were the briefings in the Brookings Institution
on r{th February by Mr. Michael McGwire; the visit to Norfiolk, Virginia, on 29th Feb=ruary, where
the Committee toured the naval base and was received on board the nuclear-propelled guided-missile
cruiser USS Mississippi by Captain Peter Heckman, Commanding Oflicer, and other ihip's officers,
and on board the multi-purpose amphibig_us assault ship USS Nasiau by Captain William^A. Kearns,
Co.mmanding Officer, a.nd other ship's offrcers. The Cbmmittee then inet it Headquarters SupremiAllied Commander Atlantic where it was lriefed by Admiral Harry D. Train II, USN, SuiremeAllied Commander Atlantic; Vice-Admiral Sir Cameron Rusby, RN, Deputy -supreme Allied
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Commander Atlantic, and staff oflicers. On 5th March the Committee met at the base of Submarine
Group II, Groton, Connecticut, where it was briefed by Rear Admiral Scott, Commander Submarine
Group II, and Captain Hay, Chief of Staff. The Committee then toured the submarine base aboard
United States navy tugs.
The Committee considered the general terms of the present report at its meetings on 25th Sep-
tember 1979 and l8th March 1980. The report as a whole was discussed and adopted by the
Committee at its meeting in the Bundeshaus, Bonn, on 29th April 1980.
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, dfficials and senior
officen who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The
views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands
The Assembly,
(r) Considering that the defence of the northern flank is inextricably linked to the defence of the
adjoining seas and Atlantic Ocean;
(rr) Believing that defence of the northern flank must be based on the early arrival of adequately-
prepared reinforcements to meet an attack because geographical and political factors impose an
imbalance in permanently-stationed forces;
(iii) Believing further that geographical factors and the present qualities of the naval forces of most
NATO countries provide a reasonable measure of naval capabilities at the present time, although
specific deficiencies need to be urgently remedied and future trends in the size of Soviet naval
ships will require to be offset in long-term NATO naval construction programmes;
(rv) Calling for better use to be made of existing allied naval resources;
(v) Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty
imposes no geographical limitations on the responsibilities of NATO naval commands;
(vr) Recalling that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Council
relies on the North Atlantic Council for information and advice,
RecouueNns rHAT rHr CouNcll
Urge the North Atlantic Council:
l. To improve allied naval capabilities in the Atlantic and Channel areas and in sea areas
adjacent to the northern flank:
(a) by calling for long-term national naval construction programmes to maintain the strength
and average hull age of naval vessels, and to keep abreast of any further increase in Soviet
naval capabilities;
(b) bV calling for urgent steps to remedy specific deficiencies especially of escort forces, mine
counter-measure vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, and to improve interoperability of
weapons and communications and transmission equipment;
(c) by making better use of existing naval resources forthwith, as recommended by the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:
(i) through the improvement of joint naval operations planning and control in the
Atlantic and Channel areas and the sea areas adjacent to the northern flank;
(ii) through flexible use of naval forces, irrespective of command boundaries, including
appropriate German naval forces, to ensure that the necessary ships are available at
earlier stages of alert;
(ili) by calling on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT on the same basis as other
WEU countries;
(d) bv establishing at appropriate naval headquarters a daily record of the location of all
Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area;
2. To improve the defence of the northern flank:
(a) by calling on all allied governments to provide political support for the Danish and Norwe-
gian Governments to resist constant pressure from the Soviet Union designed to prevent
legitimate defence arrangements;
(b) by calling for mountain and arctic warfare training in the area to be extended to all troops
likely to be available as reinforcements, and for standardised equipment to be provided
for units of ACE mobile force;
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(c) by urging the governments concerned to conclude urgently agreements on stockpiling in
the area ammunition and heavy equipment for reinforcements;
(A bV calling for those improvements in the direct defence capabilities of indigenous forces
which are required for the area to be defended until reinforcements arrive, and to provide
for the reception and deployment of these reinforcements;
(e) by calling for the air defence of Danish territory to be placed on the same basis as that
of neighbouring allied countries.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(sabmitted by Mr. Ahreas, Rapporteur)
l. Introduclion
l.l. This report investigates the problems of
defending the northern flank and of the naval
commands in the eastern Atlantic, Channel and
North Sea. The defence problems of these
widely dispersed areas are closely related firstly
because the land areas control the access to the
ocean for the Soviet naval forces and, secondly,
because control of the sea approaches to the
area is vital for reinforcement in a crisis or in
war of the very sparsely populated and thinly-
held land areas concerned.
1.2. On the central front the largest ever
peacetime concentrations of land and air forces
confront one another across a land boundary
which clearly delimits territory of countries
belonging unambiguously to NATO on the one
hand and to the Warsaw Pact on the other.
On the northern flank the situation is strik-
inglv different.
1.3. There are political differences, leading to
a more ambiguous defence situation, which
arise first from the presence of neutral Sweden
and in particular Finland with its special
5elationship with the Soviet Union. Secondly,in part because of the close relations between
the Nordic countries, of which only Norway
and Denmark are members of NATO, there is a
special political basis for the participation of
these last two countries in the Alliance which
provides that except in times of military attack
or threatened attack, there are no permanent
bases for foreign troops and no stationing of
nuclear weapons on the territories of these
countries.
1.4. The striking climatic difference of the
northern front does not need to be stressed.
Curiously, while the eastern Baltic is ice-
bound in winter, the waters of the Norwegian
coast and adjoining Kola peninsula coastline of
the Soviet Union remain ice-free. Geogra-
phically, Nonvegian territory presents great
difficulties both for a defender and for an
attacker. The small population of Norway,
and its extremely sparse distribution along the
remote northern part of the country, provides a
basis for only a small defence force. In
contrast, the adjoining Kola peninsula provides
the Soviet Union's most important naval base
and is also an area of growing economic impor-
tance to the Soviet Union.
1.5. As a consequence, in military terms, the
tiny Norwegian garrison confronts the sizable
Soviet military establishment in the Kola
peninsula.
1.6. The problems of the allied naval
commands arise less from numerical inferiority
- 
overall the NATO navies still possess consi-
derable capabilities 
- 
but from the large number
of competing tasks which the naval forces
would have to perform in a conflict. In parti-
cular, operations in the Norwegian sea includ-
ing the reinforcement of Norway and defeat of
Soviet naval forces north of the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom gap would compete
for the finite naval resources of the Alliance
with operations in the Atlantic concerned
essentially with maintaining the sea-lanes of
communication between North America and
Europe. The continued improvement in So-
viet naval capabilities in particular has made a
report on the northern flank and NATO mari-
time commands particularly opportune; the
Committee last reported on the area in any
detail in 1972t.
ll. The threat
(al The Soviet navy and the navol fulaace
(i) Overall
2.1. A principal characteristic of naval force
is its world-wide mobility. Hence, in a first
appraisal, it is useful to compare the total size
of the Soviet navy on the one hand with the
combined navies of the NATO countries on the
other. For the purposes of this comparison
" general purpose " forces are considered 
- 
i.e.
strategic missile launching submarines are
excluded from both totals. Appendix I shows
a comparison by numbers and categories of
vessels of each of the NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries compiled from Jane's Fighting Ships;
Appendix II reproduces the tabular comparison
given in the United States Department of
Defence annual report for fiscal year 1981.
2.2. This comparison reveals first of all sub-
stantial NATO superiority when total tonnage
is the basis of comparison, and when deep-
water ocean-going navies are considered. The
comparison also reveals, however, striking
asymmetries in the forces. ln total tonnage the
NATO superiority is more than two to one
overall, and is particularly marked in the cate-
gories of aircraft-carriers, amphibious vessels,
major surface combatants, and mobile logistics
vessels; on a tonnage basis there is superiority
L Defence on the nonhem and southem flanks,
Document 568, 25th April 1972. Rapporteur Mr. Vedo-
vato.
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)
in fact in all categories except patrol craft and
fast attack craft (all vessels with a displacement
less than 500 tons).
2.3. The NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison on
a number of ships basis shows a 19 o/o Warsaw
Pact superiority overall, but even on this nume-
rical basis NATO still has overwhelming super-
iority in aircraflt-carriers, and a significant lead
in major surface combatants and a slight lead in
nuclear-propelled attack submarines. The
Warsaw Pact advantage again is overwhelm-
ingly in small craft under 500 tons, but also
in conventionally-propelled attack submarines.
2.4. In terms of capabilities, on evidence
given to the Committee, the United States
carrier capability is still overwhelming. The
United States has l3 operational aircraflt-
carriers, three of them nuclear-propelled, with
displacements ranging from 40,000 to over
80,000 tons, offering flight decks 300-330
metres in length, and embarking high-perfor-
mance aircraft weighing 25-30 tons capable of
speeds to Mach 2.5. The Soviet Union hasjust introduced its first two aircraft-carriers, the
Kiev and the Minsk, while a third, Kharkov, is
expected to enter service in 1980. A fourth is
reported to be building. These are vessels of
38,000 tons displacement with flight decks only
189 metres in length, capable of operating heli-
copters, and a fixed-wing aircraft of the first
generation, the VSTOL Yak 36, of about l0
tons weight, credited with a maximum speed of
Mach 1.3.
2.5. The anti-submarine warfare capability of
NATO navies is regarded to be significantly
superior to that of the Soviet Union, both as
regards performance of sonar of various types
and the anti-submarine weapons available for
both aircra[t, surface ships and attack sub-
marines, and especially in the numbers of anti-
submarine helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft
that can be deployed over the ocean.
2.6. In specially-trained amphibious forces
NATO remains well ahead with a United
States marine corps of three divisions totalling
184,000 men compared with the Soviet naval
infantry of 12,000 men.
2.7. Most major NATO vessels have better
sea-keeping capabilities with a larger provision
for ammunition and other storage and better
crew quarters, enabling the ships to remain at
sea for longer periods.
2.8. A particular area of Soviet superiority,
however, may be perceived in some of the
lighter patrol craft of the Osa class fitted with
the Styx surface-to-surface missile which won
fame in sinking an Israeli destroyer, Eilat,
during the Middle East hostilities.
2.9. A final feature of the overall naval
balance to be noted is that the Soviet Union is
virtually the sole contributor to naval force of
the Warsaw Pact. In vessels over 500 tons the
four other maritime WarsarV Pact countries,
East Germany, Poland, Bullaria and Roma-
nia, contribute only I I vess(ls compared with
the Soviet Union's 452 o{er this tonnage.
There are many NATO tountries with a
strong naval tradition which {nake a very signi-
ficant contribution to NATO naval forces, the
strength of the United Statef navy being less
than half tlre total except for nuclear-propelled
submarines and aircraft-carrie[s.
2.10. As far as the overall naval balance is
concerned, present hgures may appear favour-
able to NATO. The naval problem, however,
for NATO commanders is in coping with many
different tasks which may have to be performed
simultaneously and would call for much larger
numbers of vessels than those of an adversary
who was prepared to initiate hostilities.
2.11. The phenomenon of the Soviet navy
today is one which very rapidly 
- 
since 1963 
-
has developed from a purely coastal and sub-
marine force which virtually did not exist in the
major oceans of the world, to one which now
has a fully ocean-going capability and is able to
exert Soviet influence in $eacetime in any
corner of the world, but qne which in the
present state of the naval $alance would belikely to prove a " one shot " navy if general
hostilities broke out. That one shot could,
however, inflict considerable damage, depend-
ing on the positioning of Soviet vessels prior to
the outbreak of hostilities. A more serious
longer-term threat may, however, be in the
making as Soviet naval ship-btuilding continues.
2.12. Thus there are reports, said to have been
confirmed by Admiral Gorshkov in private
conversation, that a nuclear-powered aircraft-
carrier is now under construction in the Soviet
Union which United States experts expect to be
in service in 1987 and be of 50,000 tons displace-
ment, approaching the size of United States
nuclear-powered carriers 
- 
about 78,000 tons
displacement and capable of carrying up to 80
aircraft. In 1978 the Soviet Union introduced
its largest yet amphibious ship, the Ivan Rogov,
of 13,000 tons capable of carrying landing craft
in a docking bay. Capable o[ carrying a batta-
lion of naval infantry, two of these vessels are
now in service and a further one may be
building. This ship is still small compared
with the most modern amphibious assault ships
of the United States, such as the Nassau, visited
by the Committee, of some 40,000 tons dis-
placement with a through-deck capability for
VSTOLaircraft as well as helicopters. They are
capable of landing 1,800 troops with tanks and
artillery, and carry 4 landing craft in their
docking bay.
2.13. The Soviet Union also continues to
develop its afloat support capability with the
8l
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replenishment ship, Berezina, of 35-40,000 tons
displacement which entered service in 1979 and
is larger than any previous support ship 
- 
it
would be fully capable of servicing the Kiev
and Minsk aircraft-carriers at sea. The Soviet
Union also.ordered a large floating dock from
Sweden of some 330 metres in length capable
of taking an 80,000 ton ship. On tow from
Gothenburg in Sweden to Murmansk it ran
aground off the north Russian coast not far
from the Norwegian frontier and had to be
salvaged by tugs supplied by the Netherlands,
which towed it to Stored in Norway for
repair. A similar dock has been ordered by the
Soviet Union from a Japanese shipyard.
2.14. The overall naval balance is only the
background to the naval problem studied in this
report which is concerned with. the regional
balance in the Atlantic, Channel, North Sea
and the northern flank in general.
(rr) Soviet navalforces 
- 
the regional balance
2.15. The major handicap confronting the
Soviet navy is of course its division into four
fleets which cannot be mutually supporting,
each having to pass through narrow waters
bordered by NATO countries or other allied
countries. The Northern Fleet, with ice-free
ports at Murmansk, Severomorsk and Pech-
enga, enjoys the best access to the Atlantic
through the relatively large gap between the
Norwegian North Cape and Bear Island,
although even this gap, being relatively shallow
water, must be assumed to be covered by the
United States Sosus fixed underwater submarine
detection system which will reveal the passage
of all Soviet submarines. The Northern Fleetis clearly configured for operations in the
Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic, and various
estimates of its strength are available, the
largest of whichr is quoted here.
l. R.D.M. Furlong: The Strategic Situation in Northern
Europe, International Defence Review No.' 6/ I 979.
Soviet Northern Fleet
Nuclear-propelled
submarines
ballistic missile
50
Nuclear-propelled cruise missile sub-
marines (anti-shipping) 44
Nuclear-propelled hunter-killer sub-
marines 29
Conventionally-propelled control sub-
marines 74
Cruisers and destroyers 32
Frigates and corvettes 70
2.16. This is a formidable fleet. In the event
of hostilities it can be expected to deploy 4-6
battle groups of surface vessels and submarines
to invest the Norwegian Sea providing collect-
ively anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and surface-
to-surface missile capability. Additionally, 5-7
groups of nuclear-propelled cruise missile or
torpedo submarines would endeavour to pene-
trate the Greenland-lceland-United Kingdom
gap to operate in the Atlantic sea-lanes against
allied shipping. Another priority task for the
nuclear-propelled attack submarines would be
to attempt the detection and destruction of the
allied strategic submarines with shorter-range
missiles, such as the United States Poseidon and
the British and French strateg,ic submarine
forces for which the Norwegian Sea, or even the
Barents Sea, must be supposed by the Soviet
Union to be possible areas of patrol as sub-
marines in these areas would be in range of the
whole of the Soviet territory west of the Urals
and a good deal of the territory beyond. Some
of the Soviet surface vessel battle groups might
attempt to penetrate into the North Sea where
they would certainly divert a proportion of the
allied tactical air forces in the vicinity, although
the vessels themselves would be extremely
vulnerable in this area.
2.17. Against these forces NATO countries
would have available for deployment in the
Naval forces of NATO coantfies available for operation
in the Athntic, North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Channel areas
(e.rcluding balhsttc missile submarines)
United
States
2nd fleet
United
Kingdom Netherlands Belgium Norway Germany (France) Total
Aircraft-carriers
Major surface
combatants
Nuclear-propelled
attack submarines
Conventionally-
propelled attack
submarines
5
6r
40
2
65
ll
l6
l8
6
4 5
l5
t7
(l)
(22)
(t2)
8
192
5l
49
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whole of the Atlantic, Channel, North Sea and
Norwegian Seas, including the coastal waters of
the states concerned, the 2nd United States
Fleet, the British and Netherlands navies (less a
small number of vessels which may operate
outside these areas) plus the Belgian, German
and Norwegian navies. To this can be added
about half the French navy if it were operating
with the NATO forces as it could be assumed
to be in the event of general hostilities.
2.18. The Soviet Baltic Fleet, together with the
much smaller East German and Polish fleets, is
clearly configured first for operations in the
shallower Baltic waters with its relatively large
numbers of the smaller conventionally-pro-
pelled attack submarines, patrol craft and fast
attack craft and landing ships and landing cratt
of various types. There are some discrepancies
in the published estimates of these strengths
available.
Some recent published estimates of Soviet, East German
and Polish naval forces in the Baltic
Furlong: R.D.M. Furlong: The Strategic Srtuation in
Northern Europe, International Defence Review No.
6/ 1979.
Military Balance: Military Balance 1979-80 IISS London.
Jane's: Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80.
n.a.: information not given.
2.19. These naval forces are clearly superior to
those of the NATO countries, Denmark and
Germany, which are maintained in the Baltic.
The Warsaw Pact forces could dominate the
eastern Baltic. For their larger vessels, which
include three cruisers and one guided missile
cruiser, to be put to maximum use they would
be expected to force the passage of the Danish
Straits to operate in the open seas, and to
Source Furlong MrlitaryBalance Jane's
Conventionally-
propelled ballistic
missile submarines
Conventional attack
submarines
Cruisers
and destroyers
Frigates
and corvettes
Large patrol craft
and fast attack craft
Amphibious ships
and landing craft
6
50
27
25
260
120
I
n.a.
34
53
n.a.
n.a.
6
57
23
55
159
78
83
succeed in doing this it is expected that the
Baltic Fleet would support amphibious landings
on some of the Danish islands. The same
amphibious capability could ibe used along the
north German coast, and ar4phibious landings
are regularly practised in EAst Germany, not
very far from the border with the Federal
Republic.
2.20. Although NATO naval forces in the
Baltic are inferior in numbers, the narrow
Danish Straits can be successfully mined and
the minefields defended by the German and
Danish naval forces. The threat of air attack
would also be considerable for any Soviet forces
attempting to pass through the Danish Straits.
2.21. The forces of Denmark and Germany
available for operations in the BALTAP area
are as follows:
Conventionally-propellpd attack sub-
mannes 30
Destroyers I I
Frigates and corvettes 20
Fast attack craft 56
Large patrol craft 23
Amphibious ships and fanding craft 47
2.22. It should be noted, ltrowever, that the
destroyers, contributed by the German navy,
are responsible for operations in the North
Sea and also contribute a ves$el to the Standing
Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT),
so that these forces are not a{railable for opera-
tions in the Baltic.
(r) Soviet land and air forces
2.23. In the Kola peninsula, adjoining the
Norwegian frontier, the Soviet Union maintains
considerable land, air and nlissile forces. The
presence of many of these forces can be
explained by the strategic and growing commer-
cial importance of the area for the Soviet Union
but they represent an overwhelming military
force which could be used to overrun north
Norway very rapidly.
2.24. Forces are said to comprise two motor-
ised infantry divisions of some 14,000 men and
250 tanks each with tactical nuclear missiles
SCUD-B. Tactical air support is said mostly
to be based in the Leningrad military district, to
the south of Leningrad. Reconnaissance and
transpoft aircraft are stationed permanently in
the Kola peninsula but there are many airfields
in the area so that reinforoement by tactical
strike aircraft could be carried out without
warning. The more important aviation in the
area is the part of the naval aviation assigned to
the northern fleet. This is reported to include
sixty attack aircraft with anti-shipping air-to-
surface missiles, mostly the Badger medium
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East Germany (Poland) Soviet Union Baltic
milrtary district
lndigenous
forces
2
4
tank divisions
motorised rifle
divisions
3 tank divisions
8 motorised rifle
divisions
I amphibious divisionI airborne division
3 tank divisions
4 motorised rifle
divisionsSoviet forces l0 motorised rifle
divisions
l0 tank divisions
2 tank divisions
bomber but some of the new longer-range Back-
fire. some 55 ASW aircraft and 75 maritime
reconnaissance aircraft, both Badger and the
longer-range Bear. Lastly, there are reported
to be ten SS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles
with a range of some 2,300 nautical miles,
putting them in range of all European NATO
territory including Iceland.
2.25. Soviet naval infantry maintains one
regiment comprising one tank battalion and
three infantry battalions in the areal it has
practised amphibious landings in the area of the
naval port Pechenga, which is within l5 kilo-
metres of the Norwegian frontier.
2.26. In the Baltic area it is not possible to
deal in isolation with Warsaw Pact forces which
might be used to seize the exits to the Danish
Straits, because the same forces are those which
confront NATO on the central front. Of parti-
cular importance, however, are the consider-
able amphibious forces maintained in the Baltic
which comprise one Soviet naval infantry
regiment 
- 
again comprising one tank battalion
and three infantry battalions 
- 
one Polish
amphibious division and one airborne division,
and an East German motorised infantry divi-
sion which has been specially trained in amphi-
bious operations. The total Warsaw Pact
ground forces in the area are shown in the table
above, but not all Polish and East German
divisions are at full strength.
ill. The Soviet Union
and the Nordic countries
3.1. The political basis of the defence situa-
tion in the northern area rests on a delicate
balance of relations, especially those between
the Soviet Union and its neighbours Finland
and Norway on the one hand and those bet-
ween Norway and its NATO allies on the
other. As practised for the last thirty years, the
underlying assumption for all the players has
been that any shift in the military relationship
on one side could result in shifts on the other.
(a) Finland
3.2. Under the terms of the Paris Peace
Treaty of lOth February 1947 , Finland
confirmed the accession of certain territory to
the Soviet Union originally included in the
September 1944 armistice when Finnish-Soviet
hostilities had ceased. Acceded territories
include the Pechenga province on the Arctic
Ocean, accession of which created the common
Soviet-Norwegian frontier, and territory around
the area of Lake Ladoga and Zlborg. Finland
was to remain a neutral country, entering into
no alliances against any of the wartime allies.
Its armed forces were to be limited as follows:
Navy: 4,500 men ; ships 10,000 tons;
Army: 34,400 men I
Air force: 3,000 men ; 60 aircraft.
Finland would acquire no nuclear weapons or
missiles. These limits are the present-day
limits of the Finnish armed forces except for
the navy which has only 2,500 men.
3.3. On 6th April 1948 under pressure from
the Soviet Union the Finnish-Soviet friendship
and mutual assistance treaty was signed in
Moscow, Article I of which provides that if
Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish
territory, are attacked by Germany or an ally of
Germany, Finland will fight to resist the aggres-
sion, assisted " if necessary " by the Soviet
Union, such assistance to be " subject to mutual
agreement ". Article II provides that there will
be consultation between the two countries if a
threat of such aggression is determined to exist.
Finnish defence equipment is largely supplied
by the Soviet Union with limited amounts from
Sweden and NATO countries. In November
1978 the Finnish parliament approved $75m
expenditure for procurement of new Soviet
defence equipment to include SAM-3 surface-
to-air missiles and possibly replacements for the
MiG-21 combat aircraft, but details of equip-
ment to be procured remain secret as in the
past.
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3.4. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union
remain ambiguous, and subject to a good deal
of secrecy which leads at times to alarmist
speculatiqn. In July 1978, during a visit to
Finland, Marshal Ustinov, the Soviet Defence
Minister, suggested to the Finnish Government
that joint manoeuvres should be held. The
proposal was rejected by the Finnish Govern-
ment without publicity but the incident subse-
quently leaked to the press and led to an offi-
cial statement being made by Mr. Tehke-
maa, the Finnish Defence Minister, to the effect
that no " official " proposals had been made forjoint manoeuvres. He added " The treaty of
friendship and mutual assistance between the
two countries, which Finland scrupulously res-
pects, makes such military co-operation pos-
sible in the crisis situation specified with preci-
sion in that document. Joint military manoeu-
vres in peacetime, or any other co-operation of
the same sort in the military field, would not be
in harmony with the international status of
Finland... Any speculation on the organisation
of joint military manoeuvres could generate a
climate of uncertainty as far as the maintenance
of the state of peace and stability in the north is
concerned, and such circumstances would be in
contradiction with the interest of the countries
in the region. "r
3.5. While Finland thus has succeeded so far
in excluding Soviet troops from its territory in
peacetime, it is nevertheless subject to conti-
nuous Soviet pressure, much of which has not
become publicly known. It has often made
representation to its neighbours, Norway and
Denmark, about the extent of their participa-
tion in NATO defence arrangements, and, in so
doing, it may not be consciously acting as the
intermediary of the Soviet Union, but its inter-
ventions may be seen in that light by other
countries.
3.6. On l9th February 1980 the newspaper
Suomenmah of the Finnish centre party criti-
cised the negotiations for the' stockpiling of
American equipment in Norway (referred to
below) adding:
" Without exaggerating the present situa-
tion we could have expected the two
prime ministers of the neutral Nordic
countries, Sweden and Finland, to
express their anxiety over the trends of
the situation in the Nordic countries
members of NATO... The United States,
the directing country of NATO, have
undertaken to disturb the balance not
only in the Persian Gulf and the Carib-
bean, but also in northern Europe. "2
l. Le Monde, lTth October 1978.
2. Quoted in Le Monde, 23rd February 1980.
3.7. Certainly Finnish territory would provide
an easy access route for Soviet troops wishing
to seize north Norway 
- 
the tongue of Finnish
territory opposite Tromsri in north Norway
leaves a strip of Norwegian territory only 25
kilometres wide between the Finnish frontier
and the sea. The belief that in certain cir-
cumstances the Soviet Union might station
military forces in Finland in peacetime is
obviously a factor taken into account in the
defence policy of Norway and Denmark.
(b) Sweden
3.8. The only country of the region not to be
involved in hostilities in World War II, a fact
which no doubt colours its view of the viability
of neutrality, Sweden since has pursued a
policy of well-armed neutrality. In 1948,
when Soviet pressure led to the conclusion of
the Soviet-Finnish friendship and mutual assis-
tance treaty, and when therq Were rumours of
similar Soviet approaches to Norway, Swedendid participate in initial discussions with
Denmark and Norway on a possible Scandina-
vian military alliance culminating in a summit
meeting of the three countries in January
1949. The talks failed to reach agreement
because of Swedish insistencg that any Scandi-
navian alliance should remaih neutral, without
any links with the North Atlantic Treaty for
which preliminary negotiations were then in
hand.
3.9. Unlike Finland, Sweden has not acted
even indirectly as an intprmediary for the
Soviet Union in approaching the Scandinavian
NATO members in connecti]on with their mili-
tary relationship with the Alliance. Sweden
does, however, take a relatively relaxed view of
the concentration of Soviet force in the Kola
peninsula, considering it in relationship to
global strategic interest to the Soviet Union,
rather than as a direct thrteat to the Nordic
countries. Sweden could be expected to regret
any allied attempt to establish a numerical
military balance in the northern region.
3.10. Swedish policy of armed neutrality invol-
ves it in defence expenditure amounting cur-
rently to 3.8 0/o of its GNP, compared with
2.4o/o and 3.2 0/o spent by Denmark and Nor-
way respectively. Sweden maintains total
armed forces of 65,900 men which, on mobili-
sation, can be brought up to 750,000 within 72
hours. It has a vigorous defence industry
which has developed the successful Viggen and
Draken tactical aircraft (the Draken has also
been sold to Denmark), otlnerwise its defence
equipment has been procrlred from NATO
countries.
(c) Norway
3.11. From the months preceding Norway's
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949
Norway has been under constant pressure from
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the Soviet Union first to reject the Alliance and
subsequently to refuse active participation in
the mutual defence arrangements practised by
other NATO countries. Other bilateral dis-
agreements with the Soviet Union surface from
time to time. These include operations on
Svalbard 
- 
territory under Norwegian sove-
reignty but which is " demilitarised " and open
to the economic activities of the 4l other
parties to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty which reco-
gnised Norway's full sovereignty. The other
area of disagreement is the division of the
seabed and f,rshing rights in the area to the
north of the Norwegian-Soviet frontier. Nor-
way declared a 200-mile economic zone in
1977 and the Soviet Union claimed fisheriesjurisdiction. The Soviet Union has now pro-
posed that the bilateral negotiations on the deli-
mitation of the waters of the economic zone
should reopen in April 1980.
3.12. At the same time there are mutually-
advantageous economic agreements between the
two countries, notably the construction by Nor-
way of four hydroelectric power plants on the
Pasvik River which forms much of the bound-
ary between the two countries.
3. 13. Norwegian " base " policy on mutual
defence arrangements was formulated in various
statements from the period of the signature of
the North Atlantic Treaty when Norway dec-
lared that except in cases of attack, or threat of
attack, there would be no permanent stationing
of foreign troops on Norwegian territory.
When, in the second half of the 1950s, arrange-
ments were being made for the stockpiling of
tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of
non-nuclear NATO countries, Norway declared
again that in similar circumstances nuclear
weapons would not be stationed on its territory.
3.14. In taking these decrsions, Norway has
undoubtedly had in mind the likelihood that
any large build-up of allied forces or nuclear
weapons on Norwegian territory might very
well lead to occupation of Finland by the
Soviet Union, or at least the stationing of Soviet
forces in that country. While allied troops are
not permanently based on Norwegian territory
in peacetime, there is a permanent incentive for
the Soviet Union to refrain from taking any
such action in Finland which the NATO coun-
tries could clearly interpret as a threat to peace.
3.15. At the same time, Norway has firmly
resisted Soviet pressure to refuse to participatein mutual defence arrangements. Norwegian
defence policy does not preclude the participa-
tion of allied forces in training and exercises on
Norwegian territory; it does not now preclude
the stockpiling of equipment for allied rein-
forcements that could arrive in the event of
aggression or of threat of aggression. It does
not preclude the operation of Headquarters
Allied Forces Northern Europe outside Oslo or
the operation of Norwegian air defence under
NATO command in peacetime. Norway is a
full participant in the integrated military struc-
ture of NATO including the Nuclear Planning
Group.
3. 16. Soviet pressure remains a constant
feature today. On 7th October 1979, Pravda
carried a warning to Norway against permitting
the stockpiling of equipment for allied forces in
its territory; on lSth February 1980, the Soviet
Union accused Norway of " anti-Soviet action "in permitting the NATO exercise " Anorak
Express " on its territory 
- 
an exercise involving
some 24,000 men from Canada, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
3.17. Despite its resistance to Soviet pressure,
Norway does sometimes appear to modify its
policy as a result. The particidhtion of Ger-
man forces in exercises on Norwegian territory
has always been a sensitive political issue.
German oflicers assigned to NATO are,
however, permanently stationed in Head-
quarters AFNORTH. Then in June 1976, Mr.
Hansen, the Defence Minister, stated that
German forces would be fully integrated into
the ACE mobile force deployment in Norway
from 1980 onwards 
- 
implying the participation
of 1,500 German troops including an infantry
battalion. Following objections both from the
Soviet Union and Finland, however, Mr.
Hansen stated on 9th January 1978 that Ger-
man participation in ACE mobile force would
continue to be limited to 480 men providing a
field hospital, a communications unit and a
helicopter unit.
(d) Denmark
3.18. Denmark's participation in the integrated
military structure of NATO reflects the poli-
tical limitations of Norway's participation as far
as the European territory of Denmark is
concerned. Nuclear weapons are not stock-
piled on Danish territory in the absence of
aggression or a threat of aggression, nor are
allied forces stationed there permanently. But,
despite Soviet pressure, Denmark like Norway
acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949
and abandoned its requests for abrogation of the
l94l treaty between the United States and the
representative of free Denmark which provided
for the installation of United States bases in
Greenland 
- 
part of Danish territory, which,
since 1979, has had autonomy in domestic
affairs.
lY. Allied forces
(a) Norway
4.1. With a population of little more than
four million lor a country 1,800 kilometres in
length with a coastline of 2,650 kilometres
when the fiords and bays are excluded, the indi-
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genous defiences of Norway are inevitably
sparse, particularly when compared with the
concentration of military force in the Kola
peninsula with which Norway has a common
frontier of 196 kilometres.
4.2. North Norway 
- 
the country north of65' N latitude including the districts of
Finmark, Troms and Nordland 
- 
accounting for
more than half the length of the country has a
population of only 450,000. Norwegian forcesin the area amount to about 10,000 men,
comprising a small infantry battalion in the
neighbourhood of the frontier itself supported
by a stronger battalion group of some 1,000
men 150 kilometres to the west at Portsangen.
The main defensive position of north Norway
is based on Brigade North of 5,000 men and a
squadron of Leopard tanks in the Troms area
opposite the " Finnish finger " which, as poin-
ted out above, leaves a strip of Norwegian terri-
tory only 25 kilometres wide between the
Finnish frontier and the sea. Forces deployed
to the north and west of this position would
inevitably be in danger of being cut off in the
event of a Soviet move through Finland.
4.3. Norwegian air defences in the north are
based on the NATO infrastructure financed air-
fields at Bodo and Bardufoss and comprise
F-104 G combat aircraft being replaced by the
newer F-16.
4.4. Norway has well-developed coastal defen-
ces, especially in the Tromsci-Narvik area,
which include coastal artillery with radar fire
control and coastal mounted torpedo batteries
and arrangements for mining the entrances to
the fiords, some of which have been pre-mined
with systems that can be remotely armed in an
emergency.
4.5. Air and sea surveillance is reasonably
well developed with the NATO Air Defence
Ground Environment (NADGE) radar stations
distributed from North Cape southwards and
Orion maritime control aircraft operating
chiefly from Andoya which patrol the Barents
Sea between North Cape and Bear Island.
4.6. Norway relies heavily on the mobilisa-
tion of reserves in an emergency. Together
with its military air transport aircraft, desig-
nated civilian aircraft of the Scandinavian Air-
line System, with Norwegian crews, are ear-
marked for immediate use in an emergency to
transport reinforcements north. It is claimed
that three additional brigades can be mobilised
and moved to the north Norway area within
five days, the first battalion-sized units arriving
within twenty-four hours. Some equipment is
pre-positioned in the north.
4.7. South Norway 
- 
the area from 65'N lati-
tude southwards, including Trondelag area 
- 
is
more thinly held in peacetime because it is less
exposed to surprise attack and because it is
much easier to reinforce through mobilisation
because of the local concentration of popula-
tion. Peacetime forces include a battalion
group of 1,200 men and a Leopard tank
squadron.
4.8. On mobilisation, the land forces in south
Norway can be increased to 150,000 within
three days providing the basis for some seven
brigades.
4.9. In 1974, Norway est{blished a defence
review commission including] representatives of
all political parties in the pailiament and of the
three armed services. The commission re-ported on 3lst March 1978. Among its
conclusions were that continued membership of
the common western defence was the best
contribution to avoiding coriflict, that existing
" base policy " and atomic golicy (i.e. no sta-
tioning of foreign troops or nfrclear weapons on
Norwegian territory in the abbence of aggression
or a threat of aggression) should be continued,
recognising that that policy would impose a
greater demand on Norwegian defence and on
Norwegian ability to receive and support rein-
forcements from abroad rapidly, and also that it
would require the political aluthorities to reactin time in a crisis situation (paragraph
21.2.6). The report further ooncluded that the
Norwegian defence must be able to face an
attack in north Norway on short warning whilein view of the increased Soviet capability for
operations along the whole bf the Norwegian
coast, it must also be preparqd for an attack on
the country as a whole. The commission
confirmed the policy of contihuing to maintain
peacetime defensive power concentrated in
north Norway but " At the same time we
should'strengthen the defence in other parts of
the country especially in Trondelag " (para-
graph 21.4.10). In order to prevent a surprise
attack on north Norway " We must maintain
a reasonable force of standing units in north
Norway... An invasion of south Norway is not
as probable until an attacker has secured
control over the outlets to the Baltic. There-
fore in south Norway... a reasonable defence is
essentially based on mobilisation forces " (para-
graph 21.2.1 l).
4.10. Thus defence in Norway is based on
three phases. Small, but well-trained, forces in
position in the north, those on the Soviet fron-
tier acting as an observation and early-warning
force that would act as a trip-wire and would
prevent unopposed occupation of Norwegian
territory, while the larger force in the Troms
area would be able to resist an attack long
enough for the first reinforcements to arrive
from south Norway. This second phase would
be based on the reinforced defence available
from mobilisation within the country and the
transport of extra brigades northwards, while
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NATO as a whole reacted to Soviet aggression
against one of its members. The third phase
would then be based on the arrival of external
reinforcelnents by air and sea, and training for
this phasb of Norwegian defence is an essential
part of NATO peacetime preparations.
4.1 l. ACE mobile force 
- 
the brigade-size air
transportable force available to SACEUR
composed of infantry battalions and supporting
units from many different NATO countries - is
specially trained in mountain and arctic warfare
and practises deployment in the Troms area
each year. Over the last five years, Norway
has been steadily moving to improve its capa-
bility of receiving reinforcements in an emer-
gency.
4.12. Since 1972, the United Kingdom 45
Commando Group Royal Marines has been
training each year in mountain and arctic
warfare conditions in Norway. In 1976, the
commitment was increased to two commandos
- 
42 and 45 
- 
together with a commando bri-
gade headquarters and logistics support units.
In an interesting development of integrated
allied forces, one independent company(Whisky Company) of the Royal Netherlands
Marines regularly undertakes training with 45
Commando in Norway and in an emergency
that company together with an amphibious
combat group of the Royal Netherlands Mar-
ines form part of the United Kingdom RM
commitment to Norway. The Committee was
privileged to visit 45 Commando Group and
the Netherlands Whisky Company on training
in Norway in February 1979 and was impressed
by the standard of skill and training achieved
by these units who are now fully capable of
surviving, moving and conducting military
operations in the extreme climatic conditions of
north Norway. Some equipment for these
units is now prestocked in Norway in peace-
time.
4.13. Recently, Canada has also earmarked an
air-sea transportable brigade group for the rein-
forcement of north Norway and elements of the
United States Marine Corps 2nd Marine amphi-
bious brigade also exercise there.
4.14. lt is understood that arrangements are
being made for the stockpiling of fuel and
ammunition for reinforcement forces in north
Norway. In February 1980 reports from Oslo
said that negotiations were in their final stages
for the stockpiling of weapons and equipment
for the United States Marine Corps brigade; in
early April an outline agreement covering prac-
tical problems of the movement of United
States reinforcements was signed in Oslo.
4.15. ln March of this year, an impressive
exercise " Anorak Express " was conducted in
the Troms area by 24,000 troops from Britain,
the Netherlands and the United States together
with ACE mobile force comprising units from
Canada, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.
General Rogers, the Supreme A llied Com-
mander Europe, stressed at the time of the exer-
cise the need for the pre-positioning of heavy
equipment in Norway for the use of reinforce-
ments in an emergency.
(h) The Baltic exits
4.16. The command responsibilities of Allied
Forces Northern Europe, with its 
-headquarters
at Kolsas outside Oslo, extend as'far south as
the River Elbe in Germany for land forces, so
that the German provinces of Schleswig and
Holstein form part of that command. The
defence command responsibility does not, how-
ever, extend beyond the Danish-German
frontier, air defence responsibility for Schles-
wig-Holstein resting with Headquarters Allied
Air Forces Central Europe under the Central
European Command.
4.17. Denmark, as explained above, has a pol-
icy similar in many respects to that of Norway
as far as its participation in integrated NATO
defence is concerned. Thus, foreign troops are
not based on Danish territory in the absence of
aggression or a threat ofaggression.
4.18. The land defence of the Baltic exits com-
prises first the Jutland Command with Head-
quarters Land Forces Jutland at Rendsburg on
the Kiel Canal which has available the Danish
Jutland Division comprising in peacetime two
armoured brigades; and the German 6th
armoured infantry division comprising the
l6th, lTth and lSth brigades; and units of the
German home defence forces. The command
of the Danish island of Zeeland with head-
quarters at Copenhagen has a Zeeland Division
available comprising two armoured brigades in
peacetime and a battalion on the Danish island
of Bornholm, one hundred kilometres to the
east, where radar installations provide impor-
tant early-warning information to the NATO
air defence system.
4.19. On mobilisation, the two Danish divi-
sions can be reinforced within twenty-four
hours with a third brigade each while longer-
term mobilisation further strengthens these divi-
sions and provides, at a later stage, up to
twenty-one further infantry battalions.
4.20. lt appears that air defence responsibility
of Danish territory is not under NATO com-
mand in peacetime, being the only part of
European NATO territory to have opted
out. It comes under AFNORTH only at a late
stage of alert. The Danish air force comprises
one squadron of twenty Swedish Draken and
two squadrons comprising twenty-four F-100D
and fourteen TF-100F fighter bomber squad-
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rons and two interceptor squadrons equipped
with thirty-nine F-l04Gs. F-16 aircraft are on
order to replace the F-100s.
4.21. As in Norway, effective defence of the
vital Baltic exits comprising the land areas
Jutland, Zeeland and Schleswig-Holstein, would
depend in the event of aggression on the arrival
of suflicient external reinlorcements. Ear-
marked for this purpose are the United King-
dom 6th field force comprising a reinforced
brigade including a tank battalion and a para-
chute battalion. The latter could be deployed
within thirty-six hours'while the 6th field force
would take up to a week to arrive if air trans-
port were available, the Chieftain tank battalion
taking longer as it would have to come by sur-
face transport. The United States Marine
Corps 4th marine amphibious brigade complete
with M-60 tanks is also earmarked for rein-
forcement of the area but would arrive by sea
from the United States in up to a month. ACE
mobile force, referred to under Norway above,
also practises deployment in the Baltic area.
4.22. On retiring as Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Northern Europe in 1979,
General Sir Peter Whiteley proposed that the
rdle of the British Army in NATO should be
changed, with British army units in Germany
being progressively reduced, perhaps to two
divisions, and that forces thus withdrawn
should be held in Britain for rapid reinforce-
ment of the Baltic area or Nonway where he
considered they would be more likely to be
required. The British defence white paper
published on 2nd April 1980 notes that the cost
of stationing British troops in Germany has
risen by 3.5 0/o annually in real terms over the
last twenty years and now accounts for three-
quarters of invisible overseas defence expen-
diture.
4.23. The Committee notes that any proposal
to reduce British forces on the mainland of
Europe below their present size would require
the approval of the Council of WEU by major-
ity vote under the terms of Article VI of Proto-
col No. II of the modified Brussels Treatv.
(c) Naval commands
(i) Command boundaries
4.24. Air defence forces of NATO countries
are under NATO command in peacetime; most
regular units of the land forces are " assigned "
to NATO command 
- 
giving NATO comman-
ders some say in the training and stationing of
the units that pass under their command at a
given stage of alert. Naval forces are not under
NATO command in peacetime 
- 
NATO naval
commanders are informed of the forces that will
be available within a specified time in the event
of alert being ordered. The only exceptions in
peacetime are the Standing Naval Force Atlan-
tic (STANAVFORLANT), a composite group
of some half dozen frigates or destroyers
supplied each by a different NATO country,
and the Standing Naval Force Channel(STANAVFORCHAN) consfsting of mine-
hunters and mine-sweepers from Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. These standing forces are
assigned to NATO commanders in peacetime
for operations, exercises and goodwill visits.
STANAYFORCHAN also conducts route
surveys and in a period of telnsion would pro-
vide the first mine counter-dreasure vessels to
be used for NATO operations.
4.25. Thus NATO naval commands, to a
greater extent than their land and air counter-
parts, remain planning comm|nds in peacetime
which, by agreement with R0rticipating coun-
tries, can conduct periodic $xercises and co-
ordinate surveillance by natio{ral units of Soviet
warships. The NATO naval commands and
their boundaries still reflect the national inte-
rests and relative force contributions of the
early 1950s when they were first established.
Some of these are felt not to correspond with
the present situation.
4.26. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlan-
tic, with his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia,
visited by the Committee at the end of Febru-
ary 1980, commands the whole of the Atlantic
area up to the Channelr. lihe area includes
the Norwegian Sea and the northern North
Sea. It is divided into three regional
commands, WESTLANT, $ASU-RNT anOIBERLANT, together with various island
commands covering territory of NATO count-
ries in the area of the Atlantic north of the
Tropic of Cance12.
4.27. The area of the Channel 
- 
including the
southern portion of the Nortldr Sea 
- 
is the res-
ponsibility of Allied Colnmander-in-Chief
Channel, a major NATO commander who
comes directly under the NATO Military Com-
mittee together with the two supreme comman-
ders. SACLANT and SACEUR. CINCCHAN'S
headquarters are in Northwood, to the north of
London. As a legacy from the organisation
agreed in the 1950s, a " Chaflnel Committee ",
composed of the chiefs of naval staff of Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom, meets occasionally in London. It is des-
cribed as an " advisory and consultative body to
the Commander-in-Chief, Channel ". Origi-
l. Naval command boundaries at Appendix III.
2. It is pointed out that in Article VI of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty the reference to the Tropic ofCancer relates only
to the definition of an armed attack for the purposes of
Article V. Thus the treaty does not restrict NATb plan-
ning or command responsibilities to the area north oi the
Tropic olCancer.
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nally designed as a counterpart to the NATO
Military Committee and military Standing
Group (since abolished) to which the two
supreme commanders are responsible, the
Committee understands that the Channel
Committee now rarely meets. Its remaining
functions could more efficiently be shared bet-
ween the Military Committee and national
military representatives to CINCCHAN.
4.28. The functions of SACLANT's subordi-
nate commander, Commander-in-Chief Eastern
Atlantic, are performed by the same person as
the Commander-in-Chief Channel from the
same headquarters. This political arrangement
gives a British admiral considerable responsi-
bility for the whole of the sea area east of
Greenland through which United States naval
battle groups would move in the event of hosti-
lities to engage the Soviet northern fleet in the
area of the Norwegian Sea and to protect the
arrival in Norway of reinforcements from the
United States and the United Kingdom.
4.29. The Baltic, including the North Sea
waters immediately to the west of Jutland,
come under Commander Baltic Approaches
with headquarters at Karup, Denmark 
- 
a
subordinate commander to CINCNORTH at
Kolsas who is himself subordinate to SACEUR.
(ii) Pattern of naval operations
4.30. In considering the sort of operations
allied naval forces would be called upon to
carry out in war, possible scenarios have to be
considered. The pattern of Soviet naval move-
ments is more limited than those of the major
NATO navies. Soviet vessels spend more time
in port, even the strategic ballistic missile
submarines. When compared with the United
States and British ballistic missile submarine
forces, at any given moment a significantly
smaller proportion of the Soviet ballistic missile
submarine fleet is at sea. Consequently, if the
Soviet Union were to prepare for general hosti-
lities at sea, a very likely sign would be move-
ments of large proportions of the vessels
composing the Northern and Baltic fleets into
the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic. NATO's
surveillance capabilities are certain to identify
such movements, including the movements of
submarines, but of course in peacetime no steps
could be taken to prevent such moves, and the
continued surveillance of large numbers of
vessels distributed round the oceans would then
impose a severe strain on NATO surveillance
capabilities, particularly on maritime patrol air-
craft. Once at sea, moreover, the staying power
of the Soviet fleet is limited compared with that
of most NATO vessels, and the initiation of
limited hostilities at sea would not be an attrac-
tive option for the Soviet Union because part
of its strategic missile submarine fleet would be
at risk because of NATO's anti-submanne
capability.
4.31. If, on the other hand, hostilities break out
without any obvious significant prior moves
to the open seas by the Soviet fleets, NATO
naval forces would then be involved in a race to
keep the Soviet fleets out of the Atlantic. As
far as the northern fleet is concerned, the race
would be between the United States and Soviet
naval forces to reach the Greenland-lceland-
United Kingdom gap, with an advantage to
United Kingdom based nuclear-propelled sub-
marines which can reach the area in advance of
comparable United States forces.
4.32. Soviet strategy is likely to be to attempt
to maintain a strong naval presence in the Nor-
wegian Sea during hostilities, partly to protect
its ballistic missile submarines operating in the
Barents and Norwegian Seas, regarded as a last
strategic reserve, and partly to isolate Nor-
way. In an ensuing battle for the control of
the Norwegian Sea, the geographical distribu-
tion of airfields, and the existence of the United
States carrierborne aircraft will provide an
advantage to NATO forces so long as the air-
fields remain intact and Norway, the Faroes,
Iceland and Greenland remain in allied
hands. If the decision is taken in time, the
early use of mines including mines laid by
aircraft could delay or prevent movement of
Soviet vessels through the Spitzbergen-North
Cape gap which they must pass to reach the
Norwegian Sea.
4.33. As far as the Baltic is concerned, the exits
can be effectively closed by mines as long
as Danish territory and Schleswig-Holstein
remain in allied hands, and as long as the
German and Danish naval forces can defend
the area. The greatest threat in this area is
probably amphibious landing by Soviet forces
which would seem to be a necessary precursor
to any attempt to move the Soviet Baltic fleet
into open waters after hostilities have broken
out.
V. Conclusions
(a) Conclusions on naval commands and forces
5.1. The days of " comfortable superiority "
for the NATO navies are over; the Soviet
Union, since at least the Cuban missile crisis, is
clearly resolved to build and maintain an
ocean-going navy enabling it to exert its poli-
tical influence on a world-wide basis in peace-
time on comparable terms to the United States.
That does not mean that the Soviet fleet is as
yet the equal of the NATO navies in war.
Overall, geography combined with the size
and quality of the fleets of many of the NATO
countries, and especially their anti-submarine
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warfare capabilities, still give NATO superior-
ity in general terms. The naval problem,
however, for NATO and national commanders
is in coping with many different tasks, in-
cluding tasks outside the NATO area, which
may have to be performed simultaneously, and
would call for many more vessels than those of
an adversary who prepared to initiate hosti-
lities. While the numerical size of the Soviet
fleet, like that of NATO navies, has declined
slightly in recent years, its quality, and in parti-
cular the size of individual ships and their
ocean-going capability, has been steadily
increasing. In the future, NATO may have
to face a Soviet generation of genuine aircraft-
carriers, larger than the Minsk, and more
amphibious warfare ships of the size of the Ivan
Rogov.
5.2. In the long term the need for NATO
naval construction programmes is to maintain
the existing strength and quality of its naval
forces, through a continual building pro-
gramme, to ensure that the average age of the
ships in service does not increase, and to ensure
that the NATO navies keep abreast of future
trends to bigger Soviet ships. This is parti-
cularly important with respect to naval opera-
tions outside the NATO area, the importance
of which is highlighted by recent events in
Afghanistan and Iran and is dealt with by the
Committee in another reportr. But a massive
increase in NATO naval forces would not be
possible because of financial constraints.
5.3. Despite the general overall superiority of
NATO navies however, many different naval
tasks to be carried out simultaneously compete
for the services of the finite NATO naval
forces, and these forces show shortages in parti-
cular areas.
5.4. In the shorter term, therefore, NATO
shipbuilding must remedy specific dehciencies
in its present forces, especially in the field of
escorts and mine counter-measure vessels.
More escorts are required to protect the sea
lines of communication, more mine counter-
measure vessels are urgently required to keep
the seas and ports of the Alliance free of mines.
An additional requirement is for more mari-
time patrol aircraft; existing resources are not
enough for peacetime surveillance require-
ments; they would be strained to break-
ing point in a crisis if the Soviet northern and
Baltic fleets were simultaneously to put to sea.
5.5. Today better use should be made of
existing naval resources. Joint NATO naval
planning and control must be improved; exist-
ing naval forces must be employed and control-
l. Application of the Brussels Treaty 
- 
reply to
twenty-hfth annual report of the Council, Rapporteur
Tanghe.
led more flexibly, irrespective of command
boundaries, so as to make the best use of the
forces.
5.6. NATO naval headquarters must be able
to plan for operations agaipst hostile forces
wherever they may be required. The Commit-
tee points out in this connection that Article 6
of the North Atlantic Treatf, which refers to
" the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer " is concerned only with the definition
of armed attack for the purposes of Article 5 of
the treaty. The treaty in itself does not restrict
the area of the authority of NATO commands.
5.7. The German navy is at present allocated
entirely to SACEUR; appropriate ships should
be made available for the whole area of the
northern flank. The destroyers and frigates
would make a valuable contribution both to the
striking fleet Atlantic and to the escort forces
which NATO naval commanders claim are in
short supply in the Eastern Atlantic and
Channel areasr. And great improvements in
the use of existing resources will come from
greater interoperability of equipment, especially
of communications and digital transmission
equipment of all kinds, and ammunition.
5.8. Lastly, as several NATO commanders
have pointed out to the Conimittee, a central-
ised NATO reporting system should be estab-
lished to maintain an up-to-{ate register, on a
day-to-day basis, of the locatlon of all Warsaw
Pact merchant shipping in tho NATO area. In
the present area of Channel Cbmmand alone on
any one day there may be 80-100 merchant
ships of Warsaw Pact countries in the ports of
NATO countries while a further 40 such ships
are at sea in the area. The national arrange-
ments for keeping tabs on the location of these
vessels are good in Germany, Norway and the
United States; they need to be improved in
Belgium and the United Kingdom; at the same
time, national policies must ensure that such
ships are never berthed in particularly sensitive
port areas. The necessary machinery then needs
to be introduced so that each national authority
reports locations on a daily basis to SACLANT
headquarters and appropriate subordinate naval
commands.
5.9. The Committee is aware that co-
operation between French naval forces and the
NATO naval commands is good; French naval
missions are maintained at the NATO head-
quarters. But all NATO qommanders who
have addressed the Committee have stressed
that, while they understand the limitations
imposed by national policy on French co-
L The Committee examines rn another report the provi-
sions of the modified Brussels Treaty as they affect this pro-
posal. See Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to
the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Rapporteur
Mr. Tanghe.
the
Mr.
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operation with NATO, they would far prefer to
be able to place the same reliance on the excel-
lent French naval forces as they are presently
able to place on the naval forces of the other
WEU countries which are earmarked for
NATO. The Committee recalls that by virtue
of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty
WEU relies only on the NATO military autho-
rities for the implementation of the mutual
defence obligations of Article V. The ear-
marking of French naval forces for NATO
commands (on the same basis as the naval
forces of the other WEU countries) would not
amount to reintegration into the military
structure.
5.10. Of paramount importance is the proper
use of warning time by political authorities,
possibly combined with reallocation of ear-
marked naval units so that they may be
assigned to NATO command at an earlier stage
of alert than presently planned. It is essential
that co-ordinated NATO command of naval
movements should begin immediately there is
any sign of a concerted significant move of the
Soviet northern and Baltic fleets towards the
open sea.
(b) Conclusions on Norway
5.11. Despite the imbalance of forces perma-
nently stationed in Norway and the Kola
peninsula the Committee believes the present
defence policy to be basically sound. At the
political level it is important that there should
be full allied support for Norway to resist the
never-ending pressure exerted on it by the
Soviet Union aimed at preventing perfectly legi-
timate plans for the rapid reinforcement of
Norway in a period of tension or hostilities.
That political support should not overlook
other Soviet pressures concerning economic
rights in Svalbard and in the sea areas off the
common frontier.
5.12. lt is important that all units of allied
countries likely to be used for the reinforcement
of Norway in a period of tension or hostilities
should receive proper mountain and arctic
training in peacetime. The Committee wel-
comes the scope of training undertaken by the
British marine commandos with a Netherlands
marines element and by Canadian forces. It
appears that more units of the United States
Marine Corps are in need of such training.
5.13. The assignment of ACE mobile force to
the support of Norway in one deployment
mode is a valuable means of identifying the
whole Alliance with the defence of the country
and the Committee welcomes the contribution
made by the participating countries,'Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. While that force provides important
political support for a threatened country, its
military eflectiveness would be greatly increasedif the different units could be provided with
entirely standardised equipment compatible
with local stocks of ammunition and spares. It
is not militarily realistic for a force of only
brigade size to be composed of battalions of
different nationality equipped on a purely
national and non-compatible basis.
5. 14. Plans for the rapid reinforcement of
Norway must necessarily include the stockpil-
ing of ammunition and heavy equipment and
the Committee notes the progress being madein this direction. A counterpart to allied
support for the defence of Norway is Norwegian
readiness to make the necessary provisions to
receive reinforcements rapidly in a period of
tension. Without modification to the existing
" base policy ", pending agreements on stock-
piling of ammunition and heavy equipment
should be concluded as rapidly as possible and
there should be no discrimination between the
nationality of forces conducting reinforcement
exercises on Norwegian territory.
5.15. Norwegian ability to resist any surprise
attack long enough for reserves to arrive is a
necessary precondition of the reinforcement
policy. Some armoured force in the Porsanger
area would greatly improve the capacity of
existing forces to deter and delay any inva-
sion. At the same time the air defence of the
vital five airfields in north Norway requires
strengthening.
(c) Conclusions on the Baltic area
5.16. The Committee concludes that while it
should be feasible to block the Baltic exits in
wartime so as to prevent the exit of the Soviet
Baltic fleet, the defence of the land areas by air
and land forces will be vitally important. The
air defence of Denmark like that of all other
NATO territory should be under NATO com-
mand in peacetime. The NATO policy not to
conduct joint NATO naval operations in the
Baltic east of Bornholm should be revised, or at
the least naval vessels of NATO countries must
regularly exercise their rights under the law of
the sea to operate in all areas of the Baltic
despite the establishment of exclusive economic
zones in the area.
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APPENDIX I
The overall naval balance 
- 
NATO and lYarsaw Pact
vessels over 500 tons, excluding ballistic missile submarines
Country SSGN& SSG SSN SS
Aircraft-
carriers Cruisers Destroyers
Over I , 100
tons
Frigates
500-1,100
tons
Corvettes
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
ll
72
J
6
23
24
9
l0
6
l5
4
t2
l6
8
2
J
l3
2
3
8
28
4
4
20ll
t2
7
l0
I
t2
8
96
l6
7
23
6
4
l4
8
5
2
5l
65
2
5
5
8
6
J
NATO 83 136 l8 4t l8s 201 29
Warsaw Pact 69 42 153 2 39 I 15 tt2 122
USSR
East Germany
Poland
Bulgaria
Romania
69 42 147
4
2
2 39 tt4
I
108
2
2
l 16
J
J
Source' Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80.
SSGN = nuclear-propelled cruise-missile submarines.SSG = conventionally-propelledcruise-missilesubmarines.SSN = nuclear-propelled attack submarines.SS = conventionally-propelled attack submarines.
Cruisers: includes helicopter cruisers.
t
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Number
of ships
2000
Carriers
NATO
APPENDIX II
General purpose naval forces of
NATO and the lVarsaw Pact
Coastal
patrol
Patrol comb
4
Mine
warfare
.Cgastal
patrol
2
Patrol
combatants
Carriers
Aggregate tonnage(Millions of metric tons)
1967 1972 1977 1979
Notes :
1972 1977 1979
1. Mobile logistic ships include only those auxiliaries which
provide underway replenishment or direct material support
to units operating away from home base. A number of other
auxiliary types are not included in these totals.
2. Displacements shown are full load for surface ships and
submerged for submarines.
Source' United States Department of Defence Annual Report, fiscal year 198 l.
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K
1979
Millions of
metric tons
8
Number
of ships
3000
2000
1 500
1 000
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APPENDIX III
NATO navals commands
EASTLANT
IBERLANT
WESTLANT
.BALTAP (SACEUR}
:(crrvccuarul
)
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DOCUMENT 837 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1975.1979
FINANCHL ETT'ORT
APPENDIX IV
1976 (- 2)
99,726
84,M2
43,01
5,301
1,1
9,3t
7.
:
4,662
7,zs0
6,854
27,354
108,357
1975
(r)
1978
(4)
3,175
18,623
21,417
6,246
37
4,307
74,627
1979 l'
--1,
3,734)) ?)d
24,777
7,365
42
4,985
19,275
82,502
771
122,261
-6
378
4r7
4t7
t29
tt7
355
345
t975
-QA
3.91
26.41
30.93f.il
0.05
s.8l
23.25
6.23
(- 4)
7,81
6,1
3,589
5,680
5,333
r 8,845
9r,013
1978
(3)
1979 [(- r) 1977 1977-ltlll97E(e)(8)(7)(6)1975 1976 t977 1979 e 1975(10) (l l)
96,905
471,588
I I 1,635 9,801
558, 52,',
7
2@,1o7 323,51t
1976
QD
9,818
52,893
59
56,156
357
248,517
23,O25
5
9,16'
1978
(14)
9,841
1979 e(r,
9,868
5
59,439
55,888
358
4,236
220,415
1975
(r6)
3.1
3.8
3.6
2.5
1.0
3.5
5.0
1.9
2.4
6.5
3.2
5.3
1976
(r?)
1977
-(rE)
3.2
3.9
3.4
2.4
1.0
3.5
4.8
1978
(re)
3.3
3.9
3.4
2.4
1.0
3.3
4.7
t975
QD
1971
Q'
254
280
291
9t
8l
272
213
t97E
Q4)
1979
1zo)
1979 1976
(27)
4.2E
27.1O
3t.34
8.79
0.05
5.99
22.45
t979 f
(30)
t978
(l)(0) (2e)
4.50
26.80
3r.19
9.25
0.05
6.80
21.4t 21.37
BelgiumFrance .......::::::
Germany.
Italy .
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Million Frs.
Million Frs.
Million DM
Million Lirc
Million Frs.
Million Guilders
Million f
70,899
55,872
37,589
3,1@
836
7,246
5,1 65
89,480
73,097q,184
4,s33
1,029
9,2@
6,810
:
4,124
6,343
too,gzg
1o9,467 I 62,880
338,833
419,986
192,O57
2,299
20,8r8
28,362
14,754
36,008
I,526,508
68,104
349,895
4.y''5,918
188,22s
2,533
90,837
1,367,821
41,371
22,553
31,
15,476
41,051
1,595,526
79,1E9
381,ffi
515,591
2t
2,823
106,91 130,
247,473
1,548,9 l,9l l,
2,1 9,830
53,079
3.1
3.8
3.5
2.3
1.0
3.3
5.0
1.9
2.3
3.1
4.O
215
253
323
350
361
110
103
309
262
174
258
322
63
443:
361
4.53
27.06
30.03
8.93
0.05
6.04
23.36
rm.00
27.21
31.31
9.r 3
0.05
3.
3.
3.3
2.3
I
3.3
4.
77
73
215
198
197
247
255
85
4
38, 45,414
6,119
1,229
10,001
9,085
;
37,733
ri),zar
15,457
4,335
17,308
5,137
r,057
1,115
577
100,928
13,03, I I
15,267
4,
23
2,865 2,9s7
I r,075ll
49,
3
9t
59,825
55,812
358
13,654
55,981
248,136
358
13,853
55,91
23,280
5,089
9,268
4,04
9,77
216,863
259,b4
507,995
59,
56,
59,&9
56,697
358
13,937
s5,n2230,418 222,
l5l,51
309 389,491
t4
55
Torll WEU . 248, 249,422 249, 3.7
20s
r99 223r98 10069,432
4,O87
1,315
1,307
623
199,681
46,363
26,157
35,769
16,359
47,789
I,889,1 57
3,736,268
205,321
55,892
31,599
39,979
17,795
52,471
2,t12,365
2,307,O55
222,906
65,459
37,376
45,706
20,248
66, I 35
2,348,527
3.6 3.6 3.6:
2.O
2.4
3.3
3.5
Canada
Denmark
Greece
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
United States.
Million $
Million Kr.
Million Drachmas
Million Kr.
Million Escudos
Million L.
Million $
3,1 4,
8,r
:
173
297
358
78
s.97
5,28 r
43,917
4,771
r9,898
163, r95,81
37
23,499
5,105
43,14
218,548
251,q2
510,, 513,1
23,691
5,1
9, 9,
9, 9,923
1.9
2.3
3.1
3.5
5.3
r35
18r
I
227
8l
I
185
7,
9
9ffiit
145,981
624
si,or
"3.2
3.8
l.
a
l.
1.58
I
I.91
0.91
2.Ot
t.
+t ,ffi
I
-t_
146, 163,063 184,121 212,612 3,100, 3,347,297
2,431,352 z70z846
4,34r,6{tl5,W,r(it 503,122 505
2J87 5.5
:
4.7i
"5.4
4.9
.-
4.4
4.9
4.4
4ts378
321290290 4t4
22,727
5
7
263
Country National currency unit Defence expenditure (national currency)current prices Defence expenditure (US $ million) a GDP in purchasers' values (US $ million) a Population (thousand) Defence expenditure as I ofGDP in purchasers' values a Defence expenditure per head (US $) Defence expenditurc as 7" of total WEU
(Appendix madc public on thc authority of thc Chairman of the Committe.)
convd.ion.
rhm th! Dd!.nt.s.. ol cNP prcviou'& pubtbhcd.
For thc D.riod 1975-199 thc following ntar of ciaharsE h.rc b..n .pplicd:
Country Unit
Belgium and Luxembourg Franc
- 
l97s
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Canada
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Dentmark
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Fraace
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Fed, Rep. of Germany
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978'
- 
1979
Greece
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Canadian Dollar
D. Kroner
Franc
Deutschmark
Drachma
L'S fi per unit
o.o27t9
0.02590
0.02790
0.03184
0.03411
0.983r 3
l.0t4l6
o.94p.34
0.87664
0.8537t
0.17392
0.16543
0.16658
0.181 34
0.19008
o.23331
0.20922
o.20352
0.22t59
0.21517
0.40616
o.39714
0.43070
0.49785
0.54559
0.03097
0.02734
0.027t4
o.02729
0.02696
Units per US $
36.78
38.60
35.84
31.41
29.32
l.0l716
0.98604
1.05345
1.1&73
't.71136
5.7499
6.0450
6.@32
5.5I46
5.2610
4.286
4.7E0
4.913
4.513
4.252
2.46
,<,
2.32
2.Ot
l.E3
32.29
36.58
36.84
36.65
37.1O
Cotulry
Italy
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Netherlands
- 
1975
- 
1916
- 
1977
- 
t97E
- 
1979
Norway
- 
1975
- 
1916
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Porlrgal
- 
1975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
Turkey
- 
t975
- 
1976
- 
1977
- 
1978
- 
1979
United Kingdom
- 
1975
- 
t9i6
- 
1977
- 
l97E
- 
1979
Unit
1,(D Lire
Guilder
N. Kroner
Escudo
T. Lira
US $ Wr unit
l 53183
r.20I5r
1.13329
1.17832
1.20357
0.39539
o.37822
0.4o745
o.6224
o.49849
0.19073
o.tE327
0.r8785
0.19076
0.t9747
o.03922
0.03309
o.o26t3
0.02276
0.02044.
0.05936
0.06229
0.05555
0.0411E
0.0321E
2.2219
i.EO62
t.7455
1.9195
2.1216
Units per US I
o.652E2
o.E3229
0.88239
0.84866
0.83086
2.53
2.64
2.45
2.16
2,01
5.24
5.46
5.32
5.24
s.06
25.:O
30.22
38.28
43.94
48.92
14.42
t 6.05
18.@
24.28
31.08
0.450
o.554
0.573
o.521
o.471
throuhout ftom Tohl mn-WEU aad Tor.t NAI6.
. : PrElitrry ..!ir d!.
.f - For! .!t,
GDP (pr.) : oror! do.D6rb produ.r h pu.ch!&n' vrtu.r, cllrr nr pricc!.&I'a: D.f.nc. cxFrditur.! (NATo d.tuiriorr, from NAIO Dts. r.L.!. M-DBG2(7921.
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Amendment 1 
The northern jlatlk and the Atlantic and Channel commands 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
4th June 1980 
1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "North Atlantic 
Council " and insert "appropriate military authorities of NATO ". 
Signed: Hardy 
I. See 6th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Amendment agreed to). 
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l. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to I with 0
abstentions.
2. Members of the Commiltee: Mr. Bonnel (Acting
Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Banks, Baumel, Bechter (Alter-
nate: Schleter), van den Beryh, Bemini, Boucheny (Alter-
nate'. Jung), Cavaliere, Cox, Deprdm, Edv'ards, Fosson
(Alternate : Talamona), Grant (Alternate : Wtlkinson)
REPORTI
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments2
by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur
29th April 1980
Handlos, de Koster, Labriola, Lemmrich, Meintz, Menard,
Onslow (Alternate '. Str Frederic Bennettl, Pawelczyk,
Pecchioli, P6ronnet. Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alter-
nate'. van Hulst), Tanghe.
N.B. The names of those taliing parl in the vote
are prinled in italics
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Introductory lt'ile
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews, examined equipment and witnessed
demonstrations as follows :
l6th February 1979 
- 
Oslo, Ministrv of Defence
Mr. Finn Valem, Director, Directorate of Civil Defience and Emergency Planni4g ;
Mr. Haakon Harbek, Head of Warnings Section, Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency
Planning;
Lt. Col. Oddvar T jam, NBC Expert, Adviser to the Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency
Planning, representing Chief of Defence.
9th July 1979 
- 
NATO Headquarters
The late Mr. W. E. Farrant, Director of Civil Emergency Planning ;
Mr. G. Potter, Civil Defence.
l9th July 1979 
- 
London, Ministry of Defence
Lt. Col. R. Glazebrook, MBE, Directorate of Army Requirements 2 (Army) (GS(OR)a) ;
Mr. J. E. Walsh, DS 12;
Lt. Col. P. M. R. Stacpoole, Senior Military Representative AWRE;
Major J. G. Rogen, MO 4 ;
Captain R. P. Harrison, MO 4;
Display of NBC defence equipement.
19th September 1979 
- 
ABC & Selbstschutzschule, SonthoJbn, Germany
Colonel Krause, School Commander;
Colonel Stcirmer, Deputy Commander ;
Major Ufererkamp, Ministry of Defence, Bonn ;
Dr. Hausser, Expert;
Display of NBC defence equipment.
24th September 1979 
- 
HQ 5 US Corps and 3 US Armoured Division, NBC Defence Company,
Frankfurt
Lt. General Berry, Commanding General 5 US Corps;
Brigadier General Kennedy, Second-in-Command US 3rd Armoured Division ;
Lt. Col. Garner, US 3rd Armoured Division Chemical Officer and22nd Chemical Company;
Demonstration of NBC defence equipment.
22nd November 1979 
- 
Etablissement technique central de l'armement, Arcueil, Fra4ce
Ing. G6n. Ricaud, Directeur de l'Etablissement;
Colonel J.-L. Lagabrielle, Division Plans, Programmes, Budget, Etat-major des drmdes;
Officers representing the army, navy and air force ;
Displays of NBC defence equipment.
23rd November 1979 
- 
Direction de la Sicurite Civile, Levallois-Perret, France
Mr. Marcel Flutre, Directeur du Cabinet, Relations Internationales;
Colonel Patoureau, Emergency Measures Planning Group;
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Commandant Bonal, CODISC ;
Visit to national civil protection operations centre CODISC (Centre op6rationnel de la Direction
de la S6curit6 civile).
6th February 1980 
- 
Walem, Belgium
Mr. Andr6 Caussin, Inspecteur Gdndral de la Protection Civile ;
Mr. Thaels, Service de la Protection Civile ;
Mr. Vermuelen, Service de la Protection Civile ;
Visit to national Civil Defence Command Post.
6th February 1980 
- 
Ecole du Genie, Jambes, Belgium
Colonel Timmerman, School Commandant ;
Major Pecheux, Commandant of the Centre d'Etudes NBC'
Commandant Dobbelaere, Centre d'Etudes NBC;
Display of NBC defence equipment.
7th February 1980 
- 
The Hague, Ministry of the Interior
Mr. J. Toet, Director of Civil Defence ;
Mr. Th. E. van de Leur, Head of Operations ;
Mr. J. P. M. Ruijters, Head of Protective Structures ;
Mr. Evers, NBC Expert.
7th February 1980 
- 
Ministry of Defence, Prinses Juliana Kazerne, The Hague
Colonel J. P. Verheyen, ACOS Operations, Army Staff;
Lt. Commander F. Logeman, Royal Netherlands Navy;
Lt. Col. C.E.A. Wegman, Royal Netherlands Army;
Lt. Col. H. M. Mulder, Royal Netherlands Air Force;
Capt. Pharmacologist Dr. D. A. Ligtenstein, CDE and Direction of Military Medical Services.
l4th February 1980 
- 
The Home O/fice, London
Mr. J. A. Howard, Assistant Secretary F6 Division;
Mr. J. K. S. Clayton, Deputy Chief Scientific Offrcer ;
Mr. J. C. Cotterill, Senior Scientific Oflicer;
Mr. F. J. Woodland, Principal of F6 Division ;
Mr. R. C. Morris, Principal of F6 Division.
6th March 1980 
- 
Department of Defence, Pentagon, Washington
Mr. Mike MacDonald, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary, Policy ;
Lt. Col. Harry Wilson, Oflice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Mr. Tom Dashiell, Assistant Director, Environmental and Life Sciences, Office of Defence
Research and Engineering ;
Mr. D. Gasbarri, Defence Intelligence Agency;
Mr. E. Henderson, Defence Intelligence Agency ;
Lt. Col. Mountel, US Army Chemical Corps.
6th March 1980 
- 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington
Mr. Lowell Fleischer.
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6th March 1980 
- 
Government Preparedness Olfice, Washington
Mr. William Chipman, Director, Population Protection Division.
27th March 1980 
- 
Defence NBC Centre, Winterbourne Gunner
Colonel A. G. Vicary, Commandant;
Wing Commander G. J. Wilson, MC, RAF, Deputy Commandant;
Wing Commander B. R. Barry, RAF;
Colonel P. D. Hidalgo, USA, GSOl (W);
Lt. Colonel T. D. Bordass, Royal Artillery, CI;
and other staff.
The Rapporteur was also provided with oflicial information for the report by:
Dr. Diekmann, Regierungsdirektor, Ministry of the Interior, Bonn 
,
Mr. Gaetano Spirito, Head of the Civil Defence Service, Rome ;
The Director of the Service National de la Protection Civile, Luxembourg ;
The Ministry of the Force Publique, Luxembourg.
Further information was provided by Dr. J. P. Perry-Robinson, Senior Fellow, University of
Sussex Science Policy Research Unit.
The Committee as a whole met in Paris on l8th March 1980 when it discussed a first draft of this
repo-rt. It met again in Bonn on 29th April 1980 when it discussed and adoptqd the report as a
whole.
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the oflicials, senior offrcers and
experts who received the Rapporteur, or otherwise provided information. The views expressed in
the report, tmless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.
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Draft Recommendation
on nuclear, biological and chemical protection
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that whilst international agreements have banned the production, stockpiling and
use of biological weapons, few limitations have been imposed on stocks of nuclear and chemical
weapons;
(ri) Aware that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons may not be attainable in the short
term and that it is essential to world peace that NATO nuclear forces should balance those of the
Warsaw Pact, while negotiations continue to secure mutual reductions in their numbers;
(iii) Recognising that adequate on-site verification procedures must be an essential part of any
agreement to eliminate and ban the use of chemical weapons, but that such procedures still remain to
be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and believing that until present negotiations reach a conclusion,
stocks and types of chemical weapons held by NATO partners should be brought up to sufficient
levels to provide any necessary deterrent and retaliatory capability;
(rv) Further believing that the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by an equality of
retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whilst awaiting agreements
to prohibit such weapons;
(y) Considering that whilst nuclear and chemical weapons remain in existence military personnel
and civilian populations remain exposed to the threat and consequences of their use ;
(vr) Convinced that effective NBC defence equipment and procedures for all allied forces can
drastically reduce casualties ;
(vii) Believing that whilst allied governments must vigorously pursue mutual and balanced force
reductions, they also have a moral duty in peacetime to keep their populations objectively informed
of the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and to implement civil defence
programmes for the survival of their people,
RrcouurNos rHAT rHe Couttcll
Urge member governments, acting where appropriate through the North Atlantic Council:
l. To recognise the full implications of the threat of battlefield chemical and nuclear attacks and
to take immediate steps:
(a) to improve protective and decontamination equipment and procedures for military
personnel, to protect electronic and communications equipment against electromagnetic
pulse effects, and to remedy the other dehciencies identiflred by the Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments in its report*;
(b) to achieve better co-operation for research, development and the production of equipment
and its interoperability ;
2. To review existing usable stocks of chemical weapons and to take steps to ensure
that the NATO deterrent and retaliatory capability is equal to the estimated offensive capa-
bility of the Warsaw Pact ;
3. Actively to encourage bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons with adequate verification ;
4. To implement urgently a co-ordinated and common " stay-at-home " civil defence
programme in peacetime to include essentially the provision of :
(a) objective information to the public on survival in conventional, nuclear, biological and
chemical war;
(b) an organisation with protected and up-date<i comrmrnications to provide warning and
monitoring services for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks, fully co-ordinated within
NATO;
(c) plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists, the police, Iire brigade, Red Cross,
similar organisations, and civilian volunteers in a war alert, attack and post-attack period;
+ Document 838, paragraph 5.8.
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(d1 fall-out shelters in public buildings and in the home;
(e) self-help equipment for sale to the public including home shelters, protective clothing,
respirators, dosimeters, etc. ;
5. To call' for NATO to publish annually comparable statistics, to an agreed common
definition, of national expenditure on civil defence.
l0s
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l. Introduction
l. l. "The sharpness of our swords, our valour
and our strength will come to nought if
we allow our camp to be surprised and
unprotected as we await the call to hght
the battle yet to come." Antonius (an
officer of the Roman legions)
1.2. The brutal occupation of Afghanistan by
the Soviet Union with a massive force of men
and armaments is not only a tragedy for a
defenceless and freedom-loving people, but a
warning signal for the West.
1.3. The check on an aggressive nation is not
only the counter-balance of an equal force of
arms and men, but also the visible and inherent
determination of a people to survive and defend
themselves.
1.4. This report is concerned therefore both
with the individual protection from fallout of
people in the armed forces in Western Europe
and the families at home for whom they stand
guard.
1.5. At a time when Europe is exposed to a
serious threat from both nuclear and chemical
weapons from the Soviet Union, coupled with
the realisation that there is no longer a NATO
capability for a prolonged conventional war, it
has now become essential for Europe to face
the consequences of a war in which chemical
and nuclear weapons could be used.
1.6. This report identifies weaknesses which
require urgent remedies. It calls for a fresh
look at the need fully to equip and protect our
military fiorces from the effects of chemical and
nuclear warfare. It urges radical action to ini-
tiate the provision of shelters and self-help
information for our populations, and the co-
ordination of civil defence plans in member
states. Above all people must be told what is
involved and the action needed for survival.
1.7. In this world made smaller by speed of
communication, we strive only to live at peace
with the Soviet Union in the understanding that
different political ideas and philosophies can
coexist. The terms for that understanding rest
on the axiom that rejects armed force as a
means of persuasion and directs all our eflorts
to the improvement of mankind.
1.8. We must and will pursue mutual and
balanced reduction in forces with the Soviet
Union but let us not wait unprotected.
***
Erplanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Banks, Rapportear)
1.9. This report investigates the requirement
for and the feasibility of providing protection
for military personnel and civilians against the
radiation effects that may be expected in nuc-
lear warfare and against biological and chemi-
cal weapons.
1.10. Previous reports have not been concerned
exclusively with the problems of individual pro-
tection, but several earlier reports have dealt
with civil defencer and one has dealt in particu-
lar with the effects of nuclear weapons2. The
absence of any report from the Committee on
protection of the civil population for the last
f,rfteen years reflects a similar waning interest
on the part of many governments ; the Commit-
tee in this report stresses that a balanced
defence policy must concern itself with protec-
tion of civilians as well as of military personnel.
ll. The threat
(a) General
2.1. In this section of the report a general
description from open literature is given firstly
of the types of weapon which are known to
exist or to have existed in both allied and
Warsaw Pact countries, secondly the characte-
ristics and eflects of the weapons are described
and, lastly, present levels of stockpiles for such
weapons are estimated from available infor-
mation.
(b) Nuclear weapons
(i) General
2.2. There is a good deal of published infor-
mation concerning present numbers of nuclear
weapons possessed by the nuclear weapons
powers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The
yields of warheads range flrom I kiloton up to
probably 100 kilotons for the shorter-range
battlefield nuclear weapons, and up to a
maximum of some 25 megatons for the larger
single warhead strategic missiles possessed by
the Soviet Union. Individual warheads in
multiple warhead missiles, whether MIRV or
MRV, have lower yields ranging from 50 kilo-
l. Civil emeryency planning, Document 170, 30th April
1960 (Rapporteur: Admiral Heye) 
- 
Recommendation 47.
Public survival and civil defence, Document 247,
l6th October 1962 (Rapporteur: Mr. Wienand) 
- 
Recom-
mendation 84.
Public survival and civil defence, Document 303,
27th February 1964 (Rapporteur: Mr. Wienand) 
- 
Recom-
mendation 107.
2. The state of European security, Document 169,
30th April 1960 (Rapporteur: Mr. Mulley).
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tons to a few hundred kilotons each. For
comparison, the original hssion bombs dropped
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were variously
reported to have yields in the range 12.5 to 20
kilotons t. The present section is therefore
limited to a brief summary of the effects of
nuclear weapons which have perhaps been less
widely publicised in recent years 2, although, in
this instance, very detailed technical informa-
tion on almost all aspects of the effects of nuc-
lear explosions is available in public literature 3.
2.3. Of the total energy released in a nuclear
explosion in the atmosphere about 50 0/o is in
the form of the blast wave ; about 35 0/o is re-
leased in the form of radiant thermal energy or
heat; about 5 0/o is in the form of initial nuc-
lear radiation, chiefly gamma rays and neu-
trons I the remaining l0 0/o comes from the later
decay of radioactive fission products (i.e.
"ashes" of the bomb) released over a period of
time. Further effects of a nuclear explosion
may be the generation of an electromagnetic
pulse or modihcation to the ionised layers of
the atmosphere ; in certain cases these effects
can seriously interfere with radio communi-
cations and radar, or may destroy electronic
equipment used for these purposes. All these
different effects are described under the separate
headings below. The effects of a nuclear
explosion vary considerably depending on
where they occur 
- 
whether underwater, under-
ground, on the surface, in the atmosphere or in
outer space. For most uses of nuclear weapons
explosions in the atmosphere can be considered
airbursts if the fireball from the explosion does
not touch the ground. Airbursts, therefore,
involve the detonation of weapons at a height
exceeding 30 metres for a weapon of I kiloton,
and over I,000 metres for a 5 megaton
warhead. For attacking special targets earth
penetrator nuclear weapons may be employed,
the effects of which will be largely those of
underground nuclear explosions.
l. Yields of nuclear weapons are measured in kilotons(or megatons) of conventional explosive (TNT) equivalent,
I kt being taken as 4.2x10t2 joules or l.l5x 106 kW hours(l kiloton = 1,000 tons; I megaton = 106 tons).
2. It is 20 years since the Committee reported in detail
on the effects of nuclear weapons explosions rn its report
on " The' state of European security ", Document 169,
adopted on 30th April 1960 (Rapporteur: Mr. Mulley).
See Appendix II thereto.
3. Nuclear weapons, United Kingdom HMSO 1959.
Biological and environmental effects of nuclear war,
Hearings before the special Sub-Committee on Radiation of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the
United States, June 1959.
The effects ol nuclear war, United States Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC: United
States Government Printing Oflice, 1979, in two volumes.
Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear-
weapons detonations, Washington D.C.: United States
National Academy of Sciences, 1975.
The effects of nuclear weapons, S. Glasstone and
P. J. Dolan (editors), United States Departments of
Delence and Energy, 1977 (3rd edition).
(ii) Blast
2.4. Most of the damage to structures and
equipment caused by nuclean weapons will be
due to blast, which is not different in kind from
the blast from conventional weapons. The mag-
nitude of the effect is vattly greater. The
largest bombs dropped in the second world war
contained only a few tons of rNr. The blast
energy of a l0 kiloton nuclear weapon is there-
fore some thousands of times greater and that of
a l0 megaton weapon some millions of times
greater. The original blast wave from the
explosion and the reflected wave from the
ground combine to produce what is known as a
Mach wave which travels outwards faster than
sound in a direction parallel to the ground. As
the air is heated with the passage of the wave,
energy is dissipated in the volume of the atmos-
phere traversed by a Mach wave so that the
peak overpressure by which blast can be mea-
sured falls off more rapidly with distance than
would be the case with an inverse square law.
2.5. A higher yield weapon will produce a
given blast effect at a greater distance from the
point of the explosion, but the increase in dis-
tance achieved is proportion4l only to the cube
root of the yield. A l0 kilotfn weapon will in-
flict given damage over a distance 2.15 times
that of a I kiloton weapofr. A I megaton
weapon will inflict the same degree of damage
at a distance l0 times greatef than a I kiloton
weapon. For an airburst explosion, there is an
optimum height at which a given peak over-
pressure will extend to the greatest distance.
The following table showing distances for
severe and moderate damage to brick houses
and locomotives assumes an optimum height of
burst to achieve the specified damage in each
case. A "locomotive" is used here to illustrate
the likely distances at which military targets
involving heavy equipment will be damaged.
Tanks could be expected to fare rather better.
"Severe" damage means virtually total des-
truction, "moderate" damage means damage
beyond economic repair for a house, or requi-
ring major reconstruction for a locomotive.
2.6. The area over which given damage is in-
flicted is of course proportio4al to the square of
the above distances. Thus a I megaton bomb
would destroy houses over dn area 100 times
that of a I kiloton bomb.
2.7. Figures are not quoted for casualties to
personnel through blast. Very large over-
pressures are required to inflict serious injury
by blast alone. In practice, personnel become
casualties due to other effects of nuclear wea-
pons (thermal flash ; initial nuclear radiation ;
effects of flying missiles from destroyed
property and fire).
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Distances from ground zero at which elfects are produced
(metres)
Damage Brick houses Locomotives
Severe Moderate Severe Moderate
Peak overpressure kg,/cm-2 0.5 0.3 3.0 1.5
Distance for I kiloton 550 800 t70 300
Distance for l0 kilotons 1,200 1,600 360 600
Distance for l0 megatons 12,000 16,000 3,60q '6,000
(iii) Cratering and ground shock
2.8. A high yield nuclear explosion at ground
level will produce a considerable crater.
Beyond the boundary of the crater itself a fur-
ther volume of earth is ruptured by the explo-
sion (rupture zone) and beyond that a still fur-
ther volume is distorted (plastic zone). Under-
ground structures within any of these zones will
be destroyed. A ground shock wave will travel
beyond the plastic zone but damage caused by
this will fall off much more rapidly than
damage from blast in the atmosphere above the
ground at the same distance.
2.9. Strongly-built structures, buried to a
depth which provides a thickness of earth cover
between the level surface of the ground and the
roof of the structure greater than the span of
the structure, will be damaged out to a distance
from the point of the explosion equal to 2.5
times the radius of the crater. Personnel in
such structures may become casualties at dis-
tances beyond those at which the structure is
damaged, because of the ground shock effect.
2.10. For bursts above the surface of the
ground the size of the crater falls off very
rapidly with height of burst. No crater is
formed when the height exceeds one-tenth of
the fireball diameter. Airbursts, which are
bursts at a height greater than the radius of the
fireball, do not produce craters. In particular
nuclear explosions at optimum height to
produce maximum blast damage would not
produce significant damage to substantial
underground structures. The blast wave in the
atmosphere does, however, exert ground
pressure which can damage lightly-protected
underground structures.
2.1l. The following table shows typical crater
size and damage distance for substantial under-
ground structures for surface explosions on dry
earth. Crater dimensions will be somewhat
greater in wet earth, and slightly less in rock.
Damage by ground burst
(iv) Thermal radiation
2.12. The fireball resulting from a nuclear
explosion in the atmosphere is intensely lumi-
nous, radiating thermal energy in two pulses at
an interval of a fraction of a second, corres-
ponding to maximum temperatures of 15,000
degrees centigrade and 8,000 degrees centigrade
for a 20 kiloton explosion ; 99 0/o of this thermal
energy is radiated in the second pulse lasting
about I second for a l0 kiloton explosion (10
seconds for a I megaton explosion). Thermal
radiation will cause casualties to personnel at
greater distances than blast. The flash can cause
temporary blindness, but if the eye happens to
be looking at the fireball at the time of the
explosion permanent blindness can result at dis-
tances up to 60 kilometres.
2.13. The thermal energy received by surfaces
exposed to the radiation decreases with the
square of the distance from the explosion.
Poor visibility does not attenuate the radiation
as much as had been assumed from early tests.In good visibility all thermal radiation will
follow a straight line so that any solid object
will create a "shadow" within which burning
will not occur. In moderate visibility heat
received may be diminished by about 35 0/0,
(metres)
Yield
Crater
diameter
Limit of damage
to substantial '
underground
structurc 
- 
di$ance
from point of
explosion
l0 kilotons 85 210
l0 megatons 820 2,000
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scattered heat will be received from all direc-
tions in the atmosphere so that the screening
effect of obstacles will be diminished.
2.14. Thermal radiation can also cause wide-
spread fires. The following table shows the
slant distances from the point of explosion for
second-degree burns to personnel and for the
ignition of light kindling material which is
likely to be found in a built-up area. These
effects occur when the fireball is directly visible
from the point concerned. A relatively high
airburst will cause more thermal damage than a
groundburst, due to the "shadow" cast by
intervening obstacles in the latter case.
Damage due to thermalflash
Yield
Maximum slant distance for :
Second-degree
burns to exposed
skrn
Ignition of
kindling
l0 kilotons 2.5 km 1.5 km
l0 megatons 40 km 40 km
(v) Nttclear radiation
2.15. A nuclear explosion differs entirely from
a conventional explosion in the emission of
nuclear radiation. This expression covers four
different types of radiation : alpha and beta
radiation (which are charged particles travelling
at high speed), gamma radiation which is elec-
tromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength
than X-rays, and neutrons which are uncharged
fundamental particles. All forms of nuclear
radiation are harmful to living organisms, yet
none of them can be detected by the senses.
Such radiation is therefore potentially very dan-
gerous. In describing the effects of a nuclear
explosion it is convenient to distinguish bet-
ween initial nuclear radiation emitted during
the first minute from the hreball and radio-
active cloud caused by the explosion. Nuclear
radiation continues to be emitted for a long
time thereafter from the products of the explo-
sion. The source of this radiation moves away
from the point of the explosion, and is termed
radioactive fallout described below.
2.16. lnitial nuclear radiation within the fire-
ball comprises all forms of alpha, beta and
gamma radiation together with neutron emis-
sion. However, alpha and beta particles are
stopped within a metre or so. Only gamma
rays and neutrons are of concern in discussing
initial radiation (beta radiation can however be
important when fallout is considered). Nuclear
radiation is much more penetrating than ther-
mal radiation discussed above, so that protec-
tive shielding is a bigger problem. On the
other hand, nuclear radiation affects only living
organisms, producing casualt[es to personnel ; it
does not affect equipment (except for the effects
of EMP on electronic and electrical equipment
mentioned in paragraphs 2.33. et seq\.
2.17. Gamma rays and neutrons produce very
similar effects on living organisms, but are pro-
pagated somewhat diflerently, and differ also in
their ability to penetrate shielding material.
The amounts and range of energies of neutrons
and gamma radiation emitted from an explo-
sion are highly dependent on the design of the
weapon. They depend on the proportion of
the fission process and fusion process, if any, in
a particular weapon. They therefore vary even
with weapons of the same yield but of different
design. The proportion of high energy radia-
tion increases with distance because the lower
energies are attenuated more in the atmos-
phere. Attenuation in the atmosphere is also
dependent on the air density, which varies with
weather conditions and heiglrt above sea level,
and which may be affected by other effects of
the explosion itself.
2.18. For all these reasons predictions about
radiation doses received at a particular distance
from an explosion of a gir,fen yield are only
approximate, especially as fa[ as the defender is
concerned who must be assu;ned to be unaware
of the design of the weapon used against him.
The uncertainty is said to be a factor of 2 for
weapons up to 100 kilotons and as much as a
factor of l0 for weapons of I megaton. This
implies that radiation damage for certain wea-
pons may be l0 times greater or smaller than
suggested in tables below. Presumably an
attacker, aware of the design of the weapon he
is using, will be better able to make accurate
predictions about the casualties it will cause
through nuclear radiation.
2.19. Gamma rays, unlike neutrons, are
electromagnetic radiation. They travel, like
light and thermal radiation, in straight lines,
but are also scattered by oxygen and nitrogen in
the air. Neutrons which are captured by nitro-
gen nuclei in the air can also cause further
emission of particularly hi[h energy gamma
rays. In practice, therefore" although substan-
tial obstacles such as hills or earth embank-
ments provide some protecti]on to personnel in
their "shadow" from the initial source of
gamma radiation, they provlde no shelter from
the scattered radiation emanating from all
points in the atmosphere. Protection of per-
sonnel therefore requires substantial overhead
cover.
2.20. The shielding effects of various materials
against gamma rays are roughly proportional to
the mass of material, so that high density sub-
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stances such as lead would provide the same
shielding with smaller thicknesses than concrete
or earth. A rough approximation to the
shielding properties of various materials is
given by the "tenth-value thickness" of the
material 
- 
that thickness which will attenuate
gamma radiation by a factor of 10. Thus,
twice that thickness will reduce gamma
radiation to one-hundredth of its incident value.
Ap p roximate te nth- value t hic knes s
for high energy gamrfia ra.v-s
Steel
Concrete
Earth
13 cm
46 cm
66 cm
2.21. Neutrons, like gamma rays, are scattered
in the atmosphere, so that neutrons affecting
personnel at a moderate distance from the point
of the explosion may reach them from any
point in the atmosphere. Nearer to the source
of an explosion a hill or earth embankment will
of course provide greater proportional protec-
tion, but for an effective shelter overhead
protection is essential. The shielding effect
against' neutrons of various materials depends
on the properties of the material, not only on
its density as in the case of gamma rays. Mate-
rials which capture neutrons will, however, give
rise to gamma radiation from the capture reac-
tion. Shielding from these secondary gamma
rays must be provided in addition to the mate-
rials which are good at slowing and capturing
neutrons. The thicknesses of earth and
concrete shown in the table above for gamma
ray shielding should normally attenuate neutron
radiation by more than a factor of 10, but the
performancc of concrete ab a neutron shield can
be greatly improved by the incorporation of
iron, barium and boron.
2.22. The amounts of gamma radiation
received by a target are measured in roentgens.
Amounts of neutron radiation are measured in
neutron flux per square centimetre. Effects on
personnel are measured in "roentgen equiva-
lent man" or rem which is the measure of the
amount of a particular radiation which will
produce a given biological effect in man. The
following table shows the cumulative effects of
initial gamma and neutron radiation at varying
distances from a l0 kiloton and l0 megaton
explosicin. The neutrons have a preponderant
effect at short distances from low yield
weapons; gamma radiation becomes increa-
singly important as distance and yield increase.
Effe"ts on man
5 rem
l0 rem
maximum permitted annual
occupational exposure (Uni-
ted States regulations)
total life exposure expected
from natural radiation
ll0
100 rem
100-200 rem
no casualties expected, blood
change can be detected
mild symptoms nausea, few
casualties, none (or very few)
lethal
200-600 rem vomiting in 2 hours, some
deaths in I to 12 months
600-1,000 rem incapacitated within I hour,
80 o/o-100 o/o lethal in 4-6
weeks
over 1,000 rem incapacitated within 30 min-
utes, mostly lethal in 2
weeks.
Combined neutron and gamma doses from
initial nuclear radiation
(see hmrlalons tn paragraph 2.18 abote)
(metres)
l0
l0
kr
mt
1.000 rem 600 rem I00 rem
I,100
3,1 00
1,200
3,200
l,600
(vi) Radioactive fallout
2.23. Residual nuclear radiation, emitted after
the first minute of a nuclear explosion, can be
divided into the effects of early fallout. from
material falling to the ground within 24 hours,
and delayed fallout from the very fine particles
of fission products from bomb material carried
high into the atmosphere which fall to the earth
continually from the end of the first day for a
period of up to several years. Delayed fallout
is thus deposited over large areas of the earth's
surface, possibly the whole hemisphere in
which the explosion occurs, but in concentra-
tions too low to be considered a serious risk.
Hazards lie chiefly in the isotopes Strontium 90
and Caesium 137 with half-lives of 27.7 and
30.5 years respectively which may enter into
the human food cycle and thus into body
tissues to cause cancer-type disease or genetic
damage. In the absence of obvious protective
measures against delayed fallout this aspect of
nuclear weapons eflects is not discussed in this
report.
2.24. Significant radioactive early fallout, com-
prising radioactive particles reaching the ground
within the first 24 hours after an explosion,
will occur only with surface bursts (including
airbursts low enough for the fireball to touch
the grourd) and underground or underwater
bursts. This fallout is composed of the residue
of the bomb materials themselves condensed on
soil and other debris from the ground, and may
also comprise material from the environment of
the explosion made radioactive by capture of
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neutrons from the explosions. The radioactive
fission products themselves amount to some 57
kg per megaton of weapon yield composed of
more than 200 isotopes of 36 different elements
with widely differing half-lives. Most will emit
beta and many gamma radiation. The nuclear
weapon itself may be "salted" with the specific
material designed to increase the amount and
nature of radioactivity in fallout.
2.25. The amount of early radioactive fallout
to be expected from a nuclear explosion cannot
be predicted in advance. It can vary hugely
from one to another. It depends on the yield
of the explosion, the design of the weapon, the
height of burst, the nature of the ground in the
vicinity and the weather conditions, especially
wind and rain.
2.26. Various mathematical or empirical
models exist however to give rbugh predictions
of the area and intensity of fallout after an
explosion has occurred once the location of
ground zero, the height of burst, yield of explo-
sion and the prevailing meteorological condi-
tions have been determined. The prediction
will however be very approximate because of
the remaining unknown factors including the
design of the weapon and the fine details of
wind speed and direction at different heights
from the ground. Although predictions may be
wrong by a factor of 2 or even l0 as far as dose
rate at a particular time and place is concerned,
they are nevertheless useful for overall planning
purposes as they will give an indication of the
total area of ground likely to be seriously
contaminated and numbers of casualties to be
expected.
2.27. Typically, fallout from a single I mega-
ton groundburst with 25 kph wind can be
expected to produce 20 0/o deaths in unprotected
persons in an area 20 km wide extending to
100 km downwind from the point of explosion,
clinical effects would be observable (dose of 100
rads) in persons exposed up to 200 km down-
wind, and radiation from fallout would be mea-
surable over more than twice that distance.
The dose rate would reach a maximum in one
hour to one day, depending on distance from
the explosion, and would decline thereafter due
to radioactive decay, falling to one-thousandth
of the initial maximum in two weeks, by which
time the dose received by an exposed person
would be 90 0/o of the total dose to be expected
from a permanent stay at the same spot. Two
weeks is a rule of thumb period during which
civilian populations would be expected to
remain in fallout shelters.
2.28. The radiation emitted by fallout is chiefly
gamma radiation, and some beta radiation from
fallout particles actually in contact with the
skin, but the energies are generally less than for
initial nuclear radiation described in paragraph
2.16. Thus shielding is mofe effective. How-
ever, the radiation is emittdd from the whole
ground surface contaminated by fallout, includ-
ing roofs of buildings, and the skin and clothing
of exposed persons.
(vii) Electromagnetic pulse and atmospheric
ionisalion
2.29. Two more effects of nuclear explosions
must be mentioned 
- 
the generation of an elec-
tromagnetic pulse which can damage electrical
and, in particular, electronic equi-pment, and
the ionisation of the atmosphere' which can
interfere with radio communications and the
operation of radar. These phenomena have no
direct effects on personnel.
2.30. A nuclear explosion occurring at a
boundary 
- 
a surfiace burst at the ground/air
boundary, or one at the upper edge of the
atmosphere on the space/din boundary 
- 
can
generate a short pulse of radio wave of a few
milliseconds duration over a range of frequen-
cies from l0 KiloHerz up [o 100 MegaHerz,
with some similarities to the radio pulse asso-
ciated with a flash of lightning. A much more
important effect is produced by a nuclear
explosion above the atmoSphere which will
distort the earth's magnetic field in space and in
turn generate an intense pulse of radio energy
in the atmosphere. This eflbct was referred to
in open literature at least as early as 1964
following observations ol interference with
electrical and radio equipment at very great
distances following some experimental explo-
sions in outer space shortly before the signature
of the partial test ban treaty in 1963. Lesser
effects of EMP had been noted even in early
tests which are reported to have triggered
burglar alarms in Honolulu.
2.31. lt is now believed that a single nuclear
explosion above the atmosphere over the centre
of Western Europe could have damaging effects
to unprotected electrical and electronic equip-
ment over much of the NATO area, generating
a field of 1,000 volts per square metre which
can induce currents of up to 100 amps in elec-
trical or electronic circuits including transmis-
sion lines and even metal pipes.
2.32. Another eflect on electronic equipment
in the vicinity of low yield nuclear explosions,
known as the "tree" effect, which makes mate-
rials momentarily conducting, can cause mal-
functioning of equipment such as the rotation
of a tank turret.
2.33. The second important
effect of nuclear explosions
ionisation of the atmosphere
(atmosphere above about 60
cause serious interference with
electromagnetic
is the general
and ionosphere
km) which can
radio communi-
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cations and the functioning of radar when burst
height is above 15 km, the effects increasing
with height of burst above 15 km. The high
frequency and very high frequency radio bands
are most affected ; other frequencies are
unlikely to be disturbed for very long.
(c) Biological $,eapons
2.34. Possible agents for use in biological war-
fare have been reported. The United Nations
studyr includes the following list :
l. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and
the effects of their posible use, United Nations, 1969.
Examples of agents that might be used to cause death
Examples of agents that might be used to cause incapacitation
" 
Unless vector prcsent
Radio frequency Likely duration of b,lackout from
high-altitude nuclear explosion
HF (3-30
MHz)
vHF (30-300
MHz)
17 minutes to 3 hours or
more
4 hours to 20 hours
Agents Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specific
therapy
Likelihood of
sprcad from man to man
Viruses
Eastern equine
encephalitis
Tick-borne
encephalitis
Yellow fever
5-15
7 -14
3-6
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil 
"
Nil 
"
Nil 
"
Rickettslae
Rocky Mountain
spotted fever
Epidemic typhus
3- l0
6- 15
Good
Good
Nil 
"Nil,
Bacteria
Anthrax
Cholera
Plague, pneumonic
Tularaemia
Typhoid
l-5
l-5
2-5
l-10
7 -21
Moderate
Good
Moderate
Good
Good
low
High
High
Low
High
Agents Diseases
Incubation
period
(days)
Effect of
specihc
therapy
Likelihood of
spread from
ran to man
Viruses
Chikungunya fever
Dengue fever
Venezuelan equine
encephalitis
2-6
5-8
2-5
Nil
Nil
Nil
Nil 
"
Nil 
"
Nil 
"
Rickettsiae Q-fever t0-21 Good Low
Bacteria Brucellosis 7 -21 Moderate NI
Fungi Coccidioidomycosis 7-2t Poor Nil
'Unless mosquito vector present.
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The Council of WEU has approved the follow-
ing list for control by the WEU Agency for the
Control of Armamentsr, although it has not
authorised the Agency actually to apply
controls in this field 2 :
"Section I: Biological products which cannot
be used for civilian purposes : Nil
Section II : Biological products which can be
used for civilian purposes :
(l) Botulic toxins;(2) Malleomyces mallei (glan-
ders) ;(3) Malleomyces whitmori (meli-
oidosis) ;
Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) ;
Brucella;
Pasteurella tularensis (tularae-
mia);
Rickettsia burneti (Q-fever) ;
Pasteurella pestis ;
Pestis bovina (cattle plague or
rinderpest)."
2.35. NATO has approached the prospects of
biological warfare very differently from the way
in which it has approached the prospects of
chemical warfare. No strategic requirement for
a retaliatory capability in the case of biological
warfare has ever been formulated by NATO
collectively. There may be two reasons for
this : the military eflects of a biological attack
would necessarily be delayed by at least the in-
cubation period of the disease ; secondly, a new
and virulent strain of a biological agent, against
which there was no natural immunity or vac-
cine available, could eventually be expected to
spread to populations very far from those origi-
nally infected and could eventually prove as
lethal to the population of the country
employing it as to that of the country attacked.
2.36. With the conclusion in 1972 of the
Convention on the Prohibition of Bacterio-
logical Warfare signed by all Warsaw Pact and
NATO countries (except France), biological
warfare does not seem a likely threat today.
The convention entered into force on 26th
March 19753. Under its terms all stocks of
biological toxin weapons were to be destroyed
within nine months of that date. France,
although not a party, enacted in 1972 a
domestic law prohibiting the production or
stockpiling of biological or toxin weapons.
l. Fifth Annual Report of the Council, Document 159,
7th March 1960.
2. Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Council,
Document 799, Chapter III B.2, 26th March 1979.
3. But has yet to be ratified by Germany and the
Netherlands, among the NATO countries.
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(e)
ll3
(O Chemicol weapons(i\ General
2.37. There is little recent experience of the
use of lethal chemical weapons. Large-scale
chemical warfare was hrst rosorted to in l9l5
in the course of World War I. After the initial
use o[ industrial chemicals such as chlorine and
carbonyl chloride (phosgene) special com-
pounds were later manufacturred, in particular
"mustard", a blister gas effective through the
skin.
2.38. The first large-scale use of poison gas inl9l5 killed some 5,000 troops and total gas
casualties on both sides in that war are reported
to have been 1,300,000 of which 100,000 were
killed. Between the world wars the chief
reported uses of lethal gases were during the
Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the Japanese
campaign in China.
2.39. ln between the two world wars new
blister and tear gases were produced. In the
1930s great progress in synthetic chemistry and
its application to insecticides led to the syn-
thesis of new agents which Would be lethal in
much smaller concentrations and were poten-
tially useful as military weapons. These are
known as the nerve gases. The fact that gas
was used by neither side in World War II pro-
bably resulted not so much from the existence
of the Geneva Convention r, as from a military
assessment that no clear rrrilitary advantage
could be obtained when the adversary had a
retaliatory capacity and when both sides posses-
sed protective equipment. After World War II
more lethal nerve gases were produced, and
non-lethal harassing agents were developed (CS)
which have been used for riot control.
(ii) Types of chemical warfare agents
2.40. Vast numbers of potentially toxic com-
pounds are described in open scientific lite-
rature, but of these only sorne two dozen have
been considered suitable for fnilitary purposes.
These are described in seyeral authoritative
works such as those of the United Nations 2, the
World Health Organisation r, and the WEU
Agency for the Control of Armaments a. There
are in addition many well rosearched publica-
tions of SIPRI. The following table lists most
of the agents which have been used for military
purposes, or are today stockpiled for such use.
l. See paragraph 3.17.
2. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons
and the effects ol their possible use, United Nations, New
York,1969.
3.Aspects of health, chemical and biological weapons,
WHO, Geneva, 1970.
4. La guerre chimtque el son ivolulion d travers le
temps, Col. Professor L. Mammarella, WEU Agency for
the Control of Armaments, Paris, Febnuary 1979.
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Principal categories of chemical warfare agents
designedly lethal or incapacitating agents
Choking.' chlorine ; phosgene ; diphosgene ;
Vesicants (blister gases) : mustard or deriva-
tives, lewisite ;
Blood gases : hydrocyanic acid ("prussic
acid") ; cyanogen chloride ;
Nerve gases : organo-phosphorus compounds
"G" and "V" series include GA (tabun), GB
(sarin), GD (soman), and YX;
Harassing agents .' tear gases (chloroacetone,
etc.), vomiting agents (DM, etc.), CS riot
control agent.
2.41. There has been some discussion of a pos-
sible use of psychologically active drugs such as
LSD, but this does not appear to have a mili-
tary application. A further class of compound
many times more toxic than any of the fore-
going, the toxirts produced by bacteria, are
strictly speaking chemical compounds, rather
than biological compounds, in that they do not
reproduce themselves. The stockpiling or use
of these compounds, however, has been out-
lawed by the 1972 convention t, signed by all
members of NATO (except France) and the
Warsaw Pact. Any stocks of toxins, under the
terms of that convention, had to be destroyed
within nine months of its entry into force.
2.42. The following list of chemical products
was approved by the Council of WEU for
control by the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments under the terms of Protocols No. III and
No. IV of the modified BrusselsTreaty 2:
Section I : Chemical products which cannot
be used for civilian purposes :
(l) Alkyl alkylphosphonofluorida-
tes ,
(2) Alkyl N-dialkyl phosphorami-
docyanidates ;
(3) Mustard gas;
(4) Nitrogen mustards;
(5) Lewisites.
Section II: Chemical products which can be
used for civilian purposes:
(l) Hydrocyanic acid;
(2) Cyanogen chloride;
(3) Parachlorophenyldimethylurea ;
(4) Maleic hydrazide.
l. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, lOth April
1972, entered into force on 25th March 1975.
2. Fifth annual report of the Council, Document 159,
7th March 1960.
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A group of experts recommended in 1960 the
inclusion of a "new group of highly toxic sub-
stances", reported elsewhere to be the V-agents,
and the Council approved a new list in 196l I
but it is not clear from annual reports whether
the Council has since made any further addi-
tions to this list 2. In Section I of this list,
items (l) and (2) correspond to the G nerve
gases, items (3) to (5) are the vesicants. In
Section II, items (l) and (2) are blood gases,
item (3) appears to be known only as a soil
sterilising agent used for the permanent destruc-
tion of all forms of vegetation.
2.43. lt appears that the substances mbst likely
to be used today for chemical'warfare would be
the nerve gases (particularly some form of
soman or the V-agents) or the vesicants; and
possibly the blood agents. The extreme toxi-
city of the nerve gases, compared with all ear-
lier products used for military purposes, has
now led to research into "binary" products
which are referred to below.
(iii) Military characteristics of chemical agents
2.44. Apart from the physiological effects
under which chemical agents have been broadly
classified above, there are other factors with
which a military commander using such
weapons is primarily concerned : the probabi-
lity of inflicting a required proportion of casual-
ties in the target area ; the tonnage of weapons
which will be required to produce the desired
effect; the duration of the effects in the area
attacked.
2.45. The probability of producing casualties is
of course a function of the toxicity of the agent
employed;the ability of weaponssystems under
field conditions to generate an effective concen-
tration of the agent for sufficient time in the
area attacked; and lastly the effectiveness (or
rather lack of effectiveness) of the enemy's pro-
tective equipment against that particular agent.
The effects depend also on the persistency of
the chemical agent. A military commander
employing chemical weapons may desire the
effects to be only fleeting 
- 
if his own troops
will require to pass through the area attacked 
-
or he may require long duration if ground is to
be denied to enemy occupation.
2.46. The major difficulty in the employment
of chemical weapons is the large uncertainty
l. Sixth and seventh annual reports of the Council:
Document 193, 3rd March 196 l; Document 225,
l5th March 1962.
2. The Committee comments elsewhere on the in-
complete information included in the Council's annual
reports, compared with information on WEU chemical
controls published elsewhere: Application of the Brussels
Treaty 
- 
Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the
Council, Document 836.
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imposed by variable weather conditions in
many cases. High wind and heavy rain
obviously disperse chemical agents, but some
agents will also break down into relatively
harmless substances when in contact with air or
water, and will do so more rapidly at higher
temperature. With some substances the toxic
effects in the target area can last three thousand
times longer in snow at 
- 
lO'C with no wind,
than with light rain and wind at + l0'C. Any
change in wind direction can immediately
endanger friendly troops many kilometres
away. The United Nations study quoted above
shows for example that an attack by 500 kilo-
grams of the nerve gas sarin on a target I kilo-
metre in diameter could, under some weather
conditions, produce a cloud still toxic 80 kilo-
metres away some l0 hours later, or even
100 kilometers away under exceptional weather
conditions. Only on a very sunny and wind-
less day would the toxic effect remain within
the target area, yet this is a relatively low inten-
sity of attack (637 kg per sq. km) compared
with concentrations considered necessary to
give a high probability of producing the desired
casualties within the target area.
2.47. From the foregoing considerations it may
be deduced that the most likely agents for use
in chemical warfare would be the nerve gases,
probably VX (lethal at concentrations as low as
0.5 mg minutes per cubic metre if inhaled, or
in quantities of 6 mg if in contact with the skin,
the lethal dose when absorbed into the body
through either route being about I mg), or
soman, and mustard gas which can produce in-
capacitating blisters in milligram quantities on
the skin, although it is less frequently lethal.
Both are liquid at ordinary temperatures and
would produce persistent effects in a target area
lasting from one hour to 16 weeks for VX
depending on weather conditions, or from l2
hours to 8 weeks for mustardr. Both can
produce casualties through contact with the
skin as well as through inhalation. There
remains the possibility of attack by blood gases
such as hydrogen cyanide which is lighter than
oxygen and not readily stopped by respirators
except flor short periods of time. For the same
reason, however, an effective concentration in
the field could be produced for only a few
minutes, if that, and its low toxicity compared
with nerve gases means that a very large ton-
nage would have to be delivered. However,
hydrogen cyanide is very cheap and widely
available in industry and its military use in the
future cannot be ruled out.
l. According to the United Nations publication: Che-
mical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the
effects of their possible use, 1969. But there are reports
of blister injuries recently incurred in a trench in Belgium
contaminated with mustard gas more than 60 years earlier.
(iv) Present stocks of chemical weapons
2.48. Soman, VX and mustard mentioned
above are liquid at normal temperatures ; so is
hydrogen cyanide although it is so very volatile
that it may be considered a gas for practical
purposes. A suitable chemical weapons system
delivering these agents is designed to break
them up into vapour or a fine aerosol of
micron-sized particles if they are to be absorbed
through the lungs, or rather larger droplets if
skin contamination is intended. This can be
achieved by spraying frofi aircraft or by
disruptive explosive charge in aircraft bombs,
artillery shells, rockets or emplaced land
mines. All these systems have been employedin the past and are assumed to be still in
use. When considering the chemical warfare
capability of a country, accoUnt must therefore
be taken both of bulk stocks of chemical agents
concerned as well as the stocks of hlled
chemical ammunition.
2.49. Standard reference sources on defence
matters give very little or no information on
actual quantities of chemical weapons stock-
piles. Tentative figures for thd sizes of chemical
weapons stockpiles come chiefly from SIPRI or
from less reliable press reports. This situation
contrasts sharply with the wealth of informa-
tion available about levels of other weapons
systems, nuclear and conventional, in both
allied and Warsaw Pact countries which is to be
found in western governmental defence white
papers, especially in the United States Depart-
ment of Defence annual repott, and in the IISS
publications.
Soviet Union
2.50. There are no recent aurthoritative quanti-
fied western estimates of Soviet chemical wea-
pons stockpiles; most reports come from
United States sources. In a recent briehng in
the United States Departmerlt of Defence the
Rapporteur was given to understand that the
United States today claims simply that. Soviet
stocks of chemical weapons are "sufficient for
their requirements" and are made up of agents
developed in the two world wars including
thickened soman (GD), a nerve gas. It is not
known whether the Soviet forces possess any V-
agent capability. The large numbers (100,000
men according to the briefling, 60,000 men
according to United States official reports) of
chemical troops in the Soviet forces do not
have responsibility for offensive use of chemical
weapons; they are said to have similar chemi-
cal defence functions to those of the smaller(about 4,000 men) United States chemical
corps. The 1980 United Kingdom defence
white paper claims that "unlike NATO, the
Soviet Union has a majol capability for
offensive chemical warfare. Soviet forces
maintain large stocks of chemical munitions
ll5
o\
Chemical properties, formulalions and toxicities of lethal chemical agents I(Excerpt from material supplied by the World Health Organisation)
' A drop of mustard weighing a few mgs can produce a serious blister which will be incapacitating if it interferes wrth the normal activities of an individual.
Key to table :
l. Trivial name.
2. Military classification.
3. Approximate solubility in water at 20'C.
4. Volatility at20'C.
5. Physical state (a) at 
-10'C; (b) at 20'C.
6. Approximate duration ofhazard (contact or airborne following evaporation) to be expected from ground contamination :(a) l0'C, rainy, moderate wind;(D) l5'C, sunny, light breeze;(c) 
-10'C, sunny, no wind, settled snow.
7. Casualty producing dosages (lethal or significant incapacitating effects).
E. Estimated human respiratory LCtr (mild activity : brcathing rate ca. l5 litres/min.).
9. Estimated human percutaneous toxicity.
' Figures now bclieved to be slightly too low.
l. Frlrrn , Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, United Nations, 1969.
I Sarin vx
Hydrogen
cyanide
Cyanogen
chloride Phosgene
Mustard
gas
Botulinal
toxin A
2 Lethal agent
(nerve gas)
Lethal agent
(nerve gas)
Lethal agent
(blood gas)
Lethal agent
(blood gas)
Lethal agent
(lung irritant)
Lethal agent
(vesicant)
Lethal agent
3 100 o/o l-5 Vo 100 o/o 6-7 o/o Hydrolysed 0.05 o/o Soluble
4 12,100
mglm3
3- l8
mg/m3
873,000
mg/m3
3,300,000
mg/m3
6,370.000
mglm3 630 mglm3 Negligible
5 (a) Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid Liquid Solid Solid
5 (D) Liquid Liquid Liquid Vapour Vapour Liquid Solid
6@) l/4-l hr l-12 hrs Few minutes Few minutes Few minutes l2-48 hrs
6 (b) l/4-4 hrs 3-2 I days Few minutes Few minutes Few minutes 2-7 days
6 (c) l-2 days I - l6 weeks l-4 hrs l/4-4 hrs l/4-l hr 2-8 weeks
7 >5
mg-min/m3
> 0,5
mg-min/m3
> 2,000
mg-min/m3
> 7,000
mg-min/m3
> I,600
mg-min/m3
> 100
mg-min/m3
0,001 mg
(oral)
8 100
mg-min/m3
l0
mg-min/m3*
5,000
mg-min/m3
I 1,000
mg-min/m3
3,200
mg-min/m3
I,500
mg-min/m3
0,02
mg-min/m3
9 1,500
mg/man
6 mg,/man+ 4,500
mg,/man"
o
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z
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and are fully equipped and trained to operate in
a chemical environment".
2.51. The distinction between oflensive and
defensive chemical capabilities is important in
interpreting official statements which cover
both without differentiating between them.
Thus the latest United States Department of
Defence Reportr, which makes only fleeting
reference to chemical weapons, states that :
"The USSR is better equipped than any
other nation to conduct chemical warfare.
There are about 60,000 chemical troopsin divisional and non-divisional units,
and this number could double after
mobilisation. Practical field training sig-
nif,rcantly increases their readiness." (page
102)
The corresponding Military Post[rre Statement 2
states simply :
"The Soviets, who already have the
world's best trained and equipped chemi-
cal warfare (CW) force, continue to im-
prove their offensive and defensive chemi-
cal capabilities. The Soviets have deve-
loped a variety of modern agents, mul-
tiple delivery systems, and the tactical
doctrine for large-scale employment. Al-
though political leaders continue negotia-
tions to prohibit CW development, pro-
duction and stockpiling, there is no evi-
dence of restraint in efforts to maintain
superiority."
A lengthier statement on Soviet offensive and
defensive capability was contained in the Mili-
tary Posture Statement three years ago 3, but
still did not offer figures :
"The Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces continue
to maintain a superior capability to ope-
rate in toxic environments. They are the
best equipped and prepared forces in the
world to employ chemical weapons and
to operate under chemical, biological and
radiological (CBR) warfare conditions...
While the Soviet leaders are currently
pursuing a total ban on the development,
production, and stockpile of chemical
weapons, their military efforts in the che-
mical warfare (CW) area continue unabat-
ed. CBR training areas are becoming
more sophisticated, improved training
methods are being developed, and
equipment is being improved and fielded
at an increasing rate.
There is no evidence to suggest slowdown
in their efforts to improve troop opera-
l. Dated 29th January 1980, for hscal year 1981.
2. Military Posture, supplement to the Chairman's over-
view prepared by the JCS organisation for hscal year 1981.
3. For fiscal year 1978.
tions in toxic environments. Warsaw
Pact doctrine and plaqs envision the em-
ployment of these wehpons in conjunc-
tion with either conventional or nuclear
weapons. A variety of delivery systems
and chemical agents fbr use against any
tactical target in the battle area is avail-
able to front commanders.
The Soviets have the capability to use
CW weapons in a war with NATO forces,
even on a first strike surprise basis.
A large, well-equipped and well-trained
CBR organisation is organip to the
Warsaw Pact force structure. In addition
to the CBR troops, all other combat and
combat support forces receive CBR train-
ing. They are unsurpassed in their capa-
bility to protect themselves and to
conduct offensive and defensive tactical
operations when such weapons are used.
Personnel protection equipment is avail-
able to all fighting. fbrces and support
personnel.
Chemical specialists and units exist in all
formations down to reg,iment. Their im-
portance has been erlnphasised through
unit reorganisation and enlargement.
They are responsible fqr technical advice,
decontamination. recoirnaissance and the
operation of all spegialised equipment
and vehicles. Combat and combat sup-
port units are well trained in protective
and decontamination techniques. In ad-
dition, all medical support units train to
care for the mass casualties expected from
nuclear, chemical or biological war-
fare. Increasing numbers of combat and
combat support vehicles with integrated
CBR collective protection systems are ap-
pearing throughout the Warsaw Pact area.
Interwoven throughout all of the formi-
dable efforts being put forth by the
Soviets and other 2. Warsaw Pact forces is
the tenet that a viable CBR protection
posture is a prerequisite to employment
of mass destruction weapons whether
nuclear, chemical or bi,ological."
2.52. Prior to the Nixon administration change
of policy on chemical weapons in 1969 (para-
graph 2.56 below) the Department o[ Defence
offered Congress rather l4rge numerical esti-
mates of Soviet offensive chdmical capabilities :
"We know that the Soviets are putting a high
priority on development of lethal and non-
lethal weapons and that their stockpile consists
of about one-sixth chemical munitions." t And
l. Department of Defence appropriations for 1961,
part 6: Hearings before the sub-committee of the Committee
on Appropnations, United States House of Representa-
tives, Washington 1960, page l8l - evidence ol General
Trudeau, Head of United States Army Research and
Development.
tt7
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a later article in a United States military jour-
nal claimed that the Soviet Union "had 106
chemical plants in operation, of which one half
were either producing or were capable of pro-
ducing the latest war gases. His stocks greatly
exceed the combined stocks of the free world,
but are quite sufficient for three or four major
offensives on a wide front. His present stock-
pile is reported as enormous, comprising fully
150/o of the total of the Russian military muni-
tions ".1
2.53. Since that time estimates that Soviet che-
mical weapons stocks comprised one-fifth or
one-sixth of total ammunition stocks have been
repeated from time to time in newspaper
articles in European NATO countries, but have
been abandoned in official United States publi-
cations. The press reported in 1969 that the
estimate had been derived from aerial photo-
graphs of Russian storage sheds, which had
been compared with similar sheds in the United
States used for storing chemical weapons. The
evidence had been adduced in support of a
United States army request for a shipment of
chemical weapons stockpiles to Germany 2.
2.54. There is however plenty of evidence in
open scientific literature that the Soviet
Union has developed G-series nerve gases, and,
as noted above, it is known to have captured a
German nerve gas plar t at the end of World
War IL The Soviet Union is believed to have
chemical projectiles available for its 122 mm
and 152 mm artillery and 122 mm multi-barrel
rocket, as well as for the FROG 7 and SCUD-A
tactical missiles and aircraft munitions.
2.55. There were press reports in late January
that Afghan refugees claimed that Soviet forces
had used chemical agents in the north-east of
Afghanistan and in Bamiyan and Takhar pro-
vinces. United States officials have been un-
able to confirm or deny these reports, and later
United States press reports repeating the claim
have been discredited as inspired by the chemi-
cal weapons lobby in the Pentagon 3, but it re-
mains possible that Soviet forces used a riot
control agent like CS used by western police
forces. The Soviet Union must be assumed to
possess a considerable offensive chemical war-
l. The author claimed that the stockpile included 50,000
tons ol nerve gas (Soviet forces had captured the German
tabun factory at Wroclow after World War II). " Is
Russia outstripping us in weapons of mass destruction ? ",
Armed Forces Chemical Journal 17 (3) 1963, article by
Admiral Coggins, former Chief of ABC Warfare in the
United States navy.
2. Washington Post, 29th June 1969, S. M. Hersh:
Pentagon's gas plans spring a leak.
3. See in particular: Poisoned gas or poisoned propa-
ganda, The Guardian, l8th April 1980; Sussex University
Armament and Disarmament Information Unit Occasional
Paper No. I , March 1980: Alleged Soviet chemical
warfare in Afghanistan.
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fare capability and clearly, too, Soviet forces are
well equipped and trained to operate in condi-
tions of chemical warfare, but some protective
equiment is inferior to current equipment with
NATO forces. Protective clothing is imper-
meable, making it difficult to perform combat
duties for long periods, whereas NATO forces
are now equipped with permeable charcoal-
impregnated foam garments.
United States
2.56. On 25th November 1969 President
Nixon made a new policy statement, renounc-
ing the first use of chemical weapons in war :
"As to our chemical warfare programme, the
United States reaffrrms its often repeated renun-
ciation of the first use of lethal chemical wea-
pons; extends this renunciation to the first use
of incapacitating chemicals." Fiom 1956 the
policy had been use at Presidential discretion ;
previously it had been retaliatory use only t.
2.57. By the close of World War II the United
States is known to have manufactured about
135,000 tons of chemical warfare agents all of
which have since been disposed of as the agents
concerned were considered obsolete or were be-
coming dangerous. Production of modern
nerve gases began in the 1950s and full-scale
production of VX was undertaken from April
196l to June 1968 at the Newport chemical
plant in Indiana. These plants are now in a
stand-by status. Present stockpiles have not
been published systematically, but many iso-
lated statements have been made to Congress
committees, and further information is avail-
able from the Department of Defence Procu-
rement reports. It is clear that, apart from
incapacitating agents (CS; tear gas) and small
residual stocks of obsolete agents awaiting des-
truction, the present stockpile is composed of
mustard blister gas and the two nerve gases GB
(sarin) and VX. The academic estimate in the
table hereafter has been made of quantities and
locations in 1976 2. The filled munitions in-
clude projectiles for the 105 mm, 155 mm,
and 8 inch cannon, land mines, aircraft spray
tanks, bombs and cluster bombs. Nerve gas
warheads for the obsolete tactical missile
Honest John have been destroyed since
I. Letter from the Department of Defence to the Chair-
man of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 29th March
l 960.
Headquarters United States Department of the Army:
United States army activities in the United States biological
warfare programme, 24th February 1977, Volume l, pages
4-2 and 5-2.
2. Should NATO keep chemical weapons ? A framework
for considering policy alternatives, J. P. Perry Robinson,
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex,
August 1977. Figures converted to metric tons.
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1973. A development programme for a chemi-
cal warhead for the current missile Lance was
curtailed in 1970, but is now continuing.
(thousands of tons)
Total stockpile
Nerve
gas
Mustard
gas
l6-18 l6- l8
In bulk storage 2-5 I l-16
Contained in filled
munitions I l-16 2-5
Stored in United States I l-16 l6- 18
Stored in Germany 2-4 Nil
2.58. 
.The expected storage life of chemical
warfare agents was 15 to 20 years, but since
July 1969 the United States has manufactured
no chemical weapons. The intense toxicity of
the nerve agents has led to public demands for
their destruction, and research has been concen-
trated on "binary" agents which, themselves re-
latively harmless, would produce a lethal agent
only when mixed within a chemical weapons
system after launch. At the same time policy
has been affected by the bilateral negotiations
with the Soviet Union on a convention com-
pletely banning chemical weapons, which have
made some progressI. The Department of
Defence annual report for fiscal year l98l says:
"We continue to strive for an agreement
with the USSR banning offensive CW
weapons. However, in the absence of an
adequate agreement eliminating the threat
of chemical warfare and in view of the
improving Soviet CW capabilities, we
must maintain a credible chemical war-
fare retaliatory capability to ensure that
there are no real or perceived advantages
to them in initiating a chemical attack.
Our CW planning places primary em-
phasis on the protection of our forces...
We also intend to maintain a stockpile of
CW munitions. Toward this end, we are
requesting $4.2 million for maintenance
of the deterrent stockpile in fiscal year
1981. In addition, research and develop-
ment continues on binary chemical muni-
tions. A binary munition consists of two
chemical agents that are harmless when
separated, but when mixed become toxic.
These agents would be mixed during the
delivery phase (i.e. after a shell is fired, or
a bomb is dropped). A facility that will
have the capability to build binary chemi-
cal bombs, warheads and projectiles is
being designed."
2.59. The report of the Qnder-Secretary of
Defence for Research and Development and
Acquisition for fiscal year 1980 reported that :
"Our retaliatory stockpile has deteriorated
to less than prudent level. The principal
deficiencies are the number of usable
munitions and the mix of artillery and
aeriel systems. There is a serious lack of
modern air-deliverable munitions to pro-
vide full tactical support and about half
of the current stockpile consists of
mustard agent which is less effective than
nerve agents... Advanced development
will begin on a lethal binary warhead for
the general support rocket system and
engineering development will be comple-
ted on the 8 inch binary VX projectile to
provide significant safety advantage in
retaliatory, storage. transportation and
disposal operations."
2.60. There is clearly a continuing debate, both
within the armed forces, and between the
Department of Defence and the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, aE to whether a pilot
plant for the production of a binary artillery
projectile should be built now as the first step
in a programme to replace a deteriorating
stockpile with a range of binary weapons, or
whether production of binary weapons should
be further deferred in the hope that agreement
can be reached with the Soviet Union on a
verifiable chemical ban that would obviate the
need for such a programme. Construction of
the pilot plant is not included in the fiscal year
l98l budget.
2.61. lt should be noted that the United States
provides information to the forces of certain
other NATO countries on the use of United
States chemical weapons whlch could be made
available to them if the requirement for retalia-
tory use arose. These forqes receive appro-
priate trainingr. Apart frorn the United King-
dom, it is not clear which dther NATO coun-
tries are involved in these atrrangements. The
only others not to have renounced the retalia-
tory use 
-of chemical weapons are Belgium,Canada, France, the Netherlands and Portugal
(paragraph 3.17.)
l. Letter from Chairman
22nd April 1975. House
Committee report.
of Joint Chiefs of Staff dated
Defence Appropriations Sub-
l. Paragraph 1.18 et seq
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WEU countries
Germany
2.62. Germany is in a special position among
the WEU countries in that it has unilaterally
undertaken in the framework of the modified
Brussels Treaty not to produce chemical wea-
pons on its territory, and has made it clear that
its forces are not trained in their use :
"The Federal Republic neither possesses
nor does she store any... chemical wea-
pons; she does not seek possession of, or
control over, weapons of that kind, she
has made no preparation for using them,
does not train military personnel for that
purpose, and will abstain from doing so
in the future. " r.
2.63. Under the terms of the treaty the WEU
Council is required to fix the levels of chemical
weapons stockpiles that may be held by any
other WEU countries undertaking effective pro-
duction of chemical weapons on the continent
of Europe. In its annual report covering the
year 1959 2, the Council referring to the Agency
for the Control of Armaments questionnaire to
member countries said : "In July the Council
sent this enquiry to the countries concerned
who replied either that they were not produ-
cing chemical weapons or that the produc-
tion of these weapons had not gone beyond the
experimental stage." Thus at least one WEU
country on the continent was involved in the
experimental stage at that time. Since that
time, the form of the question has been
modified to read : "Has the production of
chemical weapons on the mainland territory
of... (member state) passed the experimental
stage and entered the effective production
stage ?" The negative replies universally re-
ceived do not now reveal whether experimental
work is undertaken.
France
2.64. The Pont de Claix ordnance factory, near
Grenoble (Isdre), said in 1970 to have a maxi-
mum of 1,700 workers, is described as "specia-
lised in chemical weapons" 3, the Le Bouchet
research establishment near Paris as specialising
in chemical substances among other activities,
but little other inlormation is available about
French work on chemical weapons beyond
reports of pilot production of nerve gases. The
Swiss press in 1974 quoted Professor Dubois,
its Director, as saying that the DRME was in-
terested in binary chemical weapons because of
their intrinsic safety, and because, politically, it
could be claimed that poison gas was not being
l. Defence white paper 1970.
2. Document 159, 7th March 1960.
3. " Le Service des Poudres " Jacques Pergent, Forces
airiennes frangarses, No. 24, 19'10, page 96.
manufactured (the binary constituents not
themselves being toxic) 
'.
United Kingdom
2.65. The United Kingdom is not subject to
the control provisions of the Brussels Treaty
which apply only to the mainland of Europe.
Wartime stocks of chemical agents were dis-
posed of following the decision in the 1950s not
to construct a full-scale nerve gas plant. The
pilot plant at Nancekuke in Cornwall which
produced sarin at a rate of 5.5 kg per hour was
closed down and dismantled, and in March
1979 was shown to international observers as a
conhdence-building measure to demonstrate
verilication of closure and dismantling. Small
quantities of VX had also been produced at
Nancekuke. British policy was described by
Mr. Healey, the then Secretary of Defence, in
1970 :
*NATO as a whole has chemical wea-
pons available to it because the United
States maintains an offensive chemical
capability. However, I believe that both
the former and the present government in
Britain were right not to stockpile offen-
sive chemical weapons in the United
Kingdom. If the House really considers
the situation, I believe that it will recog-
nise that it is almost inconceivable that
enemy forces would use chemical
weapons against NATO forces except in
circumstances of a mass invasion 
- 
in
which event even more terrible weapons
would surely come into play." z
But recently Mr. Pym, the present Secretary of
Defence, appeared to imply that the policy
might be reviewed :
"I am not able to confirm or deny whe-
ther chemical weapons were used in
Afghanistan. The protection of our own
forces against this horrific type of warfare
is thought to be certainly as good as, and
perhaps better than, any army in Europe.
That is some reassurance but what is
alarming is the existence of a chemical
capability by the Warsaw Pact countries.
It is a horrific weapon, something that
gives us anxiety and something that is not
sufliciently criticised. We are consider-
ing at present what our attitude to it
ought to be." r
The most recent statement of United Kingdom
policy was given by Lord Strathcona, Minister
l. La Suisse, 4th May 1974, page 41.
2. Hansard for 6th May 1970.
3. Hansard for l2th Februarv 1980.
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of State for Defence, in answer to a question in
the House of Lords on24th April 1980:
"What we are considering is the Soviet
chemical warfare threat and our ability to
meer it. The united Kingdom already
occupies a leading position in the field of
defensive equipment designed to with-
stand a chemical warfare attack. We
have no plans for acquiring an offensive
capability but it would be wrong for the
West to ignore the massive Soviet stock of
chemical weapons and the issues these
raise. "l
2.66. Other WEU countries are not understood
to maintain stocks of chemical weapons.
lll. International agreements
(a) General
3.1. This section describes the status of inter-
national agreements in the field of arms control
which may be held to limit or remove the
threat of attack by nuclear, bioiogical and che-
mical weapons. The provisions of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty of 1954 are described in
each case'- the arms control provisions of the
treaty establishing WEU are, of course, of parti-
cular interest to the Assembly whose only statu-
tory duty defined in the treaty itself is to
receive an annual report from the Council
"... on its activities and in particular concer-
ning the control of armaments...".
(b) Nuclear weapons
3.2. No international agreement in force pro-
hibits the use of nuclear weapons as explosive
devices in war. The consistent position of the
NATO countries in fact has been to resist pro-
posals for "no first use" agreements because of
the agreed NATO strategy which relies on the
use of nuclear weapons if necessary to retaliate
in the event of an overwhelming conventional
attack. Some agreements or negotiations
should however be mentioned in this context.
(i) Convention on the prohibition o.[ radiological
weapons
3.3. Sporadically for the last ten years,
proposals had been put forward in the United
Nations framework for a ban on "radiological
weapons" defined as weapons designed to
scatter radioactive substances without using a
nuclear explosion. It was suggested that radio-
active waste from nuclear reactors could be
incorporated into a weapon employing a
conventional explosive which would scatter
radioactive contamination in the area of a
target. The effects would be similar to those of
local fallout described in Section II (vi)
above. It was not suggested that such weapons
had ever been used or even produced; pro-
blems of shielding might make them imprac-
ticable.
3.4. The United States and the Soviet Union
set up a special group to draft a treaty banning
such weapons following the March 1977 agree-
ment which established eight different working
groups on various aspects of arms control, and
an agreed joint United States-Soviet Union pro-
posal on major elements of such a treaty was
submitted to the Geneva Committee on Dis-
armament on 9th July 1979, providing for a
complete ban on the production, acquisition,
stockpiling or use of such w-eapons. Agree-
ment in the Disarmament Ccimmittee on the
text of such a treaty remains to be reached.
The present session of that Committee resumed
on 5th February 1980.
(ii) Other agreements
3.5. Reference should be made to five other
treaties which restrict the environments or geo-
graphical areas in which nuclear weapons may
be used. The "treaty on pfinciples governing
the activities of states in the exploration and
us, of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies" which was signed in
1967 and entered into force on l0th October
1967, provides in Article IV that parties under-
take "not to place in orbit around the earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass-destruction, install
such weapons on celestial bodies or station such
weapons in outer space in any other
manner". All NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries are parties to this agreement, but any
country may withdraw at one year's notice.
3.6. The "treaty on the prohibition of the
emplacement of nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and
the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof'
which was signed in l97l and entered into
force on lSth May 1972, provides in Articles I
and II that parties shall not implant nuclear
weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and
sub-soil thereof beyond the limit of the territo-
rial sea (12 miles). All Warsaw Pact and
NATO countries (except France) are parties to
the treaty, and parties may withdraw from the
treaty only if they decide '+that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this
treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of
its country", on giving three months' notice to
the United Nations Security Council including
a statement of the extraordinary events concer-
ned 
- 
a withdrawal provision to be found in
most arms control agreements concluded since
l 968.
t2l
L Hansard, House of Lords, for 24th April 1980
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3.7. The 1967 "treaty for the prohibition of
nuclear weapons in Latin America" has addi-
tional procotols to which the nuclear weapons
powers have subscribed, but the complicated
provisions of the treaty, and the restrictive
terms on which countries such as Argentina
and Brazil have adhered to it, make it unlikely
that this treaty alone would prevent the intro-
duction of nuclear weapons into Latin America.
3.8. The l968 "treaty on the non-proli-
feration of nuclear weapons", which enter-
ed into force on 5th March 1970, prohibits the
transfer of nuclear weapons, or control over
them, to any power that was a non-nuclear
weapon power at the date of signature of the
treaty. All Warsaw Pact and NATO countries
except France are parties to the treaty, and
France has stated that it will behave as if it
were a party to the treaty. This treaty, which
has a similar withdrawal clause to that referred
to under the seabed treaty above, effectively
prevents the transfer of nuclear warheads into
the hands of the non-nuclear members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact; it does not pre-
vent possession of the means of delivery by
non-nuclear weapons countries, nor the stock-
piling on their territory of nuclear warheads
over which nuclear powers retain control , it
will not prevent the transfer of warheads in war
as the United States has declared that it will not
then be bound by the treaty. The treaty does
not prohibit assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons being given by one nuclear
weapon power to another 
- 
thus the co-
operation between the United Kingdom and the
United States in this field, which includes the
transfer of fissile material for the fabrication of
warheads, is not in breach of the treaty.
3.9. The "treaty banning nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water" concluded in 1963. to which all
Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, except
France, are parties, has not inhibited the deve-
lopment of nuclear weapons through under-
ground test explosions, but has prevented any
more information being gathered on the effects
of nuclear weapons explosions in the other
environments. In practice, the nuclear wea-
pons powbrs party to the threaty undoubtedly
obtained complete information on underground
and underwater explosions and explosions in
the atmosphere prior to the entry into force of
the treaty. Very few nuclear explosions in
outer space were however conducted, and
experimental data on explosions in that
environment may be lacking.
3.10. The 1974 bilateral threshold test-ban
treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions
treaty between the United States and the Soviet
Union, imposing an upper limit on the yield of
underground nuclear explosions, although not
yet ratified have been respected by both parties
and have reduced the yield of weapons which
may henceforth be tested in underground explo-
sions. Negotiations are continuing on a com-
prehensive test ban which will prohibit any fur-
ther testing of nuclear weapons.
(iii) Brussels Treaty provisions
3.1l. It is recalled that under the terms of Pro-
tocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty as modified
in 1954, "when the development of atomic,
biological and chemical weapons in the terri-
tory on the mainland of Europe of the high
contracting parties who have not given up the
right to produce them has passed the experi-
mental stage and effective production of them
has started there, the level of stocks that the
high contracting parties concerned will be
allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe
shall be decided by a majority vote of the
Council of Western European Union". The
Federal Republic, in an annex to Protocol No.
III, undertakes "not to manufacture in its terri-
tory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or
biological weapons..." I
3.12. lt may be concluded that international
arms control agreements at present in force do
not remove or significantly limit the nuclear
weapons threat to which NATO forces and
civilian populations are exposed.
(c'1 Biological b,eapons
(i) The 1972 convention
3.13. The 1925 Geneva Protocol referred to in
the following section sought to prohibit the use
of bacteriological methods of warfare, as well as
chemical warfare, but was of limited value in
banning these weapons. Most parties had
reserved the right of retaliatory use, and the
United States did not ratify it until 1975. But
significant progress in banning biological
warfare was made with the "convention on the
prohibition of the development, production and
stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and
toxin 2 weapons and on their destruction"
negotiated at the Geneva Disarmament Confe-
rence. The convention was signed on lOth
April 1972 and entered into force on 26th
l. The status of application of these provisions is des-
cribed in annual reports of the Council and reports of the
Committee in reply thereto, entitled " Application of the
Brussels Treaty I.
2. " Toxins " are highly poisonous chemical agents pro-
duced by certain bacteria and other living oryanisms. As
toxins are not themselves living matter, since they do not
reproduce themselves, they could have been classed as
chemical weapons; however, the fact that they could be pro-
duced only by the use of biological processes indistinguish-
able from those required for the production of
bacteriological weapons led to the ban being included in the
biological weapons convention.
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March 1975. The treaty prohibits the develop-
ment, production, stockpiling, acquisition or
use of biological or toxin weapons. The only
verification provision is through a complaint to
the Security Council (Article 6) and an obliga-
tion on the state against which a complaint is
lodged to co-operate in any investigation
ordered by the Security Council - which wouldbe subject to the veto of any permanent
member. The right of withdrawal from the
convention if a state "... decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject mat-
ter of the convention have jeopardised the
supreme interests of its country..." is in line
with that of the treaty on the prohibition of the
emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed
referred to above. AII Warsaw Pact and
NATO countries, with the exception of France,
have signed the conventionr and France has
enacted domestic legislation prohibiting the
manufacture of biological and toxin weapons.
The first review conference on the application
of the convention, held in Geneva from 3rd to
2lst March 1980, reaffirmed support for the
provisions of the convention and noted that no
party had invoked the complaints procedure of
Article 6. The United States has however
consulted the Soviet Union as provided in
Article 5 of the convention concerning reports
of an anthrax outbreak near Sverdlovsk; these
consultations are continuing.
3.14. The conclusion of an international agree-
ment prohibiting the use of bacteriological wea-
pons but which does not contain stringent mea-
sures for verification became possible because
the major military powers had concluded that
they did not require a retaliatory capability
even if such weapons were used against
them. When all factors are taken into consi-
deration, the military effects of such weapons
were uncertain and in any case unpredictable ;
the danger of infection spreading to the popula-
tion of a user country was such that biological
weapons were not an attractive choice for reta-
liation even against their use by an adversary.
(ii) The Brussels Treaty
3.15. The provisions of the modified Brussels
Treaty and Protocols relating to biological wea-
pons are identical to those relating to nuclear
weapons quoted in paragraph 3.ll above. In
1959, the WEU Council approved a list of bio-
logical agents for control by the Agency for the
Control of Armaments 2. There are no reasons
to believe that since the entry into force of the
1972 convention there are any biological wea-
pons on the territory of the WEU countries.
1. And all except the German
the Netherlands have ratified it.
2. See paragraph 2.4 I .
3.16. It may be concluded that although a cer-
tain danger of attack by biological weapons
may exist, there is no military threat in any real
sense. The Soviet Union is not reliably
reported to have stockpiles of biological
weapons.
(d) Chemical weopons
(i) Geneva Protocol of 1925
3.17. The "Protocol for the prohibition of the
use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous. or other
gases, and of bacteriological methods of
warfare" was signed in Geneva on lTth June
1925 and entered into force on 8th February
1928. All NATO and Warsaw Pact countries
are parties to this protocol. The United States,
which signed the protocol in 1925, ratified it
only in 1975 however, and two others acceded
only since the second world war (Hungary
1952, Iceland 1967). Among these countries,
Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands,
Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United
States, as well as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Romania and the Soviet Union among the
Warsaw Pact countries, have made reservations
reserving the right to use chemical weapons in
retaliation should their use be initiated by an
aggressor. The remaining NATO countries -
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey 
- 
have thus
renounced even the retaliatory use of chemical
weapons, as have East Gerrnany, Hungary and
Poland among the Warsaw Pact countries.
The protocol does not ban the manufacture or
stockpiling of chemical weapons.
(ii) United States-Soviet Union bilateral nego-
tiations
3.18. Since the conclusion of the biological
weapons convention, the United States and the
Soviet Union have been engaged in bilateral
talks to produce a treaty prohibiting the manu-
facture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons
which would be open to accession by all coun-
tries. Reporting to the United Nations General
Assembly in October 1979, Mr. Seignious,
Director of the United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, said that progress in the
bilateral talks had been slow but "substantial" ;
if agreement were reached on such a treaty it
would ban an entire class of weapons that had
been used in a major conflict and the interna-
tional community would be participating in co-
operative measures of verification.
3.19. The United States and the Soviet Union
submitted a joint report on the progress of their
bilateral talks to the Committee on Disarma-
ment in Geneva on 7th August 1979. They
had agreed on the concept of prohibiting the
development, production, stockpiling or acqui-
sition of "super-toxic lethal chemicals, other
Federal Republic and
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lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their pre-
cursors". Exceptions would be chemicals
intended flor industrial, medical or law-
enforcement purposes as well as for the deve-
lopment and testing of equipment for protec-
tion against chemical weapons. It was agreed
that on accession to the convention states
would declare their stocks of chemical weapons
and production plants, and would announce
plans for their destruction to be completed
within ten years. The parties are agreed that
verification should be based on a combination
of national and international measures ; inter-
national measures would include the right to
request an on-site inspection but parties would
have the right to refuse such a request; parties
could also complain to the Security Council.
However, "the question of other international
verification measures remains unresolved".
3.20. The United States Department of
Defence annual report for fiscal year l98l says
of these bilateral negotiations : "Some pro-
gress... has been made towards the control of
chemical and radiological weapons. Although
we and the Soviets agree that we should control
chemical weapons, we have not yet resolved the
issues of how to specify stocks of weapons and
facilities, howJo verify any controls we impose,
or when any agreement should enter into
force." The bilateral negotiations resumed in
Geneva on I lth February 1980, and it has also
been agreed, at the suggestion of Canada,
France and the Netherlands in particular, that
multilateral negotiation will begin in the frame-
work of the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva which is to set up a working group
which, during 1980, is to define the topics to be
included in a multilateral convention banning
chemical weapons. United States negotiators
remain reasonably hopeful that agreement with
the Soviet Union will be reached in time, and
feel that multilateral discussion, generating
more pressure from world opinion, will help
the bilateral negotiations. However, an effec-
tive ban on chemical weapons remains some
years away, and even after the entry into force
of any such agreement, destruction of existing
stocks would be phased over ten years. The
military threat from chemical weapons will
remain for more than a decade at least.
(iiil Brussels Treatv provisions
3.21. The provisions of the Brussels Treaty
governing chemical weapons are again identical
to those governing nuclear weapons described
in paragraph 3.9 above. As far as application
of the provisions is concerned, the Council of
WEU in 1959 approved a list of chemical pro-
ducts for control by the Agency for the Control
of Armaments (see paragraph 2.49 above). In
July 1959, the Council sent a first questionnaire
to the governments of member countries which
had not given up the right to produce chemical
weapons, in order to ascertain whether they had
started effective production; they replied
"either that they were not producing chemical
weapons or that the production of these wea-
pons had not gone beyond the experimental
stage"r. According to successive annual re-
ports of the Council, "effective production"
of chemical weapons has never been reported
by any member state, and the Agency for the
Control of Armaments has not therefore been
called upon to carry out production controls in
this field. The non-production controls consist
of "agreed control measures" in private plants
in Germany.
Conclusion on chemical weapon controls
3.22. There is no international agreement in
force prohibiting the manufacture or stockpiling
of chemical weapons 2. The 1925 Geneva Pro-
tocol prohibits only the use of chemical
weapons, many countries party to it have reser-
ved the right of retaliatory use, and stockpiles
are known to be held by both Warsaw Pact and
NATO countries. A military threat from che-
mical weapons certainly exists. Progress to-
wards agreement has however been made by the
United States and the Soviet Union on a com-
prehensive chemical weapons ban, although
"the question of other international verification
measures remains unresolved". Future pro-
gress in these bilateral talks which were
resumed on I lth February 1980 will affect any
decision by the United States as to whether to
begin production of a new generation of binary
chemical weapons referred to in Chapter II (d)
(,v).
lY. Protective measures
(a) General principles
4.1 . Protective measures against many of the
eflects of nuclear, biological and chemical wea-
pons are possible. The extent to which prepa-
rations have been made and equipment provi-
ded to afford proper protection varies from one
country to another, and between the armed ser-
vices on the one hand and the civilian popula-
tion on the other. Appropriate protection for
military personnel, who will be required to
continue to conduct military operations despite
NBC attacks, are obviously different from those
that will be appropriate for the civilian popula-
tion. Their chief concern will be to survive
until the effects of an attack have been dissipa-
ted. In this section the principles of protection
l. Fifth annual report of the Council, Document 159,
7th March 1960.
2. Except for the provisions of the Brussels Treaty
described above.
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and, where applicable, of therapy are first
considered separately for each of nuclear. bio-
logical and chemical weapons. Lastly, the
extent to which protective measures have been
taken by the various countries is described first
for military personnel and secondly for the civi-
lian population. In compiling this information
the Rapporteur visited Belgium, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Norway, the United
Kingdom and the United States, where he was
briefed both by the military and civil defence
authorities, and in many cases saw examples of
the protective equipment provided.
(i) Protection against nuclear y'eapons
4.2. Protection against blast and ground shock
from nuclear explosions can be provided by
substantially-built underground shelters. Pro-
tection cannot be provided within the distance
2.5 tirnes the diameter of the crater
produced by a surface explosionI. Protection
from thprmal radiation will be provided by
almost any structure intervening between per-
sonnel and the point of the explosion. Protec-
tive clothing issued for protection against che-
mical weapons will also provide substantial
protection against thermal flash at distances at
which exposure of the bare skin would lead to
casualties. A curious feature of nuclear wea-
pons is that the duration of the flash increases
with the yield, lasting up to l0 seconds for a I
megaton explosion. Thus personnel at a dis-
tance where they could become casualties from
thermal flash from a I megaton explosion
would have time to take cover by lying prone
behind any obstacle within a metre or two of
their position.
4.3. The best protection against nuclear radia-
tion is provided by underground structures
similar to those for protection against blast and
ground shock 2. Protection will be afforded
against both initial nuclear radiation from the
explosion and from local fallout. Armoured
vehicles will also provide good protection.
4.4. Protection against nuclear radiation from
fallout cannot be provided for personnel
required to operate in contaminated areas,
because gamma radiation will penetrate protec-
tive clothing, although there will be some
attenuation of beta radiation. Protective mea-
sures here must be limited to evacuation from
heavily contaminated areas; decontamination
of the body from radioactive dust; measure-
ment of the dose of radiation received by
personnel ; and a survey of the area to find the
limits of contamination by means of dose rate
meters. Protective clothing issued for protection
l. Figures are given in
2. Shrelding properties
and 2.21.
paragraph 2.1 I above.
are described in paragraphs 2.20
against chemical warfare will of course comple-
tely protect the skin from coming into contact
with the radioactive dust while the respirator
will similarly protect the respiratory tract.
Decontamination on departure from a contami-
nated area is a matter of physically removing
any dust from the skin with soap and changing
into contamination-free clothing.
4.5. Individual dosimeters can be carried by
personnel which will indicate the total amount
of radiation they have received. Most of those
on issue at present are of a direct reading quartz
fibre type which reads only exposure from
gamma rays. This is effective in determining
exposure from fallout but will ignore any expo-
sure that personnel may receive from neutrons
from initial nuclear radiation.
4.6. Dose rate meters can be used to measure
the limits of ground contamination from radio-
active fallout. It is usual to plot the boundary
of zones within which the radioactivitv
exceeds I rad per hour.
4.7. Under NATO standards (Stanag 2083)
records are to be kept of the radiation exposure
of military personnel in the ranges : level I 
-
0-70 rads ; level 2 - 70-150 rads ; level 3 - over
150 rads. When the level of activity irr a
contaminated area is known in rads per hour,
the length of time that military personnel can
remain in a position for military purposes can
then be determined in terms of the operational
requirements. Although a total exposure at
level 2 would result in only very few casualties
(see paragraph 2.2 above) personnel so exposed
could not be subsequently exposed to a similar
dose of radiation, even for periods of up to a
year, without there being a high probability of
their becoming casualties.
4.8. A little research is being done on possible
medical prophylaxis measures to provide some
protection against the effects of radiation but
there are no foreseeable applications in the
immediate future. Iodine salts might be taken
if there is a danger of food being contaminated
with fallout. so as to reduce the amount of
radioactive iodine that might be concentrated
within the body. Medical therapy is possible
for hospitalised casualties from nuclear radia-
tion including blood transfusion and the use of
antibiotics to prevent infection when the body's
defence mechanism has been destroyed by
radiation.
4.9. As in the case of protection against che-
mical weapons, a warning and reporting system
can enable personnel to take shelter prior to an
attack, or prior to the arrival of radioactive
fallout after the distant explosion of nuclear
weapons.
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(ii) Protection against biological w'eapons
4.10. For the reasons discussed in other parts
of this report, biological weapons are not
regarded 
.as an immediate military threat,
although some danger of exposure to them may
exist. Respirators and protective clothing issued
for protection against chemical weapons will
protect the body from airborne aerosols in
which form biological agents might be relea-
sed. Detection of the use of such weapons
before their effects become apparent would be
very diflicult. Antibiotic therapy and prophy-
lactic measures such as vaccination or innocu-
lation would be effective against some biolo-
gical agents.
(iii) Protection against chemical weapons
4.1 l. A modern respirator and protective clo-
thing can provide complete protection against
chemical weapons in virtually all situations
provided the equipment is put on in time.
Collective shelters, if fitted with proper air fil-
ters, are effective provided there is time to enter
them. Thus early warning of an attack is a
vital additional protective measure. Deconta-
mination of persons and equipment is of equal
importance together with means for detecting
contaminated areas.
4.12. All NATO forces visited by the Rappor-
teur are equipped with impregnated active
charcoal filter respirators which will provide
protection against all chemical weapons, but for
a limited period of time. The period will be
shorter with lighter-than-air agents such as
hydrogen cyanide, but a majority of experts feel
that that agent is unlikely to be used because of
the difficulty in maintaining a lethal concentra-
tion. In any case, canisters for respirators have
to be provided on a scale of several per man
and NATO Stanag 4155 agreed in September
l9'79 (but not yet ratified) provides for a
standard thread so that different national pat-
terns of canister can be interchangeable 
- 
a pro-
vision that is not yet met by all countries.
4.13. Most NATO forces visited have protec-
tive clothing made from permeable material
incorporating active carbon into a lining, some-
times into an impregnated foam. Different
types of fabric have been developed in different
countries. These suits permit personnel to
continue to perform military duties without
too much internal condensation. Impermeable
suits can provide heavier protection for decon-
tamination teams operating for short periods. In
any case, suits will require to be changed when
contaminated, and stocks should allow for seve-
ral suits per man.
4.14. Means of detecting and identifying che-
mical agents are more complicated and are far
less satisfactory than those for detecting gamma
radiation, because of the wide range of different
chemical agents that may be encountered.
There are test papers which change colour flor
detecting persistent contamination on equip-
ment or the ground. There are detection kits
based on a pump to draw samples of air
through a series of reagents designed to detect a
different chemical substance. An automatic
detection alarm for a chemical attack is being
introduced into some forces. In general detec-
tion and early warning of chemical attack
appear to be major problems.
4.15. Chemical therapy against some of the
effects of the most toxic chemical-warfare
agents 
- 
the nerve gases 
- 
is possible through
the use of atropine or related drugs,)and may be
extended by means of supplementary oxime
therapy. Automatic self-injecting hypodermic
syringes charged with atropine, and in some
cases with oxime as well, are on issue to NATO
forces. This therapy is, however, less effective
against soman than it is against. most other
nerve gases, but improved antidotes are in deve-
lopment.
4.16. Provision for decontamination of persons
and equipment is an important part of protec-
tive measures against chemical warfare. All
forces have individual protection kits which
include decontamination powders or ointments
for use on the skin, cloths for wiping, and soap.
Decontamination of equipment and vehicles is
still based on the use of a hypochlorite or chlo-
ride of lime solution as well as a special decon-
taminant produced by the United States known
as DS2. The extent to which sprays of dif-
ferent types and sizes are provided varies consi-
derably among different NATO countries and
there is some argument as to whether spraying
alone is sufficient or whether brushing is a
necessary part of a decontamination process.
(b) National protective measures
for military personnel
4.1'7 . ln the armed forces the army is the
largest user of NBC protective measures, and is
usually the service that "leads" ; the marines
and air forces tend to use army equipment,
adapted to their particular uses where neces-
sary. In the following section the practice of the
armies is therefore described in some detail.
Rudimentary treatment of navies and air forces
is provided where inflormation was to hand.
(i\ Belgium
4.18. Belgium follows the recommendations of
NATO and FINABEL working groups on pro-
tection against chemical warfare but, as in all
countries, implementation is a matter of natio-
nal decision. A threat of nuclear or chemical
attack is taken seriously, but no direct biolo-
gical military threat is considered to exist.
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4.19. Belgium does not have a special NBC
defence corps, but provides specially-trained
engineer personnel. The engineering school
also runs training courses for future NBC
defence specialists drawn from all arms in the
Belgian army. From company to brigade level
there is one officer and a small NBC control
party who are specially trained to perform NBC
protection duties in addition to their normal
duties in the unit concerned. At division and
corps headquarters there would be a full-time
staff of 3 officers, 3 NCOs and 3 draughtsmen
specialised in NBC duties under wartime estab-
lishment. Belgian military specialists in NBC
protection have attended courses in other
NATO countries including Crenoble in
France, Sonthofen in Germany, Winterbourne
Gunner in the United Kingdom and CFB Bor-
den in Canada.
4.20. Individual protection for the individual
soldier in the Belgian army follows NATO Sta-
nag 2352. Each soldier is issued with a respira-
tor and 2 spare canisters with threads conform-
ing to the NATO standard.
4.21. A complete set of NBC protective clo-
thing is issued to all combatants with spare
suits held in reserve at various echelons.
Manufactured in Belgium, there is a permeable
suit with an active carbon impregnated foam
lining. T)-ris suit will later be procured by the
Netherlands which considered that it can be
worn for longer without the need for deconta-
mination. The complete suit comprises a coat
with hood ; trousers ; overboots and a pair of
gloves.
4.22. Each man is issued with 2 atropine self-
injectors (it is hoped that combined atropine/
oxime injectors will become available later); an
individual dosimeter recording gamma-ray dose
only ; detection papers which would detect
liquid G and V type nerve agents and liquid
mustard; 100 tablets for water purification
against biological agents ; 2 absorbent powder(fuller's earth) impregnated chemical deconta-
mination gloves for chemical decontamination
of the skin, together with impregnated paper
towels; powder and bandage for dealing with
burns complete the individual equipment of
each man.
4.23. Belgian medical units and detachments
are equipped with a special boxed gas kit for
therapeutic treatment of gas casaulties.
4.24. lt is understood that the Belgian forces
hope to obtain an improved respirator provi-
ding better visibility and voice transmission,
and enabling the wearer to drink without losing
protection.
4.25. It is hoped that future generations of
combat vehicles will be provided with centrally
filtered piped air supplied to each crew mem-
ber. This would probably not be an over-
pressure system for the whole vehicte because
of the problem of getting in and out when the
air seal would be broken. So far, NBC envi-
ronment protection is available only in the
Leopard tank and CVRT and JPK tank-
hunters. There is no provision for collective
protection in transportable shelters although
this is considered highly desirable especially for
command posts and medical units.
4.26. Observation, warning, detection and NBC
reconnaissance is provided at company level by
a 2-man NBC observation and detection post
and a chemical and radiological reconnaissance
group of I NCO and 4 men mounted in an
armoured combat vehicle. Ihey are provided
with dosimeters, dose rate meters, chemical
detection papers, an NBC marking set and air
pump type test sets for atmogpheric contami-
nation by chemical agents. They would nor-
mally travel in an armoured combat vehicle.
No automatic chemical alarm system is as yet
available but it is hoped to provide it down to
company level in the future.
4.27. ln addition to the individual decontami-
nation equipment described above each vehicle
is provided with a small Mlll spray cylinder
containing about L I litres of DS2 liquid pres-
surised by a nitrogen cartridge. It is intended
for limited emergency chemical decontamina-
tion of contact areas such as door handles,
steps, tailboards, etc. Each platoon has the lar-
ger ( I I litres) M I spray and drums of 30 kg of
hypochlorite powder used with this device. At
corps level there is more NBC decontamination
equipment and a movable carwash-type spray
using hypochlorite solution for treating vehi-
cles. Under war establishment, 6 NBC pla-
toons would be formed at cofps level for decon-
tamination, each platoon having a decontami-
nation capability of 40 vehicles per hour.
(ii) France
4.28. France devotes considerable attention to
NBC defence. Its policy in this field is adapted
to that of its allies with which it co-operates
actively both bilaterally and multilaterally in
NATO and FINABEL bodies. The organisa-
tion of specially trained NBC protection units
in peace will amount to one company in each
of the First and Second Corps. In war there
will be three NBC protection regiments 
- 
I per
corps 
- 
each composed of 3 chemical deconta-
mination companies; 1 nuclear decontami-
nation company and I NBC reconnaissance
company. A few individuals in all units will
have received special NBC protection training.
There is a training school at Grenoble.
4.29. The individual protective equipment
issued to each soldier includes a gas mask and a
powder decontamination glove. At the present
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time, protective clothing is a 1963 model issued
to all units on a scale of 2 per man. It will be
supplemented shortly by an overgarment which
can be worn for 3 weeks, the SP3, which vyill
be issued at first on a scale of I per man in all
units.
4.30. For chemical detection and warning.
France uses an individual nerve gas detector
using a buffered solution on an enzyme
impregnated paper to detect nerve gas through
the biochemical inhibition of cholinesterases.
Simple manipulation of the detector requires
some 7 minutes after which nerve gases in the
atmosphere can be revealed in the following
concentrations : sarin 
- 
l0 micrograms per
cubic metre ; soman - 20 micrograms per cubic
metre , tabun - 50 micrograms per cubic metre.
France has developed an automatic chemical
agent detector, the Detalac model Fl, which
can give audible and luminous alarm in the
event of attack by chemical agents. 18 kg in
weight, this can be placed on the ground or
mounted on a vehicle and will sound an alarm
within 2 Seconds when the concentration of
non-persistent nerve gases reaches 2 milligrams
per cubic metre, or within 2 minutes when the
concentration reaches 100 micrograms per
cubic metre. France has a range of individual
dosimeters to measure the gamma rays expos-
ure received by an individual based on the
direct reading quartz fibre principle as issued to
most NATO forces. A photo-luminescent dose
meter sensitive to gamma rays only is also in
service which can be read only indirectly with a
collective reading unit kept at company head-
quarters to prevent erroneous interpretation by
individuals.
4.31. France has developed a range of radiac
meters, including systems that can be mounted
on helicopters and vehicles, for conducting
radioactive fallout surveys. The helicopter-
mounted radiac meter provides a printed read-
out of dose rate as the ground is surveyed.
France, Germany and Italy have produced and
are developing an airborne radiological recon-
naissance set, ERRA. French equipment
policy has first provided for the detection of
nuclear contamination, and is now turning to
the detection of chemical attack.
4.32. Special decontamination equipment in-
cludes a mobile field shower for personnel at
battalion level. Small and large motorised
pump spray units for decontamination have
also been developed but the scale of issue in the
French forces is not clear.
4.33. The French air force is beginning a pro-
gramme for the construction of personnel shel-
ters and protected command posts on air-
fields. Protection of aircraft is in mini-
hangars. Decontamination facilities are pro-
vided only for the most used equipment.
4.34. The operational forces of the French
navy are equipped for NBC protection and the
ships have external sensors for radioactive
contamination. Naval bases are well protected
with underground installations.
(iii) Germanv
4.35. The German armed forces include a spe-
cial NBC defence corps, which provides com-
pany- and battalion-sized units for warning,
decontamination and survey functions to all
three services. In addition, individuals in all
units are specially trained. Troops of both the
NBC defence corps and the ordinary unit spe-
cialists are trained in the NBC defence and self-
protection school at Sonthofen which was
established in 1956. It has now trained over
90,000 students including 400 from abroad.
4.36. Each platoon in the German army (Bun-
deswehr) will have 2 to 3 specially trained NBC
defence teams of three men who will perform
other duties. At each company there is a ser-
geant additionally with special NBC training(in independent companies both a sergeant and
a corporal). There is an officer and a sergeant
at battalion level, a head of decontamination
station with a decontamination team in some
regiments and battalions at corps or division
level and a special equipment mechanic for
NBC equipment at battalion level. At brigade
level there is an NBC defence officer with 4
special decontamination teams and an NBC
collection centre. At division headquarters
there is an NBC defence officer of field rank
with a small staff and collection centre and 3
special decontamination teams.
4.37. The NBC defence corps itself provides, in
addition to the foregoing unit personnel, specia-
lised units for decontamination of personnel
and equipment, roads and military installa-
tions , and for reconnaissance of contaminated
terrain for nuclear radiation and chemical
agents. It also has the capability of generating
smoke screens. The NBC corps provides a
company of 145 men of all ranks for each divi-
sion of the German army. This company pro-
vides 3 platoons, one for reconnaissance and 2
for decontamination of personnel and equip-
ment. In addition each corps will have one
NBC defence battalion, which will be made up
in wartime of the personnel of the Sonthofen
NBC defence and self-protection school.
There are 6 independent companies and 7 bat-
talions within the territorial command, most of
them activated-only in time of war.
4.38. Individual NBC protective equipment is
issued to all soldiers in the German army and
comprises the usual respirator with standard
NATO thread on the canister; a permeable
overgarrnent of water-repellent cloth lined with
charcoal impregnated foam ; protective gloves
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and overboots. The charcoal impregnated
material absorbs gases and vapours while drops
of liquid spread on the repellent surface of the
garment and qventually evaporate. The indivi-
dual kit for decontamination comprises decon-
tamination powder for chemical agents, soft
soap and cotton pads for washing and removal
of decontamination powder or radioactive dust ;
adhesive dressing for minor injuries and ear-
plugs for use in the event of damage to the ear-
drums; 3 automatic atropine injectors ; detec-
tion paper to detect liquid nerve and blister
agents.
4.39. Survey and monitoring equipment for
chemical contamination and nuclear radiation
includes the usual quartz fibre dosimeter issued
on the scale of one per section (of 6-10
men). NBC trained personnel in German units
keep a daily exposure chart for all individuals
in a section (based on the reading of a dosi-
meter on issue to the section) classing them in
the level l-3 for exposure levels on the same
scale as laid down in NATO Stanag 2083 refer-
red to in paragraph 4.7 above.
4.40. Germany has a new wristwatch dosimeter
on trial which will detect both gamma rays and
initial nuclear radiation. This is based on a
silver phosphate plate for gamma radiation and
a silicon diode for neutron flux determination.
If tests are satisfactory, it is planned to produce
and issue this universally on a scale of I per
man. Its advantage is that it will indicate neu-
tron doses that might be received, for example
by tank crews in the vicinity of low-yield tac-
tical nuclear weapons.
4.41. Each German company has 2 to 3 NBC
defence teams which can conduct a nuclear
contamination survey, either on foot or from a
vehicle, using a dose rate meter. These teams
are trained to peg out the I rad per hour
contour line surrounding a contaminated area
and other dose rates.
4.42. ln the early 1980s, Germany is planning
to introduce special reconnaissance vehicles for
conducting nuclear radiation and chemical
contamination surveys permitting the personnel
to remain inside. They will be equipped to
give an automatic printout of dose rates and
chemical contamination coupled with the map
reference of the vehicle's position from an auto-
matic navigator. It is claimed that surveys can
be carried out at a rate of 40-60 km an hour.
The chemical analysis will be based on a mass
spectrometer. The ensemble de reconnais-
sance radiologique airienne (ERRA) model
JUK450 (airborne radiological reconnaissance
system) has been developed by Germany work-
ing jointly with France and ltaly. It can
be mounted on helicopters for conducting
radiological surveys when in flight. The
equipment provides an automatic printout
showing the co-ordinates of the position at
which the reading is taken, the height of the
vehicle, the dose rate in the range 0.02-250 rads
per hour which can be expressed as the equiva-
lent dose rate at a height of I metre above the
ground. This permits the helicopter to operate
at a height exceeding l0 metres above the
ground.
4.43. The long-term goal for vehicles is to pro-
vide an NBC filter system on all of them.
Only partial systems are as yet in service on
Leopard and other tanks. It was stressed that
chemical warning systems are not yet satis-
factory.
4.44. Decontamination follows a similar pat-
tern to that described in the Belgian army. All
vehicle crews are equipped to provide limited
immediate decontamination of points of contact
on their vehicles. Heavy decontamination
equipment, including pumpq, hoses and water
containers, is carried in all units at battalion
level and above; this supplements the emer-
gency decontamination provided by vehicle
crews.
4.45. The special decontamination platoon of
the NBC corps can establish decontamination
stations for both vehicles and men equipped
with water carriers, motorised pumps, and heat-
ers. The personnel decontbmination station
works on similar lines to those of the specialist
units of the United States forces. In effect, a
production line is established where personnel
first clean their footgear, then remove contami-
nated clothing, placing it in bins, then clean the
outside of their respirators and finally remove
their underclothing and respirators prior to en-
tering the shower, after which they are checked
for radiological or chemical contamination as
the case may be and issued with new non-
contaminated clothing. The sort of decontami-
nation station that can be established in each
battalion of the army will treat l0 vehicles per
hour and 60 personnel. In l98l a new, more
effective agent for chemical decontamination
will be introduced. The 4 decontamination
vehicles deployed by each platoon of the spe-
cial NBC defence corps can decontaminate
roads and ground as well as major items of
equipment. It can also be used for fire-
fighting.
4.46. NBC defence specialists provide teams for
decontamination of aircraft of the Luftwaffe.
Dry fallout may be removed with the aid of a
soft broom and a vacuum cleaner; when wet it
is a delicate operation as all openings and cre-
vices in the fuselage and engines have first to be
sealed with tape. Aircraft are sprayed first
with water then with detergent solution or with
A/C cleaning compound, vigorously scrubbed
and then rinsed in the case of radiological con-
tamination. In the case of chemicals, ordinary
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decontaminants cannot be used as they would
attack the structure of the aircraft, especially
skin, canopy roof and gaskets, but special sol-
vents are available and apparently fire-fighting
foam or a steam-cleaning device is also used for
the purpose, after sealing openings and crevices,
followed by vigorous scrubbing from the top
downward, followed by a rinse with clear water.
In each case the last step is to remove sealings
and to decontaminate previously covered parts
with moistened rags and detergent solution or
absorbents.
(iv) Luxembourg
4.47. The Rapporteur has not called on the
Luxembourg military authorities, but they have
kindly supplied the following information
concerning their forces. As the whole Luxem-
bourg army is barely the size of a normal batta-
lion, it does not have a specialised NBC defense
service, but has personnel speically trained in
the Belgian engineering school and elsewhere.
At all levels there are personnel, who normally
perform other duties, who are specially trained
in NBC protection.
4.48. Individual NBC protection equipment of
the Luxembourg army conforms to NATO Sta-
nag 2352. Each soldier is provided with a res-
pirator 
- 
a recently acquired Urlited Kingdom
model conforming to NATO standards - and 2
spare canisters. Each man has a full suit of
protective clothing and a spare suit is planned.
These suits are the British permeable type with
active carbon impregnated foam lining compris-
ing a coat and hood, trousers, overboots and a
pair of gloves.
4.49. Each man also receives 2 automatic atro-
pine injectors (it is hoped to procure atropine
and oxime injectors later); an individual dosi-
meter recording gamma radiation; detector
papers for liquid nerve gas and mustard gas ;
United States water purification tablets against
biological agents; chemical decontamination
powder for the skin ; impregnated paper towels,
powder and bandages for burns.
4.50. At company and higher level there are l0
special decontamination suits. The Luxem-
bourg medical unit has a special kit for treat-
ment of gas casualties (Belgian origin).
4.51. Alert and monitoring at platoon level is
carried out by a reconnaissance group of varia-
ble size in a jeep. It is provided with dosi-
meters, detector papers and pump-operated air
sampling devices for detecting chemical agents
in the atmosphere. The United States M8
automatic chemical warning system is available
at platoon level.
4.52. ln addition to individual decontamina-
tion equipment, each vehicle is provided with a
small N3 cylindrical spray containing, DS2
liquid for the limiting decontaminatio'n of
contact surfaces such as doorknobs, steps,
etc. Each platoon has a larger Nl spray
containing 30 kg of hypochlorite solution.
The Luxembourg battalion for ACE mobile
force (land) and territorial units have French
decontamination trailers for washing vehicles
with hypochlorite solution.
(v'1 Netherlands
4.53. In the Netherlands armed forces the
threat of chemical warfare is considered to be a
very real one, especially in the present period
of nuclear stalemate. While most countries
visited pointed out that the Soviet armed forces
had a very large chemical corps organised to
provide I' chemical company at the level of
iach brigade or regimental combat team, the
Netherlands assessment confirmed, from other
sources, that the protective equipment of the
Soviet forces was inferior to that of NATO
forces. The Netherlands followed the princi-
ples of the NATO Stanags on chemical protec-
tion, the aim of which was to ensure the survi-
val of the individual soldier and to enable him
to operate in a contaminated environment.
4.54. Specially trained NBC protection troops
in the Netherlands amount to I NBC defence
company comprising 3 platoons for the Nether-
lands corps of l0 brigades (4 armoured and 6
armoured infantry) which is assigned to NATO.
Within the ordinary units of the Netherlands
army there is a full-time NBC NCO at the level
of battalion headquarters. In brigade, division
and corps headquarten there is an NBC staff
with a fult-time NBC offrcer in charge. The
NBC oflicers and NCOs are trained at the army
NBC defence school in Breda which also trains
personnel performing NBC duties as an addi-
tional task.
4.55. Individual equipment at present issued to
each Netherlands soldier is the Canadian C3
respirator; a set of protective clothing (British
Mark II) vith overboots and gloves; an atro-
pine auto-injector; a bottle of decontamination
powder and a chemical test button. The pro-
tective clothing is to be replaced in 1980 by the
new Belgian suit lined with active charcoal im-
pregnated foam which has better permeability
and is longer wearing than the British Mark II
suit.
4.56. Only the Leopard tank and the Gepard
anti-aircraft tank with which some of the tank
battalions in the armoured brigade are equipped
have some built-in NBC protection. Future
acquisition of fighting vehicles will incorporate
NBC protection which is estimated to add
30-40 o/o to the cost. The Netherlands is deve-
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loping a collective shelter for protection against
chemical weapons and fallout dust which can
be carried on vehicles and used for command
posts or communication centres.
4.57. Policy in the Netherlands army is based
on a capability to operate for 48 hours in
contaminated clothing in chemical warfare
conditions. At corps level the 3 platoons of
the NBC defence company can each establish 3
lanes equipped with hand-held wash nozzles
providing a total capability of 45 tanks an
hour. Each lane is also equipped with showersfor personnel. Decontamination points are
available in small towns and in the countryside
where the Netherlands corps is deployed in
Germany ; these have been identified and their
use by the Netherlands corps in war has been
agreed with the German authorities.
4.58. As far as detection, survey and alarm is
concerned, in addition to the individual chemi-
cal detector, gamma-ray dose meters are carried
on a scale of I per section of 6-10 men which,
as usual with present equipment, will not
measure neutron flux. The Netherlands is
developing an automatic chemical alarm and is
still seeking a satisfactory test for residual
contamination vehicles. It is considered that
the decontamination of contamination with
thickened soman is very difficult particularly if
the decontamination cannot take place imme-
diately after the contamination. For that rea-
son all vehicles and major equipment are to be
provided with decontamination apparatus
which can be connected to the vehicle engine,in addition to the DS2 apparatus already
issued to each vehicle for emergency deconta-
mination. Dose rate meters for survey pur-
poses are carried in each company ; the corps
NBC defence company is to acquire a chemical
and radiological survey capability but does not
as yet possess it.
4.59. The Netherlands is developing paint
resistant to chemical weapons for use on mili-
tary vehicles and considers that it is more
advanced than other countries in this field.
Development is nearly complete but it is
thought unlikely that the paint would be suit-
able for aircraft.
4.60. The Royal Netherlands Navy NBC pro-
tection follows'Stanag 2352 Annex B, and all
personnel are equipped with a rather old model
respirator. They will be re-equipped with the
British 56 model perhaps in 1983. It is already
on issue to operational units of the Netherlands
marines who also have 4 sets of protective clo-
thing per man.
4.61. All new ships coming into service with
the Netherlands navy have a pressurised cita-
del, and by 1985 all older ships which do not
have it will be out of commission. All ships
have external sprinklers. New constructions
have a radiac alarm system and it is planned to
introduce an automatic chemical alarm into
Netherlands' vessels by 1983-E5.
4.62. NBC protected shelters ashore provide
cover for 60 0/o of military personnel and the
naval airbase at Valkenburg is to be equipped
with a "contamination controlled area" (CCA)
for its control rooms, and aircrew will have Bri-
tish-type aircrew protective equipment. Ship-
borne helicopter pilots are first priority for
equipping with aircrew NBC protective ensem-
ble in order to preserve ASW capability even
under chemical attack.
4.63. The Netherlands navy has an NBC
school at its Den Helder base firom which teams
of inspectors can cover exercises on board ships
and are also sent on loan to Belgian and Indo-
nesian ships.
4.64. Chemical attack against naval vessels is
always considered a possibility in the confined
waters in which the Netherlands navy operates.
4.65. All personnel of the Netherlands air force
are issued with the Canadian C3 gas mask and
two Mark III NBC suits. Collective protection
is provided for about 50 0/o of on-base personnel
in shelters and about 70o/o of aircraft are pro-
tected in blast shelters. Thus briefing rooms
and control rooms are already protected and
protected transport is to be acquired to enable
pilots to proceed from briehng rooms to their
aircraft in the aircraft shelters where they
would not be contaminated in chemical attacks.
4.66. Equipment for pilot protection in aircraft
has not yet been selected despite 5 years of
study within NATO. United Kingdom and
United States equipment are considered possi-
ble candidates.
4.67. There is an NBC subcollection centre on
each airbase to deal with NBC defence matters
in the region. From the subpollection centres
all data on N, B or C attacks are transmitted to
CC 19, the Netherlands collection centre in
2nd Ataf. All NBC defence personnel are
trained at the air force NBC school at Gilze-
Rijen airbase. Within the organisation of the
airbases there are several NBC sections tasked
with the warning of the local military popula-
tion and with decontamin4tion. With the
equipment they are able to decontaminate the
weapon systems available, aircfaft included, and
other material. New German decontamination
emulsion is available ; however, a method for
rapid application is still under study. Pre-
prepared decontamination stations are available
for the decontamination of personnel ; also
mobile decontamination stations are under
consideration. The RNAF adfreres to the prin-
ciples on chemical protection laid down in Sta-
nags.
l3l
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(vi) Norway
4.68. Norway follows NATO Stanags all of
which hdve been ratified but, as in most coun-
tries, not yet implemented.
4.69. Organisation of NBC protection follows
that of most countries other than the United
Kingdom in that a few special NBC defence
platoons exist specially trained and equipped to
carry out nuclear and chemical decontamina-
tion.
4.70. Almost all personnel in the 3 services
and the home guard are issued with the United
States modified respirator; some detection
equipment 
- 
paper and powder 
- 
and 2 or 3
automatic atropine injectors. Not all person-
nel have protective clothing. There is unit
NBC equipment in addition.
4.71. For decontamination the NBC defence
platoons are mobile, equipped with vehicles
and motorised pumps, and can undertake fire-
fighting as a secondary r6le as do similar units
in Germany. Equipment has been tested in
Sweden and can operate to 
- 
40' centigrade
with the use of glycol.
4.72. Collective protection for both nuclear
and chemical attack is provided for major head-
quarters which in. Norway are built into the
mountains and are also protected against
ground shock and electromagnetic pulse effects(EMP). Norway has a good deal of concrete-
protected field fortifications and in the field
cover against radiation is also sought in shelters
with 1.4 metres of earth cover overhead.
4.73. Details were not obtained of detection
and warning equipment in Norway but it is un-
derstood that the country as a whole has a mili-
tary organisation for predicting fallout and che-
mical contamination which follows Stanag
2t03.
4.74. The Norwegian air force tries to follow
NATO criteria for protection and some hangars
and "hangarettes" have been provided together
with plans for the relocation of squadrons.
Norway has been examining air crew protec-
tion equipment in the United Kingdom and
plans to adopt that equipment in principle.
4.75. As far as training is concerned, Norway
stresses the importance of good NBC protection
training in all services, especially the army and
the air force. Specialists have also been sent to
study in Germany, Sweden, the United King-
dom, the United States and the NATO school.
(vii) United Kingdom
4.76. The United Kingdom believes that its
armed services are among the best equipped for
NBC protection and plays an active r6le in
NATO Panel 7 on this subject as well as in the
corresponding FINABEL panel. As in most
countries, the army in the United Kingdom
plays a lead r6le in the development of equip-
ment and training for NBC protection, as it is
inevitably the largest user of equipment compa-
red with the other 2 services.
4.77. lndividual equipment issued to all per-
sonnel serving in Germany includes the 56 res-
pirator with I spare canister carried on the man
and another spare in unit transport. This is
considered to provide excellent protection
against all known chemical agent$ and nuclear
fallout. The canister thread is NATO gan-
dard. The NBC protection suit is the Mark III
two-piece with a tetlon/nylon outer surface and
an inner non-woven lining made of nylon with
active charcoal. This suit has a four-year shelf
life, is flame resistant and water repellent. It
will provide protection up to 24 hours against
gross chemical contamination and has a four-
week wearing life and will also provide addi-
tional protection against thermal flash from
nuclear explosions. It is issued upon a scale of
3 per soldier. Protection is completed with
overboots and neoprene rubber gloves worn
over inner cotton gloves. Individual equip-
ment also includes oxime tablets for nerve gas
prophylaxis (to be taken before an attack) and
atropine sulphate auto-injectors. For deconta-
mination all personnel have fuller's earth puffer
bottles and pads for personal cleansing.
2 types of detector paper enable the soldier to
detect the presence of chemical agents and to
categorise them.
4.78. British troops serving in the United King-
dom are not issued with protective clothing for
various policy reasons. The civilian popula-
tion of course is not so equipped.
4.79. Collective protection policy in vehicles in
the United Kingdom has been studied. It is
held that central filters with overpressure in
sealed vehicles may be satisfactory for tanks but
not for most command vehicles and personnel
carriers where provision must constantly be
made for personnel entering and leaving. Here
equipment for central filtration to provide an
air supply to ,each man by pipe which can be
plugged into the respirator is being developed.
All armoured vehicles have collective che-
mical protection but the central distribution
system is installed on only I type of vehicle.
4.80. Decontamination policy in the British
forces differs from that in all other forces visitedby the Rapporteur. The United Kingdom
claims that time and weathering are the only
wholly reliable methods of decontamination.
As a result, the United Kingdom concentrates
upon the protection of the individual and
accepts that his equipment may become conta-
minated. This philosophy is termed "the abi-
lity to fight dirty". Consequently there are no
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specially equipped and trained decontamination
units for vehicles or personnelr. Individual
decontamination can be carried out by each
man with his own equipment. All units in the
British army carry bleaching powder for neutra-
lising blister agents and all armoured vehicles
and the larger B vehicles carry a 9 litre fire
extinguisher type spray with a brush on the
end.
4.81. For detection and alarm, United King-
dom forces possess the usual quartz fibre indivi-
dual dose meter With a slow response which
will measure gamma radiation only. A "wrist-
watch" type dose meter capable of measuring
both gamma radiation and neutron flux from
initial nuclear radiation is being developed. It
will not be a direct-reading type. Special read-
out equipment is used to measure the dose
received. The dosimeter is not then set back
to zero, but maintains a permanent record of
total radiation received by the individual.
Accuracy is a problem with all neutron dosi-
meters. The new United Kingdom meter,
inaccurate at doses below l0 rads which are not
militarily significant, reaches 90 0/o accuracy at
100 rads. For dose rate meters a new radiac
meter has been acquired, issued down to
platoon lEvel,which will detect gamma and beta
radiation. Another type of instrument can be
mounted with a probe on a vehicle to conduct
radioactive surveys. A special Canadian air-
borne detector is used in helicopters. It
appears to be similar to the German/French/
Italian ERRA equipment already mentioned.
Britain has developed an automatic chemical
attack warning device NAIAD "nerve agent
immobilised enzyme alarm and detector" 
- 
a
battery-operated device which provides an
audiovisual warning when offensive chemical
agents are present in the atmosphere. It is
believed to be a very sensitive automatic alarm.
4.82. As far as medical treatment of chemical
casualties is concerned, the issue of oxime tab-
lets has already been mentioned. In addition,
portable resuscitators are issued to stimulate
breathing in nerve gas casualties. Enveloping
casualty bags can be used to cover gas casualties
either to carry a contaminated casualty to a
clean area, without his presenting a nerve gas
risk to neighbouring bases, or to carry non-
l. The United Kingdom claims that trials at its chemical
defence establishment at Porton suggest that unless
decontamination is carried out within 2 minutes of an
attack, persistent agent will have crept into cracks andjoints and will not be removed by current decontamina-
tion methods (including the use of jet engines, which
was tried at CDE in the early 1960s). The United King-
dom fears that adoption olsuch techniques will give vehicle
crews a false sense of security, they will remove their
respirators " because the vehicle has been decontaminated "
and then fall victim to the residual vapour hazard as heat
from the engine or a sunny day causes the agent to be
desorbed from the cracks.
contaminated casualties through contaminated
areas.
4.83. For the past l0 years, the United King-
dom has operated a policy whereby all military
equipment entering service must embody a
measure of protection against all nuclear wea-
pons effects. Protection against EMP| is in-
cluded in the British Army's "nuclear surviva-
bility" package. Equipment which has been in
service longer than l0 years does not have this
protection. The United Kingdom claims that
on the whole modern equipment with modern
electronics is more vulnerable and therefore
older equipment was less vulnerable to start
with.
4.84. The Royal Navy intrqduced the "cita-
del" concept of NBC protection in its ships and
considered itself the best protected navy in
NATO. The RAF aircrew protection equip-
ment has been adopted in some other NATO
countries, and it has pioneered collective pro-
tection both on static airfields and on mobile
Harrier and helicopter operations.
(viii) United States
4.85. Organisation of NBC protection in the
United States army centres around the Chemi-
cal Corps which has chemical offensive as well
as defensive responsibility. When the pro-
gramme of destruction of dangerous chemical
weapons stocks was initiated [t had been deci-
ded in principle to disband the Chemical Corps
as such. The policy is said to have been
reversed following the 1973 Middle East war
when Soviet equipment was found to be spe-
cially protected against chemical attack. At the
present time the Chemical Corps provides a
specially organised and equipped chemical
defence company of I 14 all ranks as an organicpart of each division responsible for major
decontamination and survey duties. A further
r6le of the chemical defence company is to
assist in individual training of all men in the
division 
- 
each man is supposed to receive
4-6 hours' NBC protection training in the
course of his basic combat training. This orga-
nisation corresponds to that of the German
army.
4.86. Within army units, thgre are I offrcer
and 2 NCOs who receive sptecial training in
each company and they in turn train company
teams to provide a radiological survey party, a
chemical detection party and a decontamina-
tion team. These teams can be drawn from
personnel normally performing other duties in
each company. Personnel assigned full-time to
NBC protection duties are I NCO at battalion
level and an oflicer and NCO at the level of
brigade. An NCO is currently being added at
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company level, and officers are being added to
infantry and armour battalions.
4.87. Individual equipment issued to all United
States army personnel include a respirator with
internal absorption pads replacing the tradi-
tional external canister. This is to NATO
Stanag 2352, but it does not have the standard
NATO thread now specified in the yet-to-be
ratified Stanag 4155, and it takes 20 minutes to
replace the absorption pads; it is to be replaced
with a canister respirator (XM30) to Stanag
4155, hopefully in 1985. The present respi-
rator does provide facilities for personnel to
drink, and artif,rcial respiration by means of a
resuscitation tube can be given while the mask
is worn. Individual equipment includes a spe-
cial three-factor nerve agent automatic injector(TAB)' and supplies of amylnitrite which can
be inhaled as an antidote to blood gases.
4.88. Importance is attached to the provision
of relatively large-scale decontamination equip-
ment in the United States army. The chemical
defence company at divisional level referred to
above is organised in 3 platoons, each of
which can provide 3 decontamination squads
and I reconnaissance squad. The decontami-
nation squads are fully-equipped with lorry-
borne pumps, mobile water tanks, and water
heaters, to provide both brush and spray decon-
tamination of vehicles, and a decontamination
line for personnel terminating in a hot shower
on the lines described for the German army
above. A full-scale demonstration of this
equipment was put on by United States Army
Europe for the benefit of the Rapporteur. At
unit level, all vehicles carry a vehicle deconta-
mination spray (with limited capability) and
some further decontamination supplies are car-
ried in each company.
4.89. For detection monitoring and warning,
the United States has on issue an automatic
chemical agent warning device operating on an
electro-chemical principle. It is designed to be
deployed 400 metres up-wind and provides
audible.warning of a chemical attack. Similar
equipment has also been described for the
French army above. Individual dosimeters are
still of the quartz fibre, gamma ray only, type.
The reconnaissance squad of the chemical
defence company referred to above is fully
equipped with dose rate meters to carry out
radiological contamination surveys.
L The components of TAB include:
(,) 39 me of N, N'-trimethylene-bis (pyrimidinium-4-
aldoxime) propane tribromide (TMB-a) ;(,,(iti)
(c) National protective measures
for the civilian population
(i) NATO and general considerations
4.90. Through its Civil Emergency Planning
Committee, composed of senior representatives
from the member countries, mostly from the
Ministries of the Interior, NATO endeavours to
co-ordinate a whole range of national civil acti-
vities needed to mobilise the resources of a
country in war. These include the preserva-
tion of the machinery of government; the pre-
paration and exercise of emergency powers;
civil support for military preparedness and
operations; organisation of services such as
transport, food, agriculture, industry, energy,
manpower and communications; security and
protection of populations. Civil defence in the
narrower sense 
- 
the protection of the popu-
lation against the effects of weapons consideredin this report 
- 
is an exclusively national
responsibility, but NATO attempts to provide
guidance through its Civil Defence Committee(a committee subordinate to the Civil Emer-
gency Planning Committee), composed of
senior representatives from Ministries of the
Interior, although the level of representation
varies from one country to another.
4.91. In February 1979 the North Atlantic
Council received from the Civil Emergency
Planning Committee an internal report on the
current state of civilian preparedness in the
NATO countries. This showed that a northern
tier of countries comprising Norway, Denmark,
and the Netherlands were ahead of other
NATO countries in their preparations. Two
years earlier, the North Atlantic Council
approved ministerial guidance to the NATO
countries calling for improved public awareness
of the needs for civil defence and better arran-
gements for the physical protection of the
population against the effects of nuclear and
chemical weapons (but not biological weapons
which were no longer considered a military
threat). A questionnaire was sent to member
governments on the status of their preparations.
It has proved impossible, on the basis of the
replies, to compile comparable figures for natio-
nal expenditure on civil defence.
4.92. The NATO $aff responsible feel that
national information policy on civil defence
should be vastly improved to make the public
aware both of the threat and of the measures
that can be taken to improve the prospects of
survival. Most governments have refrained
from taking action in peacetime, partly because
the subject is politically unpopular, partly from
a fear that publicity for the sort of damage that
would be inflicted by a nuclear attack would
either stimulate demand for uneconomic blast
shelters or, by reaction, encourage political
opposition to defence expenditure as a whole.
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4.93. lt is nevertheless stressed that even in a
total nuclear exchange something over one-half
of the population of the industrialised countries
could be expected to survive the initial
exchange, but will be in urgent need of civil
defence measures to prolong their survival des-
pite the effects of fallout. Casualties will be
considerably reduced by civil defence measures.
4.94. Although NATO gave civil defence guid-
ance to member countries up to the early
1960s, it has no currently-agreed "doctrine".
Most energy is being devoted today to discus-
sion of "crisis management" for handling situa-
tions during a phase of crisis and conventional
war. Experts feel that civil defence planning
should cover a whole range of possible situa-
tions from crisis up to a total nuclear exchange.
4.95. As far as monitoring and warning is
concerned, NATO would not be' directly in-
volved in the communication of fallout data
and prediction, which is arranged on a bilateral
basis between the civil defence organisations
of member countries. NATO responsibility
would be limited to an upward reporting of the
general situation in member countries up to the
North Atlantic Council.
4.96. As far as shelter policy is concerned, it is
pointed out by NATO experts that the provi-
sion of substantial nuclear blast-resistant shel-
ters for any significant proportion of the
population would be expensive 
- 
perhaps pro-
hibitively expensive. But the provision of
fallout shelters can be arranged on a "do-it-
yoursell' basis provided there is advanced
planning and the population is informed.
Nuclear radiation from radioactive fallout
can be reduced by a factor of 100 by selecting a
central internal area in an ordinary two-storey
house with makeshift additional protection.
Bungalows would ofler less protection than
two-storey houses, and a protection factor of
perhaps only l0 times could be aimed at. It is
important to provide all necessities for l5 days'
uninterrupted occupation of the shelter, as that
is the period during which nuclear radiation
from fallout would be dangerously intense.
4.97. Figures were quoted for the proportion of
the population for which shelters were avail-
able, ranging from 70 0/o in Norway and 60 0/o
in Denmark to less than l0 0/o for most other
countries.
4.98. As far as protection against chemical
warfare is concerned, there is no policy for the
whole population in most countries. The pro-
vision of respirators today is generally ruled out
for economic reasons even by some countries
that procured them in 1939. Compared with
the threat from fallout, the chemical threat
would be only a transient one and expenditure
on fallout shelters would therefore be more
cost-effective than expenditi.rre on respirators.
Some countries have however provided chemi-
cal filters in collective sheltors and Denmark is
believed to be considering providing respirators
for the population as a whole. It was suggested
that consideration should be given to providing
chemical protection for workers in certain key
sectors such as ports.
4.99. Every two years, NATO conducts its
"WINTEX" exercise which involves both crisis
management procedures with I the partici-pation of the North Atlantic Council in
Brussels and the civil defence and military
planning staffs in the member countriBs. Th;
level and scope of participation in the civil
emergency planning aspects of the exercise
varies considerably from country to country.
Denmark, Norway and Germany take it most
seriously, the United Kingdom participates to a
limited extent, but other countries less
completely.
(ii) Belgium
4.100. The organisation of civil defence in Bel-
gium as in other countries comes under the
Ministry of the Interior. The annual budget is
BF 880 million ($29 million)r to which, it was
pointed out, should be added local government
budgets of BF 4 billion ($132 million) for the
command fire brigades. Much of this budget
covers peacetime civil accident services (for
instance motorway accident and flood defences)
which are provided by the Belgian civil defence
organisation.
4.101. It has been pointed out above that com-
parable hgures for civil defence expenditure in
different NATO countries are not available;
the Belgian authorities believed national annual
per capita expenditure on civil defence to be
(Belgian Francs) : Belgium 
- 
7l ; Netherlands -
80; Sweden, Switzerland, Norway 
- 
320 ; So-
viet Union 
- 
247.
4.102. The Belgian civil ddfence organisation
has 700 full-time personnel and 10,000 volun-
teers who man in particulaf 5 mobile rescue
columns comprising 80-90 vehicles each and a
few helicopters. Conscientious objectors to
national service are required to do 20 months'
service in the civil defence organisation (instead
of l0 months in the armed forces).
4.103. Belgium does not yet have a protected
seat of government, but construction of one is
under consideration. It has a national civil
defence headquarters post at Walem, between
Brussels and Antwerp. It is located in a l9th
century fort which has been given additional
roof protection and is to be still further
strengthened. The communications network
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centre is housed on the second floor with exte-
rior windows through which pass communica-
tions lines.
4.104. The monitoring, warning and commu-
nication and alert system in Belgium is based
on 147 monitoring posts located in each of the
geo-reference grid rectangles into which the ter-
ritory is divided for control purposes. Each
post is equipped with fallout detectors, to the
standards of NATO Stanag 2103, and a ground
zero indicator and flash-to-bang meter. These
two instruments enable the location of nuclear
explosions to be determined. Monitoring posts
report upwards to transmission centres of which
there are about 5 in each of the 9 provinces and
the province command posts report directly to
the national command post at Walem.
4. 105. Communications are largely by tele-
phone at the lower end of the chain with wire-
less and multiplex higher up. It will be linked
to the NATO NICS communications system by
the end of 1980. The investment programme
in these communications is BF 85 million
($3 million).
4.106. The national civil deflence command
post at Walem maintains bilateral communi-
cations with neighbouring countries 
- 
United
Kingdom, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany,
France 
- 
each of which country will maintain a
liaison officer at Walem in war, while Belgium
will maintain liaison offtcers in the corres-
ponding command posts of these countries.
4.107. The alert in Belgium can be given by
sounding sirens which can be controlled direct-
ly both from monitoring posts and from trans-
mission centres. There are 1,187 throughout
the country which are regularly tested at 12.30
on the first Thursday of each month.
4.108. Public information policy in Belgium is
being reviewed at the present time. The issue
of a new pamphlet to the population is being
considered. lt would probably warn the popu-
lation of the need to "stay put" in the event of
a nuclear threat and would contain information
on simple fallout shelter construction. The
emphasis in this pamphlet will be on protection
both against nuclear attacks in war, and against
possible nuclear or chemical disaster in peace-
time in the neighbourhood of nuclear power
plants or dangerous chemical factories.
4.109.Although NATO policy is to recom-
mend that the population be advised to "stay
put" rather than to seek to evacuate towns,
because a moving population would be at far
greater risk from fallout than if it remains at
home in fallout shelters, Belgium already makes
an exception for areas around nuclear power
stations and dangerous chemical plants, where
local evacuation plans will exist for situations
where advanced warning of possible radioactive
or chemical contamination may be available.
Wider plans, for the possible evacuatlon of
towns in the event of war, are also being stud-
ied within the administration. Refugees from
other countries in the event of a war are consi-
dered a considerable potential problem in Bel-
gium.
4.1 10. Although a few above-ground fallout
shelters were built in the Antwerp area in the
years 1952-53, Belgium has no current policy
for the construction of collective shelters for
civilians. No legislation was reported for the
mandatory construction of shelters in any new
buildings.
4.1 I I . There is no policy for protecting the
population as a whole from any threat of attack
by chemical weapons. Protective clothing is to
be procured for the civil defenee personneljointly with the army. These personnel are
already issued with respirators.
(iii) France
4.llz.In France the Direction de la S4curitd
civile comes under the Ministry of the Inte-
rior. It is a substantial organisation with a
wide range of peacetime responsibilities as well
as civil defence proper in war. Branches of the
organisation are responsible, for example, flor
anti-pollution measures on beaches, forest fire
fighting and road safety. The Centre Opdra-
tionel Direction Shcurild Civile (CODISC),
housed in an unprotected industrial building in
Paris, provides a command post for supervision
of civil protection activities in peacetime.
4.113. French civil defence policy was com-
pletely overhauled following the creation of the
French nuclear striking force. It is considered
that the nuclear submarine base in Brittany, the
surface missile base in Provence, and Paris
would be three likely targets for a nuclear
strike. Estimates of a strike by 14 weapons of
megaton size employed in a ground burst rdle
against these 3 targets predicted 0.4 million
dead in the first minute and a further 6.5 mil-
lion dead from fallout over the following few
months, as the fallout patterns from the 3 tar-
gets would be expected to spread in 3 strips
across the whole breadth of French territory.
4.114. The warning, monitoring and alert sys-
tem in France is fully organised, based on joint
air force-civil fallout warning posts. The main
post for the whole country is based in a protec-
ted site at Taverny to the north of Paris (which
was visited by the Committee in l97l) and
there are 6 further centres known as Bureau
gineral d'alerte in 6 regional air force warning
centres. There are monitoring posts through-
out the country. The alert system has 4,000
warning sirens sited in all towns with more
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than 4,000 inhabitants. They are tested at
noon on the first Thursday of each monthr.
4.115. Public information policy so far appears
to have been limited to the distribution of tech-
nical advisory information about the fallout
protection provided by buildings, referred to
below. But a very informative pamphlet on
providing fallout shelter protection has been
prepared for issue to every dwelling in France
giving instructions about how to survive in a
fallout shelter for l4 days. This pamphlet is to
be distributed as soon as the four-year shelter
programme referred to in the next paragraph
has been completed. To be kept in each
dwelling, it will list the occupants of the dwell-
ing and the place of fallout shelter assigned to
the occupants.
4.116. French protection policy is based on the
"stay put" principle, but consideration is being
given to planning evacuation for particularly
threatened areas such as West Brittany, and
possibly for the partial reduction of the popula-
tions of towns so as to reduce the demographic
target offered to an adversary.
4.117. The provision of shelters is seen in
France as the necessary counterpart of its policy
of nuclear deterrence. A census has been
undertaken over the last 2 years of existing pre-
mises offering fallout protection throughout the
country. It has revealed a reasonable situation
in towns and a l0 0/o shortage of shelters in the
countryside. A shelter building programme
costing FF I million ($0.24 million) was carried
out in 7 ddpartements2 in 1979 and is to be
extended over the next 4 years begin-
ning in 1980 to 25 ddpartements at a cost of FF
5 million ($1.2 million). Very good technical
building literature is available showing the
amount of protection from fallout that can be
provided in different locations in different types
of buildings. It is pointed out that the inner
areas of the middle floors of tall apartment
blocks will provide protection, when the ground
floor would not because of radiation from
fallout on the ground outside. Since 1978
building iegulations have required cellars of
apartment blocks to be strong enough to resist
the collapse of the building.
4.1l8.This project will have covered a quarter
of France in the next 4 years and the policy
eventually is to allocate a shelter position for
each person in the country. Implementation of
this shelter policy, however, is carried out
through local government, down to down halls
in each commune, acting only on government
encouragement. The degree of co-operation is
not uniform.
l. Personal observation by the Oflice of the Clerk.
2. A dCpartement is a French administrative district
of some 700,000 inhabitants on average.
4.119. There is no policy at present to provide
air filters for shelters. The policy is to close all
apertures at the time that fallout arrives.
4.120. France has no policy to provide protec-
tion against chemical warfare for the population
as a whole, considering that it is not possible
with normal means to provide protection
against nerve gases.
(iv) Germany
4.121. The Rapporteur has not called on the
civil defence authorities in Germany, but they
have kindly supplied documentation providing
the basis of this section. The act of 9th July
1968 on the extension of disaster control made
the Federal Government responsible for the
extended use of the peacetime disaster control
units and services which are maintained by the
Lrinder as agents of the Federal Govern-
ment. This extended use will include civil
defence duties in war, for which purpose the
units and services were to be augmented by the
Federal Government and provided with additio-
nal equipment and training. The peacetime
disaster control units and services, including
voluntary helpers, amount to a total of 1.2 mil-
lion throughout Germany, including 135,000
augmentation personnel from various public
services and voluntary organisations who are
financed and accommodated by the Federal
Government as follows :
Municipal flrre brigades 36,000
I Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund 2,500I
Voluntary \Deutsches Rotes Kreuz 23,000
organisations lJohanntter-Ltnfall-Hitfe 3,000
\Malteser-Hilfdienst 5,500
TechnischesHilfswerk 42,000
Units under the direct
control of the chief
executive oflicer of
the local authority 23,000
These units, including in particular the Tech-
nisches Hilfswerk (technical support service),
function also in the event of natural disasters in
peacetime such as the earthquake in Baden-
Wi.irttemburg in 1978 and the severe snowfalls
of 1979.
4.122. The 1979 civil defence budget was
583 million ($332 million) and in 1980
DM
DM
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625 million (5356 million) out of total civil
emergency planning budgets of DM 731 million
($417 million) and DM 740 million (S422 mil-
lion).
4.123. The warning system for the population is
based on sirens and radio to give warning of air
raids, radioactive fallout, or dangers from biolo-
gical or chemical agents. There are separate
siren signals used in peacetime to mean "listen
on the radio for an important message" and for
a fire alarm. There are separate wartime
signals warning of air attack, radioactive fallout
or biological or chemical attack, and all-
clear. The sirens are tested twice a year.
4.124. Monitoring of the NBC situation is the
responsibility of 1,000 unmanned warning ser-
vice monitoring posts and about 560 manned
observation and monitoring posts. The terri-
tory of Germany is divided into l0 warning dis-
tricts in each of which there are 3 to 5 warning
service monitoring centres which collate and
transmit reports from the monitoring posts as
well as collecting their own data locally. Com-
munications are provided by permanently
leased PTT circuits for the warning network; it
is planned to establish a VHF radio network.
The warning service at present comprises 350
full-time personnel, 230 part-time and approxi-
mately 1,500 voluntary helpers. In peacetime
the warning and monitoring service undertakes
the monitoring of air pollution in the atmos-
phere.
4.125. Information policy stresses the normality
in peacetime of civil defence services which in
Germany are used to deal with peacetime dis-
asters as well as wartime situations. "Self-
protection" measures are stressed and it is plan-
ned to provide I self-protection adviser per
6,000-10,000 inhabitants with oflices in infor-
mation centres which are to be established by
local authorities in peacetime. The Bundes-
verband fiir den Selbstschutz (BVS - Federal
Association for Self-Protection) organises meet-
ings of various sorts to inform the public about
self-protection measures including the construc-
tion of fallout shelters and measures of protec-
tion against NBC weapons.
4.126. "Stay put" remains the basis of German
policy for protection of the civilian population
in war and legal powers are provided in the act
on the extension of disaster control quoted
above for persons to be ordered not to leave
their usual place of residence without permis-
sion. However, the same act makes provision
for the evacuation of populations from particu-
larly exposed areas.
4.127. The shelter programme provided for in
the Shelter Construction Act of 1965 distin-
guished between domestic shelters in residential
buildings and places of work on the one hand,
and public shelters to be provided by renovat-
ing World War II air-raid shelters and the con-
struction of dual-purpose installations with
peacetime functions such as underground car
parks or other underground structures, with
provision for rapid conversion to shelter use.
Since 1950 the construction of I ,874,000
shelter places has been subsidised. The 1965
act was to have made the provision of shelters
in new constructions a legal obligation, but this
provision was suspended the same year for
financial reasons. Oflicial encouragement of
voluntary shelter construction was suspended in
1975 because the specifications, providing for
maximum protection, had made construction
too expensive. Oflicial encouragement was,
however, resumed late in 1977 on the basis of
reduced specifications. The government is
renovating certain World War II shelters; cen-
tral government financial assistance is available
for approved projects for the provision of
public shelters in underground public buildings
and in schools. Grants are also available 
. 
to
private builders for the installation of shelters
in new buildings. An incrEased depreciation
allowance of l0 o/o per annum for a
period of l0 years, subject to a ceiling, is avai-
lable for shelter construction costs not covered
by other subsidies.
(v) Italy
4.128.In Italy a distinction is made between
"civil protection" and "civil defence". While
both concern activities in aid of the civil popu-
lation, the first is concerned with natural disas-
ters in peacetime, the second with wartime,
when "civil protection" is only one of the
aspects of "civil defence" activity. Civil pro-
tection is the responsibility of the Ministry of
the Interior, civil defence of all ministries, each
according to its functions. There is close co-
operation between the military authorities and
the national civil defence organisation both in
current planning, during exercises and when
natural disasters occur.
4.129. The first legislative provision in this field
is Act 469, issued in 1961, which entrusts the
Ministry of the Interior with the establishment
and operation of special units for the protection
of the civil population, known as "mobile
columns". The same act also makes the
Ministry of the Interior responsible for the pro-
tection of the civil population from dangers
connected with the civil use of nuclear power.
Consequently the "national radioactivity moni-
toring network" was established, based on
1,625 monitoring stations distributed over the
whole national territory. A second legislative
provision, Act 996, issued in 1970, makes the
Minister of the Interior responsible for the co-
ordination of rescue activity of all civilian and
military, national, regional and local organi-
sations.
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4.130. Co-ordination of civil defence has been
delegated to the Ministry of the Interior. To
provide for the maintenance of government and
information of the political authority, an un-
protected decision centre has been constructed
at an alternate site with telecommunications in-
cluding a secure voice link to NATO head-
quarters. As a protected decision centre will
not be ready in the near future, a couple of
rooms will be available in the alarm centre to
provide a protected centre for the authorities
directly involved with civil protection.
4.131. Fallout monitoring is the responsibility
of the Ministry of the Interior; monitoring of
enemy or unknown aircraft flying on the natio-
nal territory is the responsibility of the air
force. All pertinent data from the fallout
monitoring network and from the air force are
sent to the alarm centre. A warning system is
under consideration but will be constructed
only after the alarm centre and its peripheral
connections are completed.
4.132. Public information policy is to inform
the population on the effects of oflensive wea-
pons especially nuclear weapons and on the
possibilities of self-protection measures. Action
is restricted to the collection of informa-
tion.
4.133. Stay-put policy. Evacuation of the
population from big urban centres is not
contemplated except for the non-active popu-
lation. There are plans for the control of refu-
gees and the evacuation of populations in parti-
cular areas, in order not to interfere with mili-
tary operations.
4.134. The main protected shelters dating back
to the second world war (mainly underground
air-raid shelters) and all areas involved have
been acquired by the state. Some have been
repaired ; all are closed and protected. But no
supplementary measures are contemplated
either for the construction of new public shel-
ters or to require or encourage the construction
of private shelters by grants to private house-
owners. A law of 1940 requires all tube tun-
nels and stations to be constructed so as to be
readily adapted to shelters. Every possible
effort is made to secure the application of this
law by the municipalities.
(vi) Luxembourg
4.135. Under the organic law of I lth November
1976, civil defence includes all measures
designed to protect and assist the public and
property in the event of accidents and disasters
in peacetime and in war. Civil defence is the
responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior,
which is assisted by a special department, the
national civil defence service.
4.136. There is a 2,200 strong grandiducal bri-
gade of civil defence voluntpers deployed in 23
regional intervention centres. In peacetime it
provides ambulance service and lifesaving faci-
lities for the whole country except the capital.
A special unit of frogmen and another respon-
sible for intervening in the event of nuclear
accidents form part of this brigade. Fire-
fighting, the responsibility of the local autho-
rities, is handled by 7,500 voluntary firemen.
4.137. The warning, monitoring and alert net-
work includes 240 sirens gapable of alerting
about 87 0/o of the population. Sirens are ope-
rated from the national alert centre which is
also linked with Radio-T616-Luxembourg so
that it is possible to remain in contact with the
public in time of crisis. Measurement of radio-
activity is conducted by l2 detection and recor-
ding posts ; data are transmitted on request to
the national alert centre.
4.138. Until 1967 traditional methods of public
information were used to inform the public
about the possibilities of self-preservation in
case of war. Booklets sent to every household
made the public aware of tho dangers of nuclear
weapons and the possibilities of protection.
Similarly, booklets sent to farms give instruc-
tions about measures to be taken in agriculturein the event of radioactive fallout. Other
methods of information usefl are press articles
for publication in emergencies and films and
slides which can be projected on television
screens.
4.139. Because of its geographical position the
Grand Duchy has a delinite interest in the
NATO "stay put" policy which has been
adopted. It may be difficult to apply in prac-
tice because the police force might be insuffi-
cient. There is no policy for providing shelters
for the whole population in peacetime. Mea-
sures have been taken to irlstruct the popula-
tion in emergencies about lmprovising fallout
shelters and how to imprqve the protection
afforded by cellars of privatq homes. No plan
for protecting the population against chemical
agents exists at present.
(vii) Netherlands
4.140.In the Netherlands, the broad functions
of civil emergency planning are all co-ordinated
by the Minister of the Intenior. The Queen's
Commissioner (provincial governor) is respon-
sible in each of the I I provinces. The organi-
sation of civil defence proper comes within the
civil emergency planning arrangement. The
Civil Defence Act provides for each burgo-
master to be responsible for the organisation
of civil defence in his community but commu-
nities under the act have been grouped into 45
civil defence districts covering the whole of the
Netherlands. The burgomasters from the com-
munities within each district form the civil
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defence district council which administers civil
defence in the district. Each burgomaster
remains entitled to amplify the decisions of the
district council within his own communities.
4.141. The district council has a civil defence
controller with a full-time staff. There are 57
civil defence control centres which are manned
in an emergency, housed in concrete bunkers.
4.142. Bqlow the district civil defence system
citizens ire encouraged to operate self-help
groups and in urban communities there is a dis-
trict warden per 15,000 inhabitants and a block
warden per 200 inhabitants.
4.143. Within each district civil defence com-
mand, the following services are provided :
warning; advanced assistance; fire-fighting;
rescue; medical ; NBC monitoring and deconta-
mination , communications; and supply.
4.144. On mobilisation, the Royal Netherlands
Army provides staff and equipment for mobile
columns which are made available to the
Minister of the Interior. These provide 12 fire-
fighting mobile columns, each of 808 men
equipped with 48 fire engines and 163 motor
vehicles. There are 12 rescue/medical mobile
columns, each of 893 men with 195 motor
vehicles and 2 overhead loaders.
4.145. Civil defence personnel are of 4 catego-
ries : full-time staff officers; local government
oflicials ; volunteers ; conscripts (national ser-
vice personnel who have not been called up
into the armed services).
4.146. The total wartime establishment of the
civil defence service once mobilised is 117,800
plus a further 58,400 in "self-help group$",
making a grand total of about 176,200 per-
sonnel.
4.147. The civil defence budget of the Nether-
lands for 1980 amounts to Guilders I16.5 mil-
lion ($60.4 million) made up as follows :
(Dollars million)
Ministry of the Interior
Telecommunications
Grants to provinces
Grants to districts
Training
Exercises
Civil Defence College
Stores
Others
5.0
3.1
3.7
36.0
1.4
0.1
1.6
2.8
0.2
Construction including
shelters
54.0
6.4
60.4
(Guilders I 16.5
million)
4.148. The warning, monitoring and alarm sys-
tem in the Netherlands is well organised and
makes provision for warning of both fallout and
chemical attack. Throughout the country
there are 300 fixed monitoring posts equipped
to measure fallout and to locate the point of
nuclear explosions and their yield by means ofground zeto indicators and flash-to-bang
meters. There are 900 mobile monitoring
groups in the NBC service which man and also
provide a decontamination service.
4.149. The warning service itself has a section
in the military control and reporting centre of
the air defence system and also receives infor-
mation upwards from the 300 monitoring
stations located at distances 10-15 km apart(the "coarse network"). There are an addi-
tional 500 B monitoring stations at 5-7 km
intervals forming the "fine network".
4.150. To disseminate warning there are some
4,000 sirens throughout the Netherlands which
with different signals can provide warning of air
attack; all-clear; black warning (fallout immi-
nent); yellow warning (chemical attack immi-
nent). A further grey warning (fallout expected
within I hour) can be given by radio as can
also the black and yellow warnings.
4.151. Public information policy in the Nether-
lands on civil defence measures is conservatiye.
Leaflets have not been issued to the public as a
whole since 1961. The text of emergency
instructions for the population is at present
kept up to date under the responsibility of the
burgomaster in each community, with informa-
tion relevant to the particular community.
The plan is to print these instructions on local
newspaper presses in an emergency and to
broadcast them on television.
4.152. Protection policy in the Netherlands is
the "stay put" system and a shelter programme
is in hand. A survey was carried out in 1972
to determine the availability of fallout shelters
within domestic dwellings which showed that
simple self-help measures could provide a pro-
tection factor of 30 in 30 0/o of homes ; that
24o/o of the population could be sheltered in
large buildings if makeshift protection measures
were taken1' 460/o of the population would be
without shelter. As however not all shelter
spaces are located where they are needed, the
real shortfall is greater than the survey revealed.
4.153. Legislation and regulations have provi-
ded srnce 1956 for all new two-storey houses to
provide protection in the basement and since
1968 for them to provide fallout protection as
well. Since 1958 initial shelter provision had to
be provided in work places where more than 30
persons were employed. In 1970, the Shelter
Committee proposed further measures which
would increase the production of dual-purpose
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shelters and "slanting" of new construction.
Dual-purpose shelters are underground struc-
tures with peacetime purposes, such as under-
ground garages, which are specially constructed
with additional facilities to serve as shelters in
war. These additional facilities include blast-
proof sliding doors; alternative entrances
through air-locks; the provision of air filters
proof against both radioactive fallout and che-
mical weapons ; toilet facilities; bunks and
bedding. "Slanting" of new construction
means the deliberate adoption in new buildings
of materials and design techniques which will
enhance the protection they will provide from
radioactive fallout.
4.154. The shelter programme recommended by
the Shelter Committee to the government
would involve an expenditure at 1978 prices of
Guilders 27 million ($14 million) per year for
the next 20 years 1980-2000.
4.155. Protection of the population agains che-
mical attack is taken more seriously in the
Netherlands than in most other countries. As
pointed out above, some dual-purpose shelters
have been provided with chemical air filters.
The monitoring and warning system in the
Netherlands includes provision for detection
and warning of chemical attack, and the sur-
veying of chemically contaminated areas. Self-
help fallout shelters are intended to be sealed in
the event of chemical attack so that the air
change is reduced to zero during the passage of
a gas cloud. In addition, a number of designs
of rudimentary respirator based on active
carbon impregnated pads to cover the nose and
mouth are being considered for issue to the
whole population.
(viii) Norway
4.156.In Norway the civil defence organisation
is understood to come under the Ministry of
Justice; it is among the most developed in
NATO countries. There are 53 local civil
defence organisations coming under the local
chief constable throughout the country and a
total strength of 60,000 persons including
10,000 in mobile columns.
4.157. Those liable to national service may
elect to serve in civil defence, when they
undergo only 2 weeks' training but have a
longer reserve liability (18-65 years compared
with an upper age limit of 45 in the armed
forces). Both sexes are liable for compulsory
service in the civil defence, but service is not
unpopular with tl.e population as a whole.
4.158. There is a central civil defence training
school and 3 district schools for training specia-
lists and oflicers of the civil defence corps.
The remaining personnel are trained in their
own towns. Norway regularly organises natio-
nal civil defence training exercises, aiming to
involve all reservists in an e4ercise once every 3
years. The annual civil defbnce budget proper
is something over Norwegia[r Kroner 100 mil-
lion ($20 million) and a similar sum is devoted
to the shelter construction ptogramme.
4.159. The monitoring and warning system is
based on 400 monitoring posts located all over
Norway, some in local telegraph offices. Civil
defence communications employ both land
lines and radio. A dedicated civil defence net-
work of PTT lines becomes available on the
alert, and the PTT cable system is highly
redundant with nodes in hardened sites built
into the rock. Considerable attention is said to
have been given to protection against electro-
magnetic pulse. There is also a radio network.
4.160. The warning system relies on sirens as a
signal to the population to listen to the radio
when more detailed information can be given.
The system is tested twice a year. The civil
defence organisation provides some deconta-
mination squads.
4.161. Peacetime public information policy in
Norway is less restricted ttfan in most coun-
tries. Some leaflets have been distributed to
interested organisations, giving information in
particular on how to build fallout shelters.
Large stocks of leaflets are held for distribution
in an emergency. Full infotmation on evacua-
tion routes in the major towns is printed in all
telephone directoriesr. In addition, during
siren tests civil defence information pro-
grammes are run on television.
4.162. The protection policy for the population
has in the past been based on two pre-attack
evacuation plans for the cities 
- 
a limited plan
to evacuate half the population and a total eva-
cuation plan. But with the improvement of
shelter space availability, the evacuation plan is
being rethought. Meanwhile full details of it
are io be found in all locaf telephone direct-
ories.
4.163. Nonvay has an active shelter policy, the
provision of shelters of varidus categories being
compulsory in all new buildings with certain
exceptions. The emphasis is on collective
shelters. There are now places for about half
the population, more in the densely-populated
areas, and the number of places available in-
creases each year.
4.164. Norway imposes 3 different shelter speci-
fications for different scheduled areas, the better
shelters being provided in the more densely-
populated urban areas:
Area A 
- 
Built to withstand blast over pressure
of 2 atmospheres. Fitted with che-
mical and nuclear fallout filters ; pro-
l4l
l. See Appendix I.
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tection factor against radiation 
- 
100
or 40.
Area B 
- 
Blast protection I atmosphere over
pressure ; chemical and radioactive
fallout filters fitted ; radiation protec-
tion factor 
- 
100 or 40.
Area C 
- 
Fallout sheltersonly ;protection factor
against radiation generally l0 or 20.
Remote country areas 
- 
no shelters required.
4.165. These criteria have been in force for the
last 2 years only but apply to both private and
municipal shelters. The requirement for the
provision of a shelter in new private construc-
tion applies only to houses over a specified
ground area. Norway has no final target for
shelter spaces as a percent of the population.
4.166. The policy on protection against chemi-
cal attack is centred on the collective shelters in
the larger urban areas which are htted with
chemical filters. A respirator programme for
the whole population has been stopped. There
is a stockpile of respirators for rather less than
l0 0/o of the population. Civil defence deconta-
mination squads are of course equipped with
both respirators and protective clothing.
(ix) United Kingdom
4.167.In 1968 Britain's Civil Defence Corps of
volunteers was disbanded and civil defence was
put on a care and maintenance basis. There
are 24 sub-regional headquarters which in
theory should be secure underground shelters.
From a total civil emergency planning expen-
diture, inclusive of emergency food stockpiles,
of t25.8 million a year (S58.6 million), a sum
of f.4.7 million (S10.7 million) covers depart-
mental staff and the warning and monitoring
organisation.
4.168. The monitoring and warning system is
based on 873 protected underground monitor-
ing posts, all equipped with ground zero and
weapon yield indicators and fallout measure-
ment equipment. They are manned by volun-
tary Royal Observer Corps personnel who regu-
larly participate in exercises. The warning
system is based on the ability to interrupt
radio and television programmes and 7,000
power sirens in range of 85 0/o of the popula-
tion, supplemented by I 1,000 hand-operated
sirens in rural areas.
4.169. The public information policy in peace-
time has been restricted to a pamphlet entitled
"Nuclear Weapons" which provides technical
information on the effects of nuclear explosions
and gives protective factors. The government
have recently made available a pamphlet "Pro-
tect and Survive" intended for distribution only
a few days before an anticipated attack and giv-
ing instructions for making a refuge in the
home. An updated version of "Protect and
Survive" is being prepared and will be available
for sale shortly. There are additionally televi-
sion films prepared for release in the weeks pre-
ceding an attack which will also give informa-
tion on the preparation of fallout shelters and
emphasise the "stay put" policy which is now
that for the whole population. Limited eva-
cuation plans for certain urban areas drawn up
in 1963-65 have been scrapped.
4.170. There is no peacetime shelter policy in
the United Kingdom for the population as a
whole. Present plans are to rely solely on the
preparation of fallout shelters by the population
itself in the days preceding any emergency.
There are no plans to provide protection
against chemical attack.
4.171. The government is reviewing home
defence plans in the United Kingdom and an
announcement is expected shortly.
Y. Conclusions
5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions
are set forth in the draft recommendation.
5.2. Paragraphs (i) to (iii) of the preamble
summarise the position concerning the arms
control agreements in force and in the course of
negotiation as far as NBC weapons are con-
cerned. These have been described in detail in
Chapter III of this explanatory memorandum.
NATO strategy relies on maintaining a bal-
ance with the Warsaw Pact in nuclear weapons
and the Committee has always endorsed this
strategy.
5.3. As parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
on chemical weapons, however, all NATO (and
Warsaw Pact) countries have renounced the use
of chemical weapons, although seven of the
former and four of the latter, including the
United States and the Soviet Union, have
reserved the right of retaliatory use. Of the
NATO countries only the United States today
possesses stocks of chemical weapons, albeit
obsolescent, which could be used for retaliatory
purposes ; current United States policy has been
described (Chapter II above, paragraphs
2.56-2.61); France is understood to hold smal-
ler quantities (Chapter II, paragraph 2.64).
5.4. At the end of parasraph (iii) and in para-
graph (iv) of the preamble the Committee states
its belief that, pending the outcome of current
negotiations on an effective and verifiable ban
on chemical weapons as a whole, the non-use
of chemical weapons is best ensured by main-
taining a balance in deterrent, retaliatory
and defensive capability in such weapons bet-
ween NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
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5.5. Paragraph (v) of the preamble simply
stresses that the threat of nuclear and chemical
weapons continues to hang over military per-
sonnel and the civilian population alike.
5.6. ln paragraph (vi) of the preamble the
Committee stresses the need for adequate pro-
tective equipment and procedures (described in
Chapter IV of this explanatory memorandum),
which can be proof against any known chemi-
cal weapon. If coupled with adequate warning,
such equipment can nullify most of the military
effects of chemical attack to the point where the
use of chemical weapons may appear an un-
attractive option to an adversary. As pointed
out in paragraph 2.46 there is in any case a
huge uncertainty, imposed especially by vari-
able weather conditions, about the effects of a
chemical weapons attack as far as the user is
concerned.
5.7. .Paragraph (vii) o.f the preamble asserts
that it is the moral duty of governments to in-
form their populations in peacetime of the dan-
gers of nuclear, biological and chemical attack
- 
as explained in Chapter IV (c) not all govern-
ments have so far conducted a public informa-
tion programme in peacetime. The Committee
stresses the need for certain minimum civil
defence measures in peacetime which are listed
in operative paragraph 4 of the recommen-
dation.
5.8. In paragraph I o.f the operative text
the Committee calls for the full implications of
chemical and nuclear attack to be recognised,
and stresses the great importance of proper
training and equipment for the armed forces to
provide for nuclear, biological and chemical
defence. National protective measures for
military personnel are described in Chapter IV
@ of this explanatory memorandum. The
Committee has noted the following defi-
ciencies :
(, Detection of chemical attack. Most
allied units are still equipped with chemical
detection devices which involve the tedious and
lengthy manipulation of chemical agents.
Automatic black box warning devices, such
as the British NAIAD, where available, still
have their limitations I automatic distant-
warning devices, which could prevent initial
casualties to unprotected personnel at the outset
of a nerve agent attack, have not yet been deve-
loped. More co-ordinated research is needed,
and the best equipment introduced into service.
(rr) Dosimeters to detect the amount of
nuclear radiation received by personnel are
mostly issued on the scale of only I per squad
of 6 or l0 men, and for the most part do not
measure any exposure to neutrons. Individual
dosimeters should be more widely issued, and
neutron-sensitive dosimeters should be available
at least on a scale of I per armoured fighting
vehicle, where they would be of most use.
(iii) Protective clothing, effective in particular
against chemical attack but which also provides
some protection against thermal flash from
nuclear weapons, is not issued to all personnel
in all forces. Modern protective clothing with
improved wearability in combat conditions is
available and should be procured and issued on
a scale of I or 2 spares per man for front-line
forces. Appropriate protection for aircrew is
still a subject of debate and appears to the
Committee to require urgent action.
(rv) While effective respirators appear to be
universally issued to the armed forces, it is
essential that canisters should be interoperable
with a screw thread conforming to NATO Sta-
nags, and sufficient spare canisters readily
available. The United States current respira-
tor does not meet the Stanag.
(v) All new models of closed vehicles,
whether armoured or not, should be fitted with
an individual piped supply of filtered air for all
crew, and similar provision should be made for
command posts and medical centres in the
field.
(vr) While all military personnel appear to be
issued with individual decontamination mate-
rial, it is essential that proper provision should
be made for part decontamination of vehicles
on the battlefield and for full decontamination
of vehicles and heavy equipment by trained
teams in the rear area. Proper equipment
must be available and local resources in the
corps area, such as car washes, should be sur-
veyed and earmarked in peacetime.
(vi i) The Committee recognises that the
problem of decontaminating relatively fragile
equipment such as aircraft does not appear to
have been completely solved, presents a consi-
derable problem for service and repair, and
calls for urgent action to correct this weakness.
(viii) The development of a self-decontaminat-
ing paint for army vehicles appears to be a pos-
sibility although in some quarters it is believed
that such paint would be so toxic as to make its
general use more harmful than beneficial.
More research is required.
(rx) All electronic equipment 
- 
communica-
tions aid radar 
- 
must be protected against the
effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that may
be associated with a high-altitude nuclear
explosion (described in Chapter II (b) (vrr).
Although described in open literature at
least since 1964, the decision to provide protec-
tion in new equipment appears to have been
taken by NATO countries at various times bet-
ween 1970 and 1978.
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5.9. ln operative paragraph I (b) the Com-
mittee stresses the need for co-operation in re-
search and the production of interoperable
equipment. While there are many interna-
tional committees and panels attempting to co-
ordinate research into protection against chemi-
cal weapons, both in the NATO and FINABEL
frameworks and elsewhere, it appears that the
results of pharmacological research are not
always comparable between countries, and, as
noted above in the case of the United States gas
mask, essential interoperability has not yet been
achieved. Research into a range of antidotes
for chemical weapons should be given priority.
5.10. In paragraph 2 of the operative text the
Committee calls for steps to ensure that the
chemical deterrent and retaliatory capability of
NATO countries is equal to the estimated
offensive chemical capability of the Warsaw
Pact. Information concerning present stocks of
chemical weapons held by the United States
and the Soviet Union, and pilot production in
France, is given in Chapter II (dXrv) of this
explanatory memorandum. Other NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries are understood not to
hold stocks of chemical weapons.
5.11. In paragraph 3 of the operative text the
Committee calls for more active encouragement
on the part of governments for the bilateral and
multilateral negotiations on a convention for a
total properly-verified ban on chemical wea-
pons. If these negotiations are conducted in
parallel in both the forum of the Disarmament
Committee in Geneva as well as in the bilateral
United States-Soviet Union talks, there will be
greater international public pressure on the
Soviet Union to agree the necessary measures of
verification. The status of the negotiations is
described in Chapter III (d) (ri) of this expla-
natory memorandum.
5.12. In paragraph 4 of the operative text the
Committee enumerates the five .main points of
what it considers should be a minimal civil
defence programme in peacetime. The extent
to which member countries meet this pro-
gramme is described in Chapter IV (c) of this
explanatory memorandum and the Committee
is greatly concerned at the deficiencies in the
majority of the civil defence programmes that
have been examined.
5.13. In paragraph 5 of the operative text the
Committee calls for the publication by NATO,
each year, of comparable statistics of national
expenditure on civil defence. The absence of
any such comparable figures is noted in para-
graph 4.91. An agreed common definition of
items to be included in "civil defence" expen-
diture is required.
Yl. Opinion of the minority
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted in
Committee by l3 votes tp I with 0 abstentions.
A minority of the Committee, larger than the
vote would suggest, while supporting much of
the rest of the report, would have deleted in the
draft recommendation the last part of paragraph(iii) and the whole of paragraph (rv) of the
preamble, and operative paragraph 2. They
were opposed to any country holding stocks of
chemical weapons, did not believe such
weapons were a deterrent, and believed their
absence would contribute to d6tente.
6.2. A minority did not support the proposals
for a civil defence programme in paragraph (vii)
of the preamble and in operative paragraph 4
because they considered that such a programme
would be of uncertain value, and could be held
to weaken deterrence. They would have pre-
ferred the following wording: "to investigate
the possibility of civil defence programmes for
survival".
6.3. The minority would have deleted opera-
tive paragraph 4 (e) because they were opposed
to entrepreneurial methods for providing pro-
tective equipment for the population.
144
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 838
APPENDIX I
Civil defence information in the Norwegian telephone directory
Sivilforsyaret skal hielpe sivilbefolkningen
under krig og yed katastrofer i fred.
Det ledes av Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap
under Justisdepartementet.
r \..
.. 
I lokale siyilfor3var og noen andre stoder kan lydgivera gi tre sign.ler: Mktig melding -
,tft lytt pA radio, Flyalarm og Faren ov€r. So n63to side i katalogon!
]gigsuttlyiling og evakuorlng or dsnlagt for byer, tettb€byggolsar og andro utsatte om-
rAder. Plan€n€ omtatier to,Bt og li6m8t bam under 18 Ar, ufors, gaml€ oyor 70 Ar, om-
eorgspersonell, gravide og enkelt€ andr€.
Palegg om krlgsut lytting gis som rogol av Regjedngen, hvis lrndot bhr trukket inn i krlg
eller krig truer. Hensikt€n vil var€ A tA utflytteme til lryggere steder. \Ars€l vilbli gln bl.a.
ved bruk av signalet .Mktig molding - lytt pA radio,.
Pr.1. januarlgT5erdet anlagt offrntflgo liltluktsiom lorialt 18OmO pe6oner.
Pr. 1. januar 1975 er d€t anlagt pdyata tiltlukts.om to. i alt ca. 1 /[OOooO personer. M har
altsA ca. 1,6 mlllioner plasser i tilfluktsrom.
Kvinner og menn kan palogges tjeneste i sivilroBvaret. Sty.ken€ er foidolt pA brannvem,
redning, sanitet osv.
I fredstid holdss kortvarigs kurs.
Befolkningen treng€r kunnskap lor A kunn€ mote katastrofer. Folk mA vite hvordan de
skal samarbeide med srvrlforsvaret i en krisesituasjon. Direktoratet ,or sivilt beradskap
opplyse. om dette.
NERUERE ORIENTERING OM
KRIGSI'TFLYTTING' 
Metdtng yit bti gtn ved atte titsjengetige midt6r- signater
lOsloog omlander krigsutflyttrng planlagttor Oslo (se kart), .Mktig melding - lytt pa radio' kan bli gitt, hvorotter det vil
Asker og Earum (s€ kart) og Ullestrom (se kart). bligitt orlentering i radio.
utflytting vil bll satt iverk d.rtom det iden situasjon som Det vil i all€ tif€llo bll gitt beskjed om hvitko trfotknings-
toreligger, mA ansees som dot bosto besMtels€stiltak. grupper som skal eyakuoro. Politi og sivilforya'srtyrker
B€folkningen vil straks te beskjed, hvis 
€t palogg om ui- vil hjelp€ og yeil€de underutflyttingen.
flyning blir gitl.
NOEN FORHOLDSREGLER:
- Egno personkjor€toy som ikke er rekvirert ay offentlig myndighet, bor brukes.
- Hjslp andre.
- De som ikks kan flytte ved egen €ller andres hjelp, moter opp pA narmeste venteplass som blir opprettet.
- Forlai hiemmet som om De skal pA an lang tur.
- Ta med utstyr for en lang tur, bl.a. mat tor to dager, sovepose/ulltepper, batte.iradio, verdipapirer, eventuelle
rasjoneringskort osv. Sloyf unadvendig€ ting.
- De som har eget innkvarteringssted i de tillatte tilflyttingsomrade,, kiarer direKe dit. Andre ,ai anvist sted A bo nAr
de kommer frem. Det kan senere bli anledning til e flytte videre til egne hytter m.v. i andre omrAder.
Orrektoratet for srvtlt beredskap.
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Krigsutf lyttingsplan for Oslo
Opp..Dllm&
odrlda
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TEGNFORKIARING
Venteplass
lnnlastingstasjon
Avsnrttsgrense
Kjoreretnrng
Kjorevei
Krigsutf lyttningsavsnitt
Gdvei til oppsamlingsomrdde
lor personer som kan ta seg
ut p6 egen hAnd.
Opp$mlrn9$
om.adt
OVBEVOLL
Folgends klareveiEr skal nyttos ut ,ra Oslo:
Drammonsv€i€n lra utflyttingsavsniit nr. 1Grinivgion . 2
Trondh6lmsv6i6n , 3
Stromswi€n 
-Diupdabvolon . 4
Mossovei€n , 5
Venteplasser
AVSNITT 1:
Messehallen, Skoyen.
Ullern skole, Ullernchauss6en 56.
Smestad skole, Konventveien 27.
Persbrdten skole, Hovseterveien 1.
AVSNITT 2:
Roa kirke, Nordengveien 5/7.
Voksen skole, Ankerveien 56.
Ris skole, Torgny Segerstedts vei 17.
AVSNITT 3:
TAsen skole, Nordbergveien 15.
KjelsAs skole, Asbjornsens vei 3.
Hasle skole, Haralds vei 1.
Arvoll skole, BArd skolemesters vOi t.
Veitvet skole, Veitvetveien.
Grorud skole, Grorudveien 4.
AVSNITT 4:
Hovin skole, Stromsveien 110.
@stensjo skole, @stensjoveien 112.
Oppsal skole, Vetlandsveien 79.
Ekeberg skole, Stamhusveien 79.
AVSNITT 5:
Nedre Bekkelaget skole, Ormsundv. 2.
Abildss skole, Enebakkveien 264.
Lambertseter skole, Glimmerveien 42.
Nordstrand barneskole, Nordstr.vn. 27.
Ljan skole, Gladvollveien 35.
Opplysninger gis ogsi fra
Oslo Sivilforsvar
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Offientige tilfluktsrcm i Oslo
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Offentlige tilfluktsrom
1 Akershus, Akershusstranda
2 Youngstorget
3 Abelhaugen, Munkedamsveien
4 Maridalsveien 14
5 St. Hanshaugen, UllevAlsveien
6 Undergrunnsbanen,
Nasjonalteatret stasjon
Oscars gate 19
Valkyrie plass stasjon
7 Stensparken
8 Tunnelbanen, Grsnland stasjon
Enerhaugen
Carl Bemers plass
9 Sjursoytunnelen, Mosseveien
1 0 Nedre Vollgate/Tollbugata
11 Akersgata 41
12 Fred Olsens gate 1 1/1 5
13 Cort Adelers gate 3O
14 Haakon Vll's gate 1
15 Tullins gate 2
16 Wergelandsveien 15
17 Filipstadveien 15
18 Drammensveien 60
19 Eding Skjalgssons gate 25
20 Balders gate 2
21 Sommenogata 1
22 Hegdehaugsveien 36
23 Bogstadveien 30
24 Hegdehaugsveien 31 /33
25 Majorstuveien 38
26 Schwensens gate 3/5
27 Voyensvingen 4/6
28 Bentsegata 21
29 Thv. Meyers gate 7
30 Fagerheirqsgata22
31 Olaf Schous vei 2/8
32 Trondheinsveien 8O
Opplysninger gis ogsA fra
Oslo Sivilforsvar
Trf.330885
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Krigsutflyttingsplan for Asker og Berum
TEGNFORKLARING
[l Venteplass
e ott. tilftuktsrom
I xi.reretning
ttadgen. San9vika
,, 
--fr
Bekkestua
Venteplasser
Bryn skole, Bryn Skolev. 7
Kadettangen, Sandvika
Ramstad skole, Hsvikvn. 3O
Nadderud h. skole, Gl. Ringeriksvn. 59
Stabekk skole, Gl. Ringeriksvn. 24
Eikeli skole, Nadderudvn. 110
Lysaker skole, Gl. Drammensvn. 7
Offentlige tilf luktsrom
Eiksmarka Velferdshus,
Nils Leuchsvbi 48.
Katolske kapell,
Nadderudvn.67, Hosle.
Strandvn.6, Lysaker.
Trygdekassebygget Sandvika.
Bjerkelundsveien 18
Opplysninger gis ogsA fra
Asker og Berum sivilforsvarskrets
Trf. 540186
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.o.Grense rtr tettbebyggelse.
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Grcnse lot ft et lytltngsomrCde.
lffiGsltTttYtTlltc
KrigsutflyttingspAbudet vil gjelde
omrAdene Kjeller, Lillestr sm, @vre
Ralingen, Lovenstad, Strommen og Skjetten
innenfor folgende grenselinjer:
Fetveien - lsakbekken - OdegArden
- BArli - Steinbekk - Melby - Fetveien/
Mosesvingen - Kjeller - Nitteberg -
Dovrebanen v/Ssrum - Lundsovergangen
- Fetveien/lsakbekken, se kartet.
Utflytterne fra Kjeller reiser til Gjerdrum/
Hurdal. Utflytterne lra @vre Ralingen reiser
@vre Ralingsveien til Marikollen
ungdomsskole, hvor de blir fordelt til
skolekretsene Holt og Nordby i Relingen.
Utflytterne fra Skjetten og Strommen reiser
over Stav - Kjellerholen - BrdnAsdalen til
Skedsmokorset og videre Gjerdrumsv.,
Utflytterne fra Strommen og Lillestrom
fordeles fra Ullestrsm til Blaker, Gjerdrum
og Hurdal. Ca. 15OO utflyttere fra Strommen
fordele5 N. Ralingsveien tl Enebakk.
Kollektive busshansporter fra venteplassene
til Gjerdrum.
Sc utfmUngsvelenc pl kartet.
Folgende kjoreveier skal nyttes ut fra
Lillestrsm LS:
1. Fctvelen mot Fetsund av folk med egne
kjorcloy er i Lillestrom.
2. Brotorbakken 
- Skcdsmokorsat av folk
med egne kjoreloy* i Kjelleromrddet.
3. t{ordbyvclcn - Brlnlrdalen - Skcdsmo-korct av folk med egne kjoretayer pi
Skjetten og Strommen.
4. flwG Relllqsvcl i retning Enebakk av folk
med egne kisretsyer i @vre Relingen.
5. t{edrc Ralingsvel i retning Enebakk av
toik med egne kjoreloyer i Strsmmen.
6. Broterbakkcn 
- SkcdsrnokonGt av
kollektive busstransporter fra Lillestrsm.
7. Roll Olaensvci 
- Asak i lcirsund - av
folk fra \bsleenga og Lillestrom.
UElTTEPIASSEB:
1. Sagdalen skole, Strommen,
2. Mgernes skole, Ullestrom,
3. Lillestrom Gymnas,
4. Stav Ungdomsskole,
5. Lavenstad skole.
otFEltruGE nlfLUt$SR0t
'1. \hssoyhpitet Stromsveien 15, Sbsmmen,
2. RAdhuseL Stromsveien 74 Stommen,
3. Jenseberget Strandveien, Ralingen,
4. Brandvoldgaten 11, Ullestrsrn
5. Nittedalsgaten 2 b, Lillestrsm,
6. A. Kiellands gate 7, Llllestrom,
7. Vigernes skole, Lillestrsm,
8. Mgernes skole, Lillestrsm,
9. Strandveien, tunnellen Ralingen.
Opplysninger gis ogsA fra
Lillestrsm Sivilforsvar lll. 71 20 22.
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Sivilforsvarets varsl ingssignaler
Slyllforsvar'et har i de fleste stsrre tett-
bygde strok tyfoner og oirener som kan
gl elgnalene:
.VIKTIG MELDING -
LYTT PA RADIO'
.FLYALARM'
.FAREN OVER'
Slgnalet .VlKTlG MELDING - LYTI PA
MDIO' gis med kirkeklokkene der det
lkke er tyfoner og sirener.
Bruk av telefonen
I nodssituasioner
Fra ergnalet .vlKTlG MELDING - LYTT
PA MDIO' bllr gltt,
cr dct lorbudt I cn tlmc ! brukc tclc-
f@@
cller velfcrd.
Under .FLYALARM, gJelder samme
forbud. I den forate timen otter at sig-
nalet .FAREN OVEB' er gl$. ma tele.
fonen bare brukee tll kort6 samtaler.
Dereom,..dieee forekdftene bllr over-
tr0dt av'abonnenten eller andre gom
bruker telefonen hans, kan Telerarket
stenge telefonen for en tid eller opp-
heve abonnementet straks, jfr. Norsk
telefonreglement art. 58.
Vlt mltchold I bruk av tclcfoncn I nod-
rltumloncr.
Viktig melding 
- 
Lytt pt radio
-
-
--
--
--Gis med tyfoner og sirener elik:
3 signatserler med t mlnutlr opphold mellom aerlene.
Gis med kirkeklokker slik:
Rlnglng l3 rerler med t mlnutt. opphold mcllom lerlsno.
Betyr: Viktig melding, lytt pA radio for narmere orientering.
Signalet vil kunne bll brukt bAde I fred og krig.
Flyalarm
Gis med tyfoner og slrener ellk:
Korte dot lca. I mlnutt
Betyr: Fare for angrep 
- 
eok deknlngl
Farcn over
Gis med tyfoner og sirener slik:
I .tot i ca. tf minutt
Betyr: Faren eller angrepet er over.
DI REKTORATET FOR SIVILT BEREDSI(AP
TELEDIREKTORATET
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APPENDIX II
Effects of a I megaton explosion at a height of 2,000 metres
above the Empire State Building, New York
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
BRIOGE
RIVERSIOE
CHURCH STATE
BUILOING
WORLD
TRADE
CENTER
STATUE
OF
LIBERTY
STATEN
ISLAND
1.8 SECONOS AFTEB DETONATION
THERMAL AND INITIAL
4.6 SECONDS AFTER OETONATION
REFLECTEO BLAST
AVE FBONT
11 SECONOS AFTER DETONATION
OVERPRESSURE
= 
O.42 kg cm'2
WIND VELOCITY
= 290 kph
37 SECONOS AFTER OETONATION
HOT GASEOUS
. 
-/SoMBRES|DUE
t,-
OVERPRESSURE
= 
0.07 kg cm-2
16
Source.
OISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (KILOMETRESI
The prompt and delayed effects of nuclear weapons, Kevin N. Lewis, Scientific American, July 1979.
OVERPRESSURE
= 
1.1 kg crn-21
PRIMABY BLAST
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4
4th June 1980
Nuclear, biological and chemical protection
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3 and 4l
tabled by MM. Ahrens and Bfrchner
l. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, line 2, leave out " use " and
insert " production ".
2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " an equality of reta-
liatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact " and insert " maintaining a
complete deterrent and defensive capability as required by MC l4/3 ".
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" 2. To investigate within NATO the requirement for a deterrent and retaliatory capability
consisting of chemical weapons and the legal limitations with respect to their use ".
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " use " and insert " transfer ".
Signed: Ahrens, Btichner
l. See 5th Sitting,4th June 1980 (Amendments I and 4 amended and agreed tol Amendments 2 and 3 negatived).
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Amendment 5
4th June 1980
Nuclear, biological and chemical protection
AMENDMENT 5I
tabled by Mr. Brown and others
5. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.
Signed: Brown, Btichner, Pignion, Dejardin, Stollelen
l. See 5th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Amendment negatived).
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l. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Valletx (Chairman);
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaen-
sens, Antoni, Cornelissen (Altemate: Portheine), Fiandrotti,
Forma, Foschi, Garrett (Alternate: Lord Hughes\, Hawkins,
29th April 1980
Konings, McGuire (Alternate: Jessel), Malvy, Marl, Milller,
Peronnet (Alternate: Petit), Schef/ler, Talon, Ueberhorst(Alternate: Fltimig), van Waterschoot (Alternate: Brasseur\.
N.B. ?'fte names of those taktng part in the vote are
printed in talics
Co-operation between WEU member coantries on video
commanication systems
REPORT I
sabmitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2
by Mr. Yalleix, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnnpr RrcouueNonrroN
on co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication
systems
ExpLnNnronY MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur
Introduction
Conclusion
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Draft Recommendation
oa co-opcralioa bctwcca lf EU mcmbcr couarrics on
ideo commuaicat ba systcms
The Assembly,
Having become acquainted with recent developments in the United Kingdokn with the Prestel
view-data syitem, in France with the Antiope videotex system and in other membpr countries in this
held;
Aware that in the absence of appropriate American developments in this area the United States
Federal Communications Committee is studying the abovementioned and similar systems and is
considering their adaptability for the American market;
Recalling that current developments are sponsored jointly by government departments and
private enterprises;
Convinced that these new communications systems will also have a significant impact on
military communications systems;
Seeking to promote co-operation among European countries so as to foster the possibility of
gaining access to American and world markets,
RrcouueNos rHAT rnr Coutrcu- INvrrE covERNMENTs oF MEMBER couNTRIEs
l. To concert their efforts to establish European standards for video communication systems
applicable to world markets through the CEPT and, to this end, to approach the bodies or firms
concerned;
2. To urge all authorities and industries concerned to promote co-operation pith each other in
these matters.
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E xplanatory M emorandum
(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapportear)
Introduction
L In this report on the industrial bases of
European security 
- 
guidelines drawn from the
symposium on l5th, l6th and lTth October
1979 t, your Rapporteur pointed to the possibi-
lities and difliculties of the electronic commu-
nications industries in Europe; he specified that
Europe should not remain dependent on impor-
ted parts for the new information technology
which were practically not produced at all at
the present time in Europe. In order to be
better informed on some aspects of these
technologies, the Committee was briefed on
Prestel, the British Post Office view-data
system, on 4th April 1979, and on Antiope2,
the French Sofratev system, on 7th November
1979.
2. Telematics is the umbrella term for all
information technologies such as data banks,
computers and accessories, advanced compo-
nents 
- 
in particular microprocessors 
- 
and,
finally, the new transmission techniques with
fibre transmission cables and satellites.
3. The Vorld telematics market is growing
very quickly and although Europe itself is a
large market its share in production is not satis-
factory. Moreover, its position may further
deteriorate: the United States is the main
supplier for the world market but Japan,
because of its formidable design and marketing
skills, may prove to be an increasingly powerful
force. In the electronics field Japan is bound
to become a major competitor when its mass-
produced products arrive on the market.
4. In Europe industry supplies scarcely l0 0/o
of its own requirements for advanced compo-
nents. There are hardly any data banks at
Community level. Conversely, Europe is
better placed in the data-processing and soft-
ware areas. Europe can meet the challenge
however if it proves really capable of using the
larger Community market which is equal in
size to that of the United States. However,
certain exclusively national preferences should
be set aside, together with technical barriers,
special regulations and national monopolies in
the telecommunications field, which would
hardly be inclined to co-operate and develop
interlinking services.
5. The Prestel view-data system was devel-
oped by the British Post Oflice in its research
establishment. The Post Office r6le is to pro-
vide a utility using the computer and the tele-
phone network in order to disseminate informa-
tion of whatever kind to the general public, the
business community, specialist clients and
government or international organisations.
Within the public system it is possible to
restrict access to certain parts of the data base
to specific terminals.
6. In the defence f,reld it could be possible to
collate information and then disseminate it to
particular terminals for items of a relatively low
level ofsecurity or to a higher level.
7. A body of users of the Prestel view-data
system has been built up in the London arca; a
wider geographical coverage will be established
in a later period.
8. The Antiope system, developed by thejoint studies centre of the French Post Office
and the TDF (Tdlddilfusion de France), has a
dual system of transmitting information, i.e. by
conventional television transmitters or by tele-
phone. It can be very easily adapted to all
means of communications and different trans-
mission standards such as telephone and televi-
sion ; data can also be transmitted by sound
broadcasting. The principle adopted is to
separate completely the transmission aspects
from the display aspects. Current market
research has shown that television cable net-
works have the capacity to transmit full-
channel information; in the same cable ten or
twenty channels can be added, each capable of
transmitting 4,000 pages of text.
9. With the co-operation of the Paris Stock
Exchange, a pre-operational service has started
of daily stock exchange information with
transmitters in Paris and Lyons. From the end
of 1980 equipment will be available to the
general public.
10. The French and British systems are diffe-
rent in that Antiope was developed as a mixed
system, both telephone and broadcast, whereas
Prestel is a telephone system. Studies have
been conducted by the CCETT (Centre
commun d'Etudes de Tdlevision et Telecimmu-
nications) on standardisation of the systems
used.
l. Document 823.
2. Antiope: Acquisition numirique et tdldvisualisation
d'images orgarusies en pages d'ecriture (Digital acquisition
and teledisplay of pictures arranged in the form of written
pages).
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Conclusion
I l. Your Rapporteur is convinced that Euro-pean standards for video communication
systems applicable to world markets could be
defined if the postal authorities and the govern-
ments in general, as well as industries, would
co-operate sufficiently. One should not forget
that in Western Europe sizable public
contracts will be placed by the governments
concerned and they could enable the market to
be developed to the benefit of European
consumers and introduce an element of
Community preference for European manufac-
turers of telematic products and services. The
effectiveness of national development pro-
grammes could be multiplied with some
elementary co-ordination to avoid duplication
of eflort and systematic rivalry.
12. The information technology revolution
has started and will spread. If European
nations agree to work together they will be able
to handle the risks definitely involved in the
technological breakthroughs and it should be
possible for their products to supply an impor-
tant part of the world market.
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l. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Valletx (Chairman);
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaen-
sens, Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, Forma, Foschi,
Garrett, Hawkins (Alternate: Lord Hughes), Konrngs,
29th April 1980
McGwre, Malvy, Ma(, Milller, Ptronnet (Alternate: Peli,),
Scheffler, Talon, Ueberhorst (Alternate FldmiS\, van Water-
schoot (Alternale; B r as seur\.
N.B. The names of those taking part m the vole
are prtnted in italrcs.
D efe nce- relate d info rmat io n tec hno logy
REPORT'
sabmitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2
by Mr. Brasseur, Rapportear
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DnRrr RecouugNo,arrloN
on defence-related information technology
ExpLRNnronY MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. General remarks
III. Command, control and communications
IV. Naval communications
V. Army communications
VI. Air force communications
VII. Special systems
VIII. Conclusions
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Dralt Recommcndarion
oa dclcncc -nlatcd inlormatioa tcchmloglt
The Assemfly,
Conscious that in the crucial sector of microelectronic components Europe imports more than
80 0/o of its requirements in integrated circuits;
Aware that European computer firms supply only l6 o/o of the world market and that Japan has
made remarkable progress in this field;
Regretting that Europe has not so far exploited the fact that it itself constitptes a continental-
size market and has not followed Japan in pursuing a coherent policy and comnnercial strategy to
capture part of the world market;
Considering the link between telecommunications equipment for civil and military purposes,
Recouuenos rHAT rnr Cour.rcrt-
Urge member governments:
l. To promote European collaboration at governmental level and between European industries
concerned with microelectronics, communications and telematics, computers and software, and the
production of interface equipment with users so as to ensure the establishment of a sound European
industrial base in this. field to counter American and Japanese activities in European and world
markets;
2. To establish a truly homogenous European market for telematic equipment and services for
both civil and military uses;
3. To make an effort to co-ordinate orders from both civil and military publit authorities so as
inter alia to allow interoperability of equipment when justified.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur)
l. Introduction
l. On 29th November 1977, the Assembly
adopted Recommendation 308 on communic-
ations and crisis management in the Alliance.
This recommendation was accompanied by
an explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr.
Watkinson on behalf of the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armamentsr. In the
recommendation the Assembly called on all
NATO countries to participate fully in the
early completion of the NATO integrated
communications system. It also called on the
North Atlantic Council to study the possibility
of establishing a permanent teleprinter link
between NATO headquarters and the Govern-
ment of the Soviet Union and of appointing an
authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on
appropriate occasions.
2. In answer to this recommendation, the
Council did not discuss any specific aspect but
merely declared that it had taken note of the
suggestions and would submit the text concern-
ed to the NATO authorities.
3. Your Rapporteur considers this type of
answer most unsatisfactory since the report
contains many useful elements including consi-
derable information on NATO communica-
tions, the French national system and mention
of the situation in other countries, with parti-
cular reference to the United Kingdom commu-
nications system outside Europe. Your Rappor-
teur hopes this report and recommendation will
receive more detailed attention from the Coun-
cil and that its answer will include sufficient
information to sustain parliamentary work in a
national or international framework.
4. There have been many developments in
world communications in both the civil and
military fields. In the 1980s, present systems
might well be revolutionised through the use of
full lines of digital switching and transmission
equipment which will greatly increase the capa-
city of the communications systems. Moreover,
the accuracy of digital technology is the highest
available. Development of large-scale integrated
circuits in the past decade has made the digital
switch possible and launched a major competi-
tive race for business among telecommunication
equipment companies. In addition, digital and
switching centres occupy one-quarter of the
space needed for electromechanical exchanges,
require one-third of the maintenance and less
power to operate. The switches can be used
with video, computer data, facsimile and telex
transmission systems.
5. In his abovementioned report, Mr. Wat-
kinson stated that the first politically-oriented
communications system was established in
1967. lt was known as the NATO-wide com-
munications system and used various existing
and planned communication links to provide a
teletype network linking NATO headquarters
to the national governments as well as provid-
ing links to major NATO commanders, and a
parallel system to national ministries of
defence. At the same time a modern satellite
communications system was established with
twelve ground stations located in nearly all
NATO countries using the Satcom geostation-
ary satellites.
6. In the 1970s it was decided to establish a
single new system, known as the NATO intb-
grated communication system, to be jointly
funded and owned by the NATO countries.
7 . It was soon realised that such an integrat-
ed overall system would be extremely expensive
and could not be implemented fully during the
1970s because of technical, financial and other
limitations. It was therefore decided to divide
the project into two stages, the first to be
completed in 1981.
8. Communications, command and control
are essential elements in the long-term NATO
defence programme.
9. The major aims of the second stage of the
programme are: integration of the stage I sepa-
rate sub-systems into one overall system which
will, to the maximum extent possible, operate
in digital mode; expansion and improvement of
the quantity and quality of the NATO-wide
integrated communications system to all its
users; enhanced survivability through better
protection of the communication sites ; achieve-
ment of a complete degree of interoperability
with national tactical and strategic commun-
ication systems through the use of common
standards, equipment and procedures, thereby
progressively introducing digitalisation of the
equipment and the transmission network;
increased security with the introduction of new
cryptographic equipment.
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10. The capital cost of the second phase of
the programme is e$timated at $ 1.5 billion.
The programme should be fully operational
in 1995.
ll. The NATO-wide integrated communica-
tion system is the largest infrastructure pro-ject financed on a fourteen-power basis that the
allies have ever undertaken. lf completed it
will greatly improve the allies' capability for
crisis management and for the command and
control of NATO forces. The communications
system is also an essential element of the
strategy of flexible response.
ll. General remarks
12. Throughout the world, many sectors are
still turning on the fringe of major potential
resources. The recent emergence of data-
processing and telecommunications will allow
electronic data systems to be developed capable
of meeting the various requirements of a grow-
ing number of users, applications and areas.
13. Distribution systems will allow data to
be shared and decentralised. It will be possible
to form networks for the harmonious processing
of various types of data from many sources
commensurate with the diversity of human
organisations. Applications involving the crea-
tion and distribution of documents will call for
the introduction of new types of networks and
will have to be capable of handling " docu-
ments " in the form of data, texts, images and
vocal elements.
14. The interlinking of such networks at
international level, the promotion of innova-
tions in technology and applications and co-
operation with developing countries are all
elements which call for the closest attention
from our governments.
15. In this connection, it will be noted that
the conference on science and technology for
development organised by the United Nations
in 1979 emphasised the importance of techno-
logical potential and local resources but set the
problem in a global context. There should in
fact be a sort of " give and take " understanding
between nations embracing the world-wide level
of knowledge and experiehce and also the data
networks through which this knowledge is
distributed. Such possibilities of access to
data and their use are determining factors in the
maturity of this science which goes much far-
ther than telecommunications.
16. Your Rapporteur wishes to start by
examining some of the trends in four techno-
logical areas: microelectronics, communica-
tions, interfaces with users arld, finally, systems
and software.
17. Microelectronic techqology opens up
interesting prospects for stor4ge and the logical
or intelligent handling of the flow of data.
This is a field in which t$ere has been an
extraordinary trend towards l]ower costs. In the
case of digital magnetic rec6rdings, there has
been a compound annual reduction in the cost
of storing an element of data of some 40 0/o
within two decades. The cost of semi-
conductor.computer storage has also dropped.
Within barely six years, the improvement factor
has been about ten. The cost of the logic unit
of an electronic computer has fallen at a
slightly slower rate in view of the fact that as
the number of elements in a unit increases its
design and testing become more arduous.
However this may be, even before the introduc-
tion of microprocessors, which has grextly
simplified the problems of input and output
electric connections in the processing unit,
the overall cost of operations, including the
logical part and storage, has fallen in two and a
half decades at an annual rate of about 25 0/o
(compound annual rate).
18. There are good reasohs to expect that
this trend will continue at tlre same rate until
the late eighties. Micromilniaturisation will
also bring improved speeds a4d lower costs.
19. In a world where emergy is becoming
scarce, there is no doubt that demand continues
to grow insofar as lower costs make new appli-
cations a paying proposition. In recent decades,
the cost of surface communications has fallen
by about I I o/o per year.
20. Optical f,rbre cables, production of which
has just begun on a large scale, should
allow this trend to continue. But the most
extraordinary event in transmission producti-
vity came with satellites. Satellites supply
channels at a cost which fhlls each year by
about 40 0/0, representing a degree of producti-
vity comparable to that noted for data storage
by magnetic recordings.
21. A third trend emergipg in the field of
transmission technology is the influence of
digital equipment and recorded programme
control on line switching. This technology is
widespread in central switching systems. Digi-
tal switches may in fact be more reliable,
cheaper to maintain and furnish a functionally
greater output than their analogue predecessors.
22. Previously, the term " telecommunica-
tion " was used for all data transmissions out-
side the premises in which the central computer
l6l
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was located. The term " communication " by
computer channels was used for all transmis-
sions within the premises. In the meantime,
the link-up of a teleprocessing installation has
been progressively developed with the intro-
duction of automatic digital exchanges.
23. A future aim is therefore to allow the
user to employ the same procedure for sending
messages to diflerent destinations whether on
the spot or further afield.
24. Technological progress has also had
repercussions on the instruments available to
users by making them much easier to handle.
25. In the eighties, advances will be made in
voice processing so that verbal messages may be
translated into texts and processed directly.
26. The most diffrcult challenge to meet if
the growth of computer systems is to continue
is in developing simple and effective methods of
data input.
27. Once data are in electronic form, they
must be stored so that they may be reused
without further manual handling. This will be
far easier whi:n electric typewriters are replaced
by electronic typewriters, a development which
is already well advanced. The second solution
is to abolish the keyboard either by using pick-
up devices to receive data directly in electronic
form (optical reading of codes from selling
points, direct reception of surface data from
observation satellites) or by making use of
optical reading of characters and the reception
of data backed up by images for reading data
direct from typed or manuscript texts. Such
applications stem from the immense progress
made in electronic display processing.
28. The fourth technological sector is sys-
tems and software. This is the most sensi-
tive aspect inasmuch as it is more complex to
manage and requires the use of vast profess-
ional resources.
29. Systems will be introduced allowing both
the distribution and sharing of resources and
data. Similarly, it should be possible for differ-
ent types of data networks to coexist even
within a single organisation and for them to
exchange messages simultaneously.
30. The problem for the future is therefore
not so much whether data can be protected and
made accessible selectively but to decide what
regulations are required in the national and
international context. These technological
developments give us a glimpse of the future
trend of telecommunications.
31. It may be expected that a feature of the
equipment needed will be its great diversity.To meet the requirements of applications,
modern telecommunication technology will
ofler exceptional band widths (satellites and
optical fibres, for instance). But these means
will of course have to coexist with medium- or
narrow-band equipment which are more econo-
mical to use in their range of applications. We
shall also witness the emergence and interlink-ing of networks with different control
structures.
32. At present, most work on research and
the development of applications for advanced-
type networks has been carried out in firms
using ground installations. This situation will
continue and a large number of- these applica-
tions have given rise to many requirements in
respect of availability control. Another area of
innovation is with high-frequency transmission
satellites allowing a large number of small
ground stations at relatively low cost. Even
small countries with little traflic might take
part on payment of a modest fee. Such net-
works are now at the experimental stage and
have aroused the interest of authorities in many
countries.
33. An important technical test has been
carried out at European level using the Sym-
phonie satellite with the participation of the
French and German postal and telecommunica-
tions services.
34. Many new attitudes are taking shape and
institutions are changing as the major r6le
played in the world by overall data resources
becomes clearer. This trend is accompanied by
new political principles: the right of citizens to
privacy, the right of access to data in data
banks, information and relevant rights, the new
international order in the field of information
and the goal of free circulation of electronic
data across frontiers in the same way as there is
free movement of mail.
35. The development of these principles and
the technology on which they are based
will be more evident in an atmosphere of co-
operation between nations and between private
and public bodies. This means an all-round
determination to conduct tests and to learn
from them. It is most important for all coun-
tries to be able to participate. The Inter-
national Telecommunications Union and other
international bodies have special respon-
sibility in this respect.
lll. Command, control and communications
36. Computerisation of army data started
some ten years ago. It has since been perfected
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and now covers three different flrelds: budget
and finance, logistics, and personnel, all of
which are concerned with the running of the
army. In addition, specihc systems are ins-
talled in weapons systems and are used for
communications and are directly related to
command and control.
37. With regard to weapons systems, the
F-104 fighter-bomber for instance has seven
computers on board; modern artillery also
requires computerisation of many types ol'
data; the NATO air defence system, NADGE,
could not exist without computers; warships
have them on board. The modern command
and control system computers have taken over
some of the executive tasks of staff officers.
38. Command and control require the use
of all information resources with regard to the
enemy in general and to particular situations in
combat. Computerisation allows all kinds of
precise information to be classified for use in
and facilitation of the decision-making process.
The means of destruction, the arms, aircraft,
vehicles or warships to be used all depend on
the type of information processed in computers.
39. The new communications system also
allows certains types of weapons systems and
weapons to be fired automatically. A head-
quarters is therefore able to retaliate immedia-
tely in certain situations.
40. Diflerent telecommunication systems and
networks exist in order to avoid the des-
truction of one part resulting in a breakdown of
the whole system. The systems consist of
satellites, mobile communication centres, radio
communications, etc. During the six-day war
in the Middle East it was established that
telecommunication networks are quite vulner-
able and in the course of a few days the system
was downgraded and worked at only 25 0/o of its
capacity.
41. Much information could be obtained by
photography which has become so accurate that
clear pictures'can now be taken with a resolu-
tion of two square metres.
42. In order to process all the data, large
computers are installed and, of course, they
have to be protected in bunkers or under
ground. The evolution of new material in this
field is quite fast and requires the continuous
training of personnel. Automation is also stea-
dily improving but the army has to reckon with
the possibility of some systems collapsing
during emergencies, thus requiring its personnel
to handle information by less sophisticated
systems.
43. The security and viability of a system
are aspects which require cofltinuous considera-
tion. In civilian life these aspects are of course
also very important, as can be seen from the
parliamentary enquiry now being conducted in
Sweden where the population has become very
worried by the fact that all types of personal
data are now stored in conlputers and might
constitute a threat to the prifate lives of many
people.
44. Civil and military computers are to be
dispersed geographically and according to the
type of data treated. The disadvantage of course
is that this means installing more giant compu-
ters, most of which are now in administrative
or population centres. Dispersing computers
will also mean dispersing personnel and hence
more staff.
45. It is not certain whether the Russian
communication systems are as sophisticated as
those of NATO. However, in the military
field they should not be underestimated; for
instance, Russian satellites are able to handle
very sophisticated communication systems.
46. There is a NATO cotnmunications sys-
tem as well as several national communications
systems. These systems are interlinked depen-
ding on the countries concerhed. There is notjust one general linking arrangement but
several.
47. The NATO-funded systems are used to
link the different NATO headquarters to the
highest command in the national armies, i.e.
mostly up to corps level. Only in Turkey are
the communications systems linked to lower
levels. The NATO system is funded by the
NATO nations which want an integrated com-
munications system and a control system called
the ADP (automatic data processing). The
NATO command and control information sys-
tem is mainly for the central region, whereas
the world-wide communication system is the
United States military qommand control
system.
48. The systems in the vafious countries and
the NATO system, although different, are
to be made interoperable and in the future all
systems will be digitalised. The system is
primarily used to provide commanders-in-chief
and commandem with all the information
necessary to enable them to take decisions.
This means that the information has to arrive
on time in order to allow correct analysis. It
includes, of course, logistics as well as intelli-
gence information. The systems used in the
military field are not basically different from
those used by banking consortia, big internatio-
nal corporations such as Shell, the airlines,
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etc. The main difference is the speed with
which the military have to take decisions, an
obvious necessity in view of the speed of
aircraft and missiles.
49. Interoperability between the NATO and
the national systems is essential as the NATO
headquarters will have operational command
over national forces in times of crisis or war.
50. CINCENT has direct command and
control over the central region, over the two
army groups: the northern and central army
groups, and in some cases over three or four
army corps commands. There is no direct
information flow from company or battalion
level to SHAPE headquarters; information is
lrltered and evaluated at the .intermediate
command headquarters.
5l. Interoperability, althpugh a necessity, is
not very easy to achieve since each country has
its own communications systems and the inter-
faces between the national systems and the
NATO system should not be too expensive or
complicated. Standards here have been deve-
loped by NATO and the national authorities,
but not without diffrculties and f,rnancial
problems. The so-called " standardisation
agreement " leads to a long-term programme
where it is hoped that all systems will be
developed according to common design princi-
ples. Standardisation is also being achieved in
the civil field.
52. National intelligence data are provided
through the NATO command but national
authorities take the ultimate decision as to
which data are forwarded to NATO headquar-
ters. Information remains under national juris-
diction and sovereignty.
53. NATO will never be able to work under
one joint system as this would mean all coun-
tries being obliged to use the same supplier, for
instance, to buy American. This is unaccept-
able for sovereign NATO nations and therefore
one has to accept different systems and different
methods of command and control exercise.
Nevertheless, full use is made of the expe-
rience of the different nations and this has led
to a certain amount of competition and some-
times co-operative development. This is also
true in respect of telecommunications satellite
equipment. We are living in a free economy
which means competition and different systems.
54. Nuclear weapons remain under national
control and NATO communications procedures
have been established to avoid time-consuming
consultations. Several countries have special
" red lines " with Moscow and the information
acquired through these systems is also divulged
to other countries but, of course, at the discre-
tion of the country which receives the informa-
tion. Many exercises have been conducted to
reach speedy decisions after quick consulta-
tions. There are several large computers, used
mainly for civil purposes at present, but which
are for use in the NATO system in times of
crisis.
55. It is unlikely that the present-day
command structure will be changed in the near
future, although a continuous study is being
made to achieve the most efficient command
and control system. Formerly the communica-
tions element was separate from the command
and control system, but now in many countries
these three elements are looked upon as an
entity since it is becoming increasingly diflicult
to separate the handling of information from
command and control.
56. There are two schools of thought on
how to use the information. One is that every-
thing should be received at the high command
which would then take the appropriate steps.
This means a highly centralised command
system. The second is that the lower commands
should analyse the data to work out particular
missions, the decision-making also being left to
the appropriate'lower command. This means a
decentralised system. Once an operation has
taken place it should be monitored and report-
ed back to the high command.
57. The real question is rather to ensure
that computers are at the service of commands
and are adapted to their organisation. There
is therefore no need to wonder whether it will
still be necessary to have battalion, division,
army and army corps command systems.
lY . Naval communications
58. In spite of recent independent technolo-
gical advances in communications these are still
linked with naval command and control. One
result of improved communications is the
enhancement of centralised command by
which is meant any level of command and
control above the tactical level including fleet,
theatre and national commands.
59. For mainly historical reasons western
navies are organised to operate more or less
independently. However, the Soviet navy
started to become important only in the
1960s and from the very beginning its com-
mand, control and communications were far
more integrated and organised for future com-
bat applications in accordance with instruc-
tions from the central naval headquarters in
Moscow. In the West a new system will be set
up in order to support both centralised and
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decentralised control, even though the present
tendency is to favour centralisation.
60. NATO has adopted the principle of
integration between communications and com-
mand and control and once the NATO count-
ries' systems are interoperable among NATO
navies a centralised command system will cer-
tainly follow. Modern weapon technology has
greatly increased the degree of destructive force
of even smaller combat units. Naval engage-
ments can no longer be fought in splendid
isolation but will be subject to forces which
may even be many hundreds of miles away;
weapon ranges too make this inevitable.
61. Discussions are now taking place within
NATO on the advantages and disadvantages of
centralised control since the technological capa-
bility is available. To what extent should cen-
tral control be exerted in order to make
the best use of both local initiative and central
co-ordination?
62. Sophisticated communications techno-
logy can enable a theatre level commander to
be in direct touch with each unit under his
command. However, in order to filter the flow
of data and to provide a flow of detailed ins-
tructions subordinate intermediate commands
have to be maintained. Their number depends
on the volume of incoming and outgoing tacti-
cal message traffic and data with which they
have to cope.
63. Technical saturation of communication
channels is unlikely, especially in the light of
potential new transmission media which will
improve the data-carrying capacity of the sys-
tem. On the other hand, however, human
ability to assimilate information rapidly be-
comes saturated.
64. In order to ensure optimum use of the
technical system the conditions under which
central control can best be exercised should be
carefully determined and procedures for
rapid and efficient transfer of control from local
to intermediate and central commands must be
established by the new system's design.
65. The communications network is divided
into two main parts: tactical and strategic.
Tactical communications are mainly bet-
ween ships and between ships and supporting
aircraft. The link is by radio.
66. The strategic network includes coastal
stations which are nearly always sited at fixed
locations; equipment and facilities are housed
in concrete accommodations. The communi-
cations network might be shared by the other
armed forces. The coastal radio stations are
connected with the various maritime headquar-
ters and support facilities in iharbours or mari-
time airfields. Requirement$ for strategic net-
works can be met by standard professional tele-
communications equipment, which will be
computer-controlled, digital and secure.
67. The navy's tactical area is at sea and in
coastal waters. Two types of communication
systems can be distinguishedr the so-called ex-
ternal communications betwden ships as oppo-
sed to internal communicatidns on board ship.
Within a ship a number of operational discipli-
nes, as for anti-submarine warfare or tactical air
defence, are interconnected. In order to pro-
vide command and control with all essential
information, computer-assisted remote control
might be necessary. For the cq-ordinated
fighting r6le, frequent interchbnge ofdata giving
the tactical situation and the availability of
many weapons systems makes an inte-
grated internal communications network a
necessity.
Y. Army communications
68. Any modern army has an increasing use
for communications. The rnobility of troops,
fast reaction to changing situations, the increa-
sed volume of logistic requirements and
the longer range of modern weapons all
demand a communications nptwork capable of
carrying a large amount of inlformation quickly
and securely over a large area. Such a
network is now becoming increasingly inte-
grated for all types of infofiation such as the
spoken word, teletype, facsinlile and computer
data. It is generally recogniSed that only digi-
tal information can be made gecure with a high
degree of safety, and secure digitat information
exchange from user to user is the ultimate goal.
69. In the army, as in the navy, there is a
sub-division into tactical and strategic net-
works. In the army the tactical network is
generally used by the fighting forces in the
front line needing a combat r4dio and a tactical
area communications network,
70. The strategic network is at the rear area
and comprises fixed communication centres.
Transmission and switching equipment is
housed in reinforced concrete bunkers; the stra-
tegic communications network links the strate-
gic headquarters as well as s[rpply centres fior
logistics, national air defence centres, military
meteorological observations artd data-processing
stations, etc. The strategic communications
facilities are or will be computer-controlled.
Satellite systems and telegraphic and radio net-
works, either NATO or national, are being used
to ensure communications hetween the civil
and military authorities and the high com-
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mands. The military network is also often
connected with the national civil telecom-
munications network.
7l. In some NATO countries a tactical
satellite communications system is either in
operation or being considered, assuming the
availability of a national satellite.
72. As mentioned earlier, a complete renewal
of the tactical area communications system
is now being considered in order to fulhl the
requirements of digitalisation, automation, and
security proofing.
Yl. Air force communications
73. The air force strategic network mainly
consists of large communication centres at air
bases or air defence centres and, for smaller air
forces, this network can be partly integrated
with the tactical network. The strategic net-
work is also installed in reinforced concrete
accommodation which might be shared by the
other armed forces. It serves all kinds of infor-
mation on logistical, strategic command, meteo-
rological and intelligence data. Often such
data take the form of teletyped messages, but
telephone conversations also form part of the
system. Here the trend towards digitalisation
is obvious as is the use of satellite equipment,
computer control switches, etc.
74. The air force-owned, ground-based tac-
tical radio communications equipment is
mainly situated at air bases, but also at air
defence and fighter control centres. It is also
Iinked to the radar sites. Due to speed of
operation, telephone messages are predominant
and are backed up or confirmed by teletyped
messages. Fast switching times are therefore
necessary. It is anticipated that in the near
future digital speech and time division swit-
ching techniques will be introduced. At the
same time it is expected that there will be inte-
gration of teletype and data with the digital
telephone network. Computer-controlled swit-
ching systems are fast becoming operational in
the air forces.
75. The various tactical communication sys-
tems will be different for each of the three
forces although they might have several parts in
common.
76. For the strategic communications system
a general trend can be recognised, namely
the wish to integrate the networks of the
three forces into a common integrated
network that will be computer-controlled,
digital and secure. Each force could have its
own access, distribution and control, but the
switching systems and the transmission system
could be shared.
77. In view of the high cost of the equip-
ment and its large capacity, such a trend is
quite logical from a cost-effectiveness point of
vlew.
Yll. Special systems
78. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Watkinson, in
his report on communications and crisis
management in the Alliancer, explained in
paragraphs I 30 et seq the special position of
the French communications network. Your
Rapporteur does not wish to reiterate the
French position, but merely mentions that
France has accepted the common need for
interoperability with the NATO agencies.
Therefore, contracts have been drawn up and
conventions agreed to for establishing contact at
various levels: between SACEUR and the
Chiefs of the French General Staffs; between
authorised allied and French high commands(first army, tactical air force, Commander-in-
Chief Atlantic, etc.).
79. France also has bilateral relations with
all neighbouring countries and with the
United States.
80. The technological aspects ate very
important as the protocols of transmission and
of the interfaces should be concluded for ten to
fifteen years, otherwise the problem of inter-
operability cannot be solved.
81. In its relationship with NATO, France
wishes to limit standardisation for fear that
otherwise all equipment used would be Ameri-
can and in the end it would be impossible to
compete with the American giants. French
policy is to favour French and, secondly, Euro-
pean equipment.
82. The French forces have three diflerent
systems of telecommunications, one for each
arm. This is for geographical as well as opera-
tional reasons. The three systems on which
depends the transmission system of the high
command will_ be increasingly interoperable.
The military will participate in the French
Telecom I satellite to be launched in 1983;
until then Intelsat is also being used for world-
wide military communications.
83. In 1962, the French high command
decided that an inter-armed force telecommuni-
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cations, electronics and cypher commission
should be set up (know in short as CITEC).
84. In the framework of the responsibilities
of the chiefs of staff and the director of the
gendarmerie, the r6le of CITEC was to study,
define and propose principles and practical
measures allowing the necessary co-ordination
between the three services and the gendarmerie
in the following fields:
- 
transmissions of all kinds (written, dis-
plays, signs, data, sound);
- 
teleinformatics;
- 
protection of data transmitted, in parti-
cular by cypher;
- 
electronic warfare;
- 
electromagnetic detection and identifi-
cation;
- 
radioelectric navigational aids.
85. In 1978 the French Minister of Defence
ordered that a general computer commission
and a specific computer commission be set up
at the Ministry for the Armed Forces.
86. The general computer commission was
to be responsible for projects involving the use
of data-processing equipment (central and peri-
pheral units and associated equipment) market-
ed and sold by catalogue for whatever purpose
they may be intended (management, scientific
and technical calculations, industrial control,
etc.) with the exception however of equipment
used in weapons and command systems.
87. The specific computer commission was
to be responsible for projects involving the use
of data-processing equipment (central and peri-
pheral units and associated equipment) design-
ed in accordance with military or non-
commercial specihcations and, in general, all
computer equipment for weapons and com-
mand systems.
88. The qpecific computer commission
should also work out and submit for the Minis-
ter's approval an industrial policy for the
Ministry relating to equipment within its pur-
view, propagate and implement the elements of
this industrial policy, examine and keep up to
date a medium-term (five-year) equipment plan
for the whole department.
Ylll. Conclusions
89. Your Rapporteur has tried to give an
insight into the problems inherent in the new
type of telecommunications now being intro-
duced. He is convinced that present systems
will very soon become obsolete and be replaced
by completely new types of communications
systems based on new electrorlic technologies.
90. He has to leave all options open as to
what might happen in the civil and military
communications field since even the most ex-
perienced experts are unable to make an accu-
rate forecast. An earlier example of the wide
range of choices was the development of the
gramophone record, which, when invented, was
thought of as a means of passing a souvenir of a
dead person's voice on to his descendants. It
was also thought that recorded messages might
replace letters. However, records vrlere hardly
ever put to these uses but musical recordings
became and still are, to say the least, highly
popular. It is therefore of little wonder that
your Rapporteur dare do no more than merely
describe the processes now being developed.
91. The new family of dlectronic techno-
logies will bring a considerabl reduction in the
price of communications by introducing nume-
rical systems (electronic cofliputers) and new
transmission techniques (satellites and optical
fibres) in the telecommunications network. At
the same time, microprocessors and silicon
chips could reduce the need for large
computers.
92. Military equipment is somewhat differ-
ent from civil equipment as it has to be more
secure in a hardware sense as well as keeping
the messages secret. Military hardware has to
be sturdier as it is submitted to different
climatological conditions. Nevertheless, sys-
tems for the military are basically the same, for
example, as those for the International Society
of Aeronautical Telecommunications or for the
Shell communications network. For quality,
NATO requirements form a good yardstick if
the communications hardware is to be exported,
for instance to Brazil which imported from
Europe a network for banking, institutions,
business organisations and government adminis-
trations and which wanted the same standards
as NATO.
93. Inside Europe, however, different postal
authorities have different requirements, mainly
because the postal administrations want to
protect their home markets. lt is most regrett-
able that so far no European firms can be
established under European law. The Com-
munity is now trying to promote a decision of
the Council of Ministers to achieve consultation
between postal authorities before introducing
new services. From 1983 onwards the different
systems of telematics now being developed
should achieve compatibility. The CEPT in
Geneva is trying to promote this co-ordination.
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94. The European armies are in the process
of converting to computerised telecommunica-
tions. This type of communications started
with the space ventures of the United States
and later on in Europe. It is now gradually
being introduced in the armed forces and in
other large governmental or private organisa-
tions.
95. Microprocessors make it posible to set
up different centres of telecommunications
which are far less vulnerable than the large
communications centres established earlier. The
strategic networks of the armed forces were
originally installed in reinforced concrete
accommodations which housed the equipment
and facilities. The new miniaturised systems
of telecommunications are organised so that
even if one centre fails the others can take over
immediately. This provides greater security
and with microprocessors and special fibres a
very heavy traflic can nevertheless be channel-
led through small installations.
96. New view-data techniques allow such
records as a complete telephone directory, for
instance. to be put on very small microproces-
sors. The samp will happen with newspaper
facsimiles and many other matters. It is a
great pity that Unidata, set up some years ago,
was not a success because European lirms such
as Siemens, AEG-Telefunken, ITT. Thomson-
CSF, Honeywell-Bull. Cll and Philips will have
to come together again if they really want to
survive the American and Japanese onslaught.
97. Software science should be studied at
European schools and universities and the
technicians to handle software should be for-
med at specialised technical schools.
98. If the Europeans unite they still have a
chance to keep abreast with the Japanese and
Americans in this field. Moreover, Europe
should not channel its capital to dying indus-
tries rather than to new growing industries.
Until now the industries which have stopped
growing, like steel, textiles, shoes and automo-
biles, have special financial advantages accord-
ed them by governments. The development of
new industries such as that of telecommunica-
tions should be stimulated instead in order to
gain a dominant position in semi-conductors,
microelectronic components and audio and
video components. In civil market terms
Europe represents one-third of the world mar-
ket for telecommunications equipment, i.e. $ 33
billion, with a growth rate of so,me 7 % per
year. lt also represents 26% of the world mar-
ket in informatics, i.e. nearly $ 70 billion, with
a growth rate of 17 % per year. ln integrated
circuits it represents l9 % of the world market,
i.e. $7.5 billion, with a growth rate of 25 % per
year. The question is whether this European
market will be supplied by European firms or is
it more likely to be supplied by American and
Japanese firms?
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Draft Recommendalion
oa tfu slarc of Earopcaa @tospacc activitics -
reply to thc twnty-fifth annual rcport of thc Council
The Assembly,
Considering that the ESA convention has been in existence since 30th May 1975 and that
France, although playing an important r6le in the Agency which has its seat in Paris, has still not yet
ratified the convention;
Considering the separate development of French and German national direct broadcasting
spacecraft and ESA's large satellite;
Agreeing with the Council on the European industry's need to receive a fair share of orders for
military application satellites;
Aware of the deteriorating situation with regard to Western Europe's energy supplies and the
consequent threat to Europe's political and military posture;
Gratihed that several member countries are nearing agreement on a development plan for a
tactical fighter aircraft 
- 
the European combat aircraft 
- 
for the 1990s;
Welcoming the establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft, but regretting that the
Fokker-29 development programme is not yet associated with the Airbus programme,
Rpcot"tt*,tpNos rHAT rHr CouNcu-
l. Urge the French Government to ratify the ESA convention in 1980;
2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate
steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broad-
casting spacecraft and the ESA L-sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided
on the world scene and in the world market;
3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of
space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at
an appropriate political level;
4. In view of the threat to Europe's security, urge member governments to decide on the necessary
practical application measures further to the resolution adopted in Dublin in November 1979 to
develop a more effective energy policy for the European Community and to elaborate a common
European energy plan up to 1990;
5. Invite
(a) the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to
ensure the implementation of the industrial feasibility study which has been carried out on
the European combat aircraft; and
(b) the other member countries to be associated with this important European venture and to
participate in the production of this aircraft;
6. Invite the Netherlands Government to use its political and financial influence to promote a
European solution associating the Fokker-29 programme with the Airbus programme.
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E xplanatory Memorandum
(submitted hy Mr. ScheJfier, Rapporteur)
l. Your Rapporteur appreciates the Coun-
cil's efforts in the last year to provide the
Assembly with a significant volume of informa-
tion on energy problems, the European aircraft
industry, space developments and, in general,
on subjects mentioned in recommendations and
written questions.
l. Energy problems
2. The Committee has often proposed that
member governments try harder to make a
greater collective effort to meet current and
especially future energy problems. It sincerely
regrets that hardly any progress towards a com-
mon energy policy has been made in the Com-
munity. In April 1980, the Commission pro-
duced a document proposing that the Council
arrange for a study to be made on radioactive
waste, fast-breeder reactors and uranium
enrichment facilities. It is disappointing that
since 1977 no elements of joint action have
been proposed but only studies on subjects, as
mentioned above, which can lead to meetings
but not to action.
3. In Dublin, in November 1979, the heads
of state and government again agreed on the
urgent need for the Community to develop a
more effective energy policy, but the Commu-
nity document now before the Council recom-
mends in fact only greater harmonisation of
pricing policies for energy. Several times the
Committee and your Rapporteur have under-
lined that energy conservation is not the only
answer to Europe's threat of being deprived of
oil or gas supplies.
4. Moreover, in the document released by
the European Communities on Sth April 1980,
it was shown that oil consumption in the
Community rose by 2.7 0/o in 1979; in other
words, consumption rose to 525 million metric
tonnes, 25 million over the target set by the
governments of member states. Admittedly the
Community made some progress in reducing its
dependence on oil in relation to other forms of
energy: in 1978 oil was used for 54.5o/o of the
Community's energy requirements, the figure
for 1979 being 53.3 o/0.
5. In the continuing American-Iranian crisis
the European position will therefore remain
extremely weak as all countries are concerned
by the potential disruption of their economies
should Iran retaliate by cutting its oil supplies.
6. The political situation is even more difli-
cult as natural gas will incrqase in importance
as a Community energy sou{ce, thus creating a
greater dependence on imported gas. About
38 0/o of the EEC gas comes from the Soviet
Union with further supplies from Arabian
countries; the possible consequences of the
Afghan crisis are therefore obvious.
7. The Council states in its report that the
EEC should develop its indigenous energy
resources, in particular coal, nuc'lear power and
hydrocarbon, and promote research and deve-
lopment programmes in the energy f,reld with
particular regard to renewable energy resour-
ces. In the member countries, however, the
funding of the different energy sources fluctu-
ates considerably. All governments are
convinced that nuclear energy would take an
important part of the funding but further
studies, however necessary, will not be of great
help to Europe in reducing its dependence on
imported energy sources. \\Jrhat is needed is a
common energy policy which can be imple-
mented only if common aption is taken on
nuclear energy which, for tfre moment, is the
only source of energy capable of reducing
Europe's dependence on imported energy.
8. The Commission document proposed
investing 400 billion units of account in the
ten-year period 1980-90 to be spent in the held
of energy. However, funding by the Commu-
nity itself will be minimal and national funds
will be required.
9. If decisions are not taken quickly the eco-
nomic question will arise as to whether the
industrial base in Europe, which probably still
exists at the moment, will disappear for lack of
orders. In most Community member states,
apart from France, the nucloar reactor industry
is at a standstill. A consequence of this is, of
course, that the industry is trying to build nuc-
lear reactors for export marfets such as Brazil,
Argentina, Iraq, etc. This leads to political
friction between the member countries and bet-
ween European countries anfl the United States
and weakens the whole westqrn world.
ll. European aircraft industry
10. The Assembly welcomes the progress
already achieved towards strengthening Euro-
pean co-operation in the production of civil
aircraft and in particular the Airbus, and also
with regard to fighter aircraft and helicopters.
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Airbus
I l. From the start of the development of the
Airbus 4-300, Airbus Industrie planned not to
build one single type of aircraft but a family of
aircraft. The A-300, a two-engined, wide-
bodied aircraft with some 250 seats for short
and medium distances, is the basic version of
the Airbus family. In 1969, the French-
German government agreement was signed.
The first flight was in October 1972 and six
years ago, in May 1974, came the first opera-
tional flight of the Airbus when Air France
used it on one of its short-haul services. Since
then several versions have been developed from
the A-300, i.e. the A-300 B-4, C-4 and F-4.
12. The airlines, which have now been using
the A-300 for some years, have come to the
conclusion that on short and medium distances
the Airbus is one of the most economical air-
craft. This is not only because it uses less fuel
but also because maintenance costs are lower
than for comparable aircraft.
13. In 1978, airlines such as Lufthansa and
Swissair contacted Airbus Industrie requesting
the development of a smaller type of Airbus
with some 220 seats. In the spring of 1979 five
airlines concluded agreements and took options
on more than 100 aircraft of the 4,-310 type.
This was the first time in the history of the
European civil aircraft industry that an aircraft
had been bought and options taken although
the construction of a prototype had not even
begun. The A-310 should provide the same
economies for fuel and maintenance as the lar-
ger 4-300. There are plans to equip the air-
craft with General Electric, Pratt and Whitney
or Rolls-Royce engines. The first prototype of
the ,{-310 is scheduled to fly in 1982 and the
first operational aircraft will be delivered to the
airlines in 1983.
14. Rolls-Royce is still making eflorts to
have its engines installed in the Airbus 4-300
and ,{-310. So far no agreement has been
reached, mainly because British Airways has
concluded a contract with Boeing for the 757
which will be equipped with Rolls-Royce
engines. Some British airlines like British
Caledonian and Laker have ordered Airbuses,
but not British Airways. The Boeing 757
would of course be in direct competition with
the Airbus A-310. The opinion of Airbus
Industrie is that the airlines themselves should
decide which engines they want in their
Airbuses.
15. The Fokker F-29 project, a successor to
the F-28, is a new project with a seating capa-
city of 120-150. It could join the Airbus
family as the smallest member. However,
Fokker is trying to interest the Americans and
Japanese in this project: it is asking to use the
body of the Boeing 737 and proposes that the
Japanese manufacture the wings; Fokker wishes
to remain the leading partner. Fokker is of
course also associated with Airbus Industrie but
does not want to hand over the F-29 project
unless it remains the leading partner. It is
difficult to say what the outcome will be
because the development cost might rise to as
much as $ I billion and it is not at all sure that
Fokker will be able to raise such a sum. A
compromise is still possible with Airbus
Industrie.
16. The United States already has about a
30 0/o participation in the Airbus since it pro-
vides the engines and the avionics.
17 . The present members of Airbus Industrie
are: A6rospatiale (France) with 37.9 0/0, Deut-
sche Airbus Industrie (Germany) also with
37.9 o/o, British Aerospace (United Kingdom)
with 20o/o and CASA (Spain) with 4.2o/o;
Fokker (Netherlands) and Belairbus (Belgium)
are associated manufacturers, Belairbus only for
the A-310.
18. The success of Airbus Industrie means
that Boeing's share of the world market has
shrunk from 94 o/o to 64 o/o. The fact that
Boeing is building an aircraft similar to the
Airbus with its 767 is proof that the Europeans
have produced a plane at the right time and in
accordance with the airlines' requirements.
19. Apart from the A-310, which will be a
narrow-bodied aircraft and will compete with
the Boeing 757, Airbus Industrie hopes to pro-
duce the A-300 B-9, also called A-300-TA, a
widebodied aircraft for 350 passengers. Fin-
ally, there might be the A-300 B-l I which
would be a long-distance aircraft with three or
four engines. However, it is doubtful whether
there will be a big market for this as the Boeing
747 has already gained a good foothold every-
where.
20. At the end of this year a definite decision
will be taken on which of these versions will be
developed. Research and development costs
for the A-300 were $ I billion; development
started in 1969. The development cost of the
A-310 will also be $ I billion and similar costs
might be expected for the A-300 B-l l.
21. In Germany, about 20 o/o of the overall
aeronautical industry works for the Airbus. In
France the figure is about 15 0/0, in the United
Kingdom 6-7 o/o, and in the Netherlands
5 o/o. As the assembly plant is in Toulouse, the
French receive rather more than their share of
the returns according to their contribution,
while the British receive rather less and the
Germans receive their correct share. The main
result of Airbus collaboration is that, for the
first time, such a project has been of benefit to
all the partners and it is therefore very success-
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ful. Airbus Industrie now employs 17,000
people and produces three Airbuses a
month. In 1985, when production is expected
to reach ten Airbuses a month, 40-45,000
employees will be needed. By 1993, 918 Air-
buses will have been built, i.e. 592 A-300s and
326 A-310s.
European combat aircraft (ECA)
22. Your Rapporteur is convinced that in the
1980s all three armed services will need new
weapons systems. Research and development
will certainly be extremely costly, which means
that no individual European country will be
able to provide all the necessary funds. Of
course research and development should be
considered an insurance for future employment
and are necessary for industrial products of
advanced technology, but even so the new wea-
pons systems require such huge sums that Euro-
pean collaboration is essential.
23. Your Rapporteur is pleased to learn that
the appropriate government departments in
France, the Federal Republic of Germany and
the United Kingdom are firmly resolved to
develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft
for the 1990s. It seems impossible to meet all
the requirements of the air forces with missiles
and therefore a new manned combat aircraft is
needed.
24. The tactical f,rghter aircraft will be a
successor to the F-4F Phantom for the German
air force and the Franco-British Jaguar for the
French and British air forces.
25. Three types of national specifltcations
have been established for the new future
combat aircraft: the AST.403 (air staff target)
for the Royal Air Force, the ACT.92 (avion de
combat tactique for the year 1992) for the
French air force, and the TKF.90 (Taktisches
Kampf Flugzeug) for the German air force.
The national industries involved are British
Aerospace, Dassault-Br6guet, MBB and Dor-
nier.
26. The German fighter requirements are for
an air-to-air r6le in the following missions: air
superiority, all-weather air defence operations,
area defence, Iong-range combat radius, inter-
ception of cruise missiles, remotely-piloted
vehicles and helicopters and, finally, as an
escort for the Tornado and Alpha-Jet which
will be used as ground attack aircraft by the
German air force.
27. The French and British Jaguar replace-
ment programme calls for an aircraft with an
air-to-ground primary mission: close air
support, battlefield interdiction and battleheld
surveillance.
28. The new aircraft will hpve to be equipped
with the most advanced techniques, have
great manoeuvrability and be able to fly at
supersonic speed at an altitude of less than 150
metres. As the future combat aircraft has to be
very light it will probably h4ve to be manufac-
tured with the new carbon fibres. New engines
will have to be developed, pfobably at a cost of
$ 2,000 million; the radar has to be able to dis-
tinguish between a friendly dr enemy plane at a
distance of 400 km and this will mean a further
development of radar techniqu6s. The new
avionics to be installed will mean new micro-
processors to make the aircraft as light as pos-
sible. Great technological strides will therefore
be necessary in all three rnain areas of the
future aircraft: engines, electronics and air-
frame.
29. Several billion dollars will be needed for
the development of such an aircraft which will
give all participating countries the possibility of
acquiring the technological know-how in buil-
ding it. If a joint programme is established,
700 of the so-called European combat aircraft
will have to be built.
30. TheJe have been more than two years of
discussions at governmental and industrial
level. A preliminary company-level agreement
has now been reached on the results of the
feasibility studies.
Helicopters
31. In the field of helicopters four pro-
grammes are being considered and negotiations
are being held between France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom. The outcome
might make France the leading partner in a
programme for a light transport helicopter
derived from the French Puma helicopter,
Germany the leading nation in an anti-tank
helicopter programme and the United Kingdomin an 8-ton heavy transport helicopter pro-
gramme. Italy will produoe important parts
for all three types of helicopters and might be
the leading nation in the development of a
special helicopter for use in the Mediterranean
area.
lll. Space questions
Ariane
32. Your Rapporteur wishes to begin this
chapter by congratulating ESA on the success-
ful Ariane developments in 1979 since they
form the basis for any European aerospace
policy and programme.
33. In the report on Brazilian-European
collaborative ventures and the consequences for
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Europer your Rapporteur submitted a chapter
on the Ariane launch base at Kourou in which
he mentioned that the first launch of Ariane
would take place in November 1979. The
same date was given in Appendix IV of the
report. In the end, Ariane was launched
successfully on 24th December 1979 after
launch campaign delays totalling nine days.
Originally the launch was planned for l5th
December, but . during the countdown a
problem arose due to incorrect information on
pressure in one of the Viking engines. The
second problem arose on 23rd December when
a wrong indication was registered on the state
of ttre batteries needed for telemetry. This led
to a third problem involving the third stage
helium pressurisation system which resulted in
a one-day delay.
34. Your Rapporteur and the Committee are
very pleased that the f-rrst of the four test flights
of the Ariane launcher was completely success-ful. The launcher placed a test capsule in
orbit as planned. It also placed in orbit alumi-
nium alloy ballast, and the total mass orbited
was I ,602 kg plus the mass of the expanded
third stage of the launch vehicle. The test
capsule contained vibration, acceleration,
acoustic and pollution sensors. Since the
launch all data transmitted have been checked
and it has been proved that guidance and
control as well as the separation procedures
were performed as planned.
35. The first successful Ariane launch will
now be followed by three other test launches in
1980 and operational firings will start in the
first half of 1981. Appendix IV of Document
817 lists the satellites which will be placed in
orbit during the test launching programme.
36. In Appendix IV there is also a chapter
on the potential market for the Ariane laun-
cher; however, in order to capture this market
Ariane should be developed in new versions
called Ariane 2 and Ariane 3. This develop-
ment was approved by the ESA Council on
26th July 1979.
37. The Ariane 2 version will have first and
second stage engines which will be 9 o/o or l0 o/o
more powerful than the existing engines. The
third stage fuel tanks will be lengthened to
contain 25 0/o more fuel. With these improve-
ments Ariane 2 will be able to place in transfer
orbit a payload of 2,050 kg.
38. The Ariane 3 version will incorporate
the improvements of Ariane 2 plus two small
solid boosters which will increase take-offthrust
by 60 0/0. The payload will then be 2,420 kgin
transfer orbit. The Ariane 2 and 3 launchers
will be ready in three years. They will offer an
improvement of l8 0/o and 42 0/o respectively on
the present performance. This will be possible
with development costs of some F 410 million.
The cost-performance ratio can be further
improved if it is possible to make the first stage
of the launcher recuperable. Development
costs for this improvement are estimated to be
F 95 million. This new proposal was made to
the board of the Ariane programme during its
meetings in Paris on 20th and 2lst March
r980.
39. The cost for ESA member states will beF 175 million for a full launch and F 95
million if use is being made of only half of the
launcher's payload.
40. In the medium term for 1985 an Ariane 4
can be developed to raise the payload to 3,500
kg. Such a launcher will be able to orbit the
biggest Intelsat VI satellite or several medium-
weight satellites. If it is decided to build the
Ariane 4 launcher, the base at Kourou will
need a new launch pad.
41. In the long term for 1990, it will be
possible to build an all-purpose launcher,
Ariane 5, with a performance 60 0/o greater than
that of Ariane 4 with a capacity for placing into
transfer orbit some 5,500 kg. This could be
used for both manned and unmanned space
flight.
42. During the meeting of the ESA Council
on 23rd and24th January 1980 the proposal to
create an industrial commercial organisation
called Arianespace was agreed to by all member
countries except the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. This country was expected to give its
agreement later once France had agreed to pay
its share of the additional expenses incurred for
spacelab. The creation of Arianespace implies
the participation of the member states and will
necessitate negotiations between ESA and Ari-
anespace on the Ariane installations owned by
ESA, ownership of the technical know-how of
Ariane and licences, and finally ESA's use of
the Ariane launcher for its programmes.
43. The French company Arianespace was
formed on 26th March 1980 in Paris by its
forty-seven shareholders in order to produce,
launch and sell the European launcher on the
world market. It is a limited company under
French law with an international status. The
director-general is the ex-CNES director of
launchers; the administrative board, including
the director-general, has twelve members: seven
French, two German, one Belgian (represent-
ing Belgium, Denmark and Italy), one Swiss(representing Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Spain) and one Swede (representing Sweden,
Ireland and the United Kingdom). France
holds the majority of the shares, 59.25 o/o,
followed by Germany, 19.6 o/0, and the rest are
divided among the other nine countries.L Document 817.
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44. The first launch by Arianespace will be
at the end of 1982; the three test launches fore-
seen for this year and the six Ariane promo-
tional launchings will still be conducted under
the responsibility of ESA.
45. Arianespace is obliged to give ESA and
states participating in the Ariane programme
priority over other clients.
46. According to CNES the commercialisa-
tion of Ariane might lead to a turnover of about
F I billion in 1983.
47. A convention between ESA and Ariane-
space will be concluded in June or July
1980. ESA will help Arianespace in promot-
ing the launcher for export, especially for use
by international organisations such as Intelsat.
The participating states will share the further
funding of the Ariane launch base at Kourou.
Arianespace will have to launch some thirty
launchers between 1983 and 1990 in order to
show a profit.
C o mmunic atio n s ate llite s
48. At the Franco-German summit confer-
ence in Paris in February 1980, discussions
were held between the responsible ministers on
the establishment of a joint project for direct
television satellites. This Franco-German bila-
teral project was mentioned for the first time in
October 1979 during the Franco-German
summit in Bonn. The French satellite is called
TDF-l and the German TV-SAT. The
convention between the two countries calls for
a common development phase and shared tech-
nology, and will be followed by a production
phase during which each nation will build its
own satellite. The new consortium will be an
extension of the Franco-German Eurosatellite
consortium created three years ago by 46ro-
spatiale and MBB, and Thomson-CSF and
AEG-Telefunken will be asked to join the pro-
ject.
49. The financial protocol of the intergovern-
mental convention anticipates a cost of F 1,300
million, but as the satellites will be launched by
Ariane the industrial return for Germany for
the programme will be 54 0/o and for France
46o/o. The two pre-operational satellites will
be launched in 1983 and the two operational
ones two years later. The electronics of the
satellites will be different as they will have to
be compatible with the diflerent national sys-
tems. France and Germany believe it is now
time to start building a pre-operational satellite
as experience with Symphonie is suffrcient and
conclusive and therefore no further experiments
should be undertaken. They are also afraid
that they will lose the advance they now have
in telecommunication satellites and that they
will not reach the world market for this type of
satellite in time.
50. Most of the other members of ESA have
decided to continue to develop this type ofacti-
vity in the framework of the Agency. They
have undertaken the L-sat project which is pre-
sently sponsored by eight countries (Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom).
Austria will join the programme in the near
future.
51. This large satellite will be launched in the
first half of 1984 by Ariane. It will also be
pre-operational for direct-to-home television
and will be used by the Italian Broadcasting
Organisation RAI-TV and by the European
Broadcasting Union.
52. Only a part of the satellite will be devo-
ted to direct broadcasting and the satellite will
carty a payload for business communications
and experiments in the 20/30 Ghz frequency
band needed for a second-generation European
regional system will also be performed. Italy,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are
the main contributors. The satellite will be
built under the leadership of a British fltrm, Bri-
tish Aerospace. The Italian firm Selenia will
be responsible for the direct television equip-
ment on board the satellite and the Netherlands
will receive the contracts for communications
systems work (Philips). The cost of the pro-
gramme in 1980 will be F 55.5 million, shared
as follows: Belgium 3 0/0, Canada 5 o/o, Denmark
3 0/0, ltaly 23 0/0, Netherlands 23 0/o, Spain I o/o,
Switzerland 6.5 0/o and the United Kingdom
35.5 o/o.
53. It is hoped that the two programmes un-
dertaken, one in the ESA framework and one
on a bilateral basis, will be sufliciently harmo-
nised to avoid undue competition between
Europeans on the world-wide market for the
sole benefit of non-European manufacturers.
54. The need for such harmonisation at poli-
tical level has become evident and it would be
useful to consider applying the rules of the ESA
convention regarding the meeting of the ESA
Council at ministerial level.
55. To conclude, your Rapporteur wishes to
express his appreciation that the Council recog-
nises the importance of continued close co-
ordination between military and civil meteoro-
logical authorities in order to ensure an optimal
use of the available system. He hopes that the
same will be true with regard to communica-
tions and earth resources detection satellites.
lY. Conclusions
56. In his June 1978 report on application
satellitesr your Rapporteur indicated that the
ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975
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but that several member countries had not yet
ratified 'the convention. In its reply to the
accompanying recommendation, the Council
stated that the ratihcation process was following
its normal course in member countries where it
had not yet been completed and that these rati-
fications would be forthcoming in a reasonable
time. Now, two years later, France is the only
country which still has to ratify this conven-
tion. This is all the more regrettable since
decisions have been taken on the industrial
development of Arianespace and ESA should
be able to act as a juridical entity. It might
also be useful if French members of the
Committee put written questions to the French
Government on this matter.
57. Your Rapporteur is convinced that it is
now necessary to accept the decision on the
French and German national programmes for
direct broadcasting spacecraft and the establish-
ment of the ESA L-sat programme by other
ESA member states. He trusts there will be no
recurrence of any such incident and that the
European states will once again all collaborate
for the further exploitation of communication
satellite technology, in particular in implement-
ing advanced business systems satellite commu-
nications. In the meantime, close links should
be established between the two programmes in
order to avoid European interests adopting
contradictory approaches to the world market.
This might be possible if France and Ger-
many were to participate in some way in L-sat,
for instance for specific items of equipment
which will be necessary for the L-sat mission
and which might otherwise have to be pur-
chased in the United States.
58. On energy questions your Rapporteur is
disillusioned that still no decision has been
taken on a worthwhile European energy pro-
gramme. Nevertheless he again has to draw
the attention of the countries concerned to the
fact- that Europe's political and military posture
will be seriously threatened if no action is taken
in this field. The situation in Iran and the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will present a
diflicult choice for the European Community
which is largely dependent on Soviet gas sup-
plies and Iranian oil.
59. Your Rapporteur is happy that represen-
tatives of West German, French and British
aerospace companies have reached tentative
agreement on the definition, design, cost and
time schedule for the joint development of the
European combat aircraft. He hopes that the
lack of unanimity amongst air force staffs of the
three countries in definir,rg the final require-
ments for the future fighter aircraft will be
overcome and that the defence ministers will
commit themselves to funding a development
programme. He also expresses the hope that
other member countries will be associated with
this importpnt European venture.
60. The establishment of a European Airbus
family of aircraft is now well on the way and
further developments for a smaller Airbus are
being planned. However, no decision has been
reached on a 130-150 seat aircraft. Here the
Fokker-29 might find a place as a member of
the Airbus family.
61. The recommendation is self-explanatory.
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I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
l. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Valleix (Chairman\;
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaen-
sens, Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, Forma, Foschi,
Garrett, Hawkins (Alternate: Jesse[), Konings, McGuire,
29th April 1980
Malvy, Mart, Milller, P6ronnet (Alternate: Petill, Schefller,
Talon, Ueberhorst (Alternate: Fkimig), van Water-
schoot (Alternate; Bras seur).
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote
are printed in italics.
A European earth resoarces detection satellite programme
REPORTI
sabmitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questionsz
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DnRrr RrcoNrMeNoRrror.r
on a European earth resources detection satellite programme
Expr-RNnronv MenaoRnNouu
submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Remote sensing 
- 
a background
III. National activities with remote-sensing satellites
IV. Origins of European earth resources satellite programme
V. Meteosat
VI. The European remote-sensing satellite programme
VII. ESA studies in the defrnition of remote-sensing satellite systems
Ylll. Sysldme probatoire d'observation de la terre (Spot)
IX. Coastal ocean monitoring
X. The institutional framework
XI. Conclusion
AppeNorces
Main elements of the Earthnet programme
R6le of Spacelab in the development of remote-sensing instruments
and techniques
COMSS : Present key characteristics
LASS : Present key characteristics
Programme current status
t77
DOCUMENT 842
Draft Recommendation
oa a Europeaa earth resourccs daetion satcllitc
proSfamme
The Assembly,
Aware of the success of the United States Landsat, Seasat, Nimbus and Goes satellite pro-
grammes in the earth resources, oceanographic and meteorological fields respectively;
Conscious of the important infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of remote-
sensing satellite data which exists in a number of European countries under the ESA Earthnet and
Meteosat programmes and the success of a number of ESA-sponsored space projects to date;
Believing that European experience through the Iirst Meteosat meteorological satellite points to
the positive benefits derived from further European remote-sensing satellite programmes;
Considering that current developments within Europe through the Spacelab and French Spot
programmes should be regarded as the foundation for further endeavours on a European collaborative
basis in the realm of earth resources satellite programmes,
Confident that the studies so far undertaken within and on behalf of the European Space
Agency, especially regarding land applications satellite systems (LASS) and coastal ocean monitoring
satellite systems (COMSS), indicate both technical feasibility within the resources potentially
available to Europe and worthwhile returns for these projects;
Mindful of the military surveillance and reconnaissance implications which in addition to the
long-term commercial desirability of a European remote-sensing satellite programme enhance its
strategic importance to European nations,
Recouuenos rHAT rue CouNcrl
Urge the member states:
l. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth
resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme;
2. To co-ordinate their eflorts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space ^Agency,for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction
of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Oflice of.the
ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish
that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes;
3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed
effiort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of
compatible earth resources satellite launches;
4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme
through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development
so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substan-
tial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme;
5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-
sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems;
6. To encourage within the Independent EuropeanProgramme Group (IEPG) the concerted study
of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any
resulting satellite projects and their economic and eflicient procurement;
7. To urge the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe to co-ordinate
the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European
overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world.
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l.
l. Introduction
In Recommendation 317 adopted on the
report on application satellites submitted by
Mr. Scheffler, the Assembly recommended the
further development of European activities in
earth observation, including meteorology and
remote sensing by satellites. It also suggested
the Europeanisation ofthe French project Spot.
In its reply to this recommendation the Council
noted the Assembly's interest in the pursuit of
European activities in this field. In its reply to
Recommendation 316 on United States-Euro-
pean co-operation and competition in advanced
technology it mentioned the Earthnet pro-
gramme designed to set up a European network
of receiving, processing and distributing stations
for data and images transmitted by earth obser-
vation satellites. ESA was then examining the
need for European remote-sensing satellites.
2. Earthnet was the first step towards the
establishment of a European remote-sensing
space programme and was approved at the ESA
Council meeting at ministerial level in Febru-
ary 1977. Your Rapporteur wishes to point
out here that this ESA ministerial meeting was
the only one ever held.
3. Monitoring the earth's resources would
allow Europe three main land applications:
geological, agriculture (crop inventory and fore-
casting) and forestry, water resources and deve-
lopment aid; three principal global ocean appli-
cations: air-sea interaction, circulation and
polar ice surveys; and four main coastal ocean
applications: fisheries, environmental monitor-
ing, surveillance of the economic zone and
continental shelf operations.
4. In Recommendation 326 in its second
report on application satellites submitted by
Mr. Schefller, the Assembly proposed that ESA
should study the establishment of a more
sophisticated global communications network
in which the data gathered by remote-sensing,
environmental and meteorological satellites
could be combined. The Council replied that
ESA should collaborate with the World Meteo-
rological Organisation in carrying out a pre-
liminary study examining both the user require-
ments and the advantages and drawbacks of the
technical possibilities.
5. In Recommendation 328 adopted on the
report on weather forecasting submitted by
Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, the Assembly
recommended the promotion of an organisation
by the European meteorological services or
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. llilkinson, Rapporteur)
institutes to start the operational phase of a
European meteorological satellite system. In
reply, the Council stated on I lth June 1979:
"...Recently WMO has initiated a study
on an integrated observing system over
the oceans in which special attention will
be given to factors such as reliability and
cost-effectiveness.
The results of the first global atmospheric
research programme (GARP) experiment
which is taking place in 1979 and is also
being co-ordinated by WMO, will form
an important contribution to the study.
It is likely that this study will result in a
recommendation for the introduction of
an 'optimum mix' of observing systems,
containing many cemponents, such as
satellites, buoys, ships and aircraft. Polar
and geostationary satellites might form an
integrated component in such a system,
and in this connection it should be noted
that by their nature, polar satellites have
an observation capacity which is not
restricted to certain (limited) areas. Hence
these satellites derive their importance
from their usefulness for both land and
sea areas all over the world. The Council
are aware that the realisation of an opti-
mal meteorological observing system
depends on close co-operation between
all countries in and around the areas and
regions involved. The Council hence
welcome and recommend the active par-
ticipation of the member states in both
regional and world-wide efforts in the
maintenance and improvement of obser-
vation and data collection systems now
available for the North Atlantic and for
North and Central Africa.
Moreover, the Council draw the attention
of member states to the need for close co-
operation in the evaluation of new obser-
ving techniques and to the need for inte-
gration of those systems which prove to
be cost-effective in the longer term. "
6. It is important now to dehne accurately
the political and institutional implications of
the Agency's decision to embark on a remote-
sensing satellite programme. It is important
also to def,rne the relationship between the
French national programme and the ESA initia-
tives in this field. The delegations to ESA
have on several occasions indicated that they
were aware of the need for an examination in
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depth, but the political impetus to the necessary
decision-making has so far been inadequate.
7. At present, ideas abound, and proposals
can be expected, aiming at concerting efforts at
international level. Europe can either play a
passive r6le and accept the decisions or de facto
situations originating elsewhere or 
- 
if the states
that compose " Space Europe " so wish 
- 
ini-
tiate actions and make the contribution which
it has the means 
- 
technical, intellectual, finan-
cial and political 
- 
to supply.
8. It is the view of your Rapporteur that
Europe should assume a dynamic attitude, and
adopt an agreed European earth resources satel-
Iite programme tailored to match the particular
requirements of Europe in choice of such things
as sensors and orbits which are significantly
different from, for example, those required by
the United States.
ll. Remote sensing 
- 
a background
9. ln 1972 NASA launched the f,rrst Landsat
spacecraft. This was designed to acquire ima-
gery of the planet's land surfaces for earth
resources research and applications. The expe-
riment was s[ccessful, and very large areas of
the world now have pictorial coverage obtained
by the satellite and its successors, Landsat 2 and
3.
10. Landsat is one of several types of remote-
sensing satellite, all of which exploit a space-
craft's capability of repetitively and reliably
viewing almost any region of interest on the
earth's surface or atmosphere. Such satellites
form part of the progression that man has madein the surveillance of his environment from
continuously improving vantage points 
- 
from
tree top to hill top, then to balloon and aircraft,
and now to space. The method of recording
the scene has made parallel advances 
- 
from
visual observations and memory to snapshot
photography, then to systematic airborne
photography, infrared photography, false colour
photography, multispectral scanners and imag-
ing radars, all of which are remote-sensing
techniques.
I l. The extensive adoption of digital record-
ing techniques and the wide availability of fast
computers have enabled complex image pro-
cessing methods to be developed, which consid-
erably assist in image interpretation. In addi-
tion, it is now possible to combine images
derived from different sensors, allowing even
more complex phenomena to be observed and
understood.
12. Meteorology has provided a fruitful field
for remote-sensing satellite applications. Ame-
rican examples are the Tiros, NOAA and
Nimbus meteorological spacecraft. These are
inserted into near-polar orbits, with altitudes of
600 to 1,200 km. Visible and infrared sensors
give a resolution of up to l.l km at the centre
of a swath width of over 2,000 km. A Euro-
pean example is the Meteosat geostationary
meteorological spacecraft. This images the
earth in both infrared and visible bands at half-
hourly intervals. The resolution is about 5 km
at the equator.
13. Oceanography too is a prime field for the
application of remote-sensing satellite techni-
ques. The American Seasat satellite is an
example. Placed in a near-polar, 800 km alti-
tude orbit, it carried microwave sensors, includ-
ing a synthetic aperture imaging radar with a
nominal 25 m resolution and a 100 km swath
width. Unfortunately it operated for only
three months in 1978.
14. Remote-sensing satellites are proving
increasingly useful in mineral exploration. In
geology the basic questions that remote-sensing
satellites help to answer are: " What occurs and
where, and what are its structural relationships
with other rock bodies? ". In arid and semi-
arid areas, especially where the object of inter-
est (rock body ; alteration associated with
mineralisation) is exposed at the surface, it may
be possible to delimit the areas of interest
automatically by suitable classification of the
spectral reflectance data. In most cases, how-
ever, mineral deposits are hidden by superhcial
deposits, soils and vegetation. In these cases
where the deposit cannot usually be detected
directly, the remote-sensing data are used to
produce optimum human interpretations of the
regional geology as the starting point for ration-
alising exploration programmes.
15. Although many benefits of remote-
sensing spacecraft, such as improved weather
florecasting, more effrcient exploration for mine-
ral deposits and accurate crop yield predictions,
are widely known and documented, il is less
easy to quantify financial estimates. Some
examples quoted by the Remote Sensing Unit
of the British Royal Aircraft Establishment are:
(i) correctly forecasting frost-free nights
in Florida can save $ 6 million per
night, by allowing open-air heating to
be turned off in citrus fruit growing
areas ;
(ii) accurate measurements of wave size
over long periods of time in the
North Sea can save fl million for
each foot designed out of the height
of an oil production platform;
(iir) accurate plotting of storms, icebergs
and currents can save f10,000 for
every day by which the duration of
the voyage ofa large ship is reduced;
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(iv) an accurate world-wide crop yield
forecast for wheat will benefit the
United States economy alone by
$ 260 million per annum.
16. Interest in Europe in the use of remotely-
sensed data from space has increased following
the start of the Landsat programme and may
continue as users explore the opportunities and
refine the applications of the data for their
particular requirements.
17. Events have moved forward on the
broader international front and also on the
European front. Internationally other coun-
tries beside the United States and USSR are
developing remote-sensing satellite systems, e.g.
Japan, for launch in 1985, India for launch in
1986-87, France for launch perhaps in
1984. Approximately seven Landsat ground
stations have been established in parts of the
world outside the United States giving some
indication of the global interest in the reception
of multispectral scanner data from Landsat. On
the European front the member states of the
European Space Agency have established the
Earthnet programme for the reception and
dissemination of data to the user community.
Stations in Italy and Sweden receive Landsat
data with distribution through the national
points of contact in each member state.
18. For the past five years the European
Space Agency has been engaged in study acti-
vities to define the European requirements as a
basis for a possible European remote-sensing
satellite system. Any purely European system
might be integrated into an international frame-
work of remote-sensing satellites and should
aim to be complementary to, rather than a
duplication of, other satellite systems.
19. Approval was given in 1979 for ESA to
start a preparatory support technology pro-
gramme which will serve to define the technical
means of meeting the European user require-
ments. This programme will be completed in
1981. In the medium term it is therefore like-
ly that the member states of ESA will need to
decide whether to proceed with the full deve-
lopment of a European remote-sensing satellite
system. For the ESA programme, consisting of
the development, launch and operation of two
satellites, the cost has been estimated at
approximately 460 MAU (L270 m) over a nine-
year period.
Ill. National activities with
remot e-sensing satellites
20. In the United States major advances in
spaceborne remote sensing have resulted from
the NASA programme. Key elements of this
programme have been:
- 
the Landsat series of satellites startingin 1972 with the launch of Landsatl. The last satellite in this series(Landsat 3) was launcilred in 1978;
- 
the experimental remote-sensing satel-
lites aimed at a number of land, ocean
and atmospheric missions (e.g. Nimbus,
Seasat, HCMM).
New remote-sensing space systems are presently
under development in the United States; these
include:
- 
Landsat D, a more advanced satellite
version of the Landsat I -3 series which
includes a high-resolution multispectral
imaging instrument (thematic mapper);
- 
Operational satellites for land and
ocean applications for introduction in
the mid-1980 time period once satis-
factory institutional arrangements for
these satellites have been agreed.
On a national basis in the United
States various groups and task forces
have been studying the framework for a
national operational remote-sensing
organisation.
On an international basis preliminary
discussions have started between the
United States, Canada, France, India,
Japan and ESA with a view to esta-
blishing arrangements for a co-
ordination of remote-sensing satellite
systems.
At the recent United Natiorrs Conference on
Science and Technology for Development held
in Vienna, August 1979, it was announced by
the United States Delegation that " the United
States will take the initiative to bring together
the operators of remote-sensing satellites as well
as the users to develop an international
system ". The statement underlined that the
United States believed that satellites should be
operated so that all can have easy access to the
data and so that information can be collected
without unnecessary duplication and for maxi-
mum mutual benefit.
21. 
. 
Canada might join the ESA remote-
sensing programme and also develop Sursat
either alone or in co-operation with other inter-
ested states. Canada has also stated that it is
prepared to hold a multilateral meeting in
September next year to discuss the possibilities
of co-ordination among space segment owners.
22. lndia launched its first experimental
remote-sensing satellite (SEO| earlier this year
and will start work on the development of IRS(Indian remote-sensing satellite). The Indian
Space Research Organisation has indicated its
readiness to have discussions with ESA to
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maximise the benefits to be obtained from
ESA's remote-sensing satellites and IRS.
23. Japan has recently decided to go ahead
with an amtiitious remote-sensing programme
comprising both land and ocean remote-sensing
satellites. The necessary finances for the first
satellite have been allocated and it is expected
that the f,rrst remote-sensing satellite (MOS-I)
will be launched in 1985. It will be a 750 kg
sun synchronous polar orbiting satellite for
" observation of oceanic colour and tempera-
ture and establishment of technology common
to a number of earth observation satellites ".
This satellite will be followed by a geodesy
satellite to be launched in 1985 and by other
satellites with remote-sensing applications
currently in the course of def,rnition.
24. In the USSR remotely-sensed data is
collected on a routine basis from the Meteor
satellites, and from the manned spacecraft. The
data collected by the USSR is supplied to a
number of countries on the basis of bilateral
agreements.
25. In the majority of cases European nation-
al activities have concentrated on airborne
remote-sensing systems. Two recent excep-
tions are:
(l) the French Spot (Systime probatoire
d'observation de la terre) programme
for the development and launch by
Ariane in 1984 of an automatic
remote-sensing satellite comprising
two high-resolution optical imaging
instruments. This programme is
being developed by France in co-
operation with Belgium and Sweden.
Bilateral discussions are under way
with NASA to ensure compatibility
with future satellite systems, in parti-
cular Landsat D, with ESA on the
question of the acquisition of Spot
data by Earthnet, and with other ope-
rators of data acquisition stations;
(ii) the Spacelab remote-sensing experi-
ments (high-resolution mapping
camera and microwave remote-
sensing experiment) provided by Ger-
many for flight in the first Spacelab
payload in 1982, and the develop-
ment and flight by Germany of a
high-performance synthetic aperture
radar (SAR) on Spacelab in 1985.
26. For the Landsat series of satellites ground
stations exist in the United States, Canada,
Sweden, Italy, Brazil, Japan and are planned orin the process of being built in Argentina,
Chile, Australia, China, India, Kenya, Upper
Volta and Zaire. These stations could be
adapted to receive remotely-sensed data from
European satellites.
lY. Origins of European earth
resources satellite programme
27. The European remote-sensing satellite
programme started with Earthnet which receiv-
es and distributes remote-sensing data from the
NASA Landsat satellite. The second phase
would be the use of Spacelab for remote-sensing
experiments and the third phase would be
preparation for the utilisation of European
automatic remote-sensing satellites. Earthnet
has stations in Lannion (France), Kiruna (Swe-
den), Oakhanger (Britain), and Fucino (Italy);
another is under construction in Mas Palomas(Canaria) and will become operational in
August 1980. The network is managed by
ESRIN, in Frascati; this centre also deals with
the distribution of Earthnet data.
28. A major objective of Earthnet is to pro-
vide European investigators with early access to
remote-sensing satellite data, to allow promising
applications to be identiflred and valuable expe
rience to be gained in the use of these new
techniques for European problems and situa-
tions. Earthnet comprises a number of data-
recpption and preprocessing facilities located in
Europe that acquire, preprocess, distribute and
archive satellite remote-sensing data. The net-
work operates at present with data from NASA
satellites (Landsat, Seasat, HCMM and Nimbus-
G), but is expected to form the basic elements
for the acquisition of data from the European
remote-sensing satellites once these are devel-
oped. The various elements of the Earthnet
network are shown in Appendix I.
29. There are two main and interrelated
objectives associated with any experimental
earth observation programme using advanced
sensing methods:
- 
to understand the capabilities and limi-
tations of the various sensor systems
proposed and to develop measurement
techniques that can be applied to the
different areas of application under
investigation;
- 
using the proven remote-sensing instru-
ments and methods derived above, to
conduct experiments in the earth
observation disciplines aimed either at
purely scientific objectives or at per-
fecting measurement methods for later
applications oriented missions.
30. Many of the contributions required to
achieve these two objectives will come from
careful and exhaustive ground-based and air-
borne measurement programmes. These mea-
surements are, however, not in themselves suffi-
cient to define and specify later automatic satel-
lite systems completely. An intermediate orbi-
tal phase will often be required relying on the
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flexibility and increased capabilities of manned
space programmes such as Spacelab.
3l. The r6le of Spacelab in meeting the two
objectives is illustrated in Appendix II which
shows how the manned space laboratory can
act as a bridge between the initial ground and
airborne measurements and final systems based
on long life, automatic satellites.
32. It is planned to fly two remote-sensing
experiments, the metric camera, and the micro-
wave remote-sensing experiment, as part of the
first Spacelab payload (FSLP), presently sched-
uled for launch by the space shuttle in
1982. Both experiments are provided to the
Agency by the Federal Republic of Germany,
as general instrumentation for the FSLP.
33. (c) The primary objective of the metric
camera experiment is to test the
mapping capabilities of high-resolu-
tion space photography on large film
format (23 cm x 23 cm). The high
resolution data will also be evaluated
for other thermatic applications, such
as land-use studies and geology.
(b) The microwave remote-sensing expe-
rimeUt (MRSE) represents one ele-
ment in the development of a micro-
wave all-weather sensing capability
for a European remote-sensing space
programme. The MRSE instrument
is designed to operate in three differ-
ent modes:
(i) two-frequency scatterometer (for
measurement of ocean wave
spectra at wavelengths in the
range 5-500 m);
(ii) synthetic-aperture radar (for
high-resolution imaging of the
earth's surface);
(iii)passive microwave radiometer(for measurement of the natu-
rally-emitted microwave energy
from the earth).
34. Further flights of remote-sensing instru-
ments on Spacelab are planned following the
FSLP mission. In addition to reflying the
metric camera and MRSE instruments, studies
are presently under way to include a high-
performance synthetic aperture radar in a later
Spacelab flight as an intermediate step towards
incorporating radar sensors on future automatic
remote-sensing satellites.
Y. Meteosat
35. ESA entered the field of earth observa-
tion with the Meteosat programme. The pro-
gramme covers two identical satellites: the first
was launched on 23rd Noverhber 1977 and the
second will be launched at the end of this year.
They are still experimental satellites but the
configuration is the same as that of a future
operational,satellite. The primary objectives
immediately after the first latrnch were to pro-
vide European participation in the first global
atmospheric research programme and to contri-
bute to the WMO World Weather Watch
programme.
36. Meteosat itself forms part of a global net-
work of flrve geostationary satellites in equator-
ial orbit. The missions and performances of
the five satellites are being bo-ordinated by a
committee of representatives from the countries
or organisations which provided the satellites
and from the World Meteorblogical Organisa-
tion. Apart from ESA the other participants
are the United States (with three satellites) and
Japan. The European system is compatible
with their systems.
37 . In the framework of tho global atmosphe-
ric research programme the Soviet Union also
promised to supply a satellite but has so far not
done so. One of the reasons is that the Soviet
Union needs a high-powered launcher to bring
the satellite into the required orbit over the
equator. It is now able to do this, but at high
cost, and so far only communication satellites
have been placed in geostatiopary orbit over the
equator. Moreover, in order to handle the data
flow involved in such a meteorological satellite
the Soviet Union needs a computer of a type
which it is unable to manqfacture itself and
which the United States prorqised to deliver but
has not done so.
38. The Meteosat programme was started by
French space and meteorological organisations
and in 1972 the programme was Europeanised
through legal arrangements between ESA and
eight of its members: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. Its protocol cover-ing the operations came into effect in
1978. ESA controls the satellite and is also
responsible for processing and handling the
data.
39. The satellite's fixed location with respect
to the earth allows it to fulfil its three main
mission objectives: (i) to take images of the
earth's surface and cloud formations at half-
hourly intervals, (ii) to disseminate images and
other data sent to the satellite by the Meteosat
ground facilities, (iii) to collect data from fixed
stations such as buoys or from moving plat-
forms such as ships or airgraft and transmit
them to the ESA centre at Darmstadt.
40. The Meteosat programme might be
continued until 1993-94. The ground equip-
ment, of which the main cdmponents are the
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data acquisition, telemetry and tracking station,
and the Meteosat ground computer system,
represents a very high investment and the
meteorological services are therefore reluctant
to change their equipment unless absolutely
necessary. In order to assist developing coun-
tries which cannot afford a sophisticated receiv-
ing station, which costs about $ 3-400,000, the
Meteosat images are cut up and only the parts
of interest to the countries concerned are dis-
seminated every three hours instead of every
half-hour. These sectorised images can then be
received by cheap ground stations.
41. The processing associated with the three
missions described 
- 
data extraction from ima-
gery, dissemination and data collection 
- 
is
implemented by the operators in the Meteosat
control centre at Darmstadt. There, day and
night, six operators perform the analysis, follow
up the dissemination and the data collection. In
order to work at the necessary speed they use
the large Meteosat ground computer system.
42. The information provided by Meteosat
gives the meteorologists fresh insight into the
behaviour of the atmosphere as a whole and of
regional and local phenomena. Although the
meteorological services were sceptical at the
beginning of the Meteosat programme they are
now convinced that these satellites enhance the
accuracy of their weather forecasting services.
43. However, on 24th November 1979
Meteosat's primary function, to take pictures of
the earth's surface and cloud formations,
became unreliable as the satellite stopped trans-
mitting the pictures. ESA technicians tried to
rectify the technical problems of the satellite
but did not succeed. This is highly regrettable
as the other functions of the satellite are being
performed satisfactorily. The meteorological
services which had just become used to the
benelits of Meteosat will have to do without its
data until a new satellite (Meteosat 2) is put
into orbit at the end of 1980.
Yl. The European remote-sensing
satellite programme
44. ESA has been extremely interested in
various aspects of remote sensing since the
beginning of this decade. A great deal of this
interest, particularly in the early days, has
taken the form of studies in which the physics
and technology of various remote-sensing tech-
niques have been examined. In addition, the
implications of incorporating such techniques
within the context of space missions designed to
satisfy the remote-sensing requirements of a
wide body of European and other users have
been assessed. Since 1976, ESA has been
increasingly directing these and other activities
towards preparation of a full-scale remote-
sensing programme due to start with launch of
the first satellite in the mid-1980s. Within the
context of the above, the Agency's present
efforts are concentrating on the following items:
- 
activities directly related to the design
and implementation of the full-scale
remote-sensing programme. This cur-
rently involves various systems studies
and technology developments;
- 
the programme called Earthnet, in
which various ground stations in
Europe are being used to receive,
preprocess and disseminate remote-
sensing data from various United States
satellites. This programme is serving as
a baseline for def,rnition of ground faci-
lities for the full European programme;
- 
various remote-sensing experiments for
the first Spacelab mission(s).
The remote- sensing programme
Mission objectives and requirements
45. ESA has indicated that the key themes of
the European remote-sensing programme
should meet the observational requisites of:
- 
European regional needs;
- 
development aid programmes.
Within these themes, major mission applica-
tions have been identified as:
- 
agricultural monitoring, e.g. inventory,
yield prediction;
- 
land use monitoring, e.g. classihcation
and mapping;
- 
water resources management, e.g.
snow/ice surveys, soil moisture;
- 
coastal ocean surveys, e.g. sea ice,
continental shelf monitoring;
- 
monitoring of polar regions, e.g. Green-
land, ice surveys;
- 
development aid, e.g. monitoring of
production of biomass, disaster assess-
ment;
- 
mineral resources and dynamic geo-
logy, e.g. detection of lineaments and
mineral concentrations.
ESA considers that the mission requirements
can be best covered by a set of satellite pay-
loads tailored in design and operation for
observations within the following areas:
- 
land applications;
- 
coastal ocean monitoring;
- 
global ocean monitoring.
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Of the above, the first two are regarded as
having the higher priority. In addition, analy-
sis of European needs has led to the conclusion
that for the. two priority missions, microwave
sensing is particularly desirable for continuous,
repetitive imaging of the earth's surface in the
prisence of lloud cover, which is rather
high in Europe. Furthermore, the average field
size in European agricultural areas is small and
requires a high spatial resolution, higher than
the 80 m provided by the MSS of the current
Landsat satellites.
Selected satellite systems
46. In order to meet the above mission requi-
rements, ESA has proposed the remote-sensing
programme should involve the satellite systems
as given below:
- 
coastal ocean monitoring satellite sys-
tem (COMSS);
- 
land applications satellite system
(LASS).
A third system, designed to meet the global
ocean monitoring mission requirement men-
tioned above, has been discussed (GOMSS -global ocean monitoring satellite system).
However, it is now recognised that the required
functions of such a system may, with suitable
design, be incorporated within those of the
COMSS system. As a result, the concept of
GOMSS as a separate entity appears, therefore,
to be in abeyance at the present time. Present
considerations intend that the programme com-
mences with first launch in the mid-1980s.
The launch vehicle will be Ariane and it is
proposed that the space segment be based upon
the use of a satellite platform of existing
design. Phase A examinations of the COMSS
and LASS missions began in September 1978'
and are continuing at the present time with
various studies of important elements of system
design. The design situation is, therefore, an
evolving one. The present key characteristics
of COMSS and LASS are contained in Appen-
dices III and IV respectively.
T he preparatory programme
47. ESA has concluded that before starting a
detailed definition of the various systems, in-
depth studies of various critical factors have to
be performed. These involve various elements
within the microwave and optical-sensing sys-
tems and certain aspects associated with data
handling. This " preparatory " programme
commenced in March 1979 and will extend
over two years. In addition to the above,
l. COMSS 
- 
contract awarded to British Aerospace
Dynamics Group, Bristol; LASS 
- 
contract awarded to
Dornier Systems, Federal Republic of Germany.
various experimental progratnmes based upon
extensive ground and airborne measurements
are intended. These will be used to familiarise
potential users of remote-sensing data and to
develop analytical techniquos. It is expected
that this programme will be carried out within
existing, national facilities in Europe (and
Canada).
Pro gr amme time - sc ale sl
48. The main elements of the proposed pro-
gramme are:
- 
the launch of two satellites, ERS-I and
ERS-2, planned for end 1985/early
1986 and end 1987/early 1988 respect-
ively. ERS-I will very likely be the
COMSS mission;
- 
programme approval, expected in
1980;
- 
Phase B for ERS-I, to be carried out
until mid-1982;
- 
Phase C/Dto start end 1982;
- 
for ERS-2, the planning will be almost
identical but delaypd in time by a
period of about two years;
- 
studies on the adaptations required to
make the present Earthnet system com-
patible with the space segment will be
undertaken in the programme. As
much as possible, EnS-t and ERS-2
will ensure compatibility with other
major remote-sensing satellites (e.g.
Landsat D, Spot, etc,);
- 
in addition, Spacelab will be used to
the maximum possible extent as a test
bed for synthetic aperture radar of
design similar to that proposed for
ERS.
Yll. ESA stadies in the definition
of remote- sensing satollite systems
49. Key missions in the context of a Euro-
pean remote-sensing satellite programme were
briefly discussed. It is important to consider
further the studies that are under way relating
to the definition of satellite Systems for the land
applications and coastal ocean monitoring
missions. These studies can be classified into
three categories:
- 
satellite systems studies (phase A
studies),
- 
instrument definition studies, based
on specifications derived from user
requirements,
- 
sub-system studies.
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In addition to the remote-sensing instrumenta-
tion, each payload will include a data-collection
platform (DCP) sub-system. In the case of the
synthetic aperture radars (SAR), specific studies(phase A) have been carried out, whereas for
th. .optical imaging instrument (OII), theimaging microwave radiometer (IMR), and the
ocean colour monitor (OCM) instrument defini-
tion will form one (major) element of the satel-
lite systems studiesr.
50. Synthetic-aperture radar phase A studies:
Two parallel industrial phase A studies on SAR
systems, initiated by the Agency in March 1978
were completed in October 1978 (prime
contractors Thomson-CSF(F) and Marconi
Research Laboratories (UK)). The aim of both
studies was the dehnition of a single-frequency,
single-polarisation SAR system that would form
one element of a remote-sensing payload to be
carried by a spacecraft platform suitable for
launch on the Agency's Ariane vehicle.
51. Solar-array feasibility studies: Two stu-
dies have been carried out (initiated May 1978)
involving assessment of the feasibility of two
flexible-solar-array concepts (one per study).
The two concepts, which differed in deploy-
ment (roll-out and fold-out) and storage mecha-
nisms, have been analysed in relation to the
Ariane-compatible platform used in the SAR
and satellite system studies.
52. Satellite system phase A studies: In May
1978, two calls for tender were issued by ESA
relating to phase A studies of;
- 
a land applications satellite system
(LASS);
- 
a coastal ocean monitoring satellite sys-
tem (COMSS).
The main objectives were:
- 
to establish a feasible baseline system
concept, the main elements of which
will be:
- 
(, the payloads specified;
(ii) an Ariane-compatible platform
(specification provided to contrac-
tors);
(iii) a ground segment (based on an
extension of Earthnet for the Euro-
pean coverage zone);
- 
to establish development and cost plans
for the implied programme assuming
the launch of a first satellite in the
mid-1980s;
l. It was recognised after completion of these studies
that the depth of the analysis for the instruments was not
suflicient and therefore separate definition studies were
inrtiated lor the OII, IMR and OCM and are in progress.
- 
to identify critical areas in overall
systems development and in sub-
systems technology, and to provide
recommendations for the definition of
an appropriate supporting research and
technology plan;
- 
to identify the necessary growth poten-
tial in order to fulfil the mission
requirements to the greatest possible
extent, and to develop a follow-on
programme plan relating to evolution
of system capability.
53. The two studies were initiated on 3lst
August (LASS) and on lst September (COMSS)
1978. Each satellite will, as discussed earlier,
carry an optical imaging instrument (Olllt und
a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), the instru-
ment specifications differing for ench mission.
The coastal ocean monitoring payload will also
contain an imaging microwave radiometer(IMR). Whereas the OII(s) and IMR defini-
tions will form major elements of the sys-
tem studies, the specif-rcations for the SARs(plus costing and SRT plan data) are being
drawn from the radar studies conducted by
Thomson-CSF and Marconi. Further study
inputs are being derived from the solar-array
studies.
54. Your Rapporteur has outlined the main
European interest and objectives in spaceborne
remote sensing, and has described the action(Earthnet, Spacelab experiments) and studies
presently under way or planned which should
lead to the implementation of a European
remote-sensing satellite programme by the mid-
1980s. It seems clear that Europe and, indeed,
the rest of the world, with their increasing
requirements for accurate and timely informa-
tion on the earth's resources and environment,
need the new data that can be supplied by
remote-sensing satellites. Although many prob-
lems still need to be resolved concerning
the use of the data and the technical elements
to be developed, it is firmly believed that
Europe has the experience and capability to
overcome them. Perhaps the greatest challenge
we face in incorporating this new technology
into our daily lives is the more abstract one of
convincing Europe that it cannot afford to
abstain from making its proper contribution to
this original and exciting space applications
activity.
VIII. Sys/Dme probatoire d'observation
de la terre (Spot)
55. The French Government decided in
February 1978 to undertake the development of
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the Spot system, the earth observation test sys-
tem as a contribution to a global resources and
environment management system in which
meteorological, geological, geographicaI and
ecological information would be constantly
updated. CNES started its studies in 1975 and
in 1976 a programme was prepared and submit-
ted to the ESA Council defined in accordance
with the ESA convention. The French have
always been active in observation and optical
techniques and it was therefore logical to
prepare such a programme as a follow-up and a
complement to the Landsat programme.
Although originally the programme was favour-
ably received in Europe, Sweden was the only
ESA member country inclined to invest in it.
Belgium was neutral at f,rrst but later suppor-
ted the programme for industrial reasons.
Both countries are therefore contributing some
space- or ground-based hardware, but the ESA
member states as a whole did not wish to
participate.
56. One of the diffrculties was that three
major programmes were going on in ESA which
required all the money earmarked for space
activities. It is also possible that high resolu-
tion visible range instruments were not consid-
ered practical by a number of ESA members for
Northern European countries, many of which
are often cloud-covered. However, from the
very beginning it was pointed out that visible
observation was of great importance to under-
developed countries, especially in Africa.
57. Italy and Switzerland were not very
interested since the Spot system had been
designed as the forerunner of a series of earth-
oriented Ariane launch missions in low orbit.
The management of Ariane is not considered
by those countries to be really European but
more as a French project. When the ESA
Council turned down the French offer, the
French Government decided to continue alone
because it thought that earth observation would
have a big potential in terms of technological
fallout and financial returns. The programme
would cost some F 1,000 million and would
therefore be less expensive than the develop-
ment of Meteosat.
58. Tho system comprises a multi-mission
platform or bus and a mission-specific payload,
which together constitute the Spot satellite, plus
a ground segment. The multi-mission plat-
form or bus carries mission-independent sub-
systems: attitude and orbit control, power
supplies, on-board computers, telemetry and
command equipment. The bus might also
serve French military requirements although a
decision has not been taken to start intelligence
gathering through surveillance satellites using
the Spot bus. The platform equipment is
basically reusable for other earth obser-
vation missions.
59. The payload includes two identical
cameras, which are also able to take stereo-
scopic views, and the payload telemetry. For
the satellite, Sweden will build the computer
and Belgium the power supply sub-system.
The satellite is land-oriented and therefore not
equipped for ocean surveillance. Detailed
observation will be used for land management
and geological exploration.
60. After the French decision there was auto-
matically a delay in the European programme
which however poses no serious problem for
ESA. For Europe it is important to know
what American policy will be and only recently
there have been clear indications that NOAA
will manage the operational programme which
will have to pay for itsell and this means that
customers will have to pay the real price for
services.
61. The first generation of earth detection
satellites was the Landsat l, 2, 3 series of which
only Landsat 3 is still working. In 1982 Land-
sat D will become operational and will have a
ground resolution of 30 metres. The first
series has a ground resolution of 80 metres. In
1984-85 Landsat D prime will be operational;
the full system will work from 1988 onwards.
Then the customers will not only have to pay
for the operating cost but also for the cost of
the spacecraft. The French system will have
the following time-table: thq first Spot will be
launched in 1984, the second flight model
could be launched in 1986, the third
in 1989 and the fourth in l99l if a decision
for an operational system is taken. The satel-
lites would therefore be launched at intervals of
two-and-a-half years.
62. There will be three main differences
between Spot and Landsat D:
(i) Spot will have improved resolution
up to l0 metres and 20 metres in
three colours; it will therefore be
better adapted to maPPing. It will
produce maps of l/100,000 whereas
the Landsat will make its map at
scale of l/200,000. Once the Spot
system is fully operational it will be
able to produce cartograPhic uP-
dating of l/50,000;
(rr) by using a system of mirrors,
the cameras will be able to take
photographs at diflerent angles and
m4ke 
-stereoscopic pictures. As the
satellite will move over the same area
every four days,- it can observe
growing crops regularly;
(iir) Iinally, with stereoscopic observation,
altitude profiles can be established
and this is of great imPortance for
geologists.
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In the United States there is a lobby in
Congress to produce research and development
money for a stereoscopic satellite, Stereosat, but
no decision has yet been taken. Although
there is some competition between Landsat and
Spot, the main performances are so different
that in fact. they do not compete for the same
clientdle.
63. The French Government is still interes-
ted in a possible European programme for earth
detection as this would be achieved mainly
through radar observation, the satellite using a
synthetic aperture antenna. If a decision were
taken in favour of a European programme the
Spot platform would probably be used. The
mission of such a programme might well be
able to map the depth of shallow seas and also
the velocity of waves. However, it should be
taken into consideration that this type of
observation would need a high power output on
board the satellite, as shown by Seasat.
64. A European programme should be an
experimental one as enough experience has not
yet been gained with this type ofearth observa-
tion. ESA is studying the problem and a
mission definition might be arrived at by
the end of this year or early 1981. The Euro-
pean system might be complementary to the
French Spot system. The main decision would
be whether to try for an early launch and use
proven technology, which would mean that the
first satellite could be launched in 1985, or to
develop new technology and therefore have a
launch in 1987. NASA is developing a
national ocean surveillance satellite, NOSS,
which will be derived from Seasat and which
will be paid for by NASA (25 o/o), NOAA
(25 o/o) and the Department of Defence (50 0/o).
65. The Germans are very interested in
microwave detection equipment for ocean-
oriented research. The United Kingdom is
also interested in an oceanographic programme,
but Italy and Switzerland prefer land observa-
tion. The ESA programme might include
satellites for both types of observation but then
the programme would cost 460 million units of
account. Whether this money will be made
available by the governments is of course highly
questionable. One of the major advantages of
the proposed ESA programme is the inclusion
of a number of microwave instruments which
will penetrate the European cloud cover.
66. There is a great difference for Europe in
analysing data from satellites such as Landsat
and data acquired by a European system. A
European system could provide at least 50 0/o
more data than if another system is used. In
the long term, Spot might well generate suffi-
cient financial returns to make it cost-effective.
Both direct and indirect returns should be
considered.
lX. Coastal ocean monitoring
67 . Coastal areas comprise 20 0/o of the
earth's surface and from the human and econo-
mic viewpoints are one of the most important
zones on our planet. There is an increasing
need, therefore, for eflicient and detailed
surveillance to provide the information needed
to manage human activities in these areas and
to monitor the marine environment in general.
68. The key themes of the above surveil-
lance requirement lie in the fields of industrial
exploration and exploitation, environmental
monitoring and scientific research. In particu-
lar, it is expected that the following application
areas will benef,rt from the proposed COMSS:
- 
forecasting of sea state, storms and
currents;
- 
surveillance of icebergs for navigation
and the protection of oil rigs;
- 
improvement of medium-term wea-
ther forecasting;
- 
routing and regulation of sea traffic in
channels and the approaches to ports;
- 
assistance to oil exploration;
- 
optimisation of coastal constructions or
constru.ction at sea;
- 
evaluation of primary production;
- 
forecasting the location of surface fish;
- 
surveillance of oil or chemical pollu-
tion.
X. The institutional framework
69. Through conventions and intergovern-
mental agreements, space Europe in the form of
the European Space Agency has established
such activities as the scientif,rc programme, the
communications programme 
- 
which led to the
creation of Eutelsat grouping European postal
and telecommunication administrations 
- 
ESA's
direct television broadcast satellite programme,
the L- (large) Sat, Spacelab, the Ariane pro-
gramme 
- 
which led to Arianespace, the indus-
trial group responsible for building the laun-
cher 
- 
and the earth observation programme.
70. If ultimately adopted by the ESA
Council, the latter programme will dominate
ESA's activities in the near future, but there are
fears that in this field France's national pro-
gramme could complicate what the majority of
European Space Agency member states believe
should be a European effort. Fears of a
Franco-German bilaieral arrangement as with
the television satellite programme exist.
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7l. They were well expressed by a previous
Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler, in paragraph 40 of
Document 766:
" In the absence of a positive decision by
the ESA Council, the CNES (Centre
national d'etudes spatiales) has taken up
contact with NASA and an agreement
has been concluded by which the future
French satellite would use the same type
of images as NASA's Landsat D. It is to
be hoped that a European programme
will finally emerge from this national
activity following the terms of the ESA
convention under which national pro-
grammes are to be Europeanised progres-
sively to the greatest possible extent. "
72. ESA is a technical organisation with
many technical facilities but it lacks political
guidance. There is no real common European
space policy and therefore ESA operates in a
partial political vacuum. For example, the
budget of the Joint Research Centre at Ispra
was approved by the Ministers of the Common
Market whereas the ESA budget of some $ 700
million per year, nearly four times the JRC
budget, was approved by civil servants only.
The last ESA ministerial meeting took place in
1977. ESA is an ideal mechanism for the
development'of new space technologies but not
for their commercial exploitation.
73. The important immediate problems are
not institutional in the sense of the relationship
between ESA and the EEC but are questions of
commercial application and industrial work
sharing. In these fields political guidance is of
major importance if a common European effort
is to be assured. The most important applica-
tions for the earth resources detection satellite
would be fishing, agricultural land use and aid
to developing countries. As far as agriculture
is concerned this means especially monitoring
of crops and of renewable resources in general.
All these are areas of EEC interest.
74. Document 650 (26th November 1979) of
the Commission of the European Communities
expressed it well (paragraph 3.5.2):
" Several policies managed or monitored
at Community level (agricultural policy,
fisheries, environmental policy, regional
policy, etc.) would be strengthened by
advance objective information on the
state of earth resources. Remote sensing
can already provide this type of informa-
tion, the political and economic impor-
tance of which is fundamental and whose
impact on integration is substantial.
In this area the Compnunity is already
developing pilot projects for research and
co-ordination with national programmes.
Accordingly, the Community has a
specific rdle to play both by optimising
the R & D effort (setting-up of a forum
for end-users, in most cases public admi-
nistrations, on a sector-by-sector basis)
and by helping to create a market by
making the Community institutions' par-
ticular needs known.
Using this data, and in order to overcome
obstacles and to create the necessary
spin-off effect, the Community could
decide to launch pilot projects aimed at
improving the operation of certain of its
policies (forestry and/or agricultural
inventory, natural resogrces,' etc.). "
75. Remote-sensing satellites can also pro-
vide extremely valuable military information
which is a crucial reason why Europe should
develop this capability. The intelligence ob-
tained from remote-sensing satellite systems can
be so important that direct access to it is an
entirely justified investment for the European
nations which would otherwise remain in a
position of dependence inappropriate to Eur-
ope's growing economic and political power.
Xl. Conclusibn
76. At their conference in Bonn in July
1978, the heads of state arld government of
the Community recognised the need to identify
new sources of growth and employment to
offset the difficult adjustments that traditional
industries such as coal, steel, shipbuilding and
textiles are being forced to undergo. At Stras-
bourg they agreed that the dlnamic complex of
information industries based on the new elec-
tronic technologies oflered a major source of
such economic growth and social development
and invited the Commission to study the matter
and report.
77. It is the belief of. your Rapporteur that
the space industry could provide Europe with
that major source of economic growth and
social development. Accordingly the heads of
government of the Western European nations
should implement the ESA remote-sensing
satellite programme as a mattpr of high priority.
78. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to refer
to the symposium held in Toulouse in March
1978 under the auspices of ESA, CNES, the
Council of Europe and the Town of Toulouse.
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APPENDIX I
Main elements of the Earthnet programme
o
a
a
Stations
Reception
Preprocessing
Archiving
a
a
a
o
Co-ordination
Handling of orders
lnterface with users
Data bank and catalogue...
Fucino
Italy
Experimental missions OakhangerUnited Kingdom
Lannion
FranceLandsat Stations Seasat
Kiruna
Sweden H MM Nimrbus-G
Canaria
Spain
Earthnet
Management
Centre
Frascati, ltaly
National
points of
contact in
member states
Users
(Participating and non-participating countries)
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R6le of Spacelab in the development of remote-sensing instruments and techniques
\o
Continued aircraft support
Basic parallel activities
Data processing
Ground-based
measurements
Sensor R & D
Earth-science
experiments
Operations(e.9. mapping)
Experimental phase
Facility sensors
Experimental
sensors
Sensors for
operational
missions(e.9. metric camera
Simple
Automatic
Long life
High measurement
repetition rate
Operations
Development
aid
Environment
Oceans
European
regional needs
Global resources
Continued Spacelab support
Operational
satellites
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APPENDIX III
COMSS : Present luy characteristics
Payload:
Orbit:
Launch vehicle:
Platform :
Ground system :
(1) Ocean colour monitor (OCM)(visible,/inf ra red i mager)
(2) Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
(3) lmaging microwave radiometer (lMR)
Low altitude circular, sun-synchronous(repetition period four days)
Ariane
Spot multi-mission platform
Earthnet
Data collection platforms
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APPENDIX IV
LASS : Present key characteristics
Payload:
Orbit:
Launch vehicle:
Platform :
Ground system :
(1) Optical imaging instrument (Oll)(visible,/infra red i ma ger)
(2) Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
Low altitude, circular, sun-synchronous(repetition period seventeen days)
As COMSS
As COMSS
Earthnet
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APPENDIX V
Programme current slatus
Major
milestones
Time
1978 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
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Document 843
l. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman);
MM. Bozzi, Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Battaglia(Alternate: Cavaliere), Brasseur, Edwards, Giust, Glesener,
van Hulst (Alternate: Portheine\, Mrs. Knight (Alternate:
"/essel). MM. Lagourgue, Lemaire, Maravalle (Alternate:
28th April 1980
Talamona), Marquardt, Michel, Mulley (Alternate: Sir
Thomas Williams), Pignion (Alternate: Talon), Schiiuble(Alternate: Milller), Sterpa, Voogd (Alternate: Stofelen),
Zebisch (Alternate: Mrs. von Bothmer'tr
N.B. Ilre names of those taking part in the vote are
printed in italics.
Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
REPORT 
'
sabmitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnnrr RrsolurloN
to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
ExpI-nNnrony MpuonRNoutvt
submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.
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Draft Resolution
to amend Rale 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
The Assembly,
Considering it necessary to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:
The heading for this rule becomes: " Substitutes and alternates ".
In paragraph l, replace the words " may arrange to be replaced " by " may be replaced ".
Delete the last sentence.
In paragraph 2, replace the words " nominated in due form " by the words " duly registered in
accordance with Rule 24 ".
At the beginning of the second sentence, replace the word " They " by the word " Substitutes ".
Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4 and reads as follows:
" Any full member of a Committee who is prevented from attending a meeting of that
C-ommittee shall, as a rule, arrange to be replaced by the Representative or Substitute
appointed for the purpose. In special cases, he may, with the consent of the Chairman of the
Committee, be replaced by another Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as
himself.
Such an alternate nominated in due form shall have the same rights in the Committee as the
member himself. "
Delete paragraph 4.
Paragraph 5 becomes paragraph 3,
Decroes
To replace former Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
5.
6.
" Substitutes and Alternates
l. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a
Substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives
in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if
he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to
vote.
4. Any full member of a Committee who is prevented from attending a meeting of that Commit-
tee shall, as a rule, arrange to be replaced by the Representative or Substitute appointed for the pur-pose. In special cases, he may, with the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, be replaced by
another Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
Such an alternate nominated in due form shall have the same rights in the Committee as the
member himself. "
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)
l. The appointment of substitutes is pro-
vided for in Article II (D) of the Charter in
order to allow enough members to be present
for the Assembly to proceed with its work in
spite of the hazards of parliamentary life which
too often prevent some members taking their
seats. This paragraph reads as follows:
" Substitutes of the representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consulta-
tive Assembly of the Council of Europe
may sit, speak and vote in the place of
representatives prevented from attending
a sitting of the Assembly. "
2. The conditions in which'substitution is
organised in the Assembly and its Committees
are set out in Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure.
3. These provisions seem clear. However,
members of the Assembly have on several occa-
sions noted certain difliculties in applying
them, particularly during the June 1979
session. On that occasion, Mr. von Hassel,
President of the Assembly, stated that the inter-
pretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
should be examined in detail. He noted in fact
that there was some question as to the moment
from which substitution became effective. Wasit when the President made his customary
announcement to the Assembly at the start of a
sitting ? Was it still possible to sign on as a
substitute after this announcement ? Did substi-
tution apply to the whole sitting ? Could a
substitute replace more than one representative
at the same sitting ? Could a representative
speak but leave his substitute to vote ?
4. In order to remove all uncertainty about
methods of applying Rule 7, the Presidential
Committee asked the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges to submit the present
report to the Assembly.
5. In fact, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
may be interpreted diflerently according to
whether the aim is to draw up a clear, hnal and
unquestionable list of seats filled by representa-
tives and those assigned to substitutes for each
sitting or rather to assemble the largest possible
number of members when votes are taken.
6. If the expression " prevented from atten-
ding a sitting " is interpreted strictly, the provi-
sions of Rule 7 in fact allow it to be determined
at the beginning of each sitting which titular
members and substitutes have the right to speak
and vote. However, they prevent titular mem-
bers or substitutes included in the attendance
register and obliged to be absent when votes are
taken from being replaced. Their eflect is
therefore to facilitate roll-call votes but to make
it more difficult to obtain a quorum.
7. Presidents of the Assembly had therefore
been led to interpret the rules more flexibly to
allow a representative and his substitute to fill a
seat in turn at the same sitting and consequen-
tly to have the right to speak and vote successi-
vely. It was thus easier to avoid vacant seats
when votes were taken. Conversely, it could
arise that there was doubt as to which member
of the Assembly should be called during a roll-
call vote.
8. Hence, it should be detetrmined:(n when a substitute has signed the
attendance register, whether he is to
replace the titular member and
exercise all tho latter's duties
throughout the sitting, or whether
he should withdraw in the event of
the titular member wishing to
resume his place during the sitting:
(ii) when a titular mdmber has signed
the attendance register, whether heis still entitled to have himself
replaced in the event of other com-
mitments compelling him to ab-
sent himself during the same
sitting.
9. The Committee was alrnost unanimous
in considering that the expression " prevented
from attending a sitting " should be interpreted
strictly and that it was for each delegation to
ensure the necessary discipline among its
members so that representativgs and substitutes
whose names appeared on the attendance regis-
ter exercised their rights throughout the sitting,
except in unavoidable circumstances.
10. However, a small minority of the Com-
mittee felt that the aim of Rule 7 in making
provision for substitutes was to allow delega-
tions to f-rll all seats available to them. It
therefore feels that too much importance should
not be attached to the duration of the sitting.It should be possible for a representative to
arrange to be replaced at any time. Moreover,
it may happen that a representative and his
substitute are both absent at the same time. In
that event, another member of the delegation
should be able to fill the vacant seat. In short,
the minority considered that the provisions of
Rule 7 should be applied flexibly in order to
ensure that a quorum was obtained and recalled
that this was what Presidents of the Assembly
had done hitherto.
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I l. The majority of the Committee preferred
to give priority to the need for clarity and
discipline rather than to obtaining a quorum,
pointing out that members of the Assembly
would be present in greater numbers when
votes were taken precisely if there was more
discipline in the delegations.
12. However, the Committee voted in favour
of a more flexible interpretation of the Rules of
Procedure where the right to speak was concer-
ned in order to allow a member of the Assem-
bly who had already put his name down to
speak and whose speech had had to be post-
poned until a subsequent sitting to speak even
if replaced.
13. The Committee pointed out moreover
that by calling for discipline within the delega-
tions it removed the personal nature of substi-
tution which had seemed to apply under the
present wording of paragraph I of Rule 7. In
short, it considered that strict interpretation of
the expression " prevented from attending a
sitting " meant amending the expression " may
arrange to be replaced " insofar as the decision
to appoint a specific substitute should be taken
by the delegation organising its representation
in the Assembly rather than by the represen-
tative prevented from attending.
14. The Committee therefore felt that in
paragraph I of Rule 7 the expression " may
arrange to be replaced " should read " may be
replaced ".
15. Furthermore, in practice, it was not the
representative prevented from attending who
informed the President of the Assembly but the
Office of the Clerk which communicated a list
of representatives and substitutes present to the
President on the basis of the attendance register
and then to the Assembly in an appendix to
the minutes of the sitting. The words " He
must give notice thereof to the President, who
will in turn inform the Assembly " should
therefore be deleted and replaced by a referencein paragraph 2 to registration of substitutes
according to Rule 24.
16. Rule 7 also deals, in paragraphs 3 and 4,
with replacement in Committees.
17. The text of the present paragraph 3
should be drawn up in the light of the provi-
sions of Rule 45, paragraph 6, of the Rules of
Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe which are both more precise
and more in conformity with current practice
than those laid down in paragraphs 3 and 4 of
Rule 7 of our Rules of Procedure. However,
the new text could improve even further on
that of the Rules of Procedure of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by
taking account of the fact that the replacement
is effected often without the personal interven-
tion of the titular member.
18. The following text is proposed:
" Any full member of a Cdmmittee who
is prevented from attending a meeting of
that Committee shall, as a rule, arrange
to be replaced by the Representative or
Substitute appointed for the purpose. In
special cases, he may, with the consent of
the Chairman of the Committee, be
replaced by another Representative or
Substitute of the same nationality as
himself.
Such an alternate nominated in due form
shall have the same rights in the Com-
mittee as the member himself. "
19. Paragraph 4, the text of which was
unsatisfactory, should be deleted since the new
paragraph 3 renders it irrelevant.
20. Paragraph 5, relating to procedure for
replacement in plenary sittings, should follow
straight on from the first two paragraphs and
become paragraph 3.
21. Finally, the heading for Rule 7 should
now be " Substitutes and alternates ".
22. The Committee therefore proposes that
the Assembly adopt the attached draft resolu-
tion to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
and apply the provisions of the rule thus
amended strictly.
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Draft Recommendalion
on thc imput of thc cwlviag situalion
in thc Ncu aad Middle Easl on lfcstcra Eurupcan sccurity
The Assembly,
Considering that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the fundamental princi-
ples of international law and is a serious threat to the balance and peace in an area which is vital for
the security of the western world;
Believing that this intervention makes it essential to take urgent measures to guarantee the
maintenance of peace in the Middle East;
Considering furthermore that democratic countries must make use of all the peaceful means at
their disposal to demonstrate their.non-acceptance of the fait accompli;
Considering also that the holding of United States diplomats as hostages in Tehran is an intol-
erable violation of international law and a threat to peace in Asia and prevents the improvement of
relations with Iran;
Believing that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan makes it essential to strengthen without
delay the defence means of the members of the Atlantic Alliance and considering that in this
context the establishment of just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the area;
Recalling that in their declaration of 29th June 1977 the Nine said that fair and lasting peace
could only be established in the Middle East in an overall context. Such a settlement must be based
on relevant resolutions of the Security Council and establish the right of the Palestinian people to
a homeland, through self-determination, without prejudicing the existence of Israel as an independent
state within internationally secure and recognised boundaries;
Recalling that the Nine deplored the policy of settlements pursued by the lsraeli Government
in the occupied territories, which is illegal from the point of view of international law and contrary to
decisions of the Security Council in its most recent resolution;
Noting that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only body recognised as representing
the Palestinian people by the Arab states as early as in 1974;
Noting that an increasing number of western countries, including several WEU member states,
have acknowledged that a solution of the Palestine problem is difficult, if not impossible, to attain
without the participation of the PLO;
Considering that Europe, when it manages to speak with a single voice, could be in a position
to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace with justice in the Near and Middle
East;
Recalling and reiterating all the as yet unfulfilled and still relevant recommendations in
Recommendation 341, approved by the Assembly of WEU in December 1979 ;
Noting with approval the declaration on the international situation adopted by the Nine on
28th April 1980 affecting the matters raised in the present document,
ReconaueNos rHAT rHE CouNcrL
l. Intensify consultations between its members on all questions concerning the balance and
security in areas not covered by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to
agreeing on joint action whenever and wherever possible;
2. Develop forthwith the means of defence at Europe's disposal and reinforce, on the most appro-
priate basis, the capacity of Pakistan and other threatened countries in the region to defend their
territorial integrity;
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3. Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military rneasures
to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the fait accompli by the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan;
4. Demonstrate their solidarity in requiring Iran to free the United States diplomats now being
held hostage;
5. Supply Turkey with economic support to assist in overcoming the difficulties it is encountering
and for associating that country as closely as possible with the economy of Western Europe;
6. Initiate, after 26th May 1980, new steps necessary to contribute to the establishment of a just
and lasting peace in Palestine;
7. Urge the Security Council either to review and supplement Resolution 242 to express beyond
argument the original fundamental purposes and scope of that resolution; or else to consider and
declare a new composite resolution on the one hand designed to provide adequate security for the
integrity of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised boundaries whilst on the other hand
assuring Palestinians of an inherent right of self-determination on the West Bank and in the Gaza
Strip to establish their own homeland;
8. Propose, thereafter, the preparation of a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab
countries, a delegation truly representative of the Palestinian people, the United States and Western
European countries in a position to contribute to its success;
9. To this end, endeavour to secure before that conference unequivocal declarations by the Arab
participants in this settlement recognising Israel's right to exist and by Israel recognising the right
of the Palestinian people to self-determination.
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Prefoce
l. This report is not intended to be att
overall fundamental and detailed historic ana-
lysis of the situation in the Middle East and
South-West Asia as was Document 820 appro-
ved by the Assembly of WEU last December.
2. It is an attempt to trace objectively the
course of events in the area since then, but of
course quite extensive mention has to be made
of background developments. This is espe-
cially so in regard to Pakistan and Turkey,
which only received comparatively brief atten-
tion in the last report, being then peripheral
subjects, but now, of course, central to the
whole purport of this renewed attempt to point
to the dangers to peace, European security
- 
political and economic 
- 
and to suggest how
best to meet the challenges now facing us.
*
*:i
l. Introduction
3. The West certainly reacted more strongly
- 
as indeed did the great majority of third world
countries 
- 
to the news of the massive Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan on 28th
December 1979 than to all previous post-war
instances of Soviet expansionism. Yet it has to
be admitted there was, and is, a sad lack of
unity in the scope and function of the reaction
within Europe and across the Atlantic.
4. The far greater sense of outrage that was
caused probably arose from two factors. The
first was because, up to the invasion of Afghan-
istan, all other take-over bids by force in Africa
and elsewhere were not undertaken by
Russian troops as such, but by surrogate, politi-
cal mercenary forces, e.g. Cubans and East
Germans aided in varying degree by Soviet
" advisers ". Secondly, where Russian military
power had previously been directly involved in
the post-war era, e.g. in Hungary and Czecho-
slovakia, a claim, albeit a specious one, had
always been made by the Kremlin that it was
only acting in defence of its generally-accepted
" spheres of interest ", however immorally
conceived.
5. Lacking resort to either of these two
excuses for their continuing hegemonistic ven-
tures 
- 
a disclaimer for responsibility by the use
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)
of surrogate forces, or the operation of the
Brezhnev doctrine as originally enunciated, i.e.
the retention of the Yalta carve-up of spheres of
interest in Europe, the men in the Kremlin
have had to resort to one of the most bogus
propaganda exercises in history. This was the
pretence that the Afghan Prime Minister they
murdered as their first act of state following on
the military invasion of his country had invited
them to carry out the invasion in order to pro-
tect the Afghans from a non-existent threat to
the country's independence by the CIA!
6. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the
whole grim tragedy is that anyone should have
been surprised at the Russian action, even in
the absence of assumed intelligence reports and
supposed technical surveillance facilities avail-
able, at least to the United States if no other
western power.
7. There had, after all, already been a de
facto Soviet presence with a large number ofSoviet forces in Afghanistan since 7th
December and a communist r6gime sirice April
1978, followed by the signing of a Soviet-
Afghan treaty of friendship and mutual assis-
tance in December 1978 establishing the Soviet
Union in a pre-eminent political, economic and
military position. However, the arrival of
strong Soviet reinforcements apparently reveal-
ed to the West the seriousness of three major
facts of which it must have been aware but
whose signihcance it had not hitherto grasped.
8 (, First, there was the Soviet Union's
steady thrust into Asia since the second world
war, not to speak of earlier examples of Russian
expansion in Asia in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. The 19l7 revolution did not
halt a movement which had begun in the days
of Peter the Great. But, to concentrate now on
events since 1945, the perio concentrate now
on events since 1945, the period of understand-
ing between Russia and China should be
recalled during which, one by one, North Korea
in 1945, China in 1949 and North Vietnam in
1954 came under communist domination. The
break between the Soviet Union and China
which came about progressively after the death
of Stalin in March 1953 means that China can
certainly no longer be considered part of the
vast Soviet-dominated empire! This has not
prevented the Soviet Union from backing
subversive and revolutionary movements which,
one after the other, have seized power in
South Vietnam and Laos followed by Cambodia
and Afghanistan and which are now also estab-
lished in certain areas of Thailand and have
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periodically surfaced actively in India and even
in Malaysia.
9. In some respects, the re-election of Mrs.
Gandhi as.head of the Indian Union at the end
of 19'79 could be considered a benefit for the
Soviet Union to which the Indian Prime Minis-
ter, despite her avowed attachment to principles
of non-alignment, is sometimes accused of
giving preference, even after the rnvasion of
Afghanistan, in regard to some controversial
international issues.
10. Seen from this standpoint, events in
Afghanistan between April 1978 and December
1979 seem part of a vast movement which
seems dedicated to bringing the whole of Asia
into the grasp of the Soviet Union, isolating
China and jeopardising relations between the
western countries and Eastern or Southern Asia
as a whole. This expansion of Soviet influence
has been helped by a series of events which
may not be clearly linked but which have inevi-
tably resulted in the weakening or overthrowing
of political r6gimes which maintained close
links with the West, while pursuing their natio-
nal interests.
I l. Foremost remains the unresolved and
worsening Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arab
countries, because of their continuing territorial
dispute with Israel, are experiencing internal
disruption and even disintegration in varying
degree, which constitute a threat even to the
survival of several of them. For instance,
Lebanon is still in the throes of a causeless civil
war which only the presence of Syrian occupa-
tion forces in the north, and a small United
Nations force in the south, prevents from
repeating the same tragic events of 1978. But
mention should also be made of the war in
Yemen which led to the country being divided
into two states, one of which does not conceal
its leaning towards Moscow, the other being
on very shaky foundations, despite recent more
positive developments. In the Oman war, Sul-
tan Qaboos managed to put down the Dhofar
revolt only with the assistance of Iran. Events
in Saudi Arabia are particularly disturbing, the
most recent being the occupation of the Great
Mosque in Mecca by a large, well-organised
armed group in summer 1979. It took several
days' fighting entailing several hundred, if not
thousand, casualties before the mosque was
cleared. Certainly, too, many of the revolu-
tionaries escaped and are still at large. Then
there was the attack in Gafsa, in Tunisia, in
January 1980, by commando forces trained in
Libya which quite clearly sought to destabilise
the Tunisian state.
12. Apart from the Arab countries, Turkey
has been seriously weakened by internal unrest
which none of the parties struggling for power
yet seems capable of overcoming although there
are some encouraging indic4tions of a decline
in politically-motivated (errorist violence,
because of a new more rqsolute attitude by
police and troops by direction of the present
government. Also althoughl as only to be ex-
pected, what has been offered by concerned
western powers to bolster up the economy and
strengthen the ill-equipped army is not yet re-
garded by the Turks as fully adequate, such aid
is suflicient to provide a valuable stabilising
factor in the Turkish scene. West Germany in
particular in the economic held and the United
States and the United Kingdom in the military,
in both cases with full NATO support, are
playing a notable r6le in this context. In Iran,
the Shah's r6gime was overthrown at the begin-
ning of 1979. Although its methods were
questionable, to say the least, this r6gime had
been doing its best to maintain the unity, eco-
nomic development and social advancement of
the country in spite of panicularly diffrcult
circumstances.
13. All these events, whether or not directly
stimulated, if not caused, by the Soviet Union
or its allies, have helped to weaken the will and
capability of states to defend themselves in an
area which, even five yearS ago, might have
seemed staunchly determined to resist Soviet
imperialism. In view of the progress of this
imperialism and the weakiless of the states
Iiable to be affected in the next few years, and if
it continues to develop in the same way, one
cannot but be struck by the magnitude of the
threat to the whole Middle East.
l4 (ii) This is not the only threat, however,
since it coexists with a remarkable reawakening
of the most fundamentalist factions of Islam
which are often also the most hostile to the
West. This movement is now spreading to all
Moslem countries, where it takes on many
forms, thus making it difficul[ to assess its exact
extent. There are the heirs to the old conser-
vative religious organisatidns such as the
Moslem Brothers, once powqrful particularly in
Egypt, an organisation which seems to have
extended its area of activity to a large part of
the Middle East, including the Palestinian inha-
bitants of the state of Israel and Israeli-occupied
territories. At present, the Moslem Brothers
seem to be exerting especially threatening pres-
sure on the Baathist Government in Syria.
Associated with this traditionalist trend are
movements purporting to be Arab socialism,
which has little in common with western socia-
lism or communism but feels it can find, in the
origins of Islamic society, the basis of an ega-
litarianism which is hostile both to technical
progress and to the western materialist way of
life. This Arab socialism is itself intermingled
with more or less marxist tendencies, wide-
spread above all among Middle East students in
a large number of universities throughout the
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world. Finally, at least one state, Colonel
Kadhafi's Libya, is deliberately exploiting this
Moslem revival, with the intention of displacing
Sadat's Egypt, reinstating radical, xenophobic
Nasserism there and reuniting the Arab or
Moslem world around Tripoli.
15. In any event, this fundamentalist move-
ment provides grist to the mill for a violently
anti-western stand and has a considerable hold
on a society where it is capable of imposing
certain life styles traditional in Islam, which
were tending to disappear in the more devel-
oped Moslem countries, e.g. in regard to the
emancipation of women. One sign of the
expansion of this new fundamentalism is the
return of the chador from North Africa to
Pakistan.
16. Events in Iran in recent years have of
course provided a measure of the extent of this
movement since it was indeed the Ayatollah
Khomeini who overthrew the Shah's r6gime
and established a resolutely Islamic r6gime in
the country. His ideas are not yet predomi-
nant elsewhere but play a decisive r6le in the
challenge to established authorities, particularly
in Tunisia and Saudi Arabia and probably also
in Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, the Emirates,
and even in Pakistan and Turkey. He seems
to have had a fair degree of responsibility for
the Afghan insurrection which gave an excuse if
it did not contribute to the direct Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan, because of the Krem-
lin's fears that Islamic fundamentalist fervour
might spread across the borders of Russia's own
south Asian Moslem empire.
17. It would obviously be fallacious to
consider that there was a direct link between
the Soviet thrust towards the Moslem areas of
Asia and this revival of Moslem fundamenta-
lism. But the r6le played by events in Iran in
provoking direct military Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan should not be disregarded. Nor
should one forget Soviet assistance, particularly
military, to Colonel Kadhafi's r6gime, South
Yemen, Ethiopia and many other states or
uprisings in Africa and Asia.
18. Thus the resumption of Moslem funda-
mentalism is an important factor in develop-
ments in the Middle East and, in general, it has
so far served Soviet interests in the area, either
by curtailing western influence, or by facili-
tating Soviet intervention. The question is
whether the invasion of Afghanistan has or has
not reversed this trend, or at least temporarily
halted it.
l9 (iii)The oil crisis, too, which has been
practically continuous since October 1973, is a
further reason for the worsening of the inter-
national situation. Since the closing of the
Suez Canal, which followed the closing of the
majority of the pipelines bringing oil from the
far end of the Persian Gulf to Mediterranean
ports, most Middle East oil has been shipped to
Western Europe through the Strait of Hormuz
and the Indian Ocean and round the Cape of
Good Hope. It would be catastrophic for the
West if the Cape route were closed and reper-
cussions would be widespread. Whatever the
reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanis-
tan, it brought Soviet divisions more than 1,000
km closer to the Strait of Hormuz. They are
now separated from the strait by only about
500 km of territory inhabited by the Baluchis of
Pakistan and Iran. Despite diffrculties of
terrain, this is no longer a serious impediment
to further Soviet expansion towards the Indian
Ocean.
20. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz
would cut off most of Western Europe's oil
supplies, forcing drastic reductions in industrial
output and making it incapable of waging a
long war. The Soviet Union therefore now
seems to have the means of reducing Europe to
a position of material inferiority making it
increasingly diflicult to resist clearly-expressed
Soviet demands and threats.
21. Moreover there are indications that in
the Soviet Union where, for a long time,
enough oil was produced for domestic needs
and those of a large part of the eastern coun-
tries, home-produced oil output is no longer
keeping pace with consumption and the USSR
is now facing a relative oil shortage. Hence-
forth the Soviet Union can therefore offer the
producing countries an alternative market for
the oil which the Middle East currently ships to
the West, especially since the new value of gold
as a medium of exchange.
22. The interconnection of these various
factors makes the current situation particularly
complex and it is very diffrcult to foresee the
outcome. A new distribution of wealth and
power is nevertheless to be noted, not only bet-
ween the West, on the one hand, the Soviet
Union and its allies, on the other, and thirdly
the developing countries, but also between the
developing countries themselves. It is difficult
to assess this distribution since yardsticks such
as gross national product per capita do not give
a true picture of the situation in societies in
which very great wealth coexists with equally
great poverty and where the state may appro-
priate, particularly for the defence budget, a far
higher proportion of the gross national product
than could be the case in Europe or the United
States where there is a greater spread of wealth
and r6gimes are less authoritarian, and conse-
quently less able to enforce a policy of " guns
rather than butter ".
23. Most Near East oil countries spend
more than l0 0/0, and sometimes more than
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15 0/o, of their gross national product on
defence, whereas the figure for most Western
European countries is only just over 3 0/0. But
these are the countries that, together with the
Soviet Union, supply the Middle East countries
with most of their armaments, and this is parti-
cularly important in that their aim is to use
every possible means to avoid, thanks to their
exports, an over-massive transfer of wealth
towards the oil-producing countries.
24. This new distribution of wealth and
power means that it is very difficult to find, or
even envisage, an overall solution to the prob-
lems raised by instability in the Middle
East. Each country has its own particular
position in a balance which takes account of
the nature of the threat represented by the
Soviet Union, the importance of the various
Islamic sects and the resources, particularly oil,
which it possesses.
25. These are the reasons why your
Rapporteur, anxious to study developments in
the Middle East situation as objectively as
possible with a view to drawing the political
conclusions which should command Western
Europe's attention, will examine successively
the cases of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran,
the Arab world and Turkey.
ll. Afghanistan
26. Rather than reproduce a wholly new sec-
tion on Afghanistan this chapter should serve
rather to concentrate on the course and trend of
events which have occurred since Document
820 was adopted on 5th November 1979.
27. After the overthrow of President Daoud
in April 1978, it appeared in fact that a grow-
ing proportion of the Afghan people found it
hard to support each new successive r6gime.
Insurrections broke out in many provinces and
50 0/o of the country was in a position of insecu-
rity whereas 30 0/o was actually controlled by
the repels. The government was unable to
control more than the towns and the main road
from Kabul to the Soviet Union.
28. The post-Daoud rdgime would not have
survived this rebellion, in which elements of
the Afghan army took part on several occa-
sions, without Soviet military assistance, which
was constantly increasing. Large numbers of
Soviet air force units took part in quelling the
rebellion, as well as several thousand Soviet
advisers, with or without uniform. Well before
December 1979 these forces were guilty of
actual crimes against humanity with the des-
truction of whole villages and the massacre of
their inhabitants.
29. Furthermore, the government was al-
ready pursuing an extremelty harsh policy of
repression aimed inter alia at the Moslem
clergy, accused of connivance with the new Ira-
nian Government and the army. Thus the
whole Pathan territory was in the grips of the
rebellion except for a few towns. The centre,
east and south of the country were also suffer-
ing serious unrest and in July fighting broke out
near Kabul, where there had already been
armed clashes in April.
30. In such circumstances, the Afghan eco-
nomy was in particularly dire straits since inter-
nal communications, inadequate at the best of
times, were practically cut off. The agrarian
reform was carried out in very poor conditions,
the threatened landowners having stopped
sowing their crops, and the Soviet Union was
also having to keep the country supplied.
Well before December 1979, it was therefore
directly involved in a struggle where there was
every indication that it was in confrontation
with the large majority of the Afghan popula-
tion.
31. The coup d'6tat on l4th September
1979 may perhaps be explairted by the deterio-
ration of the internal situation, the spread of
the rebellion to sixteen of the country's twenty-
one provinces and the flight into exile of some
200,000 Afghans, not to speak of the victims of
repression and the some 12,000 persons who
- 
according to Amnesty International 
- 
were
imprisoned. Available infotmation does not
allow a very clear picture to be formed of
events leading up to the death of President
Taraki and his replacement by a Khalq leader,
Prime Minister Haf,rzullah Amin.
32. The massive arrival of Soviet forces at
the end of December 1979 did not in fact repre-
sent a very great change in the course of Sovietpolicy. Possibly the coup d'6tat of l4th
December 1979 was effected without Moscow's
agreement. In any event, fdr from ending the
rebellion, it fanned the flames with the result
that the Soviet Union had to increase the num-
ber of its military advisers a[ the beginning of
December. Still achieving no results, it sent
large numbers of forces to Afghanistan on 28th
December by land and air, and it was under
their " protection " that President Amin was
immediately assassinated arld replaced by a
representative of the Parchailr, Babrak Kamal,
brought in by air from the Soviet Union, while
on 7th February 1980 Tass accused President
Amin of having been an agent of China and the
United States determined to organise a counter-
revolutionary putsch in order to concentrate
power in the hands of his family. For a long
time the Soviet Union had been trying to
impose and maintain a r6gime subordinate to it,
but a large part of the Afghan population has
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found this concept unacceptable. On the one
hand it was too visibly supported by a danger-
ous neighbour. Secondly, in a country with a
very strong.Moslem tradition, communism was
considered a foreign element diflicult to assimi-
late. Finally it relied almost exclusively on the
Pashtun rnajority of the population which was
difficult for the other peoples to accept.
33. The access to power of a resolutely
Moslem rdgime in Iran heralded the possibility
of Afghan communism foundering in turn
before the same sort of Moslem revival; and the
Soviet Government might have had reason to
fear a rapid extension of this new Islamic
fundamentalism within its frontiers. Neverthe-
less, Soviet statements that the Soviet Union
had intervened in force in Afghanistan at the
request of Mr. Amin's government are wholly
unconvincing since the first Soviet move was to
arrange for the assassination of the leader who
was supposed to have called for their assistance.
34. Since 28th December, increasing num-
bers of reinforcements have been brought in by
land and air and at the end of February it was
estimated that there were between 70,000 and
100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In spite
of the deployment of modern weaponry, they
do not yet seem to have achieved anything
more than a semblance of control over the
main roads round the country and those leading
to the Soviet Union. On 22nd February,
Kabul was paralysed by an almost general
strike. A number of statements by Afghan
refugees in Pakistan refer to the use of chemical
weapons and particularly toxic gases by the
Soviet forces in the month of February. In the
absence of a detailed enquiry by bodies of
recognised impartiality, there must be some
doubt about the value of such declarations, but
the increasing obstacles being placed by Soviet
and Afghan authorities in the way of enquiries
by western journalists help, to say the least, to
substantiate such rumours since they cannot be
disproved in such conditions.
35. According to certain reports, the first
contingents sent are believed to have consisted
mainly of troops from Central Asia, but they
were replaced a few weeks later by European
Russian troops; perhaps because the Soviet
Union was not sure of the loyalty of its own
Moslem population. It should be added that
the Afghan army which was fighting the rebel-
lion before the arrival of Soviet troops seems to
have broken up and very largely joined the
rebels, sometimes after massacring its ofli-
cers. All information received from Afghan-
istan is fragmentary and questionable, the
Soviet Union itself claiming to have only about
10,000 troops in the country, which seems
quite unrealistic since in mid-March 1980 the
Soviets claimed to be controlling most of the
frontiers around the country, which would
imply far greater numbers.
36. It has been a matter of conjecture why
the Soviet Union undertook this massive inter-
vention with all the diplomatic and military
risks involved, the example of Vietnam having
shown that even the most sophisticated equip-
ment is not always enough to quell a rebellion
by a nation determined to defend its indepen-
dence.
37. Among the theories put forward, some
attribute the invasion to a purely defensive
policy. This is naturally the reason given by
the Soviet Union which claims, inter alia in a
long dispatch from Tass published in certain
western papers on 7th February at its own
expense, that the Afghan insurrection was
started by Pakistan with American assis-
tance. It is probably true that some of the
rebels' weapons came from Pakistan but the
very mediocrity of these weapons is a clear
indication that there was no American partici-
pation in a rebellion whose national character
was evident.
38. A second interpretation is to underline
the danger to the Soviet Union itself of an
extension of the Islamic revival shown, in parti-
cular during 1979, by the establishment of an
Islamic republic in Iran. There are more than
70 million Soviet Moslems, mainly in the south
of the Asian provinces, i.e. on the frontiers of
Iran, Afghanistan and China. An extension of
the Moslem revival in these areas could endan-
ger the unity of the Soviet state and the mainte-
nance of the communist rdgime there. Accord-
ing to this theory, it was to defend itself
against this threat that the Soviet Union did its
utmost to prevent the establishment of an Isla-
mic republic in Afghanistan.
39. Mention has also been made of the
application of the infamous Brezhnev doctrine,
under which the Soviet Union believes it has a
right and duty to intervene in communist
countries should the r6gime be threatened,
albeit by domestic, popular choice. In the case
of Asia, there has admittedly not been a divi-
sion into zones of occupation as in Europe
after the second world war, and in spite of the
communist nature of the r6gime established in
April 1978 it might have been thought that the
Brezhnev doctrine would not be applied as in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, it
should be recalled that, in 1978, Afghanistan
signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation
with the Soviet Union associating it with the
Soviet bloc.
40. A fourth theory is that the invasion of
Afghanistan was due to China's militant policy
towards the Soviet Union and the assistance
which the Afghans received from Pakistan,
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itself threatened by India's ambitions. Hence,
it is believed that it was with the connivance of
India that the Soviet Union stationed its forces
on the frontiers of Pakistan so as to bring about
the liquidation of that state, already seriously
threatened and weakened since the l97l war.
So far, no evidence has been offered in
support ofthis theory.
41. Finally, it has of course been under-
lined, and must be emphasised, that the inva-
sion of Afghanistan brings Soviet forces to less
than 500 km from the Gulf of Oman, i.e. the
route from the Arab-Persian Gulf to the Indian
Ocean. From there, it is easy for Soviet tanks
to reach the shores of the Gulf of Oman quickly
and for the naval bases which Russia has
always dreamt of to be set up in this warm and
open sea. Although a direct invasion of Pakis-
tan and Iran may seem rather unlikely, because
of the risk of the third world countries uniting
against the Soviet Union, a Baluchi revolt
against either Pakistan or Iran could well pro-
vide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to
seem to promote the formation of a Baluchi
state under its protection. In this way, the
Soviet Union could, through the intermediary
of this state of the shore of the Gulf of Oman,
control the route through which passes most of
the West's ind particularly Western Europe's
oil supplies and thus have the whole western
world at its mercy because it would be able to
cut this route whenever it thought fit.
42. To all these reasons should perhaps be
added possible errors of calculation by Soviet
leaders who may have underestimated the
Afghans' will to resist and that of the whole
Moslem world then deeply disturbed by the
development of the conflict between the new
Iranian republic and the United States and the
western countries' will to react.
43. However this may be, any or all of these
various explanations are possible, and whatever
the Soviet leaders' intentions may have been
when they decided to take large-scale action in
Afghanistan, they certainly opened new and
threatening vistas in Iran, Pakistan and the
region of the Gulf. This de facto situation
must obviously form the basis of our reasoning
rather than possible suppositions regarding the
intentions of the masters of the Kremlin.
44. The present situation is particularly
confused, both militarily and diplomatically.
Militarily, a strong Soviet presence in the
area is undeniable. However, despite the
growth in its naval forces in the Indian Ocean,
the Soviet Union does not yet command the
seas where American fleets have been consider-
ably strengthened by the arrival of aircraft-
carriers and reinforcements from several Euro-
pean countries. But the United States' deci-
sion to send a force of 1,800 marines to Oman
is not likely to disturb the Soviet Union's
overwhelming preponderanco in land forces.
Similarly, United States supplies of arms to
Pakistan are not likely to be enough for it to
resist a Soviet attack, particularly if, as is prob-
able, India gave its backing to the Soviet
move.
45. The fact that a large number of Afghans
took refuge in Pakistan (it is ostimated that they
numbered about 600,000 at the beginning of
1980) has serious implications. It is quite clear
that these refugees form a reserve on which the
Afghan rebels may draw and that Soviet forces
are incapable of making the frontiers between
Afghanistan and Pakistan airtight because of
the terrain. Should the crisis worsen it is diffi-
cult to see how Pakistan could not be involved.
The threat is very serious.
46. The Soviet Union has not concealed the
fact that it intends to keep its forces in Afghan-
istan until order is firmly restored. None of
the sanctions conjured up against the Soviet
Union after its invasion of Afghanistan seems to
have weakened its determination which has
been firmly expressed and implemented by
Soviet leaders. Everything indicates that Afghan-
istan will, for a long time to come, be an
area of tension and threat and that the mainte-
nance of the present status quo, however
unsatisfactory to the West, will mean it making
an effort in the military field and in assistance
to the countries threatened, foremost being
Pakistan, but certainly also Iran and Turkey
and probably others. It will be possible to
make this effort only if the western world as a
whole clearly realises what is at'stake and has
the firm determination to do something about
it.
47. First reactions to the invasion of
Afghanistan make one wonder about the
realism of this apprehension and determina-
tion. Although all western countries and many
third world countries have condemned the
Soviet intervention, the propoBals for retaliatory
measures against the Soviet Union made by the
United States Government have so far received
but limited response, even from certain mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance.
48. This is why the British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington,
made a proposal to members of the European
Community at the ministerial meeting in Rome
on l9th February 1980, which the Nine adop-
ted, as shown in the communiqu6 issued on
that occasion, in which they state inter alia:
" ......
4. It is also their (the Nine's) desire
to seek out ways and means of restoring
a situation in line with the resolution of
the General Assembly of the United
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Nations of l4th January, which appeals
to all states to respect the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, political indepen-
dence and non-aligned character of
Afghanistan and to refrain from any
interference in the internal affairs of that
country.
5. They take the view that, in this
spirit, the crisis could be overcome
constructively through an arrangement
which allows a neutral Afghanistan to
be outside competition among the
powers.
6. Accordingly, they have decided to
go into this point more thoroughly and
to concert their position on the subject
with all allied and friendly countries
and with all countries having an interest
in the equilibrium and stability of the
region. "
49. The Americans had some reservations
about this proposal; but on the whole there is
every indication that the United States Govern-
ment shares the point of view of most European
governments that an attempt should be made to
ensure the early withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan.
50. In the Soviet Union, the Nine's propo-
sal first met with an indignant refusal on the
curious pretext that the Afghanistan. It
is quite evident that if the Soviet position were
to remain the same and if the invasion of
Afghanistan by a strong armed force is not an
intrusion in the internal affairs of this country
while a reasonable compromise proposal allow-
ing it to be evacuated without the Soviet Union
losing face is an intolerable intervention, no
dialogue is possible between the Soviet Union
and the western countries. However, subse-
quent statements by Soviet leaders show that
they might be prepared to negotiate on the
basis of the Nine's proposal.
51. It is not impossible that the continued
resistance of the Afghan people, which still
make.s it impossible for the Soviet army to
control the country, in spite of the destruction
and massacres which are apparently on the
increase, might make the Soviet Union less
uncompromising, particularly since a firm pol-
icy pursued by the West would have every
chance of being followed by all Moslem coun-
tries and probably by many other non-aligned
countries, which would place the Soviet Union
in an untenable international, and perhaps also
internal, situation.
52. Your Rapporteur is therefore convinced
that only a very firm and sustained stand can
help to solve the problem raised by the inva-
sion of Afghanistan and he welcomes the fact
that at the meeting of the European Council on
28th April the Nine at least managed to adopt ajoint declaration on the international situation,
the text of which is given at Appendix L
lll. India and Pakistan
53. In the sixteenth century, the conquest of
the Indian sub-continent by the Mogul dynasty
brought political unity to this vast area. The
dynasty's tolerance allowed very diflerent ethnic
and religious groups to live side by side in rela-
tive peace, among which the Moslem faction
played an essential r6le in terms of civilisation,
economy and administration, but without
dominating in an unacceptable manner the
Hindu population which was in the majority in
the area. When the British Empire took over
from the Moguls in the eighteenth century, it
was possible to maintain the political unity of
the Indian sub-continent until 1947.
54. With the departure of the British came
civil war between part of the Moslem popula-
tion and the Hindus, leading inevitably to parti-
tion between the Indian Union and Pakistan in
two parts, one in the Ganges delta, the other in
the Indus valley. While Pakistan had a very
large Moslem majority, India retained a large
number of Moslems within its predominantly
Hindu population. Today, some 100 million
of the 800 million Indians are believed to be
Moslem; whereas in present-day Pakistan there
are believed to be more than 80 million Mos-
lems out of a total population of less than 90
million.
55. Pakistan's unity as initially conceived
was based essentially on the Islamic faith; but
the distance between the then two parts of the
country and the fact that its inhabitants were of
very different ethnic origins made it difficult for
them to cohabit in a fairly centralised state.
The l97l war between India and Pakistan
Ied to the separation of the eastern part of
Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. But there
are still tensions even in the remaining wes-
tern part of the country, as initially established.
56. Although free elections were held in
1973, this was exceptional, and today there is
again an authoritative government in Islamabad
which seized power in 1977 in a coup d'6tat.
Its authority is not easily accepted, particularly
in the south of the country, inhabited by Balu-
chis, where there is permanent unrest.
57. It was probably inevitable that the Indian
Union should aim at reunifying the former
Indian empire. Hence Pakistan has constantly
proved to be its principal adversary, India
having apparently found the territorial annexa-
tions which followed the Chinese offensive in
the Himalayas in 196l more acceptable than
the partition of 1947, even after India's victory
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in 1971. As Pakistan has always felt threa-
tened by Indian claims, particularly during the
governments of Pandit Nehru and his daughter,
Mrs. Gandhi, who were born in the disputed
and divided province of Kashmir, it has been
natural for it to seek alliance with India's other
adversary,. China, and to join a coalition with
Middle East countries and the United States in
SEATO in 1954 and accede to the Baghdad
Pact, which became CENTO. Pakistan left
CENTO in 1978 in protest at the absence of
American action against the establishment of
a communist rdgime in Afghanistan. But in
spite of a diffrcult relationship with the United
States, which refused to supply it with arms,
objected to the 1977 coup d'6tat, and opposed
the building of nuclear power stations in Pakis-
tan, the latter is still allied with the United
States under a bilateral agreement concluded in
1959 and also with China; while India, per
contra, has sought the assistance and support of
the Soviet Union. It is very diflicult to deter-
mine what assistance Pakistan actually gave the
Afghans rebelling against the communist
government with effect from 1978, and what
part the United States played in such assis-
tance. But nothing in the information gathered
by your Rapporteur conhrms the Soviet asser-
tion that the Afghan refugee camps which are
increasing in numbers along the Afghan-
Pakistan frontier have been or are mili-
tary training camps. Whether real or alleged,
the question of assistance provided a pretext,
but only a pretext, for the Soviet Union to
maintain that the Afghan insurrection was due
to foreign intervention provoked by the United
States.
58. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the
United States Government has increased co-
operation with Pakistan, stressing its " vital
interests " in the area and its will to " use forceif necessary " to protect these interests. The
transformation of the 1959 agreements into a
full-blown treaty of alliance is however encoun-
tering diffrculties because General Zia ul-Haq
will not agree to the establishment of American
bases on Pakistani territory, but the United
States has agreed to a major quantitative and
qualitative increase in its arms deliveries to
Pakistan on favourable credit terms. Similarly,
China increased its economic and military assis-
tance to Pakistan considerably at the beginning
of 1980.
59. However, it is to be regretted that India
seems ready to react negatively to this assis-
tance. Since 1947, the Indian Union has been
steadily bringing together very varied ethnic,
religious and linguistic groups and a federal
status allows it to maintain a r6gime which, if
not perfectly democratic, at least allows free
elections and an alternance of power. This
political organisation probably makes it possi-
ble for very different groups of humanity to live
together far more easily than in Pakistan. But
today there is every indication that India consi-
den Pakistan as its principal opponent, together
with China. Admittedly, the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan caused concern in India and
Mrs. Gandhi, just elected Prime Minister,
voiced her condemnation of the Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan both during President
Giscard d'Estaing's visit in January 1980 and in
subsequent declarations. However, she later
condemned no less forcefully deliveries of
American weapons to Pakistan. The course of
Indian foreign policy is still far from clear.
60. It would therefore seem to be in the
West's interests to do the maximum to obtain a
reconciliation between India and Pakistan as
the best means of limiting tension, the eflects of
which can but be disastrous for the security of
the whole region in face of an undoubted Soviet
threat. Reconciliation wouldl have the advan-
tage of removing any pretext fbr intervention by
the Soviet Union in a region which is now par-
ticularly threatened.
6l . Pakistani Baluchistan is now the last
obstacle separating Soviet forces from the
Indian Ocean. There is a more or less perrna-
nent rebellion in the area against the govern-
ment in Islamabad, just as Iranian Baluchistanis in permanent conflict with Tehran and
Afghan Baluchistan's relations with Kabul have
always been strained. It now seems to be the
part of the country where resistance to the
Soviet invasion is the least active.
62. These disturbances might serve as a pre-
text for Soviet intervention in Baluchistan and,
ultimately, for the Soviet armies to seize bases
near the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz,
whence they could seriously threaten the West's
oil supplies from the furthen reaches of the
Persian Gulf. The main problem now facing
the West seems to be to avoid the occurrence of
such a combination of circumstances and to
obtain reconciliation between India and Pakis-
tan as an essential condition for the establish-
ment and maintenance of lasting peace in sou-
thern Asia. It is perhaps nrot impossible to
achieve this in view of India's economic depen-
dence on western aid, the weakness of the
Pakistani state, and the concern that might arise
in India at the approach of SOviet armies to its
frontiers. The recent visit by Mr. Swaram
Singh, former Minister of Pakista;r, to New
Delhi and the welcome he received show that
General Zia is aware of the need for reconci-
liation and point to hopes for a rapprochement
between New Delhi and Islamabad.
63. Moreover, from the Indidn point of view,
long-term certainly, it cannot be in that
country's best interest to block or seek to block
western initiatives to strengthen Pakistan's
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defensive capacity. For the only effect of
denying such arrangements would be to force
General Zia or any successor into ever-closer
political and military co-operation with China
which is already unhappy, to put it mildly,
about the existence of a Delhi-Warsaw axis.
Peking, rightly or wrongly but certainly under-
standably, sees the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty
of August l97l as another step forward in what
the Chinese regard as a deliberate, steady pro-
cess of encirclement of China within a growing
Soviet Asian hegemony. With Afghanistan
now absorbed in the USSR and Iran in danger
of disintegration, Pakistan is, in the eyes of
Peking, the only non-Soviet influence or
controlled outlet to the rest of the world except
for China's limited Far Eastern sea coast. So
surely it must be for the benefit of the stability
of the sub-continent, including especially that
of India, that Pakistan is not driven to look
only to an increasingly concerned China to help
to preserve its own identity.
64. Already a framework of co-operation to
this same end does exist, in regard to the Uni-
ted States, despite the total erosion of the
CENTO and SEATO arrangements, via the
provisions of the Pakistan-United States bi-
lateral agreement of 1959; but as Mr. Brzezin-
ski found out on his recent visit to Islamabad,
this agreement in its present form does not
involve the necessary basic ingredients of conh-
dence-building, which Pakistan requires from
the West, if the Soviet occupation of Afghanis-
tan is not to lead to fresh crises in the not-too-
distant future in a region of the world of vital
importance to western economic as well as
political security.
65. For the United States State Department
has always maintained that the 1959 agreement
is only an executive agreement, and conse-
quently of less weight and sanctity than an
international treaty. The difference between
the two is that while a treaty by virtue of its
ratification by the United States Senate is bind-
ing on successive governments, an executive
agreement which lacks such ratification is bind-
ing primarily on the administration which
enters into it. Furthermore, United States
assistance by way of armed force is conditional
on consent of the Congress of the United States
which may or may not be forthcoming. Also
the agreement does not make it mandatory for
the United States President to provide assis-
tance by way of armed force, but only discre-
tionary.
66. Moreover, the United States has shown
reluctance to Pakistan's request to convert the
agreement into a treaty with Senate ratifications
in order to give it more credibility. They have
proposed that there could be a Congressional
reaffirmation of the agreement. On this score,
visiting Congressmen to Islamabad, even since
the invasion of Afghanistan, have informed that
prior Congressional reaffrrmation of the 1959
agreement would be no assurance that the
Congress would support the President if he
decided to despatch United States forces to
help Pakistan repel Soviet aggression, direct or
directed. Congressional concurrence, accord-
ing to them, would depend upon the political
climate of opinion at that time.
67. The agreement in its preamble and Arti-
cle I refers to the " joint resolution to promote
peace and stability in the Middle East ". This
reference is to the so-called Eisenhower doc-
trine. In its preamble and Article IV the
agreement also refers to the London declaration
of 28th July 1958. Under paragraph 4 of the
London declaration, United States military
assistance is made subject to " existing Congres-
sional authorisation ".
68. Thus the Eisenhower doctrine and the
London declaration clearly limit the effective-
ness of the 1959 agreement, to an extent unac-
ceptable to the rebuilding of confidence in the
West's will as well as its capacity to prevent
further Soviet-inspired political eruptions.
lY. Iran
69. Your Rapporteur examined the ques-
tions raised by developments in Iran in 1978
and 1979 in the report adopted by the Assem-
bly in December 1979. He described the revo-
lutionary movement which, on lst February
1979,led to the fall of the Shah's r6gime and its
replacement by an Islamic republic which,
having brought to power the more reactionary
elements among students, was already encoun-
tering opposition from numerous ethnic mino-
rities, including the Kurds in western Iran, the
Azerbaijanis in the north and the Baluchis in
the south-east with the risk not only of total
anarchy but of a dismemberment of the coun-
try. It has proved to be a political system
which gave power to religious leaders without
responsibility and brutally repressed the former
heads of the administration and the arrny, eco-
nomic leaders and liberal intellectuals. Force
has been its only answer to autonomist
claims. In the name of the Islamic faith it has
conducted subversive activities which remain a
threat to its neighbours and the Gulf states, has
spread hostile propaganda about the West
throughout the Moslem world and has helped
to worsen the world economic crisis by cutting
the country's oil output which it was anyhow
quickly ruining, causing too sharp a rise in the
price of this essential source of energy, of
which, hitherto, Iran was the world's fourth
producer and second exporter.
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70. The fact that the West has been apathe-
tic and powerless in watching the " red and
black revolution " take over certainly helped to
convince the Soviet Union that a take-over in
Afghanistan would not meet with greater oppo-
sition. It was also disturbing for its traditional
allies in the Near and Middle East who may
well wonder whether it would make a greater
effort to support them in case of urgent danger
than it did for its Iranian ally.
71. However, three events have profoundly
changed the relationship between Iran and the
West since November 1979. The hrst was of
course the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet
forces. No one in Iran could be unaware of
the threat represented by the Soviet Union,
Iran's neighbour on both shores of the Cas-
pian. In the new circumstances, isolation,
both local and international, became a major
dangei, which incited Iran to be more cautious
in its relations with the rest of the world, to
stand aloof from the Soviet Union, to draw
closer to Iraq and the Gulf countries and to
seek arrangements with the West with a view
inter alia to obtaining technical assistance and
armaments which had become essential. This
attempt has been made immeasurably more
diflicult by the direct intervention of Iranian
" students " in the political life of the country.
72. First, there was a show of force by these
so-called students, more or less tolerated if not
encouraged by the Council of the Iranian revo-
lution and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, at
the United States Embassy on 4th November
1979. Some fifty members of the embassy staff
were confined to the building and have since
been held hostage by the Iranian students who
are asking for the former Shah, who had taken
refuge in the United States, to be handed over
to them in exchange for their liberation. It
was quite evident that the United States
Government could not hand over the former
head of a friendly state who had taken refuge in
the United States. It therefore merely arranged
for the Shah to leave American territory.
Since then negotiations, both long and compli-
cated, have been conducted between the United
States Government, the Iranian authorities, the
students occupying the United States Embassy
and a number of other countries, not to men-
tion the United Nations and various unofficial
organisations, in order to find a solution to this
affair in view of the Iranian Government's need
to strengthen its international position, when
the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. In
February there were signs that progress was
being made towards the liberation of the host-
ages in exchange for the creation of an inter-
national committee to enquire into the Shah's
so-called " crimes " and also for some form of
recognition by the United States of the mistakeit had made in supporting the former Iranian
r6gime. This hope faded in March when the
decision about the fate of the hostages was
deferred to the future Iranian National Assem-
bly and after a first round of fairly doubtful
elections in terms of democratic practice gave
the advantage to supporters of the Ayatollah.
73. There is little doubt that the Soviet
Union is encouraging, if not directly, through
influence on the Iranian Tudeh Party, the
extremist students who are defying the author-
ity of the government by keeping these hostagesin the United States Embassy in Tehran.
Although there may not be any absolute proof
of collusion, the backing afforded by the Tudeh
Party (Communist) to the students allows this
to be safely presumed. Moreover, the fact is
that the students are serving the interests of the
Soviet Union by turning Iranian opinion
against the United States whicfr otherwise might
have shown far greater solidarity with the
Afghan people in the teeth of Soviet invasion
and by preventing a closer rapprochement
between the cause of Islam and that of the
West, both being threatened by the USSR.
The United States for its part has to wage a
battle on two fronts in the Middle East since it
cannot bow to blackmail baped on its diplo-
mats being taken hostage any more than it can
agree to Afghanistan being invaded and occu.-
pied. If the sayine 
"fecil cui prodest constitutedproof, it could well apply to the Soviet Union's
r6le in the problem of the hostages in Tehran
as it now stands.
74. The diversity of the ongoing negotia-
tions, the secrecy about somd of their aspects
and the false rumours which are being spread
make it extremely diflicult to assess the true
situation. It is quite certain that the Iranian
Government under Mr. Bani Sadr seems clearly
to wish to terminate a crisis which is poisoning
its relations with the rest of the world and
leaving Iran in a state of extileme weakness in
face of the Soviet threat and the internal diffi-
culties it is encountering with the uprisings by
the Kurds, Azerbaijis and Baluchis.
75. The western powers for their part seem
to have every interest in being patient, however
intolerable this may be for the American
Government and specifically for the members
of the United States Embassy who have now
been kept hostage for several months and
although patience cannot be said ethically to be
the right response to the challenge to human
rights represenfed by accredited diplomats being
taken hostage.
76. In the international situation created by
the invasion of Afghanistan, the fundamental
interests of the Islamic countries, concerned
about their independence and security, corres-
pond to those of the West, i.e. above all to
maintain balance and peace in Asia and
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throughout the world and to ensure the freedom
and independence of nations.
77. The other important event in Iran at the
beginning oT tgSO was the formation of a legal
government after the election of IUr. Bani Sadr
as President of the Republic on 28th January
1980. This election, which seems to have been
held in fairly satisfactory conditions, is to be
followed shortly by legislative elections which
should complete the establishment of a consti-
tutional r6gime. The age and ill-health of
Ayatollah Khomeini can but help to weaken
the authority of irresponsible, religious ele-
ments in face of stable civil authorities respon-
sible to the electorate.
78. There is 
- 
or should be 
- 
now a person
of responsibility in Iran who has been legally
elected by a clear majority of the Iranian peo-
ple, whose authority is at least partially
recognised by Ayatollah Khomeini, and who
seems to have the wish if not yet the power
needed to restore internal order and guide Iran
back to its due place on the international
scene. It is certainly not in the interests of the
western countries to weaken Mr. Bani Sadr's
position. On the contrary, they would surely
be well advised in helping him to restore state
authority in Iran.
79. The moderation shown by the United
States and the European countries in the affair
of the hostages seems to indicate that they fully
understand the position. There is certainly no
question of doing other than continue to show
disapproval of those who have so seriously
attacked one of the essential principles of inter-
national law. Yet only a strong-enough
government can make this principle prevail
among those who are holding the Americans
hostage. The weakness of states bordering on
the Soviet Union is certainly no guarantee of
peace or lawfulness. The unfortunate United
States attempt to rescue the hostages on 24th
April did nothing to change the.nature of the
problem, nor did it change the position of the
Nine, as shown by their declaration on 28th
April.
Y. The Arab-Israeli dispute
80. The events in Afghanistan occurred at a
time when the Arab world was already pro-
foundly disturbed and divided, firstly by the
signing and application of the Camp David
agreements between Egypt and Israel, secondly
by a series of economic diiferences relating
mainly to the fixing of oil prices, and thirdly by
the implications of the reawakening of Moslem
fundamentalism.
81 . There is no clearly-defined separation
between the two sides. Where Palestine is
concerned Egypt seems totally isolated in the
Arab world. But there are also major differ-
ences between countries which, like Libya,
seem to want no form of peace between the
Arab world and Israel, and others which, like
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are doing their
utmost to hnd an acceptable settlement for all
the peoples concerned including the Pales-
tinians.
82. The question of oil prices naturally
involves contradictions between exporting and
importing countries whose interests would be
diametrically opposed if certain exporting
countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
were not contributing to the Arab fund and the
Kuwait fund in order to afford assistance in the
development of Arab countries without oil.
83. The reawakening of Moslem fundamen-
talism appears to have affected almost all Arab
countries, but some states are trying to use it
principally as a basis for increasing their own
national influence within the Arab world.
This is the case of Colonel Kadhafi's Libya;
whereas others, such as Saudi Arabia, see it as a
threat to their own internal stability. It should
be added that the Shi'ites, who form a large
proportion of the population of the Gulf
countries (60 0/o in Bahrein, 33 0/o in Kuwait),
have sadly become an element of discord in the
eyes of the Sunnite governments of these
countries since the Iranian revolution.
84. This extremely confused situation quite
clearly facilitated the Soviet operation in
Afghanistan. In general, the operation was
condemned by all Moslem countries. But it
has been reported that several countries such as
South Yemen and Syria and the Palestine
Liberation Organisation were nevertheless
determined not to jeopardise their friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, probably because
of the assistance which they expect from it in
support of their cause in the war between the
two Yemens, in the Palestinian affair or in
Lebanon, respectively. Only the Gulf coun-
tries reacted strongly to the threat since, admit-
tedly, they were in the front line. Their
governments have planned various means of
political and military rapprochement and
strengthened their armies in order to counter
internal subversion, as in Oman, Saudi Arabia,
Bahrein and Qatar in 1979, and in respect of
aggression from abroad, possibly from Iran or
from prot6g6s of the Soviet Union.
85. The Arab countries' front in face of the
invasion of Afghanistan does not therefore seem
to be a united one and the Egyptian newspaper
Al Ahram even claimed, in February, that two
infantry battalions from South Yemen had been
sent to co-operate with the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan. Although this news was not
confirmed, it is a sign of the prevailing uncer-
tainly about the attitude of several Arab count-
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ries. Nor is there any doubt that Libya took
advantage of the situation created by the inva-
sion of Afghanistan to attempt a show of force
against the Tunisian Government in Gafsa and
that Syria, which had seemed about to evacuate
Lebanon, has at least delayed its decision.
86. Developments in the Yemen are even
more disturbing insofar as there has been a
rapprochement between North and South
Yemen in favour of the government in Aden,
which is heavily armed by the Soviet Union
and backed by a Soviet presence in Ethio-pia. It has been reliably reported that six
Soviet troop carriers crossed the Suez Canal in
mid-February, two of which left contingents of
troops from Eastern Europe in Hodeida and the
four others in Aden, where Soviet instructors
have already been training South Yemenite
troops for several months in the use of recently-
delivered MiG-21 aircraft. Latest develop-
ments following on increased Saudi financial
support of North Yemen are a little more
encouraglng.
87. One of the first aims of the two Yemeni
Governments in their negotiations since the
1978 war was, in theory, the creation of a joint
armed force to be used to promote a policy of
non-alignment. In fact, the reunification of the
Yemen on the basis of military decisions would,if conf-rrmed, be a serious threat to the Sulta-
nate of Oman. The United States and Saudi
Arabia, which have made considerable military
efforts to ensure the security of North Yemen,
would thus witness the collapse of one of the
states on which their policy was based and
would have to make even greater efforts to
maintain the independence of the Sultanate of
Oman which would be in considerable danger if
another rebellion in the Dhofar region were to
be backed by a reunified Yemenite arrny equip-
ped with Soviet arms.
88. Currently the strength of the Omani
army, air force and navy, although being aug-
mented as rapidly as the nation's economic
resources permit, is adequate only to maintain
internal security, coastal surveillance duties,
and to hold at bay an attack from its well-
armed hostile neighbour, South Yemen, whose
domestic military capability is heavily rein-
forced by Cuban troops, East German military
advisers and maybe even some Soviet officers
and skilled personnel to help to handle the
sophisticated weaponry the USSR has seen fit
to supply to this small country in such bounti-
ful measure.
89. The only immediate external help the
Sultan has at his disposal is about 600 British
individual contract oflicers whose obligations
are primarily designated in a training r6le in
the Omani national armed forces.
90. It is evident that even if the limited
deterrent eflect of this small indirect British
presence in Oman should be augmented in due
course by an American force of 1,800 marines
on permanent alert stand-by at sea or on Diego
Garcia, this would not be suffioient, particularly
since this latter element migh[ have to handle
difliculties in all the countrie$ round the Gulf
let alone Pakistan. ThereforJe the important
proposal for setting up a ll0l000-strong inter-
vention force ready to move anywhere in the
world at short notice, announoed by the United
States at the beginning of 1979, will have to be
implemented quickly if coniidence is to be
restored in an area which, it should be recalled,
contains half the known oil reserves.
91. Present divisions and oonflicts through-
out the Arab world obviously [refp Soviet oper-
ations in the area. The fac( that the Soviet
army has moved closer to the Strait of Hormuz
can but heighten the threat of Soviet intrusion
in the affairs of Arab countries and strengthen
" red " or " black " subversiott such as already
made many of these countries tremble in 1979,
including the most powerful, Saudi Arabia, at a
time when the health of its Sovereign was a
matter of concern.
92. It is quite evident that the West has no
interest in intervening directly in the internal
affairs of the Arab world, bu! it has even less
interest in siding with the qpponents of the
Arab countries. Today, its ofvious interest is
definitely to maintain peace a[rd relative unity
in the Arab world so as, on lhe one hand, to
ensure a normal flow of its oil supplies and, on
the other, to avoid the Soviot Union finding
further opportunities for intervening in the area
and setting up bases near the oil route.
93. This is a measure of the West's interest
in re-establishing progress towards durable
peace in Palestine because, ag long as Israel is
in a position to use the Catnp David agree-
ments as a basis for continuing to pursue an
expansionist policy, particularly on the West
Bank, the Arab countries rnost interested in
destroying the established ord,er in the Middle
East will continue to call on the Soviet Union
to support their cause, and the more moderate
Arab leaders will find thernselves increasingly
isolated and threatened.
94. In the report which he submitted to the
Assembly in November 1979, your Rapporteur
referred to the need, embodying effective gua-
rantees for Israel's own security, for the West to
restore peace based on the effdctive right of the
peoples of the Israeli-occupr,ed territories to
self-determination in conditions which might be
those proposed by the Jordanian Government
and which Egypt 
-but not Israel- has appar-
ently just endorsed. The restoration of peace
in Palestine would place the West in a much
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better position to help the Arab governments to
deploy, with popular support, the forces needed
for deterring the Soviet Union from intervening
in the region.
95. Indeed it cannot be too often stressed
that whereas a generally acceptable solution to
the Palestinian problem is not a panacea which
will cause all other causes of friction to fall
away, no solution can ever be reached which
does not include a Palestinian settlement.
Both the French and British Governments have
taken the lead in the face of the likelihood of
the Camp David agreements failing to produce
any definitive advancement by the time the tri-
partite agreement of 26th May lapses, partly
because of Mr. Begin's obduracy and partly
because of the all too clearly and recently illus-
trated inability of any American initiative to
break the deadlock in an election year. It
would not be right to omit mention of the
encouraging fact that there are growing signs
that Mr. Begin's hard-line approach to the
whole problem is by no means endorsed by
signihcant sections of the Israeli people.
96. Your Rapporteur has to note that since
November 1979 marked progress has been
made in the directions suggested by the WEU
Assembly when it adopted the draft recommen-
dation presented on behalf of the General
Affairs Committee.
97. During a visit to several Arab capitals
in March 19'79, the French President, Val6ry
Giscard d'Estaing, made a number of state-
ments and was party to several joint communi-
qu6s, the main terms of which may be found in
the Franco-Jordanian communiqu6 of I lth
March:
"......
The two heads of state agreed that the
quest for a peace settlement guarantee-
ing the legitimate rights and aspirations
of all parties concerned was more than
ever indispensable, and they noted that
the international community was now
aware of the need to flrnd an interna-
tional solution to the Middle East crisis,
based on the United Nations Charter,
on the Security Council resolutions and
hence on the following principles: with-
drawal of the Israelis from the Arab
territories occupied in 1967, recognition
of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people including their right to a home-
land on these territories, and recognition
of the right of all the states of the area
to live in peace within secure, recog-
nised and guaranteed frontiers.
The two heads of state acknowledged
the crucial nature of the Palestinian
problem. They expressed their belief
that this was not a problem of refugees,
but of a people who legitimately aspire
to exist as such and who must be in a
position to exercise their right to self-
determination in the framework of the
peace settlement.
The two heads of state agreed to direct
every effort towards opening up the
prospect ofgenuine peace. They consi-
dered that the principles of the global
settlement applied to all parties invol-
ved. These should therefore be associ-
ated in the negotiations, in particular
the Palestinian people, which presuppo-
sed the participation of the Palestine
Liberation Organisation.
.. .... 
tt
98. The British Government, for its part,
described its attitude towards the PLO in a
statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Lord Carrington, in the House of
Commons on l Tth March:
"...We continue to believe that the PLO
is an important factor, and will have to
be involved at some stage in the peace
process. At the same time we urge
them to accept Israel's right to live in
peace within secure and recognised
boundaries.
...I do not think that any progress in
Middle East peace efforts is possible
without an acceptance and a recognition
by the Palestinians, and therefore by the
PLO as well, of the state of Israel as a
state. That is absolutely essential.
Equally, I do not think it is possible to
get peace in the Middle East without
some recognition on the part of Israel of
the rights of the Palestinians.
...I do not think that the PLO, as such,
is a terrorist organisation. There are
some elements of the PLO which in the
past have been associated with the terro-
rists; but it would be a great mistake to
assume that it is possible to get a settle-
ment in the area without taking into
account the PLO... "
99. Already one country of Western Europe,
Austria, has recognised the PLO on l3th March
1980 aS the legal representative of the Palesti-
nian people, as Portugal also did. The Belgian
Government has recalled that in February 1978it had advocated recognising the PLO and the
Palestinians' right to self-determination which,
moreover, had been approved by the Nine as a
whole in the United Nations.
100. However, the Netherlands Minister for
Foreign Affairs made a statement in Cairo on
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llth March 1980 which seems to describe the
present position of the Nine when he said:
" The European Community will take
no initiative on the settlement of the
Middld East problem before 26th May
next when the negotiations on indepen-
dence are to be concluded. Europe has
no plans for an initiative for the time
being. We all agreed not to take a
decision before this important date.
Subsequently we shall study whether a
European initiative will be useful or
not. "
l0l. In its declaration of 28th April, the
European Council specihed that it had instruc-
ted the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs
to submit a report to it on these problems at
its next meeting.
102. It was to try to break the deadlock in
the negotiations between Egypt and Israel that
President Carter, on l9th March, invited King
Hussein of Jordan, Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat to
go to Washington to discuss the situation with
him. Probably for the same reasons, on lst
March, the United States Representative to the
Security Council voted for a resolution presen-
ted by Morocco and Jordan condemning Israeli
settlements in occupied territories. This reso-
lution was thus adopted unanimously. Presi-
dent Carter subsequently said that this vote was
due to a breakdown in communications and the
United States had intended to abstain. This
means however that it would not have opposed
the resolution, which was therefore, and is, a
valid, lawful Security Council document.
Moreover the reasons put forward by President
Carter to justify this abstention were solely
concerned with Jerusalem and not the con-
demnation of settlements in occupied territo-
ries, which condemnation the United States
therefore endorsed, and presumably still
endorses.
103. It therefore has to be faced that, in spite
of Israel's evacuation of Sinai, the negotiations
between Egypt and Israel will not, unless a near
miracle intervenes, be terminated before 26th
May. The time will then surely be ripe for
Europe to initiate steps for the debate
on Palestine to be opened in another frame-
work and with the participation of all con-
cerned, especially the neighbouring states most
directly affected by the present impasse, and
usefully too, your Rapporteur suggests apart
from the United States because of its particular
ties with Israel, by France and the United
Kingdom because of their close historic ties
and obligations in the area.
104. In the naval field, the growth of the
Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has been
accompanied by an at least equivalent if not
greater increase in western forces in the area,
where the American fleet has already been
strengthened and the United Kingdom, France,
Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany sent
warships in January or February 1980. But
the deterrent effect of the West's apparent naval
superiority is not suffrcient to guarantee the
maintenance of peace in the Middle East. It is
essential to deploy large contingents within
speedy reach of, if not in, the area
capable of meeting large-scale Soviet military
action. But it seems clear that the United
States does not at present have the logistic
means and air transport for sending such a
force to the Middle East.
105. However, although the United States
and the Soviet Union are not yet in direct
confrontation they are both present in force
near the Strait of Hormuz, with the danger of
the Middle East conflict being internationalised
on a scale unknown in this region since the
second world war, and this at a time when, in
spite of the prodigious growth in their wealth,
a number of Arab countries are being consi-
derably weakened by the reawakening of Islamic
fundamentalism which seems to be increasingly
exploited by countries such as Libya and, more
and more, by revolutionary Iran.
Yl. Turkey
106. A review of the situation in the Near
and Middle East would not be complete
without mention of the prqsent position in
Turkey. At the junction of Europe and the
Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Arab
world, Turkey occupies a kqy position. The
size of its population which, if the present rate
continues, will have increased by 168 0/o bet-
ween 1950 and 1990, making Turkey one of
the most densely-populated countries in Eur-
ope, its strong military traditions and its deli-
berate choice since 1921 to belong to the wes-
tern world and to have a democratic r6gime
now make it an essential part of the West's
security arrangements in the Near East.
107. However, in the past ten years there
have been very serious economic difficulties in
Turkey since it has not yet been able to make
much progress in economic development, and
there have also been serious internal political
problems of which the Soviet Union has fre-
quently tried to take advantage. The demo-
cratic rdgime set up by Ataturk is experiencing
difficulties. Moslem fundamentalism has made
great strides and links up with extreme left-
wing or communist factions to create an
atmosphere of terror and disorder. Each
month, there are hundreds of victims of internal
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disturbances in Turkey, the situation being par-
ticularly serious in Izmir as recently as in
January 1980.
108. The return to power in 1978 of the
People's Republican Party led by Mr. Ecevit
did nothing to alleviate the situation. On the
contrary, it has grown worse because of Tur-
key's underdevelopment, its meagre resources of
energy which it has to import at ever-higher
prices and dwindling western assistance due to
ihe economic crisis and the poor functioning of
the association between Turkey and the EEC.
This led, at the beginning of 1979, to the return
to power of the Justice Party with Mr. Demirel
at the head of a minority government which
is still far from having the situation in hand.
109. In the military held, the Cyprus aflair
in 1975 led the United States to place a uni-
lateral embargo on arms supplies to Turkey
although it was a member of NATO. The
result was that when the United States decided
to resume supplies in 1979 the Turkish army's
equipment had become obsolescent and needed
to be replaced very quickly. Moreover,
Turkey had retaliated against the United States
measures by banning observation stations
directed at the Soviet Union from its territory.
I 10. There have already been extensive nego-
tiations with- the Turkish Government and
more will probably be necessary before there is
a return to an acceptable situation. In the
circumstances, the West has no choice. Tur-
key must be helped to rebuild a modern
army. It must be given means of extricating
itself from its present serious economic crisis
and also be offered sounder prospects of inte-
gration in the western world than hereto-
fore. While the Americans and the British to a
lesser extent seem prepared to supply the arms
needed by the Turkish forces, the Federal
Republic of Germany, particularly concerned
by the fate of Turkey because of long-standing
traditions and also the presence of more than a
million Turkish workers in Germany, instruc-
ted Mr. Matthoeffer, its Minister of Finance, in
January 1980, to assess the amount of assis-
tance Turkey needed and to organise co-
operation between the western countries to
provide this assistance which initial estimates
place at about $3,500 million over a
period of three years.
I I l. In February 1980, the European Com-
munities for their part decided to reacti-
vate procedure for association with Turkey in
conditions which would ensure better employ-
ment possibilities for Turkish workers and a
better market for Turkey's agricultural and tex-
tile products, with the prospect of earlier acces-
sion to the Community than previously envi-
saged. Although these measures call for major
financial sacrifices by the whole Community,
are contrary to the Federal Republic's employ-
ment policy, run counter to the interests of the
Mediterranean members of the Community and
cause political concern in Greece, they must be
taken and their urgency cannot be overempha-
sised. With a praiseworthy degree of states-
manship the Greek Government has shown its
realisation of this, particularly in the context of
Mr. Matthoeffer's mission, and of West Ger-
many's continuing concern. There is no
reason to doubt that this is so for all the
western countries.
Yll. Conclusions
l12. In occupying Afghanistan the Soviet
Union has seized an essential strategic point in
an area where the West's position had been
particularly undermined by the expansion of
Vietnam, the weakening of Pakistan, the Ira-
nian revolution, the crisis in Turkey and the
general uncertainty prevailing in the Arab
world. The signs of weakness shown by the
West itself in recent years, in both the econo-
mic and the foreign policy helds, have only
allowed the Soviet leaders to think that every-
thing was now possible for them.
ll3. Admittedly, the extent of reactions to
the Kabul affair and the ferocious resistance of
the Afghans may have led the Kremlin to won-
der whether their calculations, in this particular
instance, were correct.
l14. Be that as it may, to have a lasting
deterrent effect vis-i-vis future Soviet adventu-
rism western reactions must be backed up by a
tangible demonstration of the West's military
capability 
- 
and will power 
- 
in the threatened
area and its determination to use this capability
and will power, if need be. The gathering of a
large fleet in the Indian Ocean, where European
ships will be alongside American ships, is
already a significant deterrent, but to be fully
effective in the continental Middle East terri-
tories there is a need for land and air forces
within striking distance of the threatened areas.
Despite the increased Soviet threat there is cer-
tainly not yet any readiness in Oman to permit
the permanent stationing on land of any exter-
nal armed forces. This reluctance of even the
countries most friendly to the West derives
from three considerations, not each of course to
the same extent in each case.
ll5. Firstly, fear of neo-colonialism reasser-
ting itself, in whatever context, is still very
real. Secondly, there is a fear that in the
context of the present credibility gap of an
effective western deterrent to, and, if need be,
response to any further Soviet advances, there is
an understandable apprehension that to accept
new obligations implying commitment to the
West could endanger rather than improve their
chances of avoiding an Afghan fate. Thirdly,
216
DOCUMENT 844
particularly applicable to Moslem countries,
even extending to Pakistan and beyond, the
existence of a serious irritant dimension in
regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute sours the
whole situation.
I16. The provision of base facilities as oppo-
sed to a physical presence, except by agree-
ment, at a time of crisis is another and much
more promising possibility.
l17. It is perfectly clear that the Soviet
Union has not yet suffered a setback by the
extent of western reaction likely to achieve
either of these aspirations. The outcome of the
Afghan operation may certainly be considered
negative in some important respects in that the
result has been condemnation by 108 members
of the United Nations and by the conference of
Islamic countries meeting in Islamabad, a deter-
ioration in Soviet relations with non-aligned
countries, including Mrs. Gandhi's India, non-
ratification by the United States of the SALT II
agreement, difficulties with its foreign trade and
grain supplies, the compromising of the Olym-
pic Games in Moscow and much closer Sino-
American ties, without so far at least even
managing to gain real control of Afghanistan.
However, even if the Soviet Government
wishes to return to the situation prior to 27th
December 1979, it cannot be hoped that it will
capitulate publicly.
ll8. The purpose of Lord Carrington's pro-
posal, adopted by the Nine and accepted by the
United States, was to allow the Soviet Union,
thanks to the neutralisation of Afghanistan, to
withdraw honourably from the situation in
which it had placed itself and to demonstrate
that it was not the West that sought a show of
strength. Opinions differ as to whether the
Soviet Union seems to have understood the
situation and is showing a desire to take the
way out proposed. Even on the most optimis-
tic appraisal it remains to reach agreement on
the possible meaning of " neutralisation ",
which obviously includes, in western and third
world eyes at least, the Afghans having the right
to determine the internal r6gime of their coun-
try without intervention from outside.
ll9. Unless and until such time as an effec-
tive result has been achieved, the West will
have no solution other than to set up a defence
system to ensure the security of what is a vital
area, and hence its own security, in the Middle
East.
120. In closing, your Rapporteur does not
apologise for emphasising yet again that this
security cannot be guaranteed until a solution
has been found to the Palestinian question
which is acceptable to all concerned, so that it
will stop poisoning the atmosphere of relations
between Moslem and western countries. thus
increasing opportunities and pretexts for direct
or indirect intervention by the Soviet Union in
the Near and Middle East. That is why the
influence of Europe, which alone is now cap-
able of advancing a fair and reasonable solu-
tion, is essential for the establishment of a just
and lasting peace guaranteeing Israel's right to
exist and the Palestinians' right to self-determi-
nation. There is every indication that the
beginning of summer 1980 is to be the decisive
time when a European initiative in this direc-
tion could at last set in motion a process lead-
ing towards peace, since the date of 26th .}l{lay
will allow a final opinion to be reached on the
possible outcome of the Camp David agree-
ments, in this context.
Postscript
l2l. It would be inappropriate to enci this
report, and in particular the immediately prece-
ding chapter " Conclusions ", without reference
to several highly relevant, additional considera-
tions in the context of European security that
came to the notice of the Rapporteur during an
unexpected but very valuable visit by himself to
Muscat and Oman, Pakistan and Turkey
during April, after the main text of this report
had already been drafted.
122. Firstly, there is no doubt at all that
Oman's earlier faith in, and support of, the
Camp David accords as a contribution to a
solution of the Palestinian problem have fast
faded. Although Palestinian, or should one say
PLO, direct influence in the Sultanate is still
insignificant, the same can certainly not be said
of other Gulf states including Kuwait, Qatar,
Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Henoe Oman is find-
ing its lone stance, as an Arab state, in support
of Camp David and maintaining diplomatic
relations with Egypt an increasingly lonely one ;
especially because of the facto too, that Saudi
Arabia is now becoming more and more hard-
line on the subject. These trends are in their
turn making it more and more difficult for
President Sadat of Egypt to persuade the Israeli
Government that any settlement acceptable to
Mr. Begin that could be reached between Cairo
and Tel Aviv could be other than illusory.
123. Secondly, the lack of confidence referred
to earlier in the report on the part of Pakistan
to believe that any reliance can be placed on
western, and in particular on American, pledges
of effective support if the Afghan invasion spills
over into their country, either directly or indi-
rectly through a fragmentation of Baluchistan,
has serious implications in strategic terms on
how essential western interests in the whole
Gulf area and the adjoining Indian Ocean can
be safeguarded. Quite clearly, since regional
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friends of the West are either unwilling or un-
likely to make any signif,rcant contribution to
their own, collective security, the growing gap
in the East-West balance in the area will have
to be filled, and this means of course, except for
some limited European naval contributions, by
the Uniied States. While it seems evident that
the Americans are quite prepared to face up to
this challenge, some sacrifices will have to be
made elsewhere. Your Rapporteur has been
assured at a very authoritative American level
indeed that the naval, air and marine reinforce-
ments required can be found without depleting
the resources devoted to the Euro-Atlantic
NATO theatre. However, it does mean that a
cost will have to be paid in terms of much-
needed anticipated reinforcement of America's
NATO contribution that will at best have to be
deferred for some considerable time. This
means that, since the Soviet military threat in
Europe and the Atlantic is growing daily, the
European countries involved will have them-
selves to make extra efforts towards their own
self-defence other than those already projected
and in the pipeline.
124. Thirdly, there is certainly not yet suffi-
cient awareness of the full extent and implica-
tions of the Afghan refugee problem. The
plight of refugees as such is normally rather a
matter for study by the Council of Europe and
other pertinent bodies concerned with humani-
tarian issues rather than that of a defence orga-
nisation such as WEU. However, this parti-
cular refugee problem is quite different from
most others in that it contains highly explosive
political elements. At the most recent count
there were at least three-quarters of a million
men, women and children who had crossed the
long border of Pakistan to find sanctuary
mainly in the North-West Frontier Province
but also in Baluchistan, and to a small extent
even in Sind. It is estimated that there are
probably up to a quarter of a million more who
have escaped into Pakistan and are staying pri-
vately with fellow-tribesmen and members of
their own families but who do not want to
register with the United Nations, probably
because they feel that such a step could inter-
fere with their freedom to return to a never-
ending battle whenever the opportunity occurs,
in order to harass the Russians and the pro-
Russian Afghan soldiers in their homelands.
Indeed, it is this desire of the refugees not to be
regarded as such, but simply to be treated as
soldiers needing an opportunity to recoup and
obtain new arms and equipment, which is
shared by all Afghan refugees and which
involves such embarrassment for the Pakis-
tanis. For these latter, while entirely sympa-
thetic to their fellow Moslems and entirely
hostile to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
have no wish to provoke punitive Russian raids
against which they do not have the power to
retaliate 
- 
certainly without much greater exter-
nal support than they can as yet envisage as
being likely to be forthcoming.
125. Your Rapporteur, who spoke to hun-
dreds of these same refugees, was struck by one
fact. What was needed, it was said, more than
food and shelter, was more guns to help them
to renew the fight for their homeland and in
particular for weapons capable of bringing
down the helicopter gun-ships which represent
Russia's only effective method of keeping even
a limited measure of control over the moun-
tainous areas outside the urban centres such as
Kabul.
126. There are two other truly dangerous
situations that are arising which could cause
internal disorder in Pakistan to an extent where
Russian exploitation must seem tempting to the
Kremlin.
127. Virtually all the refugees bring with them
not only their families but all their livebtock
too, which has to share the already all too
sparse grazing available in the impoverished
provinces of the North-West Frontier and
Baluchistan.
128. Up to now, religious ties and strict disci-
plinary control by the Pakistani authorities
have prevented local grievances from manifes-
ting themselves; but the long-term social conse-
quences of hundreds of thousands of people
having to endure further deprivation of their
own scant means of livelihood in order to
accommodate the refugees are not difficult to
envisage. Also there are about 80,000 nomads
who for thousands of years have regularly
crossed from the mountainous slopes of
Afghanistan to graze their herds in Pakistan
then to return to the hills again when the
temperature in the plains becomes too hot for
them. This year, for the first time in history,
the nomads seem disinclined to undertake their
annual historic trek, which once again adds to
the explosive potentialities that are involved in
a region where inter-tribal tensions are a paft of
life.
129. It is of course true that if Pakistan is
to receive all the support, politically, economi-
cally and militarily, that it needs from the West
to preserve its national integrity, this would be
easier to achieve in terms of public support
on both sides of the Atlantic if Pakistan could
be seen to be moving away from a rigorous
military rule to a more democratic form of
government, appropriate to the particular
problems of an unevenly divided ethnic popula-
tion in regard to resources as well as numbers
of people 
- 
not an easy solution to find.
130. Yet it is fair to note that General Zia
has made a start in the right dirction 
- 
Mrs.
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Bhutto and her daughter have been released
from house arrest. More civilians' are being
attracted into the cabinet rather than military
personnel. Last but not least at local level
elected district and municipal councils are
now in being and functioning quite well, albeit
in a restricted field of responsibilities.
l3l. It is good to be able to end on another
encouraging note. As your Rapporteur left
Turkey, news had just arrived of the substantial
economic and military western help proffered
by NATO, the United States, West Germany
and Britain. This has undoubtedly led to a
revival of Turkish morale just at a time when
an uplift was desperately needed and a renewed
faith in the benefits of being a member state of
the western comity of nations.
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l. The heads of state and government and
the foreign ministers examined the international
situation. They expressed grave concern at the
trend of recent events, especially in Afghanis-
tan, Iran and the Middle East. They conside-
red that these events now more than ever
require of the member states of the European
Community that they show their cohesion.
2. The European Council noted with deep
concern that Soviet military forces have not
been riithdrawn from Afghanistan despite the
condemnation of the international community
expressed by the General Assembly of the Uni-
ted Nations and despite the repeated calls of the
Nine and of the Islamic conference and the
ASEAN countries.
The European Council reaffirmed the
view of the Nine that a solution in accor-
dance with the resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly could be found in an arran-
gement which allowed Afghanistan to remain
outside competition among the powers and to
return to its traditional position as a neutral
and non-aligned state. Respecting the right of
the Afghan people freely to determine their
own future, they believe that to this end the
great powers and the neighbouring states should
undertake to respect the sovereignty and inte-
grity of Afghanistan, to refrain from inter-
ference in its internal affairs and to renounce all
forms of military presence or association with
it.
The Nine are ready to support, in concert
with friendly and allied countries, any initiative
designed to promote such a solution, emphasi-
sing thaf their own proposal is neither rigid nor
exclusive. In this connection they believe that
the Islamic and non-aligned countries have a
particularly significant 16le to play.
3. Since the occupation of the United States
APPENDIX I
European Council declaration
on the international situation
Luxembourg, 2Eth April 1980
Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of its staff
as hostages, the Nine have repeatedly
condemned this inadmissible violation of inter-
national law. They reaffirm their solidarity
with the government and people of the United
States in their present time of trial.
They consider that the situation created
by this violation opens the door to develop-
ments fraught with serious consequences. A
return to a state of legality is the only way to
ensure peace and security.
The European Council reaffirms the deci-
sions taken by the foreign ministers of the Nine
on 22nd April in Luxembourg.
The Nine declare their full support for
the steps which the Secretary-General of the
United Nations intends to take to secure the
release of the hostages.
4. The Nine reiterated their belief that only
a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement
can bring true peace to the Middle East.
The European Council, conscious that
Europe may in due course have a r6le to play,
instructed foreign ministers to submit a report
on this problem on the occasion of its next
session in Venice.
5. The European Council denounces the
acts of violence committed in southern Leba-
non against members of UNIFIL and demands
that they should cease immediately, and that
the force be permitted to carry out in full its
mandate from the Security Council.
6. At this time of crisis in world affairs the
European Council believes that it is vital that
international procedures for the management of
crisis and the easing of tensions be used to the
full and that the United Nations Charter and
international law be fully upheld.
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APPENDIX II
Recommendation 341
on the impact of the evolving situation in the
Near and Middle East on Western Earopean security
The Assembly,
Considering that the maintenance of
peace in the Near and Middle East is essential
for Western Europe's security and economic
prosperity ;
Regretting that Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, far from establishing internal
peace, political stability and a resumption of
economic activity in that country, has led to
intercommunal and religious strife and created
yet another difficult refugee problem ;
Considering that the upheaval in Iran in
1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has
further delayed the introduction of democracy
and the restoration of national unity;
Concerned that by taking and detaining
employees of the United States Embassy, in
violation of all principles of international law,
Iran may endanger world peace;
Noting that the Camp David agreements,
while establishing peace between Israel and
Egypt, have so far provided no solution to the
main problems in the Middle East, especially
the Palestine question ;
Considering that solutions which exclude
participation by the Palestinian people do not
ofler them the possibility of exercising their
right to self-determination and militate against
the underlying causes ofthe conflict;
Considering that the positions adopted by
Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King
Hussein in the United Nations on 25th Septem-
ber 1979 constitute a positive step towards
peace ;
Deploring that the continuing establish-
ment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank
only makes more diflicult a just and lasting
solution to the Palestinian problem ;
Welcoming the fact that the Nine have
been able to speak with a single voice on
Middle Eastern matters on several occasions,
particularly on 25th September 1979 in the
United Nations General Assembly,
REcourraeNos rHAT rHe CouNcrl
l. Either directly or where more appropriate
indirectly through the .participation of its
membership in European political co-operation
among the Nine, ensure that consultation
between its members is extended to cover
matters relating to Afghanistart and Iran ;
2. Ensure that its members refrain from
selling arms to lran as long as internal strife
and armed repression continue in that country
and call upon all other arms-supplying coun-
tries to impose a similar moratorium ;
3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages
held in the United States Embassy ;
4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of
its members in the United Nations and call for
a clarification from the Securlty Council of the
actual implications of Resolution 242 ;
5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States
urgently to consult with a view to reaching
agreement on a mutually acpepted interpreta-
tion of the implications of the Camp David
agreements;
6. Ask its members to urge Israel immedia-
tely to accept the existence of the Palestinian
people and to renounce its policy of settlements
on the West Bank and commence negotiations
with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve
self-determination, including the inhabitants of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;
7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also
immediately, to declare its acceptance of an
independent Israeli state within internationally
agreed and defined borders;
8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides
a total abandonment of all acts of violence,
which call into question the validity of any
such declarations ;
9. Use its best endeavours, if these precon-
ditions are met, to promote a broader-based
conference than Camp David including repre-
sentation from all the countries directly invol-
ved in the Palestinian dispute.
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l. The Nine stated their views on Afghan-
istan on l5th January, 5th February and,
through the Chair, on l9th February 1980.
As regards lran, the heads of state and
government and the foreign ministers of the
Nine stated their views on 30th November
1979. The ambassadors of the Nine in
Tehran have remained in very active and close
consultation since the start of the crisis.
2. Also as regards Iran, the Council
condemn the taking as hostages of members of
the staff of the United States Embassy in
Tehran, contrary to international practice and
law, and call urgently on the Iranian Govern-
ment to put an end to this situation immedia-
tely. They recall that the governments of
member states have supported all moves, both
in the United Nations Security Council and in
the European Communities, to secure the
in mediate and unconditional release of these
hostages.
Accordingly, the Council recommend
that until such time as the hostages are actually
released, member states should refrain flrom
selling arms to Iran, provided this kind of sanc-
tion is effectively applied by the United States
Government itself. The Council have no
knowledge that member states are at present
delivering armaments to Iran.
In any case, the Council do not intend to
express an opinion on the strictly internal
aspects of the Iranian revolution.
3. As regards the Middle East conflict, the
Council recall the position adopted by each of
the member states and formulated in agreed
terms by the nine countries of the European
Community, as in fact mentioned in Recom-
mendation 341.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980
The Council agree with the Assembly
that a just and lasting peace can be established
only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement
in accordance with Security Council Resolu-
tions242 and 338 and on:
- 
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force ;
- 
the need for Israel to end the territorial
occupation which it has maintained
since the conflict of 1967 ;
- 
respect for the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence of every
state in the area and their right to live
in peace within secure and recognised
boundaries ;
- 
recognition that in the establishment of
a just and lasting peace account must
be taken of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinians, including their right to a
homeland.
The Council recall the terms of the state-
ment issued by the Nine on l8th June 1979
deploring " any action or statement which
could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of
peace " and, in particular, Israel's claim to
eventual sovereignty over the occupied territo-
ries and its policy of establishing settlements.
They consider that all the parties
involved should be called on to participate in
working out and implementing such a settle-
ment, and in particular the Palestinian people
who, as the Chairman of the Nine declared at
the last General Assembly of the United
Nations, " are entitled within the framework set
by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to
determine their future as a people " and,
through their representatives, to play their full
part in the negotiations.
The Council note that the member states
are determined to continue their efforts to
further the search for an overall settlement of
the Middle East conflict.
Reply of the Council I
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Amendment I
2nd June 1980
Impact of the evolving situation in
the Near and Middle East on Vl/estern European security
AMENDMENT I I
tabled by MM. Hardy and Stolfelen
L In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the economic assistance neces-
sary for " and insert " economic support to assist in ".
Signed: H ardy, Stoffelen
l. See 4th Sitting, 3rd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 2
2nd June 1980
Impact of the evolving situation in
the Near and Middle East on Western European security
AMENDMENT 2I
tabled by MM. Urwin and Hardy
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, line l, after "every" insert "peaceful"
and in line 2leave out "intervention in " and insert "invasion of ".
Signed: Urwin, Hardy
l. See 4th Sitting, 3rd June 1980 (Amendment amended and agreed to).
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Amendments 3,4 and 5
Impact of the evolving situation in
the Near and Middle East on llestern European security
AMENDMENTS 3,4 and 5l
tabled by Mr. Yalleix
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " on the most appropriate
basis ".
,4. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" 8. Propose that the United Nations Security Council guarantee respect for an overall set-
tlement ensuring inter alia the security of Israel in a specific, concrete and bindirrg manner".
5. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " before that conference " and
insert " prior "; after " participants " insert " in this settlement ".
l. See 4th Sitting,3rd June 1980 (Amendment 3 withdrawn; Amendment 4 negatived; Amendment 5, Part I not moved,
Part 2 agreed to).
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l. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2
abstentions.
2. Members of the Commit ee.'Mrs. von Bothmer (Chair-
man); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Alternate: Schlingemann)(Vice-Chairmen); Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bru-
gnon, Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon (Altemate: Bozz[),
Gessner, Hanin, Hardy, l.agneau, Lord McNair, MM.
14th May 1980
Mangelschots (Altemate: van Waterschoot), Mende, Mom-
mersteeg, Miiller, P6,idier, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann(Altemate: Vohrer), Talamona, Thoss, Urwin, Valiante,
Vecchietti (Altemate: Antoni), Y oogd.
N.B. Ilre names of those taking part in the vote are
printed in italics.
The international situation and European security
REPORTI
sabmitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2
by Mr. Yohrer, Rapporteur
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Draft Recommendation
oa the iatertrttional situation and Earopean securily
The Assembly,
Considering that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is a pure vi$lation of the law
of nations as defined inter alia in the Charter of the United Nations and the fifiral act signed inHelsinki; 
l
Considering that Soviet expansion in the Middle East is a threat to stability irr that area which
is of vital interest to the West;
Considering that the deployment of new weapons in Eastern Europe is also liable to upset the
balance on which peace depends;
C-onsidering that consultations between members of the Atlantic Alliance wer{ not held quickly
enough or in sufficient detail to allow a joint policy to be drawn up in face of these threats;
Deploring in particular that these countries were not in a position to {efine jointly the
measures made necessary by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan:
Recognising nevertheless the need for the decision taken by the members of ilIAfO to increase
progressively the proportion of their expenditure allocated to joint defence;
Endorsing the proposal by the Nine to seek the departure of Soviet forces frdm Afghanistan, a
status of neutrality and non-alignment being conferred on that country by agreement between the
parties;
Considering that the search for a balance of fgrces and armaments in EurQpe at the lowest
possible level, even if this cannot be achieved in the short term, is still in cqriformity with the
interests of the West;
Considering that it is in the interest of all to develop contacts and exchafrges of all kinds
between Eastern and Western Europe; 
,
Considering that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms ln all countries is
still one of the West's major objectives,
RecorraueNos rHAT rHs CouNcrr-
l. Ensure that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance concert regulatly and efficiently
the policies they pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. Ensure that the members of the Atlantic Alliance agree on effective measurbs to be taken to
convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan;
3. Ensure that its members pursue their efforts to sustain the defensive capaci(y of the Atlantic
Alliance in face of new Soviet weapons;
4. Ensure the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies to u.i,i.r. a limitation
and reduction of forces and armaments to establish a true balance in forces and in conventional
weapons and continental-range nuclear missiles at the lowest possible level;
5. Ensure that the application of the final act signed in Helsinki is the subject of strict and
exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference.
227
DOCUMENT 845
l. Introduction
l. When the General Aflairs Committee
drew up its programme of work for the first
part of the twenty-sixth session of the Assembly
at the beginning of December 1979, it suggested
presenting a report on European security,
d6tente and disarmament, and this proposal was
agreed to by the Presidential Committee. At
its meeting on 25th January 1980, however, the
latter decided that the subject should be
changed to the present title. This decision was
not taken lightly but because it recognised that
there had been a radical change in the inter-
national situation, further to which neither
d6tente nor disarmament seemed quite so
evident but became goals more open to
discussion.
2. Largely contributory to this change was
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 28th
December 1979 which aroused sharp reactions
among certain western countries first and subse-
quently throughout the Moslem world and
many other couhtries. One of the main conse-
quences was to raise doubts about d6tente.
Reactions were exacerbated by the fact that the
West had already been witness to interventions
by Cuba, allied with the Soviet Union, in
Angola, Ethiopia and Aden and by Vietnam,
also allied with the Soviet Union, in Cambodia,
which encouraged thoughts of widespread
manoeuvres to weaken and isolate countries
which were determined to oppose further Soviet
expansion, although the direct and large-scale
intervention by Soviet forces in Afghanistan
introduced a new element.
3. In the month after the Soviet intervention
in Afghanistan, the United States Government
decided to halt certain forthcoming trade pro-
grammes with the Soviet Union, particularly
supplies of grain, to stop supplies to Afghanis-
tan, to stop Americans taking part in the
Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in sum-
mer 1980, to suspend procedure for ratifying
the SALT II agreement in the United States
Senate, to increase its defence appropriations
for both nuclear and conventional arms and to
authorise the President to register those liable
for call-up so as to be able to increase the level
of American forces. In addition, on 24th
January President Carter announced a policy
for supplying military equipment to China,
Pakistan and Turkey.
4. These measures were accompanied or
followed by a number of similar decisions in
certain member countries of the Atlantic
Explanatory Memorandum
(sabmitted by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur)
Alliance and also in Moslem countries. There
was therefore ample justification for wondering
how far d6tente was still a practical proposition
and whether in 1980 the problem of European
security could still be envisaged in terms of
d6tente and disarmament.
5. The question facing the Committee is
therefore no longer first and foremost to deter-
mine how to pursue ddtente but to see whether
d6tente still has a place in the world today and
what remains of it following the tension
aroused by the invasion of Afghanistan.
6. It has often been wondered, and not
without reason, whether the word " d6tente " is
appropriate for dehning the trend of East-West
relations since the death of Stalin in 1953. It
is, however, a convenient way of describing a
certain form of relationship, even if its
meaning is not always very precise, although its
significance has been more or less pin-p6in1.6
and defined in the texts of agreements, in two
fields at least: the limitation of strategic arms
and the recognition of states and frontiers in
Western Europe. However, the Soviet side has
always stressed that there could be no " ideolo-
gical d6tente ", which means that d6tente may
come into play in the means employed in the
struggle between the capitalist and communist
worlds but not in the fundamental reasons for
the struggle. Again, the West has always held
that any improvement in relations between
states on either side depended on respect for the
sovereignty of national states and human rights
which, in a manner of speaking, constituted a
guarantee for the changes of method on both
sides.
7. This fundamental difference largely
explains the difficulties of promoting d6tente,
particularly each time the Soviet Union consi-
dered its security or the ideological cohesion of
the communist world obliged it to bring to heel,
if necessary by force, countries or individuals
which it considered, rightly or wrongly, to
constitute a threat. At international level, the
interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in
Czechoslovakia in 1967 gave shape to the
Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for
socialist bloc countries. This concept probably
explains, at least partly, the military inter-
vention in Afghanistan in 1979. Where the
freedom of persons is concerned, there seems to
have been a sharp upturn in recent months in
the many infringements of human rights in
respect of real or imaginary " opponents " or
" dissidents ", perhaps because the Soviet
Union thus hoped to prevent the Olympic
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Cames to be held in Moscow in summer 1980
providing dissidents with a means of contacting
westerners and giving widespread publicity to
their views.
8. It is therefore necessary to examine how
far these Soviet actions are compatible with the
pursuit ol detente as it had developed in the
last quarter o[ a century'. whether they make it
incumbent on the West to adopt a completely
new policy in its relations with the East and
how far the West can relax its insistence on
respect for human rights and the independence
of states and acquiesce in a lorm ol " realism "
which would encourage it to turn a blind eye to
the excesses committed by the Soviet Union in
order to preserve the main part of " d6tente ".
9. Finally', it is hardly' possible to speak o[
detente and disarmament without relerring to a
balance of forces which is probably the main
guarantee for the maintenance of peace. It is
clear th.at the deplol'ment of SS-20 missiles and
Backfire bombersr and the stationing of Soviet
armed forces near the routes along which most
of the oil imported by Western Europe is
shipped lrom the Persian Gull are a serious
challenge to this balance since the Soviet Union
henceforth has the wherewithal to threaten
Western Europe with the almost total destruc-
tion of its armed forces and even its inhabitants
and with economic asphi,xia by closing the
Strait of Hormuz. Even if the Soviet Union
does not use these arms directly, it can now
bring so much pressure to bear on Western
Europe that the latter can no longer consider
effective resistance by its own means. In such
a weak position, and if deprived of effective
support lrom the United States. Europe would
have such a great handicap in continuing the
talks on which detente was based that it is hard
to see how it could resist Soviet pressure and
not have to accept Soviet-imposed conditions
for reverting to peaceflul coexistence. In such
circumstances, Europe has even less means of
pursuing a policy that would isolate it from its
American ally on which, more than in periods
of calm. depend its security and its survival as a
group of independent states.
10. The disparities which have been noted
in theatre nuclear weapons require the imple-
mentation of NATO decisions with regard both
to the modernisation of Iong-range theatre
nuclear weapons and to the limitation of
armaments. This is not in order to bnng
about a parity of nuclear weapons systems but
to increase the credibility of the Alliance's
l. These bombers have a much wider range of actron
thau earlier Soviet bombers and can carry a larger number
oi weapons Therr abrlrtl' to break through antr-arrcraft
barrages has been enhanced b1 a sophrstrcated electronrc
s)'stem and the lact that thel are able to fl1' at verv hrgh
speeds at lou altrtudc.
deterrent strategy by, making good a weak spotin its possibilities of escalation, where the
medium-range missile system is concerned, and
introducing a larger number of options for
limited and controlled reactions.
ll. Is there still room fur ddtente ?
l. The state of ditente prior lo the invasion
of .Afghanistan
I I . Even if the scope ol the word detente is
not very clearly' defined. there are nevertheless
four areas in which considerable strides hav'e
been made in recent y,ears in East-West rela-
tions towards a reduction oI tension and the
peaceful organisation of international society,
where improved relations have provided a
framework lor peace.
Qt) Rclatton.s bclwccn thc Sovict L'niou untl
the L'nitatl Stut(\
12. The improvement of relations between
the two great powers is an essential part, if not
the basis. of any policy of ddtente flor. if rela-
tions are based on mistrust. threats and tension,
none of the countries can take steps to improve
relations with the others. [n the name of
common interests, they' are condemned to com-
plete alignment with the power which might
guarantee their security. In the Eastern Euro-
pean countries in particular there is no possibi-
lity of liberal movements at domestic level or of
greater national independenoe while there is
tension between the two great powers. It is for
the two leading powers above all to establish
the structure for international peace because
they are the principal powers able to negotiate
all matters connected with the production.
deployment and possible use of nuclear
weapons.
13. Thus, the limitation of nuclear weapons
has been the cornerstone ol the development of
detente in the last decade. For instance. a
number ol agreements have been prepared by
the two great powers, although they have some-
times subsequently been negotiated and signed
in a wider framework and marty other countries
have later acceded to them. Some of these
agreements are of especial importance. such as
the treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear
tests, the non-proliferation treaty, the agree-
ment on installing a " red " teleprinter between
Moscow and Washington and, above all, the
SALT I agreements on the limitation of nuclear
weapons.
14. In June 1979. the two great powers
managed to prepare and sign a SALT II agree-
ment limiting the deployment of strategic
nuclear weapons. At its session in December
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1979, the WEU Assembly took note of this
agreement and, in the resolution in the report
on SALT ll and its implications for European
security submitted by Mr. Cook, expressed the
hope that the United States Senate would
approve the early ratification of the SALT Il
agreement. In taking this step, it is clear that
the Assembly expressed the wishes of a very
large section of European public opinion,
whose approbation was perhaps less related to
the content of the SALT agreements themselves
than to the process launched by the nego-
tiations between the two great powers on strate-
gic weapons, seen as a consolidation of peace
and the promise of continued d6tente and dis-
armament.
15. Overall, the measures agreed upon by
the two great powers seem to form a true
framework for peace, particularly the red tele-
printer intended in principle to avoid war due
to an accident being misinterpreted by one of
the partners, but useful above all for exchang-
ing information between the two great powers
in the event of a crisis liable to endanger peace.
16. One of the provisions of the SALT II
agreement included a promise to start SALT
III negotiations with the aim of extending to
nuclear weapons deployed in Europe the limi-
tation imposed by the SALT II agreements on
intercontinental weapons. Such negotiations
therefore implied the participation, indirect at
least, of those European powers having nuclear
weapons. The results of the negotiations and
agreements were of course questioned by some
and attempts have been made to assess the
advantages which one or other of the two great
powers might obtain from the standpoint of its
own security and also the possible effects on the
solidarity of the members of the two alliances.
However this may be, the establishment and
development of a continuing dialogue between
the two great powers could but help to avert
the threat of war.
(b) Di.sarmamcnt
17. It cannot yet be said that a start has
been made on real disarmament. Agreed, for
more than twenty years the Disarmament
Committee has been meeting in Geneva and
has made a major contribution to preparing
texts such as the treaty banning nuclear tests in
the atmosphere, in outer space and under the
sea and the non-proliferation treaty, but these
are measures for limiting but not actually redu-
cing armaments.
18. In July 1978, a special session of the
United Nations on disarmament allowed new
ideas to be aired such as the enlargement of the
Committee, accompanied by a system of rota-
tion allowing all its members to participate and
take the chairmanship in turn. The aims of its
work were spelled out and the possibilities of
reaching agreements on various aspects of
conventional or nuclear disarmament were
explored.
19. lt is to be regretted that the decisions
taken by the United Nations General Assembly
have not been followed up more quickly, but a
process leading towards disarmament may be
on the way and defence appropriations in natio-
nal budgets have risen less steeply in recent
years than other appropriations. There have
even been marked and probably undue reduc-
tions in most western countries with defence
appropriations of no more than 2 to 6 o/o of
their GNP with the result that their armaments
are not being modernised or replaced quickly
enough whereas the Soviet Union is still alloca-
ting more than I I 0/o of its GNP to defence and
is building up greater quantities and more
varied and sophisticated armaments, particu-
larly in Western Europe, thus gaining a clear
lead in most fields.
20. However, there is no need to be pessi-
mistic or to give up hope where the evolution
of disarmament is concerned. Although it
might be thought that no true disarmament has
begun, the armaments race, at least between the
two alliances, is slowing down and both sides
are intent on seeking, and not without success,
ways of directing negotiations towards a reduc-
tion in the level of forces deployed by both
sides, for instance in the framework of the
MBFR talks in Vienna.
(r') Sccuritt' and to-operatittn in Europe
21. The holding in Helsinki of a conference
on security and co-operation in Europe in
summer 1975 gave the impression. at least in
Europe, that detente was going to lead to far
more positive results than had been achieved by
the two great powers in the field of disarma-
ment. This conference had been prepared by
negotiations and bilateral.agreements, particu-
larly between the Federal Republic of Germany
and several Eastern European countries such as
the Soviet Union, the German Democratic
Republic and Czechoslovakia, in order to settle
differences still remaining flrom the second
world war and by very numerous contacts
between Eastern and Western European
countries and a considerable increase in trade
between these countries.
22. In accordance with the recommenda-
tions of the preliminary Helsinki conference,
adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
the participating countries on 3rd July 1973,
during the first stage of the conference, the final
act included chapters on :
- 
questions relating to
Europe ;
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- 
co-operation in the fields of economics,
of science and technology and of the
environment;
- 
questions relating to security and co-
operation in the Mediterranean ;
- 
co-operation in humanitarian and
other fields.
23. Of course, the line taken at the Helsinki
conflerence did not mean there were no mental
reservations on either side. In the West, there
was probably some expectation of even more
concrete results in respect of freedom of trade,
ideas and persons and of the Soviet Union's
agreement to the notion of human rights lead-
ing to hopes that there might be a change in
political customs in the countries of Eastern
Europe or even in the r6gime of those coun-
tries. Neverless, the results achieved with the
third basket already represent a substantial
success.
24. But in Eastern Europe some of the prin-
ciples accepted at Helsinki, such as the mainte-
nance of the status quo and the intangibility of
frontiers, served to strengthen the positions
acquired by the Soviet Union after the second
world war and its domination over a large
number of Central and Eastern European
countries.
25. It should be noted that the Helsinki final
act has had positive effects as regards relations
between states in Europe.
26. However, western complaints that the
human rights aspects of the Helsinki agree-
ments are not being respected correctly, parti-
cularly as regards the free movement of
persons, are not unfounded. The Helsinki
final act furnished hope and a juridical basis for
the protests of many persons in the Eastern
European countries who found it difficult to
accept the control over society exercised by the
Soviet Union or the state or party authorities.
They used the final act to assert their right to
a certain degree of freedom from the national or
Soviet authorities. Although the Soviet Union
and the Eastern European countries leave much
to be desired in their application of the
Helsinki commitments, they have nevertheless
shown greater moderation than heretofore in
imposing sanctions on those who act by them.
27. Disagreements emerged during the
1977-78 Belgrade meeting, which produced flew
results. The Soviet Union was already expe-
riencing considerable difficulty in respecting its
Helsinki undertakings and was reluctant to
enter into any more where its domestic r6gime
was concerned.
(d) Development of bilateral relations
28. The development of economic and trade
relations between Eastern and Western Euro-
pean countries advocated at the Helsinki confe-
rence has been mainly bilateral. Although
France, in the days of General de Gaulle, then
the Federal Republic, when Chancellor Brandt
defined his Ostpolitik, opened the way for their
European partners to establish and develop
bilateral relations, nowadays all the Western
European countries, in one way or another, co-
operate actively with the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries in the economic
field. This co-operation, while remaining the
individual responsibility of each state, concerns
the whole of Western Europe and the WEU
Council continues to play an important r61e in
the co-ordination of such bilateral relations
between each of its members and the Eastern
European countries and this has been the main
item on the agenda of all meetings of the WEU
Council of Ministers for several years.
29. The development of bilateral relations
has been of particular impQrtance since the
1973 crisis since, in a time of recession, the
development of external trade is a means of
reviving the economy of each country by
helping to maintain the level of employment.
Economic co-operation with the Soviet Union
and with Eastern Europe is not just a
matter of trade. In view of the nature of a
planned economy, such trade has to be conduc-
ted in the framework of a long-term policy pro-
viding for investments and organising a credit
system acceptable to both parties.
30. Westem governments have sometimes
been criticised for granting unduly beneficial
credit terms to their Eastern European partners
and making excessive sacrifices in order to
develop their trade with the East. But they
derive benefits from this trade which compen-
sate for any financial sacrifices they may have
to make. For instance, considerable invest-
ment has been needed in the past few years to
allow Soviet natural gas tO be brought to
Western Europe where it is in the process of
replacing other sources of energy, as is now the
case in the Federal Republic of Germany and,
more recently, France. For the investment
required for constructing the pipelines to be
profitable, it will have to make a worthwhile
contribution to the economy of Western Europe
for at least twenty years. But it should be
noted that the Federal Government for its part
grants no credits to Warsaw Pact member coun-
tries but merely affords banks granting such
credits guarantees for the political risks.
3l. There are therefore many aspects to
d6tente affecting a variety of fields and of
considerable importance for East-West relations
and for helping our countries to face the crisis,
limit its effects and view their own future with
more confidence. The nature of the threats
hanging over or calling in question d6tente
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must therefore be examined attentively to see
whether they justify a radical review of a politi-
cal course chosen freely by the West a long
time ago.
2. llhat is ddtente ?
32. Among the factors considered not so
long ago as part of detente, several are now
being called in question with the result that no
one now knows exactly what the term covers.
(a) Human rights
33. In the West at least it has always been
considered that detente did not concern only
relations between states but also respect for
individual rights. At the Helsinki conference
on security and co-operation in Europe, the
western powers managed to ensure that
commitments relating to human rights were
given a prominent place in the final act, and
since that time they have been disappointed at
the way in which the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries have applied the
text they had just signed. One of the most
important points was the possibility for people
to leave their country if they were not satisfied
with their living conditions. It is certain that
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries, which were very restrictive in
allowing emigration, have been more liberal
than in the past, and it has been possible to
discuss more or less long-term programmes
with them with a view to allowing emigration
flor national, religious or ideological minorities
which felt they were persecuted in countries
with communist r6gimes. Following the Hel-
sinki final act, they proved far more willing to
allow emigration.
34. Thus, many Soviet dissidents have now
taken refuge in Western Europe or in the
United States. However, more recently there
seem to be restrictions on the possibility for
citizens of the Soviet Union and the peoples'
democracies to emigrate and hence the
application of the Helsinki final act in this
respect seems less satisfactory.
35. T.he Helsinki final act has been quoted
frequently by opposition political circles,
particularly in the Soviet Union and Czechoslo-
vakia, in calling for liberalisation, but there has
been no response. However, it should be
noted that the most obvious excesses have been
toned down. On the one hand, the works of
many Soviet dissidents are now published,
translated and known in the West, and on the
other hand repression is certainly less brutal but
also less effective than before Helsinki. The
results obtained at Helsinki may therefore be
considered in two ways: in absolute terms to
underline their faulty application by the Soviet
Union and its allies, or from a more historical
point of view, noting that there has been a posi-
tive trend which the improvement in East-West
relations has encouraged considerably. How-
ever, this trend is by no means steady and news
from the Soviet Union heralds a new wave of
repression, the most striking example of which
is the internal exile of the Academician, Andrei
Sakharov, in Gorki, merely because of his opi-
nions. But many other persons, such as Father
Dudko, have experienced repressive measures
in recent months. There is therefore justifica-
tion for indignance about the non-respect of
many provisions of the Helsinki agreements and
at the same time satisfaction towards a trend
which is a tangible result of these agreements.
(b) Securitv of states and non-intervention
in their internal a.ffairs
36. Even more than the question of human
rights, the application of what is known as the
Brezhnev doctrine, i.e. the right of the Soviet
Union to intervene in the internal affairs of
socialist bloc countries, raises problems which
periodically detract from d6tente. The most
recent case was the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, starting on 27th December
1979. It should be noted that this intervention
does not directly involve the application of the
Helsinki final act, which concerned only Euro-
pean countries, nor can any specific guarantees
be invoked since no western country has given
Afghanistan any. No one complained when a
pro-Soviet regime was set up in Afghanistan in
April 1978 by typical force of arms. However,
the Soviet intervention brings into play the
application of the United Nations Charter to
which both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan
have acceded.
37. The invasion was not a bolt from the
blue, an unheralded occurrence in a country
where the Soviet Union had never shown any
claims. The r6gime in Afghanistan since 1978
was dominated by an Afghan Communist Party
and linked to the Soviet Union by a treaty of
assistance and co-operation which already
made it to some extent a satellite of the Soviet
Union. However, following an internal coup
d'etat, the Afghan leaders were no longer those
whom the Soviet Union had helped to bring to
power but a team whose authority was accepted
neither by the Soviet Union nor by the majority
of the Afghan people who had launched a
rebellion which, in December 1979, controlled
the major part of Afghanistan.
38. The Soviet intervention did not therefore
change the communist nature of the r6gime.
In a particularly brutal manner, it replaced
one communist government by another,
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perhaps because it considered the new one
more docile, probably because it hoped it
would be better able to put down the rebellion
by authoritative measures and by concessions to
the Islamic trhditions of the Afghan people.
39. Apart from infringing international law
by violating the United Nations Charter, this
action brought the West face to face with a
whole series of problems.
40. The first was to decide whether the occu-
pation of Afghanistan was a serious blow to the
East-West balance. It is clear that the pre-
sence of Soviet troops on the frontiers of
Eastern Iran and Pakistan gives the Soviet
Union a means of intervening in those coun-
tries, both weakened, Pakistan by its recent war
against India, and Iran by the 1979 revolution
and the ensuing period of unrest and inter-
national isolation. Moreover, only a territory
dominated by the Baluchis whom neither Iran,
Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever been able to
control effectively, now separates the Soviet
Union from the shores of the Indian Ocean
near the Strait of Hormuz through which most
of Western Europe's oil supplies passes.
41. But sending a large military force to a
mountainous area in the centre of Asia is a
heavy burden for the Soviet Union, comparable
in many respects with that of the United States'
engagement in Vietnam, and consequently it is
weakened far more than it is strengthened by
the occupation of a vast territory which is diffi-
cult to control, particularly as the 400 km of
arid and sparsely-populated country separating
the south of Afghanistan from the shores of the
Indian Ocean are diflicult to cross and it seems
impossible for the Soviet Union, at the present
time, to open up a road. Moreover, the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan has incurred the
almost unanimous opposition of the Moslem
countries, expressed at the Islamabad summit
meeting at the end of January 1980. Even
India, hostile to Pakistan, seems to be worried
about the Soviet foothold in Afghanistan.
42. The Soviets probably thought they could
take advantage of the situation 
- 
favourable to
them 
- 
created by the tension between the
United States and the new lranian Government,
worsened by members of the United States
Embassy in Tehran being taken hostage, to
risk an attack on a Moslem country. Were
this so, the calculation has now proved wrong.
43. The occupation of Afghan territory by a
Soviet armed force, now apparently exceeding
100,000 men, equipped with the most up-to-
date weapons, thus has negative consequences
for the Soviet Union which seem to oflset the
territorial advantages obtained.
44. The West has naturally never recognised
the principles underlying the Brezhnev doc-
trine. It has always considered that countries
with communist r6gimes were entitled to inde-
pendence just like other countries and it cannot
agree to any party taking power being consi-
dered unassailable once and fbr all. However, in
aflairs such as that of Hungary in 1956 or
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the West in fact recog-
nised that it was possible for the Soviet Union
to pursue a policy which conformed to this
doctrine without risk of armed reaction from
the West, which certainly protested and took
measures to strengthen its security but did not
seriously consider resorting to force.
45. However, the invasioh of Alghanistan
was almost unanimously condemned by public
opinion not only in the West but throughout
the non-communist world. The Soviet Union
seems to have realised the extent of this
condemnation because it was apparently of its
own accord that it postponed the Bolchoi
theatre's planned tour of several countries
including Japan and France in spring 1980 for
fear of hostile demonstrations. Moreover, the
new situation calls for security measures to pre-
vent the stationing of Soviet forces on Afghan
territory endangering the security and territorial
integrity of neighbouring countries, particularly
Pakistan and Iran, and to prevent the Soviet
Union from believing that it has the tacit
consent of international society to ride
roughshod over the indepe4dence of states.
The case of Yugoslavia comes to mind in the
event ofa leadership crisis in the near future.
46. However, the question is whether the
invasion of Afghanistan justifies an overall
reappraisal of the process of d6tente and what
remains of it. In particular, no decisions must
be taken on possible sanctions without carefully
considering the full implications. First, there
is no question of sanctioning a fait accompli,
but, on the contrary, of refusing to do so by
insisting on the early evacuation of Afghanistan
by Soviet forces. This requirement justifies
steps to exert pressure as effectively as possible
and is just the opposite of recognising the fait
accompli.
47. In the weeks following the invasion of
Afghanistan, the governments of western coun-
tries, third world countries and even some
communist countries discussed and from time
to time consulted each other on the steps to
take as a result of this event.
48(i) Although most of the Soviet Union's
allies endorsed the official assertion that action
launched from Pakistan, armed by the United
States, had led to the Afghan revolt against the
communist regime set up in the country in
April 1978, thus compelling the Soviet Union
to react, two allies, Romania and North Korea,
did not subscribe to the motion endorsing the
new Afghan rdgime adopted by the representa-
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tives of parliamentary groups from socialist
countries in Sofia on 8th February, hence,
implicitly and to the extent allowed by their
dependence on the Soviet Union, recognising
Soviet responsibility. Other eastern countries
such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and even the
German Democratic Republic showed reluc-
tance towards the Soviet assertions.
49(ii) After a Soviet veto had prevented the
Security Council taking a decision, the United
Nations General Assembly met in special
session on l4th January and, by 104 votes to l8
with l8 abstentions, adopted a resolution tabled
by twenty-four non-aligned countries calling for
the " immediate, unconditional and total with-
drawal of the foreign troops lrom Afghan-
istan ".
50(rrr) Meeting in Islamabad from 27th to 29th
January 1980, the Islamic Conference adopted a
resolution which " condemns the Soviet mili-
tary aggression against the Afghan people,
denounces and deplores it as a flagrant viola-
tion of international laws, covenants and
norms, primarily the Charter of the United
Nations... demands the immediate and uncondi-
tional withdrawal of all Soviet troops...
suspends the membership of Afghanistan in the
organisation of the Islamic Conference " and
" solemnly deglares its complete solidarity with
the Islamic countries neighbouring Afghan-
istan ".
5l (i v) The United States for its part, through
the intermediary of President Carter, not only
condemned the Soviet intervention but also
decided to take immediate steps to show its
disapproval of the Soviet Union. However, the
effectiveness of these steps depends on the other
members of the Atlantic Alliance following
suit, since no boycott can be effective unless it
is respected by all the western countries. Not
all the European countries have yet adopted a
position on the series of measures decided upon
by the United States, but it may be noted that:
(a) As of l5th May 1980, the govern-
ments or Olympic Committees of
forty-three countries, whether mem-
bers of the Atlantic Alliance or not,
have decided to boycott the Olympic
Games in Moscow. At the request
of the Soviet Olympic Committee,
the International Olympic Commit-
tee met several times prior to the
winter games at Lake Placid and, on
l2th February 1980, decided unani-
mously that the games should still be
held in Moscow. However, national
committees have until 23rd May to
answer the invitation and several of
them are still uncertain about their
answers. At its meeting on lTth
March, the General Aflairs Commit-
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tee seemed divided over the question
of boycotting the Olympic Games.
Several members thought that a boy-
cott would warn the Soviet popula-
tion that the West was hrmly resolv-
ed to oppose the policy of the Soviet
leaders and wished everyone to
follow this course. Others feared on
the contrary that it might tighten
solidarity between Soviet public opi-
nion and their leaders against what
might appear to be a unilateral mea-
sure taken by opponents of the
USSR. Two points of convergence
emerged however: one around the
need for a truly collective attitude on
the part of the West without which
any retaliation to the invasion of
Afghanistan would prov6 the weak-
ness and not the strehgth of the
Atlantic Alliance, the other around
the fact that a possible boycott of the
Olympic Games would be meaning-
ful only if it was part of an overall
policy and in no case could it be the
western countries' only response to
the invasion of Afghanistan.
While retaining their freedom of
action in other areas, the members of
the EEC have decided not to increase
supplies of products to the Soviet
Union on which the United States
has placed an embargo.
The selective nature of the boycott
decided upon by the United States
Government without consulting its
allies beforehand nevertheless raises
a particular problem. A boycott
undertaken without consultation and
detailed agreement between the coun-
tries taking part is probably bound to
be ineffective.
52(v) After the Franco-German meeting on 4th
and 5th February 1980, a communiqu6 was
issued setting out the joint positions of
the two countries, inter alia:
" They reached the following conclusions
which define both countries' policy in the
present circumstances :
l. They consider that the Soviet mili-
tary intervention in Afghanistan is unac-
ceptable and creates grave dangers for the
stability of the region and for peace.
They consider it essential that it be
ended without delay, as demanded by a
large majority of the United Nations
General Assembly. This is the only
way to re-establish a situation in accord-
ance with the rights of the Afghan people
and which meets the requirements of
international peace.
(b)
(c)
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2. They consider that the present
crisis is likely to trigger off a process
which, by degrees, and whatever the
intentions, could have the most serious
consequences for the world. In these
circumstances they wish to reaffirm both
their countries' fidelity to the Atlantic
Alliance and their determination to hon-
our their engagements to it.
3. They take note of the fact that due
to the Afghanistan events d6tente has
become more diflicult and more uncer-
tain and that consequently the with-
drawal of foreign troops from Afghan-
istan is necessary. They declare that
d6tente could not bear a further shock of
the same kind. In that case France and
the Federal Republic of Germany would
take, in liaison with their allies, the
measures required in that circumstance to
guarantee their security and defend inter-
national stability.
4: They understand the concern
shown by countries authentically atta-
ched to non-alignment and they affirm
that these countries have their part to
play as regards world peace and stability.
Moreover they agree that the East-West
confrontation must not spread to the
third world... "
53. This communiqud has since been the
subject of rather divergent comments since the
French head of state said the Federal Republic
of Germany and France still wished to try to
protect what had been gained in recent years
with regard to peace and the maintenance of
d6tente, while the German Chancellor empha-
sised that, for the first time in Franco-German
meetings, a communiqu6 proclaimed unequivo-
cally the loyalty of the European partners to
the Atlantic Alliance and underlined their soli-
darity with the United States.
54. However, it should be noted that these
two interpretations in no way affect the two
countries' very firm condemnation of the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan.
55. After the Franco-German meeting, the
United States Government proposed holding a
meeting in Bonn of the Ministers for Foreign
Affairs of the United States, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom
and Italy in order to discuss a joint position.
The French Government did not accept this
proposal, fearing that American views might
prevail. Mr. Vance, United States Secretary of
State, therefore decided to visit each of the
European capitals concerned in order to hold
the consultations which were not possible in
the form he had planned.
56(vr) On l5th January, the North Atlantic
Council authorised the Secretary-General, Mr.
Luns, to make the following sttatement:
"The North Atlantic Council joined by
senior representatives from capitals met
today as part of the All,iance's continuing
consultations on the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and its consequences for the
East-West relations and for the Alliance.
They expressed full support for the
United Nations Generatr Assembly resolu-
tion of l4th January last and denounced
the Soviet action. The Soviet invasion
contravenes fundamental principles of
international behaviour and represents
a serious blow to the Alliance efforts to
build a framework of constructive rela-
tions with the Soviet Union.
Allied governments have taken and are
considering measures to make clear to the
Soviet Union : 
- 
the deep concern with
which they view the Soviet occupation ol
Afghanistan ; - rheir belief that d6tente is
indivisible and must be reciprocal, and 
-their conviction that adtions of this sort
cannot be taken with impunity.
The members of the Cquncil stated their
conviction that eflorts in the pursuit of
ddtente to which they remain committed
will be gravely underr1ined so long as
Soviet forces occupy Afghanistan. Each
member state will take appropriate indi-
vidual measures and steps, and all agreed
that actions taken by one should be taken
into account by other member states.
The situation created by the Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan will remain at the
centre of allied concern and consulta-
tion. "
57(un) The Nine, for their part, without
subscribing to American decisions on a possible
boycott of the Soviet Union, decided to stop
granting the Soviet Union preferential credit
terms, to stop selling it agricultural produce,
particularly butter, at a loss and not to increase
their sales of wheat to the Soviet Union so as
not to undermine the effects of the American
boycott decisions. They also stopped all
food assistance to the Afghan Government and
diverted it to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
58(vrir) President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to
India allowed him to join Mrs. Indira Gandhiin expressing, on 27th January 1980, their
condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan
and the two countries' concern for d6tente to be
pursued. In the joint statement, they declared:
" l. ......
(l) Any situation arising out of the use
of force in international relations and
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intervention or interference in internal
affairs of sovereign states is inadmissible.
(2) . In order to stop further escalation,
all states should refrain from any action
which could intensify great power rivalry
and bring back the cold war, especially
through dangerous arms build-up liable
to threaten peace and stability in sensi-
tive regions.
(3) It is necessary to restore conditions
in which the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all states can
be preserved and the right of their
peoples to freely determine their own
destiny without outside interference
assured.
(4) Respect for and implementation of
these principles do not prejudice any
state's legitimate security interests and
would, in fact, go a long waY towards
safeguarding them.
2. Accordingly, the President and the
Prime Minister have decided to take all
necessary initiatives to defuse present ten-
sions and to help create a climate of
mutual trust and confidence. To this
end, they will remain in close consulta-
tion with each other.
3. The President and the Prime
Minister appeal to all states, particularly
the most powerful ones, to recognise the
gravity of the danger and to bend all their
efforts to avert it. "
59. It can be seen on the one hand that the
Soviet Union's action has very seriously jeopar-
dised two of the basic principles of the final act
of the Helsinki conference and aflected the
balance whose maintenance is still essential for
any true d6tente. Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan has made it impossible for the
West to close its eyes to these facts and,
however varied, its reactions show that all the
western countries and almost all the non-
aligned countries have had to work out what is
left of d6tente after these events.
60. The continuation of ddtente, its possible
forms and retaliatory measures and necessary
defence and security measures still divide all
these countries. Their division is probably
only provisional for the many talks between
heads of state and government, western and
non-aligned, which have been held since the
invasion of Afghanistan indicate that most
governments have not had time to define a new
policy or, a forliori, concert their views suffi-
ciently with their partners to be able to imple-
ment a policy or even less to make a detailed
examination of the full consequences, even if
they are unanimous in condemning the Soviet
action.
61. In the Afghanistan affair, it was evident
that western reactions were not sufliciently
concerted. Either the Americans took deci-
sions before consulting their allies at all, as for
boycotting the Olympic Games or the embargo
on certain products, or the Europeans were in
no position to draw up a joint policy. This
situation calls for two series of measures. First
and floremost, the damage done must be
repaired by seeking, together with the Ameri-
cans, positions around which it is, possible to
repair the cracks in western cohesion, particu-
larly in areas where the divisions are most
marked. In the longer term, machinery for
consultation in Europe and in NATO will have
to be strengthened, particularly for the discus-
sion of questions not connected with the areas
directly covered by the commitments entered
into under the North Atlantic Treaty. Is it not
one of WEU's main tasks to hold such consul-
tations ? In this respect, the nine-power poli-
tical consultations from which emerged the
proposal to neutralise Afghanistan presented by
Lord Carrington in February are a success, at
least for Europe.
lll. Security and ddtente after the invasion
of Afghanistan
62. Uncertainty about the immediate future
means that, for the reasons just given, your
Rapporteur feels that statements by govern-
mental or other authorities in most western
countries have caused misunderstandings which
are now being corrected but which for some
time will probably overshadow relations bet-
ween these countries.
l, Deterrence
63. It is in any case evident that the invasion
of Afghanistan, together with other disturbing
facts such as, in particular, the speedy deploy-
ment of continental-range SS-20 missiles in the
Soviet Union, gives Western Europe a particu-
larly acute security problem. On the one
hand, the proximity of large numbers of well-
armed Soviet forces to the shores of the Indian
Ocean only a short distance from the Strait of
Hormuz through which passes almost 80 0/o of
Europe's oil makes it possible for the Soviet
Uriion to cut off the West's supplies without
risk of effective retaliation at present. The
Soviet Union can now hope to tackle future
negotiations on oil supplies or problems rela-
ting to the Middle or Near East from a position
of strength.
64. On the other hand, possession of the
SS-20 missile with its three nuclear warheads
on a mobile launcher allows military targets
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throughout Western Europe to be reached from
Soviet territory with extreme accuracy. This
gives the Soviet Union overwhelming superior-ity. It is now estimated that there are about
one hundred SS-20 missiles deployed in Europe
but, at the present rate, there will probably be
about a thousand during the eighties. The
Soviet Union will then have the means of des-
troying the whole western defence system in
Europe in a first strike, without having to use
weapons of mass destruction against the popu-
lations. The absence of equivalent means in
the West would then place the United States
before the extremely difficult choice between
either not retaliating to such an attack or trig-
gering off an all-out nuclear war which would
almost certainly lead to the destruction of its
own territory at the same time as that of its
European allies. The United States is natu-
rally trying to develop weapons capable of
countering the SS-20: cruise and Pershing II
missiles. But they cannot be brought into ser-
vice before 1983 or be deployed in sufficient
numbers in Europe before 1985.
65. Here again, what is to be feared is proba-
bly not so much an unexpected Soviet attack,
which would involve too great a risk of a
nuclear hecatomb, as the use of the eminently
favourable, but temporary, situation in which
the Soviet Union now finds itself to impose on
the West conditions for peaceful coexistence
which Europe is probably not prepared to
accept today. The only way of countering
such nuclear blackmail is the presence of Ame-
rican forces on the mainland of Europe and
their amalgamation with those of the European
members of NATO to the greatest extent pos-
sible so that the Soviet Union cannot threaten a
selective nuclear attack against European forces,
speculating on a differentiation between Europe
and the United States. In the longer term, the
maintenance of a high-enough degree of deter-
rence to evade nuclear or military blackmail by
the Soviet Union requires a considerable milit-
ary and hence financial effort, starting now in
order to avoid an even greater nuclear imba-
lance than at present.
66. Even before the invasion of Afghanistan,
there was some acceleration in the effort made
by certain western countries, particularly the
United States, to replace and modernise their
means of defence. After the event, President
Carter even took the first steps to prepare for a
possible reintroduction of compulsory military
service in his country.
67. Aware of the relative weakening and
obsolescence of its armaments, Europe for its
part undertook several years ago to try to
increase the proportion of the defence appro-
priations in its total budget. However, the
increase, which was in principle to have been
3 o/o per year for the members of NATO, fell far
short and the common eflort Should be stepped
up considerably in the next few years.
2. Security
68. Although most prob4bly the Soviet
Union's aim is not to unleasfr its divisions on
Western Europe, in present circumstances at
least, one may nevertheless wonder what its
alms are.
69. The goal is perhaps to increase the terri-
tory in the grip of Soviet communism or to
achieve a kind of neutralisation or Finlandisa-
tion of the whole of Western Europe so as to
make it incapable of having an independent
foreign and defence policy and opposing the
Soviet Union's manoeuvring.
70. In the first case, the most serious threat is
probably now to Yugoslavia where it may be
feared that the death of Marshal Tito will give
rise to a problem of succession quite soon.
This problem may assume dangerous propor-
tions if Yugoslav elements, particularly com-
munists who took refuge in the Soviet
Union after the break betweert Tito and Stalin,
call for Soviet assistance. There is no doubt
that the Yugoslav leaders and people are keenly
aware of this danger. They have done their
utmost to demonstrate in no r4ncertain manner
national cohesion and a desine to defend the
integrity of Yugoslav territory and the indepen-
dence of its political r6gime. The West has no
special interests to defend in Yugoslavia, but it
could not condone the Soviet Union taking
over the country by force, be it for reasons of
the West's security or to uphold the credibility
of its attachment to democracy and the right of
peoples to self-determination. It must there-
fore show its firm intention here and now to
support the Yugoslav people's desire for
independence. Any sign of weakness on thepart of a new Yugoslav Government would
allow appeals to be made to the outside world
which might provide an opportunity or a
pretext for Soviet intervention. An assurance
that any violation of the integrity of Yugoslav
territory would be considered a serious threat to
western security should prevent the Soviet
Union gambling on a weakening in Yugo-
slavia. But the credibility qf such firmness
depends on the West having rneans of counter-
ing a conflict in Europe or elsewhere. The
Afghanistan affair has shown that this is not so
and the small infantry unit of American
marines sent to Oman on l3th February 1980
is far from constituting a truly deterrent mili-
tary presence. The Afghanistan affair would
probably not have happened if the West had
been more firm towards interventions by the
Soviet Union's allies in Africa and Asia,
whether Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia or
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Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia. In future,
therefore, the West must show that it has both
the strength and the determination to react
against any further attack on the balance of
forces in the world.
7l. Whether in Afghanistan or Yugoslavia,
Europe cannot hope to make its weight felt in
the settlement of problems unless it has the
means necessary for taking action, which
implies that all the countries of Western Europe
should build up their defence equipment in the
conventional field in accordance with the
NATO decisions and perhaps, also, for France
and the United Kingdom, in the nuclear
field. It should be noted that most members of
the Atlantic Alliance have started, each one in
the manner it considered most appropriate.
72. Today these countries should also definejointly the measures they would take in the
event of an emergency in Yugoslavia in order
to give their military effort the maximum effect
in the political order.
3. Ddtente
73. After the invasion of Afghanistan, certain
western countries expressed the conviction that
this would put a permanent or temporary end
to all the machinery grouped under the heading
of ddtente and they considered breaking off all
negotiations on disarmament, the control of
armaments and security and co-operation in
Europe. while at the same time thinking of
placing strict limits on economic, cultural and
other exchanges with the Soviet Union and its
allies. They believed ddtente to be indivisible
and based on a high degree of mutual
confidence.
74. Conversely, others expressed the convic-
tion that detente was not monolithic and, while
not excluding widespread strengthening of
security and defence measures, it could
continue or even develop in fields not directly
affected by the Afghanistan affair. Their
reasoning was based on several considerations.
First, many aspects of d6tente benefited both
the West and the Soviet Union and, in spite of
everything, helped to give slightly more free-
dom to countries under Soviet rule and to indi-
viduals in the Soviet Union itself. The emer-
gence of a public opinion in the eastern coun-
tries should put a brake on the expansionist
aims of Soviet leaders. It was therefore not for
the West to discourage them. This is particu-
larly so for trade, the West being short of
certain raw materials or energy products and
lacking adequate outlets for its industrial and
agricultural products. To lose the advantages
accruing from the opening of frontiers to the
economies of the western world could but
weaken the West at the present juncture and
might considerably worsen the current crisis.
75. Finally, some feel that the cause of the
invasion of Afghanistan, like many disturbances
throughout the world in recent years, does not
lie solely in Soviet expansionism but also in
what is know as the bloc system. They there-
fore consider that if the crisis stemming from
the invasion of Afghanistan were to lead to a
strengthening of the alliance systems, it would
in the long run generate other, more serious
crises in the future. Consequently they consi-
der it essential at one and the same time to
pursue the West's armaments efforts and to
increase action designed, eventually, to termi-
nate the military blocs.
76. This last consideration cannot be shared
by countries which are still members of NATO
insofar as they consider that only the United
States ensures the security of Western Europe.
This does not necessarily mean that they
endorse the idea that d6tente is ended once and
for all since the invasion of Afghanistan. For
the Western European countries, there are two
main sides to d6tente. not counting armaments
questions. One concerns economic and trade
relations and is mainly dealt with in a bilateral
framework or, for nine-power Europe, in a
Community framework. The other relates to
political problems and is mainly considered in
the multilateral framework of the conference on
security and co-operation in Europe.
(a) The CSCE
77. In autumn 1980, a conference is to be
held to verify the application of the Helsinki
agreements by signatory countries and to
examine what further developments are possi-
ble. The Madrid conference is being prepared
with the greatest care through numerous
meetings of committees, sub-committees, com-
mittees of experts, etc. Neither the Soviet
Union nor the West has so far wished to stop
the work of these bodies. However, there has
been every reason to question the significance
of the conference on security and co-operationin Europe in view of the violations of the
Helsinki agreement represented by the measures
contrary to human rights taken by the Soviet
Union and its allies and the fact that the
guarantees given in respect of states and
frontiers in Europe seem to encourage the
Soviet Union to show even less respect than in
the past for states and frontiers outside Europe,
although the Helsinki final act included a
preamble setting out principles of international
law whose scope was obviously not limited to
Europe.
78. Should we therefore pretend to believe
that Helsinki and its follow-up are likely to
transform international relations or, in any
event, relations between the countries of
Eastern and Western Europe ? Your Rappor-
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teur is inclined to think that, despite the above-
mentioned shortcomings, the pursuit of the
conference on security and co-operation in
Europe is still a positive factor. He thinks that
in a period of tension human rights would be
respected even less by the Soviet Union and
that the margin of independence of its allies
would be narrower than at present. This does
not mean that a blind eye should be turned to
violations of the Helsinki final act but, on the
contrary, they should be denounced and the
Soviet Union warned to mend its ways.
79. All the participating states have expres-
sed their wish to hold the Madrid conference as
agreed in Belgrade. Preparation continues at
multilateral level in the various groups within
the CSCE and at bilateral level. The proceed-
ings and results of the CSCE scientific forum
held in Hamburg show the iniportance of
having a framework. in which the East-West
dialogue may continue.
(b) Economic relations
80. Where economic relations are concerned,
your Rapporteur considers account should be
taken of the possible impact of certain boycott
measures compared with the interest, for the
West and for d6tente, of maintaining and even
developing trade with Eastern Europe. Here a
distinction should be drawn between the case of
Afghanistan proper, that of the Soviet Union
and that of the other communist countries
which have no direct responsibility in events in
Afghanistan and whose a posteriori endorse-
ment of the Soviet undertaking cannot be consi-
dered wholly free and sincere. Moreover,
several of them have shown signs of disappro-
val, as transpired from the communiqu6s issued
after the Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-
Soviet and Bulgarian-Soviet meetings in
January 1980 and from Mr. Gierek's speech to
his party congress on l2th February.
81. Where Afghanistan proper is concerned,
it seems diflicult to envisage any kind of rela-
tions with a government imposed by a foreign
country and kept in power by the presence of
Soviet forces. On the contrary, economic
assistance to countries taking in Afghan refu-
gees is the only possible way of demonstrating a
refusal to bow to a fait accompli. This is the
attitude adopted by the EEC and it seems
unlikely that it will meet with many objections.
82. For the Soviet Union's allies which did
not take part in the invasion of Afghanistan,
the only reason which might justify a restriction
of trade with them is that they would very
probably have to let the Soviet Union benefit
from the advantages accorded to them. This
may lead to certain specific restrictions on
exports of equipment essential for the Soviet
military effort to which all the western coun-
tries should agree. But it is hardly possible to
envisage going further.
83. Where the Soviet Union itself is con-
cerned, the matter is obvior.rrsly far more tricky.
So far, unilateral measures have been taken by
a few countries, particularly the United States,
with regard to a few producfs. Yet the United
States did not wish to brea]k current contracts
but simplyannouncedthatit would not agree to
the conclusion of new contracts for certain pro-
ducts such as wheat and subsequently phos-
phates. The EEC, for its part, decided not to
oflset the American boycott by supphes from
Europe but was against an economic boycott of
its own. Application of this doctrine can but
encounter difliculties of interpretation and
mutual grievances among the western allies if a
code of conduct towards the Soviet Union is
not negotiated and freely accepted by all the
partners. The United States must not expect
the Europeans to subscribe to or ipso facto par-
ticipate in any boycott measure on which it
may decide unilaterally. Such measures must
therefore be worked out and agreed upon in
close consultation.
84. However, past experience indicates that,
generally speaking, such mdasures have only a
very limited practical effect and although it
may be useful to demonstrate symbolically the
West's objection to the inva$ion of Afghanistan,
i.e. by measures designedt to reach public
opinion in the Soviet Union, economic
boycott is not an effective weapon. It gives
rise to as many disadvantagps. if not more, for
those practising it than for the intended victims
and, when a state the size of the Soviet Union
is involved, there is very little chance of such
means making it repent.
4, Control of armaments
85. The invasion of Afghanistan came at the
right time to remind the West of the Soviet
Union's increasing military lead. This might
result in all negotiations on disarmament being
halted to allow the West to make the neces-
sary effort to reinforce its position without
delay.
86. However, so far there is nothing to show
that the Soviet Union has violated its disarm-
ament undertakings and it is probably not in
the West's interest to throw itself headlong into
the armaments race when lt is not even sure
that it will manage to catch up with the Soviet
Union or prevent the Soviet Union from further
increasing its superiority.
(a) SALT
87. Where the control of armaments is
concerned, it should be noted that neither the
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SALT I nor the SALT II agreement places the
West directly in a position of inferiority. The
balance of intercontinental nuclear missiles is
maintained and there is no reason to denounce
the SALT I agreement or to refuse to ratify the
SALT Il agreement other than as a symbolic
gesture to show the West's objection to the
invasion of Afghanistan.
88. The same is not true of the SALT III
negotiations in their present terms. The aim of
SALT III being mainly to limit continental-
range nuclear weapons in Europe, it seems
difficult to reach agreement as long as Soviet
superiority in this field remains at the present
level. It is now no longer possible to accept
the fait accompli of the deployment of SS-20s
unless they are offset by weapons of equivalent
effect.
89. This does not mean that the SALT III
negotiations must not be held but merely that
they may be held only if they seek to achieve
overall parity in this type of weapon, failing
which Europe's very security may be jeopar-
dised.
(b) MBFR
90. The Federal German Government consi-
ders that the overall results of these negotiations
may be considered positive, although nothing
final can yet be expected. Indeed:
- 
The MBFR talks constitute the start of a
multilateral dialogue on security policy
which complements the bilateral negotia-
tions in SALT. Both East and West
have recognised the stabilising effect of
this form of contact and have an interest
in continuing and using it.
- 
NATO has proved itself capable of taking
united action on the basis of a joint concept.
This experience has an integrating effect on
the Alliance.
- 
After the establishment of strategic nuclear
parity, the MBFR offer a means of achieving
controlled parity in conventional weapons
within a limited geographical area.
- 
The MBFR negotiations have made public
opinion more keenly aware of security
matters and the importance of force ratios.
Since the beginning of MBFR, there has
been no unilateral reduction by the western
participants, yet the MBFR have already had
a stabilising effect.
- 
In the past year of negotiations, concepts
have drawn closer, particularly with regard to
the aim of parity. There has also been some
prog,ress towards defining joint collective
ceilings and concentrating on the question
of troop levels with some selectivity
where armaments are concerned.
91. Although concepts have drawn closer,
decisive questions fundamental to the negotia-
tions remain unsolved:
- 
Public disagreement about troop levels in the
East, on the one hand, and views about parity
on the other demonstrate the significance for
security policy of discussing data and defining
the results to be obtained.
- 
Joint collective ceilings are a fundamental
factor which the West cannot give up. They
cannot be associated with questions of
national obligations with regard to the reduc-
tion of forces and the fixing of maximum
levels of forces for direct participants other
than the United States. The West's insist-
ence on a specific limitation on Soviet
troops in the force reduction area is
due to geographical conditions and the
consequences of the MBFR agreements
which are not the same for Soviet for-
ces as for forces of European direct
participants. This requirement implies no
discrimination against the Soviet Union and
must be maintained.
- 
As a consequence of MBFR being limited to
Eastern Europe and the ensuing advanta-
ges for the Soviet Union, the West wishes the
negotiations to be concentrated on reducing
troop levels with only selective reduction of
armaments. The East maintains the princi-
ple of a general limitation of armaments by
all direct participants. For geographical
reasons, this would not be to the advantage of
the western countries where reductions are
concerned.
92. The Federal Government is convinced
that these difficulties can be solved if both sides
are prepared to seek a truly balanced result
which takes account of geographical require-
ments and leaves aside political considerations
unconnected with MBFR. As in the past, it is
determined to contribute to the success of the
MBFR negotiations in agreement with the other
members of the Alliance.
(c) Disarmament
93. It is well known that no worthwhile
results have been achieved so far in disarma-
ment proper and there is little likelihood of
greater progress being made in this period of
tension than was possible when circumstances
were more favourable. Admittedly, the MBFR
negotiations were not broken off with the inva-
sion of Afghanistan, but it is hardly necessary
to underline that there can be no question of a
successful conclusion unless Europe's security is
guaranteed in face of the Warsaw Pact's large-
scale deployment of conventional forces.
94. This is not so for the negotiations being
held in the United Nations following the
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General Assembly's special session on disarma-
ment held in 1978. Here, the discussions are
no longer of a specifically East-West nature but
concern the world as a whole. They have
moreover moved far too slowly for it to be
possible to expect practical conclusions in the
near future. But, faced with the invasion of a
third world country, the United Nations should
pull together bringing about a rapprochement
of the interests of the third world and of the
West since, for all, it is a matter of establishing
an international order in which the direct inter-
vention of a great power to impose a political
r6gime on a smaller power by force would be
absolutely banned.
95. The West has no reason therefore not to
play an active part in encouraging negotiations
likely to achieve this result.
lY. Conclusions
96. At the time of drafting, there can be no
question of other than provisional conclusions.
Nevertheless, your Rapporteur wishes to sub-
mit a few remarks for the Committee to discuss
which, although not conclusive, should allow a
worthwhile comparison to be made of each
member's interpretation of a highly fluid
situation.
97(i) Without claiming to pierce the inner
thoughts of the Soviet leaders, it is not difficult
to see that by entering Afghanistan the Soviet
armed forces came closer to the Indian Ocean,
which may be considered as a first sign of a
possible threat to the main transit route for oil
from the Gulf.
98(,r) The Soviet Union has thus, no less
clearly, violated some of the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying the United Nations Charter
and the final act of the Helsinki conference,
which raises doubts about that country's alleged
wish to give priority to respecting its under-
takings to international society rather than, as
appears to be the case, applying a narrow
concept of national interests or pursuing an
aggressive and triumphant view of the revolu-
tionary vocation which it has allotted to itself.
99(iii) This twofold observation, interpreted in
the light of calculations which may be made as
a result of the sudden deployment of conti-
nental-range missiles on Soviet territory, points
to the conclusion that the West, and parti-
cularly its European element, should pay very
strong attention to the military and particularly
nuclear aspects of its security.
100(iv) Although such considerations may lead
some to make what might be called an " agonis-
ing " reappraisal of everything covered by the
word d6tente, it is most probably not so for
those who perceive, behind this phenomenon,
merely a deliberate choice by all concerned to
Iimit and spell out the range of means which
they might have to use in a confrontation where
the stake has not substantially changed since a
time which may go back as far as the reign of
Peter the Great, the l9l7 revolution or the
Stalin era.
l0l(v) For anyone who holds such views, highly
symbolic measures designed to show, in the
eyes of public opinion in the eastern countries
in particular, the firmest and most widespread
disapproval possible of the Soviet operation in
Afghanistan may be of undeniable value,
although there may be no hope of any far-
reaching change in Soviet policy.
102(vi) The military efforts which are essential if
the West is to be able to meet the challenge to
its security through the deployment of conti-
nental missiles in Europe and the massive
movement of Soviet forces towards the Strait of
Hormuz have quite different aims and are an
urgent necessity.
103(vrr) However useful or essential they may
be, these measures preclude only to a limited
degree the pursuit of negotiations to find a
balance of forces and armaments in Europe at
the lowest possible level.
|}4(viilNor do they preclude the search for a
harmonious development of exchanges of all
kinds between East and West except insofar as
such as a search might be hampered by symbo-
lic measures such as those mentioned in para-
graph (v) above.
105(rx) In any event, it is not for the West to
terminate the efforts made at the Helsinki
conference to improve, however unsatisfac-
torily, the material, moral and intellectual lot of
individuals in the Soviet Union and in the
countries under its hegemony.
106(x) These various considerations seem
appropriate for the establishment of a policy,
provided however that there is sufliciently wide
agreement for them to be acted upon, if notjointly at least in parallel by the member coun-
tries of WEU, the European Community and
NATO and also by countries which, although
claiming to be non-aligned, have as their aims
international order, peace and the freedom of
individuals and peoples, the only basis on
which a peaceful, stable and open international
society may be built.
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Replies of the Coancil to Recommendations 336 to 344
RECOMMENDATION 336 I
on the balance offorce2
The Assembly,
Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely
differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force ;
Believing that the overall East-West economic and military balance is favourable to the West,
but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet
military doctrine of " daring thrusts " against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial threat
by the NATO countries;
Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate diffe-
rences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that there is
some advance towards agreement on the'concepts of parity and common collective ceilings;
Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in
the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on
each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through
improved warning and verification facilities,
Recour'reNos rHAT rup CouNcrr-
Urge member governments :
l. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and
resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment;
2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly'on maintaining military capabi-
lities required for credible deterrence;
3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more
detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on:
(r) the assessment of present force levels in the area;
(ii) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances;
(iii) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better
warning and verification facilities;
4. To examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states
concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing
confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent.
- 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(8th Sitting).
2-. Explanatory Memorand-u-m: see the Report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf ol the Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments (Document 809).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Recommendation 336
L The Council wish to underline member states' awareness that a realistic security policy must
be b.ased on objective assessment of the situation, taking into account all relevant factors possibly
bearing on security. A comparison of the military cipabilities of the East with those of the
Alliance remains a focal element in any assessment of the security situation, and shoulf,continue to
be one.
In the Council's opinion, responsible security policy must avoid the danger of underestimating
the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, in particular at a time when security policy is deter-
mined by the twin policies of maintaining a credible defence posture and at the same time furthering
arms control. The resolve to resist external pressure remains an essential prerequisite for the
pursuit of d6tente.
2. The member countries of WEU remain convinced of the importance of maintaining credible
deterrence which continues to be the fundamental strategic concept of allied defence.
In particular the member countries of the integrated military structure are also convinced that
they should react to any possible aggression according to the doctrine of forward defence and flexible
response. Therefore they undertook, in view of the changing strategic situation in Europe, to contri-
bute their share of the necessary resources for a wide-ranging action programme and to implement
with determination, step by step, the NATO long-term defence plan.
3. The member states involved in the negotiations on mutual and balanced fonce reductions have
re-emphasised their determination to work for a successful outcome which would contribute to a
more stable rplationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.
The countries consider that agreement on the starting size for forces to be reduced is an essen-
tial prerequisite for any reduction. In order to advance the negotiations towards an early result, they
have tabled a proposal in Vienna for a simplified interim phase I agreement which focuses on United
States and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations based on agreed United States-Soviet
data. The manpower withdrawals would be a first agreed step towards reducing the existing dispar-
ity and towards achieving the objective of establishing parity in the form of a common collective
ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on
ground and air force manpower in the area of reductions.
A package of associated measures forming an integral part of that proposal are designed to
promote military stability and confidence, to ensure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement,
and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.
4. At the CSCE follow-up meeting due to be held in Madrid at the end of 1980, member states
will ensure that the balance between all sections of the final act is maintained and will work towards
the adoption, as part of this balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the
aegis of the CSCE on militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, which would
apply to the entire continent of Europe, and should help to create conditions conducive to limitation
and reduction of arms in the same geographical framework.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l2th March 1980.
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RECOMMENDATION 337 I
on political conditions for European armaments co-operation 2
The Assembly,
Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European arrnaments policy held in
Brussels from l5th to lTth October 1979
Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is
likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future;
Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own
security, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons;
Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal
interests in the various member countries;
Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the
Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles
to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee
in accordance with a wish often expressed by the Assembly;
Recalling its Recommendation 335;
Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331
and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330;
Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only European
assembly with defence responsibilities,
REcor*rveros rHAT rHe CouNcrL
l. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the produc-
tion of armaments;
2. Examine, inter alia on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what
means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific
responsibilities of each institution:
(a) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on Euro-
pean supply and demand in the field of armaments;
(b) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall finan-
cial, technical, economic and social repercussions;
(c) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European
states;
(d) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments;
(e) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries;
(fl legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffrc in armaments;
3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to
facilitate this work;
4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommen-
dations 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it under-
took to do in its reply to Recommendation 298.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on
(9th Siuing,).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see
(Document 819).
3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session
the Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
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to Recommendation 337
l. The Council agree that all efforts should be made to promote co-operation in the defence
equipment field and to exploit suitable opportunities in the interests of member countries.
2 (a) All members of WEU contribute, together with the five other members of the group, to the
annual IEPG equipment replacement schedule. By cataloguing replacement intentions for a period
of some fifteen years ahead this provides a comprehensive description of the demand 
.side of the
European armaments market. On the supply side mention should be made of the SAC's continuing
work in this direction and of the studies undertaken in the IEPG Panel III. However, the present
system of armaments co-operation in Europe is a sequential process in which matching national
requirements (demands) are considered against production possibilities (supplies) in participating
countries or elsewhere. " Supply " in this context is a complex matter since substantial development
work and new production invest'ment are required for many modern weapons. The Council do not
consider that the cause of equipment co-operation would in practice be greatly advanced by forma-
lising the collectioil of " supply " information through an international organisation.
2 (b) There are formidable theoretical and practical diffrculties in devising rtethods suitable to
the needs of different governments for analysing choices of international armaments programmes
from even the most comprehensive information. The technical, economic and social issues are very
complex, and the nature of national interests involved do not lend themselves to uniform evaluation.
Collective international analysis of such information, leading to agreed conclusions which are capable
of implementation, is unlikely to be feasible at present. Furthermore, compromises on national
equipment requirements are often necessary to secure agreement in collaborative projects: national
governments alone have to take the decisions. The Council are doubtful of the value of creating
further international machinery to supplement national policy makers' analysis of alternative
methods of meeting equipment needs.
2 (c) No customs duties are payable on the transfer of armaments or any other manufactured
goods between WEU countries, or other EEC states.
2 @ The Council do not believe that specific legislation is required to facilitate the formation of
transnational bodies producing armaments. As the Assembly is aware, several consortia, such as
Euromissile and Panavia, already exist. Moreover, in the Council's view, legislation governing inter-
national bodies producing armaments should not be separated from the general body of national and
EEC company law.
2 (e) The Council do not believe that transfer of technology between industries in member states
of WEU can be significantly improved by legislation. In their view the primary requirement is the
agreement of acceptable transfer terms within specific projects.
2 A Sharing the concern expreSsed by the Assembly, the Council agree that every effort should
continue to be made to halt the illegal trading of arms.
3. The WEU Council are not empowered to make any statement to the Assembly on behalf of the
IEPG, but will continue to encourage appropriate exchanges of information. There are five mem-
bers of the IEPG who are not members of WEU. Formally therefore the making of a report on its
activities to the WEU Assembly is a matter for the Chairman and wider membership
of the IEPG to consider. It is, however, open to members of the Assembly to question their own
governments about developments in the IEPG through their national parliaments.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l2th March 1980
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RECOMMENDATION 338 I
on the definition of armaments requirements
and procurement in Vl/estern Europe2
The Assembly,
Stressing the important r6le it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European
Ievel of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance;
Considering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European arrnaments policy, and in
particular its Working Group I;
Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its success,
RrcourraeNos rHAT rse CouNcrt-
Urge member governments:
l. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European
armaments industry through the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading
eventually to fully European corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence
equipment;
2. (a)To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment
projects duly examined by the IEPG;
(b) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon
exports to third countries can be reduced;
3. (a) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national
and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to
them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by
the Conference of National Armaments Directors;
(b) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on
Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(9th Sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Meintz on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and
Armaments (Document 82 l).
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l. The Council consider that the creation of a number of international conso(ia for the produc-
tion of defence equipment has been a useful contribution to a better organisalion of armaments
co-operation in Europe. In order to preserve the technological know-how and exp{rience in manage-
ment techniques gained by such co-operation when a continuing need is foreseefr, these consortia,
which might be opened to firms from other member countries, should be encduraged to bid for
further co-operative projects and to adopt an appropriate structure; this would not of itself rule out
the possibility of competition. Successful projects, such as the production of the Hot, Milan and
Roland missiles and the Tornado aircraft clearly point the way to this new form of co-
operation. The Council are of the opinion that il in the context of their efforts towards harmonisa-
tion, member countries reach agreement on common requirements, this may stimulate the formation
of such international consortia. Such agreement would provide opportunities for the industries to try
to meet those common requirements by proposals for producing the necessary equipment jointly. It
should nevertheless be left to the industries concerned to organise themselves and to choose the type
of co-operation which best suits their requirements.
Although the Assembly recommendation and the points made in the previous paragraph
primarily concern European armaments industries, the Council observe that this form of co-operation
does not exclude joint production by European and North American firms together,
2(a) As the Assembly is aware, the member states of IEPG already undertook at the meeting of
Armaments Directors in September 1977 to give preference to future collaborative equipment
selected for production in the framework of the IEPG rather than non-European equipment in
competition. The countries represented in the IEPG agreed not to depart from thi$ preference unless
for overriding reasons, particularly performance, price and delivery date.
2(b) The Council are fully aware of the advantages of an Alliance-wide rnarket for defence
equipment. Much work is this respect has already been done. Already in 1975, in this spirit. two
member countries which had developed the Roland weapons system. granted tfle licence for that
system to the United States on favourable terms. Furthermore, the proposals fofwarded to CNAD
by the United States representative constitute in the opinion of the Council a significant step towards
achieving the goal of greater co-operation within the Alliance and a " two-way street " in defence
equipment with the United States insofar as this is consistent with the guidelines recalled in
paragraph 2(a) above. In this respect, it may be recalled that the member countries of the IEPG
have given a favourable reception to the proposals mentioned above, which are designed to bring
about an Alliance-wide co-operation in the defence equipment field through bilateral memoranda of
understanding, dual production of defence equipment and the concept of farrrilies of weapons.
Greater co-operation between the allies and a better division of the production of defence equipment
will indeed reduce the economic importance of exports to third countries, a consideration which
certainly has the sympathy of the Council.
3(a) As stated by the Council in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 333, paragraph A,
national parliamentary defence committees are generally kept informed on national defence budgets.
However, it should be left to the governments of individual member states to decide within the
context of existing national laws and procedures to what extent detailed information can be given
about future national defence equipment requirements. The annual equipment replacement sche-
dules prepared by the IEPG and completed by CNAD, which bring together the equipment require-
ments of the Alliance as a whole, and, as a consequence, contain very sensitive information, are
classified " confidential ", and the Council are not in a position to request memb,er governments to
communicate these documents to national defence committees.
3(b) For the same reasons, the Council see no possibility of requesting the Chaitman of Panel I of
the IEPG to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
of the Assembly. The Council, though fully appreciating the wish of the Assembly to be kept
informed, cannot ignore the difficulties encountered by some countries which are members of the
IEPG, but not of WEU with regard to informing the Assembly or its Committee on Defence
Questions and Armaments about the work undertaken by the IEPG and consequently have to leave it
to the member governments to brief their national delegates on IEPG activities.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980.
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on the industriul bases of European security 
-
guidelines drawn from the symposium on
Isth, 16th and 17th October 19792
The Assembly,
Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European arma-
ments production and procurement;
Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s to agree on a joint concept for a
European battle tank:
Aware of the risk that if discussions on the fluture combat aircraft are too protracted,
European nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible deflence, to buy a ready-made American
aircraft such as the Northrop F-l8L;
Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible techno-
logical decline as a result;
Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missilesl
Aware that in tele-informatics 
- 
telecommunications, computers, advanced components and
data banks 
- 
European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese;
Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments respon-
sibilities.
RecouueNos rHAT rue Courcr
Invite member governments:
l. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chiel lower echelon
commanders, armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to
the Independent European Programme Croup insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic
Alliance :
2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the l990sl
3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s,
to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further
development of the British Harrier;
4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchange-
able components and to promote containerisationl
5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation
by ordering several versions of the same type of missile;
6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint
integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed;
7.. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated
circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems;
8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, parti-
cularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new ones.
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the
(9rh Siuins).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Onslow
Technologrcal and Aerospace Questions (Document 823).
Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session
and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific.
248
DOCUMENT 846
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL'
to Recommendation 339
The Council welcome the interest which the Assembly as the only European assembly with
defence responsibilities, takes in the future of the European industries and of the co-operation -which
must be established between them.
l._- With regard to the framework and form of such co-operation, they consifler that the most
ellective use should be made of existing machinery for concerting measures in the armaments field, in
particular the IEPG and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. This co-operation,
which involves many interests, is a complicated, large-scale undertaking.
2. The Assembly will be aware that, in the spirit of its recommendation, the Frencfr and German
Governments have recently decided to develop jointly a battle tank for the 1990s and that other
countries have expressed interest in this programme.
3. The IEPG is currently examining the problems connected with the future combat aircraft
which is also the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United
Kingdom Governments. The Council share the Assembly's concern that these efforts to co-operate
should produce European successors for the Jaguar, Harrier and Phantom F-4F.
4. The position of the European shipbuilding industries is a matter for concern but this state of
affairs is not confined to Europe. The production of interchangeable components and standardisa-
tion would be very diffrcult in practice, firstly, because warships are not mass-prodqced and secondly,
because they vary considerably in both design and type of service from country to country. In this
particular field individual economic problems add further to the differences between states and supply
and demand vary in the same way.
5. Co-operation on missiles through bilateral programmes or the Euromissile consortium is
already producing very satisfactory results. The expediency of producing several versions of the
same missile must be dictated by the operational requirements of the diflerent arined forces; these
requirements are taken into account, together with a number of constraints, particullarly of a f,rnancial
nature. The necessary choices must therefore be based on the findings of studies on the subject.
6. The Council are aware of the military requirements for joint communications in the flreld of
command and control. On this point, as on the subject of advanced technology, it should be noted
that several member countries of WEU have industries capable of competing with the industries
named by the Assembly in the fields of telecommunications and lasers for example. However, the
Council are not convinced that the standardisation of telecommunications equipment would help, in
the immediate future, to promote the European equipment which they have already declared tb be
necessary. Governments are aware of the importance for the future of the armaments industries of
mastering these techniques in a European context and of what has to be done to achi'eve this.
7. The creation of consortia forms the subject of Recommandation 338 to which the Council have
replied separately.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980.
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on improving the status of WEU staff2
The Assembly,
Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversion-
ary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;
Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to
the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions;
Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set
up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,
RgcorrarraeNos rHAT rrte Couttclt-
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*:
l. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible;
2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-
ordinated organisations;
3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy
and in particular:
- 
to review the structure of grades;
- 
to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;
- 
to study the type and length ofcontracts;
- 
to co-ordinate staff rules;
- 
to review the indemnity for loss of job;
to study methods of transferring an oflicial from one co-ordinated organisation to another;
to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals;
II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU oflicials of all staff vacancies so that they may
take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.
* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council olEurope, ESA.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(l lth Siuing).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and
Administration (Document 824).
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Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied
with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations.
L l and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specihcally to deal with matters
concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be
given the power to take decisions.
As it is, this body which started its operational work on lst January 1980 and was set up with
a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an
advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility
for the uniform application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions.rests with each organi-
sation and its Secretary/Director-General.
Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each Secretary-General and each autono-
mous organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsi-
bilities covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules.
The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and, even more, the
establishmentof a jointbodyfor the administration of pensions as a legal entity could, in the interests
of the staff, only be considered and gone into alter an adequate running-in period - the length of
which cannot be assessed at this stage - and in the light of experience.
Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by the Assembly, the
Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be
premature. In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its l49th
report, recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established
among the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching different
decisions regarding similar cases.
3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but
have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts woqld be qualified to
consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations tflemselves and, in
the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member govefnments.
Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may
emerge from this consultation should be awaited.
In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly
in point I.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular,
of its Secretary-General:
(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems
are still under consideration at the administrative level.
(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding
types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account 'the specific circumstances of
each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to
harmonise these provisions wherever possible.
(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff
rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.
@ The methods of transferring an offrcial from one co-ordinated organisation to another are
governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organi$ations concerned;
as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will
show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules.
II. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary
measures to ensure that all members of staff are informed of vacancies within the organisation. It
should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for
promotion within the organisation, before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and,
finally, to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as
vacancies are filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although
this rule is not applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th May 1980.
251
DOCUMENT 846
RECOMMENDATION 341 I
on the impact of the evolving situation in the
Near and Middle East on Western European security 2
The Assembly,
Considering that the maintenance of peace in the
Europe's security and economic prosperity;
Near and Middle East is essential for Western
Regretting that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, poli-
tical stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and
religious strife and created yet another diflicult refugee problem;
Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has
further delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity;
Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation
of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace;
Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt,
have so far provided no solution to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine
question;
Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer
them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and militate against the underlying
causes of the conflict;
Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein
in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace;
Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only
makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem;
Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a
Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979
General Assembly,
single voice on Middle
in the United Nations
Recot'aueNos rHAT rHe CouNclt-
l. Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its member-
ship in European political co-operation among the Nine, ensure that consultation between its
members is extended to cover matters relating to Afghanistan and Iran ;
2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed
repression continue in that country and call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a
similar moratorium;
3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy;
4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a clari-
fication from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution242;
5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agreement
on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements;
6. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people
and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid
1.. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(l lth Sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see
(Document 820).
the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
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Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip;
7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its
dent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders;
8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all
into question the validity of any such declarations;
9. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote
than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly
dispute.
acceptance of an indepen-
acts of violence, which call
a broaderLbased conference
involved in the Palestinian
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l. The Nine stated their views on Afghanistan on l5th January, 5th February and, through the
chair, on l9th February 1980.
As regards Iran, the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of the Nine stated
their views on 30th November 1979. The ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran have remained in very
active and close consultation since the start ofthe crisis.
2. Also as regards Iran, the Council condemn the taking as hostages of members of the staff of the
United States Embassy in Tehran, contrary to international practice and law, and call urgently on the
Iranian Government to put an end to this situation immediately. They recall that the govern-
ments of member states have supported all moves, both in the United Nations Security Council and
in the European Communities, to secure the immediate and unconditional release of these hostages.
Accordingly, the Council recommend that until such time as the hostages are actually released,
member states should refrain from selling arms to lran, provided this kind of sanction is effectively
applied by the United States Government itself. The Council have no knowledge that member states
are at present delivering armaments to Iran.
In any case, the Council do not intend to express an opinion on the strictly internal aspects of
the Iranian revolution.
3. As regards the Middle East conflict, the Council recall the position adopted by each of the
member states and formulated in agreed terms by the nine countries of the European Community, as
in fact mentioned in Recommendation 341.
The Council agree with the Assembly that a just and lasting peace can be established only on
the basis of a comprehensive settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338 and on :
- 
the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force ;
- 
the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict
of 1967 ;
- 
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries ;
- 
recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the
legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.
The Council recall the terms of the statement issued by the Nine on l8th June 1979 deploring
" any action or statement which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace " and, in parti-
cular, Israel's claim to eventual sovereignty over the occupied territories and its policy of establishing
settlements.
They consider that all the parties involved should be called on to participate in working out
and implementing such a settlement, and in particular the Palestinian people who, as the Chairman
of the Nine declared at the last General Assembly of the United Nations, " are entitled within the
framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their future as a people "
and, through their representatives, to play their full part in the negotiations.
The Council note that the member states are determined to continue their efforts to further the
search for an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980.
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on the situation in lran2
The Assembly,
Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes
an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of
peace;
Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United
States in the emergency thus created;
Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in
Iran could entail for European security;
Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in the
framework of tne European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning the
situation in Iran,
ReconaueNos ro rHE CouNctt-
l. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's
support for the European Council's declaration;
2. That the consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or,
where more alpropriate, through the participation of its members in European political co-operation
among the Nine to determine action on this problem.
l. Aclopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty.Fifth Ordinary Session(l2th Sittins).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the draft recommendation tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the General Affairs
Committee (Document 830).
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As the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Thorn, stated when addressing the Assembly on 5th December
1979, the Council lully appreciate the concern expressed by the Assembly regarding the situation in
Iran.
The Council have drawn the attention of member governments of WEU to the support given by
the Assembly to the declaration adopted by the European Council at its meeting held in Oublin on
29th and 30th November 1979. They note, further, that a resolution was unanimously adopted by
the United Nations Security Council on 4th December 1979,and has the full support oiall member
states of WEU.
For the future, member states will continue their consultations in any appropriate frameworks.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th December 1979.
2s6
DOCUMENT 846
RECOMMENDATION 343 
'
on Arctic technology 2
The Assembly,
Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in examining the use of the earth's
natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economic and ecological implica-
tions;
Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have
been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions;
Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field
compared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start and
wide experience of polar technology in the past;
Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and the
United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and would
welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity between
the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries;
Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have
gained vast experience ofvarious aspects ofoffshore technology;
Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for
ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member
countries;
Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its possible conclusion in
the early 1980s,
RecouueNos rHAT tnn CouNcrr-
l. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of
collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology;
2. Invite member governments:
(a) to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions;
(b) To welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation o[ Antartic marine
living resources;
(c) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antartic Treaty is not changed,
distorted of prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving
an important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area ;
(d) to adopt a common position at meetings of Antartic Treaty member statcs dealing
with the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources.
-l.4goPted by the Assembly on 5th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(l3th Siuing).
_ 
2. ElPlanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Biillesheim on behalf of the Committee onScientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 822).
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l. The Council, who have carefully considered this recommendation, welcome the constructive
manner in which it draws attention to the opportunities for economic activity in both polar regions
and supports the Antarctic Treaty system as well as the work of member governments who partici-
pate in the Antarctic Treaty.
2. The Assembly will be aware that in many ways the Arctic and Antarctic are the antithesis of
one another. Geographically the Arctic is an ocean, covered for the most part with pack ice about
two metres thick, practically surrounded by continental land masses, large areas of which are subject
to seasonally severe Arctic environmental conditions. The Antarctic is a continent, all but 5 0/o of
which is covered by a continental ice sheet up to four kilometres in thickness, entirely surrounded by
a vast ocean, large areas of which are encumbered with icebergs and seasonally fluctuating sea ice.
3. The pace and direction of economic developments in the Arctic, both on shore and within the
maritime jurisdiction of the Arctic Ocean littoral states, is very much a matter for the individual
states to decide subject of course to the provisions of existing treaties, such as the Spitzbergen Treaty,
which have special bearing on some parts of the area. The Council are aware that developments in
the Arctic Ocean, particularly those related to oil exploitation, could have environmental effects of
consequence far beyond the borders of the Arctic and express the hope that this consideration will be
constantly borne in mind in reaching decisions about such developments. Nevertheless, the member
governments will bear in mind that future developments in the Arctic may well be such as would
indicate the desirability of closer collaboration both between themselves and between them and the
Arctic littoral states.
4. In the Antarctic some member governments take the view that economic developments are
subject to the same underlying considerations as in the Arctic ; other member governments do not
agree with this view. This difference of view did not prevent three member governments (of
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom) from participating in the initiative which led to the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The treaty, which was the first to denuclearise a specific region, has not
only maintained the peace in the area but has also nurtured scientific research of importance to the
whole world and taken initiatives such as the agreed measures for the conservation of Antarctic fauna
and flora and the convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals which have ensured that poten-
tial threats to parts of the Antarctic ecosystem were dealt with before they became real. In this
connection the Council are glad to note the Assembly's welcome and support for the draft convention
for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources which it is hoped will ensure the conser-
vation of the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole in a manner acceptable to all member coun-
tries of the organisation. This convention aims at the conservation of the living resources of the
Antarctic in a manner which is in accord with the world conservation strategy recently communi-
cated to governments by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources.
5. In relation to non-living resources, the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty are engaged
in exploratory discussions of arrangements under which it might be possible for Antarctic minerals to
be exploited (if any in commercial quantity are found) in a manner consistent with the care which
these states have extended to the Antarctic environment. The Council are aware that the exploitation
of non-living resources in the Antarctic could have consequences both in the Antarctic ecosystem and
far beyond it and thus is a matter of concern also to states other than the consultative parties to the
Antarctic Treaty.
6. In the Council's opinion, there should be no conflict between a future law of the sea conven-
tion and the Antarctic Treaty system. Indeed, Article VI of the treaty, which specifies that its
provisions apply to the area south of 60" south latitude stipulates that " nothing in the present treaty
shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state under inter-
national law with regard to the high seas within the area ". Consequently, if the law of the Sea
Conference reaches an agreement setting up an international authority for the exploitation of the
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th May 1980.
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seabed, the sphere of competence of that authority will, by virtue of the provisions of the Antarctic
Treaty itsell include the seabed to the south of the 60th parallel lying beyond the outer limit of the
continental shelf. None of the provisions of the " unoflicial negotiating text " on which the work of
the conference is based refers to the Antarctic.
7 . The member governments who are also consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, have
shown their practical willingness to adopt positions which have given rise to a unique set of recom-
mendations on matters of common concern to them in the Antarctic.
259
DOCUMENT 846
RECOMMENDATION 344 
'
on Brazilian- European co llaborative yenta res
and the conseqaences for Europe2
The Assembly,
Considering the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officials to
strengthen scientiflrc and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western
Europe;
Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology can but be beneficial
for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to advance their political and
economic positions;
Aware that in recent years Brazil has advanced more quickly than some Western European
countries in f,rnding alternative energy resources;
Impressed by thE progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology
ancl communications;
Conscious of the mutual advantages of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in:
(a) nuclear research and development;
(b) alternative energy resources;
(c) space research and development;($ aircraft development,
RecopttrleNos rHAT rue CouNcrt-
Invite member governments:
l. To improve European co-ordination.in respect of existing nuclear research and development
programmes in Brazil, with special emphasis on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and on security and safety problems;
2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources;
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to
conc.luding a co-operation agree-ment with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking
facilities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites;
4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of aircraft;
5. To increase exchanges of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of
technology.
.. !..AgoPted by the Assembly on 6th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session(l4th Siuing).
^2. Explanatory.Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Schefller and Cornelissen on behalf of thecommittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace euestions (Document gl7).
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DOCUMENT 846
REPLY OF THE COUNCILI
to Recommendation 344
The Council consider that economic, scientific and technical co-operation between Brazil and
the member countries of Western European Union should be developed, with the additional purpose
of strengthening the political links between Europe and Latin America.
l. In the matter of scientihc collaboration between Europe and Brazil on nuclear research and
development, the member countries of WEU have always attached particular importance to the
conduct of all international co-operation under effective safeguards against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and appropriate levels of physical protection and standards of safety. Regardless of
whether they are parties to the non-proliferation treaty or not the member countries of WEU accept
IAEA (and where appropriate Euratom) safeguards, and almost all of them have unilaterally under-
taken to base their policies on the guidelines agreed between the principal nuclear exporting countries
circulated in the IAEA document INFCIRC/254. These considerations are already being scrupu-
lously observed by those member countries of WEU which are already co-operating with Brazil in the
development of her nuclear energy programme. They will in future be followep by other member
countries which may collaborate with her for exclusively peaceful and non-explosive purposes on a
non-discriminatory basis.
2. In view of the notable progress achieved by Brazil with alternative energy resources, the
Council are of the opinion that co-operation with Brazil in the field should be increased. Some
specific developments such as the Brazilian " gasohol " project are of immediate interest to Europe
and are being followed with the closest attention.
3. The European Space Agency should strengthen collaboration with Brazil with a view to estab-
lishing patterns of co-operation and further exchanges of information between European countries
and Brazil on thb use of the most advanced space technologies including telecommunications and
remote sensing technology.
4. As regards industrial collaboration in the aircraft sector, the Council believe that there are
many interesting prospects in this direction. The Brazilian state aircraft corporation 
- 
Empresa
Brasileira de Aeronautica SA (EMBRAER) 
- 
has in recent years increased its putput considerably
and is seeking co-operation with the European countries with a view to improvlng the next genera-
tion of civilian and military aircraft. The long-established co-operation between the Brazilian
industry and the aircraft industries of the WEU countries offers considerablo scope for further
development.
5. Finally the Council believe that relations in the flreld of research and the application of techno-
logy should be strengthened, so that increasingly prohtable exchanges of experts and transfers of tech-
nical knowledge between the two geographical areas can be developed.
L Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980.
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Document 847 4th June 1980
The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands
PREVIOUS QUESTTON,
moved by Mr. Boucheny and others
under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure
The Assembly,
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty commits it to respect the ideals proclaimed in the
Charter of the United Nations and particularly the sovereignty and independence of the nations it
representsi
Deploring that one of the aims of the report presented by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Commit-
tee on Defence Questions and Armaments is to bring French naval forces back into the NATO inte-
grated command, at the same time increasing West German naval intervention capabilities;
Recalling that in 1966 the Government of the French Republic took the sovereign decision to
resume full control of its military means,
Condemning any attempt to question the freedom of action and of decision of the European
states;
Emphasising that the report by Mr. Ahrens might call in question the special status of Norway
and Denmark in respect of the holding and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and seeks to constitute,
under the aegis of the United States, a European military bloc directed against the Soviet Union,
DecroEs that there are no grounds for debating the draft recommendation on the northern flank
and the Atlantic and Channel commands.
Signed: Bouchenv, Depietri, Visse, Deschamps, Wargnies
l. See 6th Sitting,4th June 1980 (Previous question negatived).
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